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1.1. Overview to the Research 
 
When in the 360s a fragmented groups of nomads, the Huns, arrived in the vicinity of the Dniester 
and Dniepr Rivers, areas occupied by nomadic Alans and sedentary Goths, stories of their 
expansion came to the ears of the Romans. The Roman world duly recorded these events. Greco-
Roman authors structured their accounts of the Huns on the basis of the knowledge they had of 
earlier nomads in the area. The accounts were general and stressed images of barely human pastoral 
nomads whose way of life was crucially different from that of the sedentary Romans. The stories 
gave the impression of a clash between sedentarists and nomads, and fears about forthcoming 
contacts with the Huns were increased by the fact that raids were known to be part of the nomadic 
way of life.  
When a band of Huns approached the vicinity of the Roman borders during the 370s, contacts 
between them and the Romans became a reality. Even though the Huns made raids on their own and 
with other barbarian groups in areas of the Roman Empire, contacts with the Romans were not only 
hostile, for trade also brought Huns and Romans together. The Romans, moreover, were interested 
in hiring Huns as mercenaries for their army. This was the start of friendly connections between the 
two. However, the Romans’ contacts with certain groups of Huns did not tie other Huns, and hence 
fragmented groups of Huns could temporarily ally themselves with whomever they pleased. While 
this caused problems for the Romans in controlling the Huns on a larger scale, it also led the 
Romans to seek connections with the Huns. When the contacts between the Huns and the Romans 
increased, contemporary authors became more interested in writing about the Huns. At the same 
time the nature of the accounts changed. Contemporary authors preferred first to tell about the 
official contacts between the Huns and the Romans than create fascinating images of the Huns as 
wild barbarians. 
The kind of relationships that existed between the Huns and the Romans, and how the contacts with 
the Romans affected leadership positions among the Huns and the overall unity of the groups of 
nomads are the main questions in my research. In addition, I discuss whether the connections with 
the Romans led to rise of a Hun empire along with administration, even an “inchoate early state” or 
a “supercomplex chiefdom” as I prefer to call the phenomenon.1 For this reason my study is 
                                                 
1 Khazanov 1984, 295, 228; cf. Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, 11, 13-14; Kradin 2008, 107-112. There is an ongoing 
debate, whether one can speak about state in the case of nomads. According to Khazanov, the use of the terms “nomadic 
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strongly connected not only to Roman, but also to nomadic studies, and I participate to the 
discussion of the social evolution among nomads. 
I evaluate the situation among the groups of Huns and their contacts with the Romans mainly during 
the 360s to the 460s.  The reason for this is that during the 360s fragmented groups of Eurasian 
pastoral nomads, whom Late Roman authors started to call Huns, arrived in areas occupied by 
nomadic groups of Alans near the Don river. After the clash between the Huns and the Alans, they 
made an alliance and moved further west. Some of the Huns reached the borders of the Roman 
Empire during the 390s, but another wave of Huns began to settle in the vicinity of the northern 
parts of the Black Sea and between the lower Danubian basin, the Great Hungarian plain and the 
Carpathians in the beginning of the 420s. This intensified contacts between the groups of Huns and 
both halves of the Roman Empire. During the 420s and the 430s, groups of Huns and other 
barbarians started to form a larger confederation in order to raid, and to benefit from the contacts 
with, the Roman Empire. This is regarded as the time of the rise of the Hunnic Empire. The 
confederation was led by the Hun brothers Rua and Octar in the 430s and after them their nephews 
Bleda and Attila in the 440s. After Bleda’s death in 443, Attila was the sole head of the 
confederation of Huns and led many attacks against the Romans. The attacks and peace treaties with 
the Romans increased wealth among the Huns and this is claimed to have generated a 
transformation from the Huns’ nomadic way of life to a partial adoption of sedentarism along with 
the leadership position becoming hereditary and autocratic in nature. It is also argued that at the 
same time a leading stratum evolved or strengthened among the Huns and its members started to 
form an active administration.2 During the last years of Attila’s leadership the battles against the 
Romans turned into defeats and this caused the confederation to fall apart after Attila’s death in 
453. Subsequently, the Huns fragmented once again into many independent groups,3 and 
connections between the Romans and the Huns became very scarce. At the same time written 






                                                                                                                                                                  
state” and “nomadic statehood” is vague. Bondarenko, Korotayev and Kradin, for their part, suggest that it would be better 
to use a term that is self-explanatory, and hence they suggest a title “supercomplex chiefdom”. See Chapter 9. 
2 Kelly 2008, 54, 228; Heather 2006, 325-328; Thompson (1999) 2000, 67, 177, 181-183, 189; Schreiber 1976, 42; Bona 1991, 
62, 71-72, 207. 
3 Schmauder 2009, 161. 
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1.2. Previous Research 
 
One of the most influential voices in studies on the Huns is Edward Gibbon. The reason for this is 
his claim in The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Volume 4, “The End of the 
Western Empire”, that the Huns provided the final impetus for the downfall of the Roman Empire, 
and since Gibbon the Huns have been studied fundamentally from this perspective and in 
connection with Roman history. Generally speaking, Gibbon’s idea of the Huns as the trigger for 
the migration of barbarians towards the Roman Empire in the 4th century has prevailed as one of the 
most debated questions in early historical research. Moreover, a long-lasting interest has been to 
study the kind of impact the Huns made on the political and military situation in the Western and 
the Eastern parts of the Roman Empire.  
Both topics are studied by Peter Heather in Decline of the Roman Empire (2005) and also in relation 
to his studies about Goths in The Goths (1998). Like Heather Walter Pohl has also discussed the 
Huns’ impact on other barbarian groups, especially on the formation of new units and their identity 
in Die Wölkenwanderung – Eroberung und Integration (2005). The topic is also discussed in many 
articles which concern the archaeological material connected to the Huns, such as Michael 
Kazanski’s “The Sedentary Elite in the ‘Empire’ of the Huns and its Impact on the Material 
Civilisation in Southern Russia during the Early Middle Ages” (1993). In general, archaeological 
material connected to the Huns is considered from the point of view of cultural connections 
between the Huns and other groups. This is the case e.g. with Joachim Werner’s Beiträge zur 
Archäologie des Attilareiches (1956) and in such works as Attila und die Hunnen (2007) edited by 
Bodo anke and Alexander Koch and Hunnen zwischen Asien und Europa (2008) edited by lexander 
Bodo Anke, Heike Externbrink, Melanie Herget, which include collections of articles related to 
archaeological exhibitions on the Huns. 
Contemporary authors’ descriptions of the Huns form another primary source material along with 
archaeological finds. R. C. Blockley’s work The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later 
Roman Empire. Eunapius, Olympiodorus, Priscus and Malchus is a collection of fragments from 
four Late Roman contemporary authors who have also mentioned Huns in their works. Blockley’s 
collection of the extant fragments is a crucial source for studying the Huns. It provides background 
information on the named contemporary author’s and their texts, helping us to appreciate more fully 
the descriptions they give of the Huns.  
In general, there are many overall studies on the Huns that also touch some specific issues, e.g. 
Timo Stickler’s Die Hunnen (2007) includes an exceptionally wide study of the supposed 
forefathers and wanderings of the groups of Huns from the first centuries BC to the third century 
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AD. By contrast Gerhard Wirth has in Attila. Das Hunnenreich und Europa (1999) as well as 
Christopher Kelly in Attila the Hun (2008) pay particular attention to Roman policy making with 
the Huns, and its influence on strengthening leadership positions among the Huns. Michael 
Schmauder’s Die Hunnen. Ein Reitervolk in Europa (2009) focuses on the Huns’ nomadic 
background and its influence on the actions taken by them. Still the most profound research of the 
Huns in general is Otto J. Maenchen-Helfen’s The World of the Huns (1973). It includes in-depth 
research on many specific topics such as the background and languages used among the groups of 
Huns. However, some parts of Maenchen-Helfen’s work remained unfinished at the time of his 
death, and hence it is difficult to be sure about the author’s final claims. This is especially true of 
his views on the position of Hun leaders. The same is also the case for Edward A. Thompson’s 
work The Huns which was revised by Peter Heather (1999). Thompson died during the rewriting of 
this work, originally published as A History of Attila and the Huns (1948). The work from 1948, 
however, helps to follow Thompson’s slightly changed views about the rise of the Hunnic Empire 
and the strengthening position of the Hun leaders, which are author’s main interest in both of the 
studies.  
Gyla László and János Harmatta have also concentrated on studying the possible changes in the 
leadership position and society of the Huns. By contrast with other studies, they consider the 
changes from a nomadic studies point of view. Accordingly, László in “The Significance of the Hun 
Golden Bow” (1951) and Harmatta in “The Golden Bow of the Huns” (1951) and “The Dissolution 
of the Hun Empire” (1952) conclude that Hun society evolved into feudalism at the latest during the 
440s. 
Especially Nikolay N. Kradin’s “Early State Theory and the Evolution of Pastoral Nomads” (2008) 
and Anatoly Khazanov’s Nomads and the Outside World (1984) which both include a thorough 
study of the possibilities of nomadic states rising are of great use when discussing the nature of the 
alleged ‘Hun Empire’ or inchoate early state or supercomplex chiefdoms. In this task studies of 
nomads and their ways of forming group compositions as chiefdoms and confederations of tribes 
are also crucial. A general overview of the issue is given by e.g. Thomas J. Barfield’s The Nomadic 
Alternative (1993). The rise of nomadic empires and states is indisputably connected to nomads’ 
contacts with sedentary societies and empires, and hence Roger Batty’s Rome and the Nomads 
(2007) gives a good basis for evaluating the situation of the Huns from both the nomadic and the 
Roman perspective. 
The Roman viewpoint on the Huns in particular, and on the nomads in general is revealed through 
the writings of  Greco-Roman authors. In order to evaluate the authors’ accounts of the Huns, 
Benjamin Isaac’s The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (2004) is helpful here in offering 
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an in-depth study of Roman ways of writing about groups that were considered non-Roman, or so-
called “others”. The generally created images of nomads in antiquity are carefully explained in 
articles in Der imaginierte Nomade edited by Alexander Weiss (2007), as well as in Brent D. 
Shaw’s useful article “Eaters of Flesh, Drinkers of Milk” (1995). A profound overview of the 
methodology of image research and the concept of otherness in research into antiquity is given by 
Erich S. Grüen in Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (2010), and in Jonathan Z. Smith’s “Differential 
Equations on Constructing the Other” (2004) and “Close Encounters of Diverse Kinds” (2004). 
Also Looking at the Other: Historical Study of images in Theory and Practice edited by Olavi Fält, 
Kai Alenius, Saija Jalagin (2002) shows in many cases studies how the methodology of image 
research and the concept of the “other” work as methodological tools. 
 
 
1.3. The Aim of the Research 
 
The aspects that caused the rise of the so-called Hunnic Empire and how the Hun leaders 
strengthened their leadership position to reach a supposedly king-like status during the first half of 
the fifth century are the most studied topics in studies on the Huns. These topics also form the core 
of my research, though I challenge the exaggerated claims of Hun kings and Hunnic Empire. In 
addition, the aim of my research is to suggest that we should name the Hun leaders military leaders 
and consider the largest unity of the groups of Huns during the 440s a supercomplex chiefdom. I 
also stress, in contrast to the general claims, that the groups of Huns did not give up their nomadic 
way of life at any stage when they dwelled in regions next to the Roman lower-Danubian borders 
from the last decades of the fourth century to the beginning of the sixth century. My research 
includes five topics that support my main claims and the crux of my study, namely that the Huns’ 
contacts with the Roman world caused a supercomplex chiefdom to rise among the united groups of 
Huns which strengthened the position of Hun military leaders. 
Because written material on the Huns is fundamentally based on the Late Roman authors’ 
descriptions of the Huns, I have first of all studied the degree to which learned ways and 
expectations of storytelling about nomads, barbarians, and people living at different points of the 
compass in antiquity influenced Late Roman authors’ stories about the Huns. This is done in order 
to consider whether these descriptions merely tell about the authors’ goals of showing their ability 
to write fluently and foster their own political goals in the accounts of the Huns rather than 
providing exact information about the Huns. This gives a basis to evaluate what kind of leadership 
position contemporary authors were referring to when they called the Hun leaders rex and basileus. 
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I show that literary conventions fundamentally affected Greco-Roman authors’ accounts of the 
Huns, and that rex and basileus were only common terms used by Greco-Roman authors to name 
barbarian leader. Therefore, I propose that the Huns’ Eurasian pastoralists’ nomadic way of life is 
the starting point in order to evaluate the activities of the Huns. This forms the basis for the second 
theme of my research. My second theme is to point out that the Huns’ nomadic way of life casts 
doubt on the claim that the Huns’ dominated local barbarian groups when the Huns dwelled in the 
vicinity of the Carpathians and the lower Danube during the first half of the fifth century. Because 
nomads in general favour temporary alliances, I discuss the possibility of a confederation between 
the groups of Huns and local barbarians that pleased all parties. My aim is to show that 
archaeological material also supports this view, and suggests that Germanic groups would have 
been interested in joining with groups of Huns, especially when participating in raids in the Roman 
regions. In addition, I demonstrate that the idea of Huns’ domination over local barbarian groups, 
e.g. the Goths near the Black Sea, is based on a misinterpretation of contemporary authors’ accounts 
of the Huns: the stories of the contemporary authors are believed as such, although authors stress 
the common claims that acts of these nomads can only cause misery; I argue that the activities of 
the Huns support the claim that activities between sedentarists and nomads can also please both. My 
deduction of the co-operation between the Huns and local barbarian groups strengthens the 
evaluation that the arrival of the Huns contributed to the formation of smaller Germanic groups into 
specific and independent units. This is striking because it suggests the likelyhood of Germanic 
groups making futher allainces during the sixth century onwards. 
The third theme of my research stresses that because nomads favour temporary alliances, the only 
leadership position that can reach acceptance on a large scale among the groups is a position of 
supreme military leadership for temporary military activity. In addition, my aim is to show that 
even if military activity increases and becomes more long-lasting, as was the case with groups of 
Huns during the first half of the fifth century, and the position of the supreme military leadership 
might become more long-lasting, this does not change the basis for the position: the crux remains 
others’ acceptance of it according to their needs. Therefore, I challenge the view that the position of 
Hun leaders at the head of a large number of groups of Huns and local barbarians who formed large 
troops for raiding especially during the 440s would indicate that the position of Hun military leaders 
had changed so much that they would have had a similar power position to kings among 
sedentarists. I argue that we should call Hun leaders, who Roman authors refer to as rex and 
basileus, by the title of “supreme military leader” rather than “king”, “monarch” or “autocrat”, 
which has been commonly done so far. Calling Hun leaders “supreme military leader” emphasizes 
the nomadic nature of the leadership position, and does not give a misleading image of the basis of 
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the position and the unity of the groups that the leadership position is connected with. My claim 
opens a new and necessary discussion on ways of referring to nomad leaders in history which does 
not ignore the nomadic background of their position and the society. Rather it stresses the 
possibilities and nature of power which existed among nomads. My fourth goal is to challenge the 
common views that Huns’ nomadic way of life became transformed at least partially into a 
sedentary way of life and the Huns formed an empire or state similar to sedentary societies, which 
might even be called feudal state. In my study I show that the Eurasian pastoralists’ nomadic way of 
life provided the possibility of forming larger and mightier unity, which can be called a 
supercomplex chiefdom. I investigate whether this rather than an empire or state was formed among 
the groups of Huns during the 440s when they created their largest unity and caused the most severe 
threat to the Roman Empire. I also wish to challenge previous ways of seeing nomadic way of life 
and to investigate adoptions to a sedentary way of life and power structures. My study emphasizes 
that the activities of the Huns support groups of nomads might form a larger unity with a leader at 
the head of temporarily united groups. This provides a case study to consider the possibilities of 
social evolution among nomads. 
Finally I study the actions of groups of Huns during the fourth and fifth centuries and the 
relationship between the Huns and the Romans. I consider to what extent the Romans affected the 
course of events and the leadership positions among the Huns. This is important in order to consider 
the general claim that strengthening the position of nomad leaders and the unity between groups, 
including the rise of hierarchical structures and the so-called nomadic state, or what I call the 
phenomenon of supercomplex chiefdom, are fundamentally connected to contacts with the outside 
world, for changes always require external input.  
 
 
1.4. The Methodology 
 
Archaeological, but no written sources were left by the Huns. The only text material that elucidates 
the situation between the Huns and the Romans is written by Greco-Roman authors from the last 
decades of the fourth century to the first decades of the sixth century. Thus the perspective is purely 
Greco-Roman, showing how the educated Greco-Roman elite described the nomadic newcomers 
and the Romans’ actions with them.4  Given this the Greco-Roman point of view in the accounts of 
                                                 
4 By Roman authors I mean contemporary Greco-Roman authors who wrote accounts about the Roman world and about 
regions that belonged to the Roman Empire.  
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the Huns, I use two different kinds of methodology in order to understand what the Huns more 
fully. 
First, I use the concept of “otherness” and a methodology related to imagological research in order 
to evaluate the Late-Roman authors’ accounts of the Huns. 
The crux in imagological research is that written sources do not so much tell about the object, but 
rather the views of the writer of the texts. They show how the writer wants to present the object. In 
other words, sources merely inform us about the image of the object. As Marika Rauhala 
summarizes, images may be called “conceptions”, “views”, or “attitudes”; an “image can be 
regarded as a subjective and simplified model through which an individual perceives the 
surrounding world”.5 
Thus descriptions of the Huns primarily tell about the author’s views on the Huns, or how they want 
to present nomads in general. Even though it is a question of individual perception, still, as Fält 
notes, an image also reflects the ideas of the surrounding community. If this were not the case, the 
author might well not to be able to claim the ideas because his arguments would not be believed by 
the audience, or there would be no surrounding context to validate them.6 Images do not only tell 
the individual’s own views about the target, they also reflect the overall ideas of the surrounding 
society. Therefore, we might conclude that in the case of Greco-Roman authors’ accounts of the 
Huns, there is the question of a sedentary society’s way of perceiving and depicting nomads. 
Moreover, the leadership position among the Huns is described in terms of Roman society.7 
The view that accounts tell more about the writer’s perceptions of the target than the target itself 
also holds for the methodological concept of otherness. 
The basis for the concept of otherness is that when one defines him/herself, it is done via a 
polarization of what I am and what I am not, or what I want to be or do not want to be.8 In order to 
make the definition simple the concept of “the other” is used. The other is claimed to have different 
features to “I” and “us” which are often, but not explicitly, those which the storyteller considers 
unwanted in comparison to the features attached to him/herself or his/her own society.9 Especially 
when there is a need to speak on behalf of one’s own existence, e.g. times of crises and conflict, the 
concept of other is generally favoured.10 In brief, the other is claimed to have the opposite features 
of those common to the storyteller, hence the other is also emphasized as a threat. Stories about 
opponents do not then tell so much about the object, but the values that the storyteller considers 
                                                 
5 Rauhala 2012, 11-12; Fält 2002, 9-10; Oktas 2002, 199-202, passim 208, 210. 
6 Fält 2002, 8, 10; Oktas 2002, 206, 210. 
7 Kradin, Skrynnikova 2009, 120; Green 1985, passim. 50-51. 
8 Smith 2004 a, 230-232, 237. 
9 Smith 2004 a, 232, 237. 
10 Smith 2004 a, 233; Fält 2002, passim 8-9; Oktas 2002, 205. 
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important. Greco-Roman authors for example generally claimed that non-Romans, such as 
barbarians, were untrustworthy. When Greco-Roman authors wrote about nomads, who were 
considered barbarians, the differences in the nomadic and the sedentary way of life were stressed. 
Moreover, because the nomadic way of life was considered a threat to the sedentarists’ existence, 
accounts of nomads generally included images of terrible brutes or insane animals to whom 
everything common to Romans was unknown, or differed in a decisive manner. This is also the case 
in the accounts of the Huns.11 
For this reason if we wish to evaluate what might have been the situation among the Huns in any 
particular event, the overall situation should be dissected from the basis of a nomadic way of life. 
Therefore, the second methodological point of view which I use in my research, comes from 
nomadic studies and especially from the concepts of social evolution among nomads and the 
possible rise of an “inchoate early state of nomads” or “supercomplex chiefdom”.12 
Because there are many different kinds of forms of nomadism and nomadic ways of life,13 it is 
important to define what kinds of nomads the groups of Huns may have been. Although the Huns 
were not a homogeneous unit but fragmented groups who arrived in many waves to the borders of 
the Roman Empire and the Black Sea Region between the 370s and the 410s, still their arrival from 
the Eurasian steppe gives a basic knowledge of the kind of nomadic way of life they lived. It also 
explains what kind of society the groups could form and what kind of leadership positions were 
common and could evolve among them.14 While the nomads on the Eurasian steppe have herded the 
same areas and favoured similar ways of raising animals for centuries, still the decision and actions 
that the nomadic groups and units have made have varied a great deal. Therefore, straightforward 
comparison between the groups, e.g. how they are expected to act in certain situation must be made 
cautiously. The basis for understanding the actions of the Huns is that the Huns were expansive, 
scattered groups of horse raising pastoral nomads from the Eurasian steppe who also took part in 
traiding and raids.15 
                                                 
11 Shaw 1995, 6, 8, 12-13, 24-26; Isaac 2004, passim. 503, 505, 506; Weiss 2007, passim. 7-10; Timpe 2000, 206. According 
to Isaac accounts of barbarians which emphasize their image as inferior to Romans can be taken as a sign of racist views and 
thinking. Whether one agrees with this interpretation or not is a matter of taste, but there is more general agreement on 
Weiss’s point that the images created of barbarians, especially nomads, altered during antiquity, though some elements 
remained the same. In any case, the crux is that the images created of nomads or barbarians in general emphasized ideas 
which were important for the holders of those images. 
12 Khazanov 1984, 295. In addition I follow the view of N. N. Kradin (e.g. “Nomadism, Evolution and World-systems: 
Pastoral Societies in Theories of Historical Development”, 2002) and S. A. Vasjutin (“Typology of Pre-states and Statehood 
Systems of Nomads”, 2003). 
13 Khazanov 1984, 15, 19 21, 33; Batty 2007, 141-142, 148-149. 
14 Barfield 1993, passim. 1-15. 
15 Priscus fr.2, fr. 10, passim. fr. 11.1., fr.14, fr. 15.4., fr. 49, fr.46 in Blockley 1983, 226-227, 240-243, 292-293, 298-299, 352-
353, 356-357; Socrates Scholasticus, Hist. ecc., VII, 30; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 82; Ammianus, RG, 31.2.17, 31.2.21; 
Jordanes, Getica, passim XXIV, 123-126; Procopius, De bell., III, 1- 6; Matthews 1989, 321, 341, 353, 376, 380; Kradin 
2005 b, 82; Kradin 2005 a, 157.  
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While the specific kind of nomadic background of the Huns helps one to consider what kind of 
leadership position would be possible among them, the views related to the nature of the leadership, 
and the formation of an empire and state or a complex chiefdom among nomads are much debated 
especially because the topic touches on the theme of social evolution.16  
Even though social evolution among the pastoral nomads has not been studied in great depth, still 
the discussion has gone through several stages, in which where different kinds of views and 
methodologies have evolved. Especially in the 1930s the so-called theory of “nomadic-feudalism” 
became highly popular and introduced different emphases, but in the end only a simplified 
understanding of steppe feudalism prevailed. However, during the 1950s new interpretations of 
nomadic feudalism became popular, emphasizing livestock as the main means of production. The 
view was developed further and Bondarenko, Korotayev and Kradin explicitly list four overall 
points of view that became prevalent: the concept of a pre-class nomadic society;17 the concept of 
an early state of nomads;18 different feudal interpretations of nomadism;19 and the concept of 
nomadic modes of production.20 However, nowadays most attention is paid to substantiating 
specific modes of development in nomad stock-breeder societies – this includes the study of the 
political system of nomadic empires, which has led to the conclusion that they cannot be considered 
states.21 Instead, it is suggested that complex nomadic societies should be called by a more 
descriptive name than state, e.g. an inchoate early state or a supercomplex chiefdom.22  
Using the notion of a supercomplex chiefdom and the methodology it involves, I argue that the 
phenomenon of a supercomplex chiefdom comes closest to what happened among the groups of 
                                                 
16 Articles in Nomadic Pathways in Social Evolution (2003) give a wide understanding of the phenomenon. For discussion on  
specific kinds of nomadic ways of life, see Barfield 1993, passim 131-158. 
17 Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin mention the following authors who have especially stressed this view: Markov “The 
Nomads of Asia” (1976); Varnstein “The Nomdas of South Siberia” (1980); Pavlenko “The Early Class Societies: the 
Origins and the Way of Development” (1989); Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, 8-9. 
18 Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin mentions the following authors who have especially stressed this view: Khazanov “The 
Social History of Scythians” (1975) and “Nomads and the Outside World” (1984); Preshits “Some Peculiarities of the 
Formation of Class and Early Class Relations amongst Nomadic Pastoralists” (1976); Krader “The Origin of the State 
among the Nomads of Asia” (1978); Escedy “Nomads in History and Historical Research” (1981) and “On the Social and 
Economic Structure of Nomadic Societies” (1989); Kychanov “The Nomadic State from the Hsiung-nu to Manchu” (1997); 
Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, 8-9.  
19 Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin mentions the following authors who have especially stressed this view: Tolybekov “The 
Nomadic Society of the Kazakhs in the 17th to the Beginning of the 20th Century. A Political-Economic Analysis” (1971); 
Natsadorzh “General Features of Feudalism among the Nomads Peoples” (1975); Zlatkin “Basis Regularities of the 
Feudalism Development among the Pastoral People” (1982); Manai-Ool “Tuva in the Feudalism Epoch” (1986); 
Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, 8-9. 
20 Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin mentions following authors who has especially stressed the view: Markov ”The Nomads 
of Asia” (1976); Bonte ”Marxist Theory and Anthropological Analysis: the Study of nomadic Pastoralist Societies” (1981) 
and (1990); Masanov ”The Nomadic Civilization of the Kazaks” (1991). Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, 8-9. 
21 Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, 9. 
22 Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, 11; cf. Kradin 2002, 371-373; Kradin 2005 a, 165-166; Kradin 2008, 114, passim 
120-122. 
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Huns when they formed a larger unity during the 440s. The features of a supercomplex chiefdom 
are explained in the following section. 
 
 
1.5. Central Concepts of the Research 
 
My research deals with concepts such as barbarians, nomadic groups, confederation, military 
leadership, supreme military leader and phenomena such as nomadic empires, nomadic states and 
supercomplex chiefdoms. In what follows I briefly define the most important concepts, leaving a 
deeper explanation to the chapters where they are discussed. 
A concept of a “barbarian” is central to research on the Roman Empire. The Romans adopted the 
word and its meaning from the Greeks, though in the usage of the Romans the concept slightly 
changed. The Greeks had used the word barbarian of people who could not speak Greek properly or 
at all, and were thus considered inferior to them. In addition, barbarians were those who did not 
have the political system and culture common to the polis, and they dwelled outside the core areas 
of the Hellenes. When the Roman Empire strengthened during the fifth century BC onwards, the 
Romans adopted the word barbarian for themselves. Indeed, the Romans referred to themselves as 
barbarians according to the original meaning of the word in the early stage of the rise of Roman 
might. However, the usage and meaning of the concept changed after the Romans’ successful 
conquests of many different populations in wide and distant regions. First of all, the word barbarian 
could be attached to anyone who could not speak proper Greek and Latin, and did not live in the 
Italian Peninsula. On the other hand, barbarians were especially those who dwelled outside the 
borders of the Roman Empire. Furthermore, the word was synonymous with non-Roman, referring 
to those who were claimed not to appreciate the same ideals and to have dissimilar manners to the 
Romans. Accordingly, barbarian was a concept which was mainly used to enhance the elements 
important for the idea of being a Roman and to stress the image of the greatness of Romans.23 This 
is the overall historical background to the concept barbarian; the way in which I use the word 
follows the ideas favoured by modern historical research. First, the concept of barbarian does not 
mean that barbarians would have been in any way inferior to Romans, or any other people. Second, 
the word barbarian refers mainly to people who lived outside the Roman borders. 
Like the word barbarian, “Huns” is also difficult to define. The starting point is that Greco-Roman 
authors started to use the word “Huns” for nomadic groups, who authors considered unknown 
                                                 
23 See chapter 2. 
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nomads on the eastern Danubian frontier during the last decades of the fourth century. However, 
even though the name gives an impression of a united group, there is no single entity which we 
could easily identify as “Huns”. Rather there were many groups of pastoral Eurasian nomads who 
temporarily allied themselves both with each other, and with other nomadic and sedentary groups 
(e.g. groups which the Greco-Roman authors named “Alans” and “Goths”) next to the north-eastern 
Roman borders between the 370s and the 450s.24 In addition, the group composition changed during 
the period in many ways. First, there were many independent groups of Eurasian pastoral nomads 
who did not want to establish long-lasting, if any, alliances with other groups. Second, during the 
first decades of the fifth century there were at least four large coalitions of Eurasian pastoral 
nomads who were acting independently before they united on a larger scale during the 430s and 
440s. Furthermore, in general the groups of Eurasian pastoral nomads had favoured joining nomad 
and sedentary groups who lived in the vicinity of the western and northern coastline of the Black 
Sea by means of alliance or as a result of conquest.25 Therefore, the name Huns in contemporary 
accounts also refers to these groups and not only to Eurasian pastoral nomads. However, from time 
to time contemporary authors also mention names of other groups, and when this is the case, I also 
mention them, while otherwise I speak only of “Huns”. 
If the definition of the overall term Huns is problematic, an evaluation of the composition of the 
nomads were in question is not an easy task either. In anthropology larger nomadic units are often 
claimed to consist of tribes and clans, which are the result of units formed by families, but this is 
only a theoretical model.26 Accordingly, because nomads’ social structure is segmentary, breaking 
up into more or less inclusive units at a number of different taxonomic levels, it is problematic to 
claim that e.g. in the case of the Huns three tribes would have formed the unit that attacked Thrace 
in the beginning of the 5th century. Because of this, I prefer to call units of Huns in general 
“groups”27 rather than “tribes” or “clans”. Before I turn to use the term group, I explain what kind 
of composition, e.g. how many clans or tribes there might have been in question in “the group”. In 
this way we might gain a better understanding of the situation; in other words, by using the term 
“groups of Huns” I want to emphasize that there were a vague number of units, who might not have 
                                                 
24 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.1, 12; 31.3.1; cf. Claudian, In Ruf., I, 321-324; Stickler 2007, 82. 
25 Priscus fr. 11.2., fr. 49 in Blockley 1983, 258-259, 274-275, 356-357; Stickler 2007, 102-105. 
26 Khazanov 1984, 120-121. I fully agree with Khazanov that this theoretical model has many similarities with the way 
nomads refer to their own units themselves. 
27 Pace Khazanov 1984, 140. I am well aware that the term “group” is also used by anthropologists who define nomadic 
units in the way that Khazanov does; i.e. relatively small collective groups of people where kinship regulates the relations 
within the group. By contrast with Khazanov’s definition, I use the term “group” to also refer to larger numbers of nomads 
and their allies who have formed a unit so as to gain something e.g. booty or to conquer new territories. In other words, I 
use the term “group” to refer to a unit whose size can vary from hundreds to thousands and where the members have 
joined together because of a shared interest. 
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all been Eurasian pastoral nomads but could have been sedentarists who joined into an alliance or 
confederation and participated in the actions.  
When we try to define what kind of Eurasian pastoral nomads the groups who Greco-Roman 
authors call Huns are, we need to define what kind of nomadism they had and what we mean by the 
term “nomadic way of life”.  
Nomadism is claimed to have its purest manifestation on the Eurasian steppe. The reason for this is 
that agriculture activity might either be totally absent or it plays a secondary or supplementary role. 
Eurasian pastoralists live in societies, where the husbandry of grazing animals is viewed as an ideal 
way of making a living and the regular movement of all or part of the society is considered a normal 
and natural part of life. The main herding animals are sheep, goats, horses, cattle and camels. Of 
these, horses are most appreciated because they have always been considered a prestige animal. In 
order to guarantee enough food for the herds, there is need to exploit extensive, albeit seasonal, 
steppe and mountain pastures. The migratory cycle concentrates on the winter and summer season. 
During the migration, households and camp groups, which are the most important units for daily 
living, gather inot larger groupings and form clans and tribes. Otherwise, large-scale political 
organization among steppe nomads was designed to deal with external relations, e.g. they were 
needed during raids and attacks.28  
While my study deals with the clash between sedentarists and nomads, there is also a need to define 
the concept of a sedentary way of life. The crucial differences between a sedentary and a nomadic 
way of life occur in the division of labour and in the form of the society. A striking sign of a 
sedentary way of life is shown by a certain way of living that is considered permanent. A 
concentration on land is derived from the sedentarists’ strong input into agriculture, which is the 
basis for their living. While harvesting is a fundamental part of the sedentary way of life, animal 
husbandry is also important though it often plays a secondary role. Moreover, raising livestock is 
considered to be an individual occupational speciality and is firmly embedded in the surrounding 
sedentary culture. Permanency is not only shown by the sedentarists division of labour, it is also 
manifested in the way their society is formed. One of the most profound features for sedentarists is 
that there is permanency in the leadership position and in power structures. They also give a basis 
for stable administration in a geographical area where inhabitants are firmly and long-lastingly 
connected together. Also the permanency in sedentarists’ buildings and building projects makes the 
society follow and rely on the structures of power that have been established.29 
                                                 
28 Barfield 2003, 172; Barfield 1993, 131, 137, 141-142, 145-149; Khazanov 1984, 19; Vasjutin 2003, 54-55. 
29 Barfield 1993, passim 4-5; Khazanov 1984, passim 18-25; Kradin 2009, passim 31. 
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It has been claimed that the Huns’ arrival on the borders of the Roman Empire led to the rise of the 
Hunnic Empire but the phenomenon of an empire often lacks an exact definition.30 However, if we 
want to speak about such a phenomena as the Hun Empire, we should not only name it, but also 
study it as a “nomadic empire” because of the Huns nomadic background. On the whole, the 
concept of an empire is wide and a nomadic empire is only one variant. Furthermore, a nomadic 
empire is considered to belong under the concept of a “barbarian empire” and an “early empire”. 
Next I will briefly explain the general feature of the concept of an empire and the special features of 
a nomadic empire.31 
A crucial feature of an empire is that it consists of large territories with defined borders. Second, the 
formation of an empire often takes many decades or even centuries. In addition, an empire has a 
metropolitan centres and periphery, as well as centralized power and administration. A periphery 
forms a subsystem to the metropolis, but the complexity of social organisms in the periphery might 
differ greatly, from a local group to the state in its entirety. In addition, an empire has a well defined 
military organization and social structures, including multi-level economic system.32 
A crucial reason why a nomadic empire needs its own, precise definition of an overall concept of 
empire is the time frame for its existence. Overall, the majority of nomadic empires have not often 
existed more than 100-150 years, while only a few decades or even just a decade is considered a 
long enough period to speak about a nomadic empire as researchers do in the case of the Huns. It 
would in fact be more accurate to speak about a nomadic empire only when the large scale unity of 
nomads, and the groups united to them in a certain area, last longer than a decade or two. Keeping 
this in mind, I otherwise agree and follow the general definition of nomadic empire, given bby 
researchers, when referring to the Hun empire.33 
A nomadic empire can be defined as a nomadic society that is organized on military-hierarchical 
principles and occupies wide regions. Second, its existence is largely based on the exploitation (e.g. 
robbery, extortion of gifts, non-equivalent trade) of nearby territories, especially sedentary societies 
and this supports the existence of the nomadic metropolis. Moreover, a nomadic empire is 
considered the property of the whole clan of the khan, the supreme leader, and hence the members 
of the clan form an institution of co-government. This also regulates ways of inheriting power. The 
                                                 
30 Bona 1991, 61-63, 71, 207; Wirth 1999, 55-56, 66, 69-70, 90107, 113; Thompson (1999) 2000, 64, 177, 183, 225-227; 
Heather 2005, 329-330, passim 324-327; Stickler 2007, 66, 77, 102-103; Kelly 2008, 54, 72, 87, 228; Schmauder 2009, 155-
155. 
31 Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, 11; Kradin 2003, 73-74. 
32 Kradin 2003, 73-74. 
33 Kradin 2003, 78-80, 85; pace Schmauder 2009, passim 79-81, 126-127, 154, cf. Khazanov 1984, passim 228-233. 
According to Kradin’s own typology of three different kinds of nomadic empires and quasi-imperial xenocratic nomadic 
formations,  Kradin places the Huns in the category of quasi-imperial nomadic statehood formations, and also consider 
them to be “typical nomadic empire”. The reason they are labelled “typical” is that the nomadic way of life did not face 
crucial changes.  
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social and political organization of a nomadic empire has a many-layered hierarchical character, 
interconnected at all levels by tribal and supra tribal genealogical ties. Its a administration is divided 
either into two or three units: the centre and its ‘wings’, namely the units that help to spread the rule 
from the centre to all the regions that belong to the empire. Urbanistic constructions are not large-
scale and consist primarily of splendid burial-vaults and funeral temples for the deceased members 
of the steppe elite. Finally, nomadic empire could vanish in few years or decades.34 
Another term that needs to be defined in relation to empires is the concept of a state. The reason for 
this is that there is disagreement whether a nomadic empire could turn into a state.35 According to 
Kradin the most complex societies of nomads are not states at all but represent chiefdoms.36 
Furthermore, Kradin emphasizes that nomads have no need for bureaucratic machinery because 
chiefdoms have or already include channels (e.g. the supreme military leader has follower warriors 
and members in the ruling clan also provide some support) which control larger regions and units 
without requiring the kind of state machinery found among sedentarists.37 Accordingly, it could be 
more appropriate to name, particularly the most complex societies of nomads by using the term 
supercomplex chiefdom or xenocratic nomadic complex.38 Nonetheless, we should not pass over the 
view that a nomadic empire which is identified as supercomplex chiefdoms would not already be a 
real model prototype of a state.39 In my study, I consider whether we could call the alleged Hun 
empire a supercomplex chiefdom or a nomadic state and for this reason, the following definitions of 
concepts are needed. 
The phenomena of a state among nomads is thought to have three different kinds of phases which 
follow each other, eventually forming a similar kind of state structure as that found among 
sedentarists. In the first phase nomads characteristically levy tribute especially from sedentarists 
who dwell in or near the vicinity of the regions that are controlled by nomads. In the second stage 
nomads make large-scale conquests and this leads to the creation of a complex society. This brings 
about the third and final phase where economic and ethnic specialization within the same ecological 
zone occurs.40 
                                                 
34 Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, 11; Kradin 2003, 74, passim 78-80; Kradin 2002, 374; Khazanov 2003, 37; Kradin 
2001, 310. 
35 Khazanov 2003, 39; cf. Kradin 2008, 114, 120-121.  According to Khazanov there are two types of nomadic state, while 
Kradin disagrees with the idea that the state could emerge among nomads. According to Kradin the most complex form 
should be called a supercomplex chiefdom rather than an inchoate early state or a dispositional nomadic state because the 
characteristics that belong to the definition of a state, e.g. a developed class society and agriculture as the basis of economy, 
cannot emerge in the frames of a nomadic way of life. 
36 Kradin 2008, 116-119; Kradin 2008, 147-150. 
37 Kradin 2008, 117, passim. 149-150. 
38 Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003,10-11, 14; Kradin 2005 a, 166; cf. Vasjutin 2003, 53; Khazanov 1984, 295; Claessen, 
Skalnik 1978, 23, 641; Kradin 2003, 80; Kradin 2008, passim 109-112, 113-117, 121. 
39 Kradin 2008, 114, passim. 120-122; passus Khazanov 1984, 295. 
40 Khazanov 1984, 231-233; cf. Kradin 2008, 111. See chapter 9. 
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By contrast to the concept of a state, a supercomplex chiefdom has a less complex structure, even 
though the numbers of population can be hundreds of thousands or even more. There is a high rate 
of centralization, social stratification and inchoate forms of urban and monumental construction.  A 
supercomplex chiefdom is led by a supreme chief, whose position is based on military success. In 
addition, the supreme chief has subchiefs who support his lead and are sent as governors to different 
areas, especially regions farther away from the centre. However, at the same time the nomadic 
groups on the peripheries have their own leaders. Thus, a supercomplex chiefdom has an 
administrative hierarchical structure which includes several levels of leadership positions. In 
addition, there is a complicated system of titles for chiefs and officials. The main task of the 
officials in the upper level is to take care of diplomatic correspondence with neighbouring 
countries, and conclude dynastic marriages with rulers of agricultural states and other nomadic 
groups.41 Written language can also occur in a supercomplex chiefdom. 
The rise of a long-lasting and large nomadic unit or society which precedes the formation of 
supercomplex chiefdoms is dependent on conquest and the existence of military leaders.42 It can 
therefore be argued that the position of Hun leaders at the head of a united groups of Huns is most 
likely to have been based on military leadership.43 For this reason I suggest that it would be more 
fitting to name the position of Hun leaders “supreme military leader” rather than “king” as has been 
done so far. In addition, it is inappropriate to employ the same concepts to characterize political 
systems of both nomadic and settled societies.44 I fully agree with the view that the society of steppe 
pastoralists differs from sedentary agrarian inhabitants to such an extent that one can say that the 
nomads were characterized by their specific pathways of social evolution.45 With reference to my 
claim, I will next explain the basis for the position of military leadership and supreme military 
leadership in order to elucidate my claim.46 
                                                 
41 Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, 12-14; Kradin 2001, 299, 309-311; Kradin 2006, 115-116. 
42 Vasjutin 2003, 53-55. Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, 11. Khazanov 1984, passim. 158, 166-167, 230. 
43 Kradin 2001, 309-310. Kradin considers that the military organization of the Huns would have been similar to that of the 
Hsiung-nu. 
44 Khazanov 2003, 37, 39; Kradin 2008, 117, 120. 
45 Khazanov 1984, 165, 228; Kradin 2008, 117, 121, passim. 107-122. Khazanov admits that the term “nomadic state” is 
extremely vague and imprecise, hence he remarks that he uses the term in a wide sense. However, Khazanov claims that a 
chiefdom or stratified society precedes the emergence of a state. By contrast with Khazanov, Kradin suggests that we 
cannot speak about a state or even an early state because “we cannot say that the nomads had a state machinery” and “from 
the view point of general evolution, they [nomads] have created a supercomplex chiefdom”. Taken together, the terms 
“nomadic state” and “supercomplex chiefdom” primarily refers to the same phenomenon, but the term used varies. I agree 
with Kradin that it is better to name the phenomenon a “supercomplex” chiefdom because it underlines its specific features 
and nomadic nature in comparison to sedentrarists state. 
46 Dmitriev 2003, 148; Barfield 1993, passim 147-168; Khazanov 1984, 157-159, 161-169, 172-179; Kradin 2005 a, passim 
149-166; Kradin 2001, passim 297-310; Morgan 1986 (1990) 37-39. See Chapter 4.  
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In general, every male commoner is a warrior in nomadic society but local chiefs are often, though 
not always, the military leaders of the troops from their districts.47 However, the tasks and the 
position of military leadership exist only according to need, e.g. during a time of war and raiding 
operations or conquest. In addition, because the tasks are related to excellent skills in war, 
charismatic and talented warriors who do not have the position of chief, can also be elected as a 
military leader. In other words, the position of military leadership is more dependent on personal 
skills, followers support and personal charisma than anything else.48 Because the position of 
military leadership is the only leadership position which can attain the large-scale support of 
nomads, it might evolve into a permanent and most powerful position among the nomads. However, 
a precondition for this occurring is that successful raids and conquests by nomads are a constant 
feature of life.49 Defeats in wars and lack of military success could destroy the position of the 
supreme military leader and the whole structure of the military leaders who followed him.50 
Accordingly, I claim that this feature speaks in favour of naming the mightiest leadership position 
among the nomads a supreme military leader, thus emphasizing the leadership positions’ nomadic 
nature.51 
The final concept to be defined is related to the unity which the Huns and other barbarian groups 
formed during the first half of the 5th century. The question is should we call it “an alliance” or “a 
coalition” or “a confederation”?52 According to New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the words 
are defined as follows.53 An alliance is “a relationship in which two countries, political parties, or 
organizations work together for some purpose”; while it can also mean “a group of countries or 
political parties that are formally united and working together because they have similar aims”. By 
contrast with an alliance, a coalition is defined as “a group consisting of people from different 
political or social groups who are co-operating to achieve a particular aim”. Finally “confederation” 
has the meaning of “an organization or group consisting of smaller groups or states, especially one 
that exists for business or political purposes”. I prefer to call the unity formed by groups of Huns 
and local barbarians especially during the 430s and the 440s a “confederation” because the concept 
includes the idea of united groups, who act together because of shared interests. Second, the concept 
                                                 
47 Khazanov 2003, 31; Vasjutin 2003, passim 52-55; Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, passim. 10, 12-14; Kradin 2003, 
80-81; Kradin 2005 a, 162. 
48 Dmitriev 2003, 155-156; Khazanov 1984, 166-167; cf. Morgan (1986) 1990, 36-39; Kradin 2003, passim 80-81; 
Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, passim 9-15.  
49 Vasjutin 2003, 53-55; Khazanov 1983, passim 166-167. 
50 Kradin 2003, 77, 81, 84-85; Vasjutin 2003, 55.  
51 See Vasjutin 2003, 53. 
52 The discussion on the nature of the large unity that nomadic groups might form is wide; see Khazanov 1984, 35-36; 
Khazanov 2003, 36; Kradin 2002, 376; Kradin 2003, passim. 84; Vasjutin 2003, 52, passim 57; cf. Di Cosmo 2005, 487.. 
53 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1993, 54, 427, 474. 
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“confederation” is not related to the existence of political parties, and this is also illustrative of the 
relationship between groups of Huns and local barbarians.  
 
 
1.6. Primary sources 
 
Greco-Roman authors’ accounts of the Huns from c. the 360s to the 530s are the primary sources in 
my research, though I also discuss archaeological material at times when it elucidates the topic in 
question. 
I divide contemporary authors’ accounts of the Huns into different categories in order to elucidate 
their specific nature. The first category holds the first accounts of the Huns, a time when 
contemporaries heard about the arrival of the Huns and tried to find out who the new nomadic 
groups were, where they were coming from, and what were they doing. In other words, it is a 
question of a period when Greco-Roman authors lacked detailed information on the Huns. 
Consequently, the stories about Huns include many images common to barbarian topoi and are 
generally used to describe nomads. In addition, the descriptions are based on many previous stories 
about nomadic groups similar to Huns who had roamed in the areas of Scythia. That is to say, the 
accounts of the Huns in the first category are generalized in nature. The contemporary authors that I 
list in this category are Ammianus, Claudian and Eunapius, whose texts cover the period from the 
370s to the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries.  
The second category includes accounts of the Huns written by Jerome, Sozomen and Olympiodorus 
and Priscus. The time scale is from c. the first decade of the fifth century to the 470s. A special 
feature of these authors is that they had either met Huns, e.g. as members of Roman embassies sent 
to the Huns, or they witnessed the attacks of the Huns. In other words, their accounts include first-
hand information about the Huns and are written from this perspective. In general, the stories are 
descriptive and imaginary stories and are less favourable to barbarians. Overall, I rely more on 
information about the Huns given by authors listed in the second category in my research.  
The third and last category consists of such writers as Zosimus, Procopius and Jordanes, who wrote 
about the Huns during the last decades of the fifth century to the first decade of the sixth century. It 
is a time when the domination of the Huns had vanished and the Huns had once again fragmented 
albeit becoming partly assimilated with other barbarian groups in the vicinity of the Roman borders, 
or they had roamed into areas north and east of the Black Sea. The authors in the third category, like 
in the first, only had a few contacts with the Huns. Therefore, these accounts of the Huns are in 
some sense comparable to the descriptions in the first category as they were likely to be based on 
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earlier reports. In addition, the authors used the history of the past to contribute to their political and 
other goals. This means the descriptions of the Huns include many popular images of nomads and 
barbarians in antiquity. However, the importance of the texts in the third category is that they 
include some traits of earlier descriptions of the Huns. They also include some information about 
the actions of the Huns at the end of fifth century, though the name “the Huns” was also applied to 
new nomadic groups in the vicinity of the lower Danube at the turn of the fifth and sixth centuries, 
and hence partially blur the understanding what was going on among the groups of Huns. 
I will now discuss the background of the authors whose accounts of the Huns are fundamentally 
based on.  
Ammianus (c. 330 - 400) was Greek-speaking and is believed to be a native of the Syrian city of 
Antioch.54 He served in the Roman army, was made one of the protectors domestici and fought 
many battles against the barbarians in different parts of the Roman Empire during his career. 
However, after 363 he dedicated himself to writing a Roman history in Latin.55 It is supposed that 
Ammianus admired Tacitus and connected his narration about the Roman Empire to Tacitus’ work. 
Ammianus’ history Res gestae includes 31 parts and covers the years 96 – 378. However, only the 
last 18 books have survived.56 In the last book, XXXI, Ammianus describes the arrival of groups of 
Huns into the vicinity of the Roman Empire and defines what kind of nomads the Huns were. 
Ammianus’ stories are the first known accounts of the Huns. It is supposed that Ammianus could 
have met some Huns during the battles against Persia in 363, but it seems that most of his 
knowledge is based on others reports on the Huns or similar nomadic groups.57 Ammianus’ 
descriptions of the Huns can be taken as an exemples of barbarian topoi, with generally favourable 
images of nomads. On the other hand, it is also argued that the stories about the Huns could be 
taken as an accurate depiction of their pastoral nomadic way of life.58 In any case, the main 
significance of Ammianus’ accounts is that they define what kind of arrivals the groups of Huns 
were, where they roamed and what they did. 
Claudian (c. 370 - 404) was a Greek-speaking citizen in Alexandria. He moved to Rome before 395, 
where he became a court poet. After a while, Claudian joined the service of Stilicho, magister 
militum of praesentalis, in the Western part of the Roman Empire. Before accompanying Stilicho 
Claudian had become notarius and tribunus. Claudian wrote his earliest works in Greek, but later 
                                                 
54 Rolfe 1950, ix. 
55 Rolfe 1950, x-xiv. 
56 Rolfe 1950, xvi-xvii. I use J. C. Rolfe’s translation of Ammianus’ work Res gestae. Rolfe’s work thought to be partially 
inaccurate; e.g. in the descriptions of the Huns the word “barbarorum” is not translated as “barbarians” but “savages” 
(Ammianus, RG, 31.3.8.). 
57 Matthews 1989, passim 333-334, 337, 377-380; Thompson 1966, 151-155. 
58 Matthews 1989, passim 333-334, 336-337, 339, 341, 353, 355, 376, 380. 
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on changed in Latin. This is supposed to have happened when he moved to Rome, where he spent 
the last four years of his life. Claudian’s short description of the Huns is written in Latin and it is a 
part of a panegyric. Like Ammianus, Claudian briefly describes the overall nature of the Huns 
whom he most likely never met. Claudian’s accounts of the Huns include generally favoured 
images of nomads and stress the nomadic nature of the Huns.59 
The only thing that is known about Olympiodorus’ (365/380 - 432) early years is that he was born 
in Thebes. He calls himself a poet and seems to have been quite a skilful writer. Olympiodorus 
worked most of his time in the service of the court of the Western part of the Roman Empire and 
supposedly was sent by the court to visit some groups of Huns in 412.60 Olympiodorus wrote 22-
part work where he mainly described the situation in the court of Western Roman Empire and the 
relationship between the Romans and barbarians during the years 407 – 425. Olympiodorus’ work 
is survived only partly in Photius’ Bibliotheca, especially in part 80. In one of the fragments 
Olympiodorus explains that his main goal was not primarily to write a history, but to describe the 
situation of his time for others to use in histories. This is also seen in Olympiodorus’ text. He 
mainly lists events and his narrative is descriptive rather than fluent storytelling. This is also the 
case in his short account of the Huns from c. the year 411 or 413. Olympiodorus briefly tells about 
the success of the Roman delegation that he led and its success with the Huns and their leaders. This 
is first-hand information, and though it is a short and plain account, it elucidates the position of Hun 
leaders and the fragmentation of their society. Olympidorus’ way of keeping only to the main 
features of the events also makes his accounts informative.61 
Priscus (c. 410/420 – 480) was a Greek sophist and a historian who came from the city of Panion 
and ended up in the service of Theodosius II in the Eastern Roman Empire. Furthermore, Priscus 
wrote an extensive history of his time, covering the years 443-471. Even though the history became 
very popular, only fragments have survived. Many of them are part of Excerpta de Legationibus, 
collected by Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitos in 913 – 959.62 All the fragments of Priscus deal 
with the relationship between the Romans and the barbarians. The stories about the Huns cover 
primarily the years 430 – 470 and most of them are derived from his visit to the Huns in 449. 
Priscus was sent as a member of an Eastern Roman delegation to solve the ongoing disputes with 
                                                 
59 Claudian, In Ruf., I: 311-321; Platnauer 1976, viii, xiv-xvi.  
60 Blockley 1981, 27; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 73; Heather 2005, 324; Stickler 2007, 57. 
61 The fragments of Olympiodorus’ lost work are collected and translated by Blockley in The Fragmentary Classicising Historians 
of the Later Roman Empire. Eunapius, Olympiodorus, Priscus and Malchus. Text, Translation and Historical Notes. Blockley has also 
written the The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later Roman Empire. Eunapius, Olympiodorus, Priscus and Malchus. Vol. 2., 
where he explains the background of Olympiodorus’ writings. 
62 The fragments of Priscus’ history are collected and translated by Blockley in The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the 
Later Roman Empire. Eunapius, Olympiodorus, Priscus and Malchus. Text, Translation and Historiographical Notes. Blockley has also 
written The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later Roman Empire. Eunapius, Olympiodorus, Priscus and Malchus. Vol. 2., 
where he explains the background of Priscus’ writings. 
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the Huns led by Attila. During the visit Priscus could observe the situation among the Huns well at 
first hand, and the notions form the core of Priscus’ accounts. Consequently, Priscus’ stories about 
the Huns can be taken as a relatively reliable source of the Huns, especially in the 440s. However, 
Priscus also describes the actions of the Huns both before and after the 440s, and he quotes official 
peace agreements and accounts from other contemporary authors. This makes Priscus’ work the 
most comprehensive “contemporary history of the Huns” we have today. Having said that, however, 
the reliability of Priscus’ accounts on the Huns is occasionally doubtful. There are some 
descriptions which are clearly written to criticize the political situation in the Eastern Roman 
Empire rather than to tell about the Huns. Equally, from time to time Priscus refers to earlier 
authors’ century-old stories about similar events to those at hand among the Huns. Despite this, 
Priscus’ style is to tell about his observations and list the most crucial elements of every situation 
rather than to write vivid narration. This makes his stories convincing. Thus Priscuss’ fragments are 
the main sources in my work. 
Jordanes (c. 490/500 – 551) was a Christian Goth who apparently worked as a high-level notaries, 
but during the last years of his life he became a historian. He wrote a work De origine actibusque 
Gothorum, or Getica for short, in Latin. Jordanes describes the history of the Goths from the 
imaginary past to the sixth century, though the main interest of the work is in the events of the fifth 
century. Consequently, the Huns and their influence over the Goths are discussed at some length in 
the work, although, the history is mainly a summary of Cassiodorus’ lost history of the Goths. 
Nonetheless Jordanes also emphasizes those views he personally found important. It is very likely 
that because of Jordanes’ Gothic origin, he was especially fond of creating an image of the Huns 
who came to dwell in the territory of the Goths as the most terrible people on earth. Such 
exaggeration makes the stories unreliable. However, Jordanes uses many earlier authors’ accounts 
of the Huns in his narration, and hence his work offers a good opportunity to gain overall 
information about the lost works and accounts of the Huns.63 
 
1.7. The Structure of the Work 
 
My work consists of five topics that together answer the main questions of my work: (1) the nature 
of the leadership position among the Huns; (2) the possible rise of a supercomplex chiefdom among 
the groups of Huns during the 440s at the latest; (3) Greco-Roman authors’ ways of writing about 
groups who they considered non-Romans, especially barbarians and nomads; (4) the relationship 
                                                 
63 I use the English translation of Jordanes’ history by C. C. Mierow, The Gothic History of Jordanes (1915).   
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between the Huns and the Romans, and the Romans’ influence on the Huns’ desire to form a larger 
unity; and (5) the formation and nature of confederation between groups of Huns and local 
barbarians in the vicinity of the lower Danubian region. 
In Chapter 2 I discuss the Late Roman authors’ literary conventions on barbarians in general and on 
nomads in particular. This is done in order to explore the accuracy of the Late Roman authors’ 
accounts of the Huns on their nomadic way of life and leadership position.  
In Chapter 3 I analyse whether the Huns were really nomadic newcomers to the Roman world when 
they arrived in the northern parts of the Black Sea during the 370s. In addition, the chapter 
elucidates how fragmented the groups of Huns seem to have been and how close the contacts were 
with other barbarian groups (e.g. Alans and Goths) in the Dniester and lower Danubian basin during 
the last decades of the fourth century and at the beginning of the fifth century.  
Because the groups of Huns favoured temporary alliances with other barbarian groups this gives a 
basis for studying the nature of leadership positions among the Huns, which is the subject of 
Chapter 4. In addition, I explain the kind of framework the Eurasian pastoral nomads’ nomadic way 
of life and society had. I also discuss the nomads’ prerequisites for forming confederations, and 
explane whether these elements occurred among the Huns. This is the main focus of Chapters 3 – 5. 
These Chapters also analyse the unity of the groups of Huns and their contacts to other barbarian 
groups, especially in the eastern and western half of the Roman Empire from the 410s to the 
beginning of the 430s. This leads us to a discussion of the possibilities of a supercomplex chiefdom 
among the Huns emerging during the 440s, which is the theme of Chapters 9 - 10. 
Because the attacks of the Huns against the Romans increased from the 430s onwards, in Chapter 6 
I analyse whether the titles which the Late Roman authors used for Hun leaders in their accounts of 
the peace treaties allude to a strengthening leadership position among the nomads. In addition, I 
evaluate whether the might of the Huns was based on the formation of a supercomplex chiefdom. 
The possible changes in the Huns’ nomadic ways of life, e.g. the partial adoption of a sedentary way 
of life, are considered in Chapter 8. 
Finally, in Chapter 10 I point out how the last years of the confederation of the Huns and their 
barbarian allies support the claim that the Huns never developed a supercomplex chiefdom. In 
addition, I emphasize that the Huns remained nomads, which is supported by the fact that after the 
confederation with the other barbarian groups was over, the groups of Huns again fragmented and 






2. ROMAN AUTHORS’ WAYS OF WRITING ABOUT THE HUNS 
 
 
Many of the Late Roman authors refer to the Huns as barbarians and this immediately shows that 
the Huns are considered to be non-Romans.64 Generally speaking names that designate differences 
between groups are generally used in a time of conflict or tension between groups and the purpose 
is to create an image of an other, or even an enemy.65 The view is substantiated by depictions that 
stress differences in customs, appearance and beliefs etc., and the accounts often end up 
emphasizing hegemony that which is represented as foreign.66 Therefore, the accounts of that which 
is foreign merely tell more about the concepts of the creator of the accounts than the target itself.67 
This is also the case with Greco-Roman authors’ descriptions of barbarians in general and the Huns 
in particular. 
The Romans had adopted the word barbarian from the Greeks, and it was primarily addressed to 
peoples who were living outside the Roman borders at various points of compass.68 Although the 
concept of barbarians was a generalization, there were also divergences in the image drawn from 
environmental conditions and the location of the dwelling areas according to the point of the 
compass. Also the manner in which groups gained their living were claimed to be reflected in 
certain characteristics.  
In order to consider the extent to which contemporary Roman writers might have relied on earlier 
stories about nomads and barbarians in their accounts of the Huns, I first study how environmental 
conditions and living regions at certain points of the compass were claimed to affect human nature. 
After this I analyze how Roman authors described nomads and the nomadic way of life in general, 
and how this might have affected the descriptions of the Huns. This reveals to what degree the 
accounts of the Huns echo the prevailing images of nomads and are written so as to emphasize the 
elements which are important to the Romans. Lastly, I discuss how learned ways of writing 
determined the Late Roman authors’ accounts of the Huns. I consider to what extent stories about 
the Huns are written in order to show the writer’s own education and ability to write as an 
intellectual. Furthermore, I consider whether these authors wrote about the Huns more to comment 
on a topic which they found important than to tell about the nomadic newcomers. 
 
                                                 
64 Ammianus, RG, 31.3.8; Sozomen, Hist. Ecc. V; Jordanes, Getica, XXXIV, 179; Jerome, Ep. LX, 16-17; Priscus, fr.11.2 in 
Blockley 1983, 268-269. 
65 Hall 1988, 105; cf. Grüen 2011, 2, 352; see also Pongrazt-Leisten 2001, 197.   
66 Smith 2004 a, 236, 232; Hall (1997) 2002, passim. 235-238; Pongrazt-Leisten 2001, 195-196, 206-207. 
67 Fält 2002, 9-10; Smith 2004 a, 230, 232; Oktas 2002, 201; Green 1985, passim. 50-51. 
68 Isaac 2004, 134; Grüen 2011, 345. 
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2.1. Characteristics of the Huns Defined by Environment  
 
The Romans adopted the concept of the relationship between geographical location and 
environmental conditions and human qualities from Hellenic authors.69 The crux of the concept was 
that geography and climate were claimed to define features that were common to people in certain 
areas, and it was stated that the conditions in Greece and on the Italian peninsula were the best and 
hence brought forth the best qualities of the inhabitants there.70 As a result, the farther away from 
the core areas, the more savage the inhabitants and the less salubrious the living conditions became. 
Accordingly, these claims strengthen the Romans’ self-conceived ability and right to rule other 
regions and people.71 By contrast to the ancient Greeks who had preferred a polarization between 
west and east, Roman writers concentrated on defening the differences between peoples in the north 
and the south because these were the points of the compass where the opponents of Rome mainly 
came from.72 Moreover, the notion that the environment affected to human nature was also used to 
explain visible differences between people (e.g. darker skin). This created information about distant 
regions and their inhabitants.  
Because the Huns arrived from the north-east to threaten the Roman Empire and images of people 
from a certain area were general in nature, I claim that images of people from the north and east 
affected the accounts of the Huns. The images could also have been used because the Huns were 
nomadic newcomers whom no one knew anything about as Eunapius remarks: “The first account of 
the Huns, written at a time when no one had anything clear to say about their place of origin and 
where they were living when they overran Europe and crushed the Scythian [the Goths] nation, I 
have collected from the ancient authors and set down according to the criterion of probability”.73 
Therefore, general information on people living in the north might have helped contemporary 
authors, such as Ammianus and Claudian, to say at least even something about the Huns. Vegetius 
claims that people living in the north and south of the core areas of the Roman Empire had the 
following characteristics for climatic reasons:74 
  
                                                 
69 Smith 2004 b, 308-309; Isaac 2004, 55-56, 72, 85-86, 108-109. Smith states that in classical ethnography differences were 
explained above all as the consequence of spatial conditions, which were pre-eminently climatic. 
70 Isaac 2004, 56, 58-59, 82; cf. Schubert 2007, 22, 24. Isaac calls this “environmental determinism”. 
71 Vitruvius, De Arch., 6.1.3, 6.1.5, 6.1.10-11; Isaac 2004, 2, 7, 12, 45, 85-86; cf. Wiedemann 1986, 189, 193; Hall 2002, 
passim. 235-236, 259. 
72 Isaac 2004, 85-86; Grüen 2011, 344. However, what was common to both the Greeks and the Romans was the negative 
image of the East, derived largely from the threat of Persia. 
73 Eunapius fr. 41 in Blockley 1983, 58-59. 
74 Vegetius, Ep. rei mil., 1.2; cf. Vitruvius, De Arch. 6.1.3; see also Aristotle, Pol. 1327b. Vegetius’ views have many 
similarities to Vitruvius who quotes Aristotle. 
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[…] all peoples that are near the sun, being parched by great heat, are more intelligent but have less blood, and 
therefore lack steadiness and confidence to fight at close quarters, because those who are conscious of having 
less blood are afraid of wounds. 
[…] peoples from the north, remote from the sun’s heat are less intelligent, but having a superabundance of 
blood are readiest for wars. 
[…] Recruits should therefore be raised from the more temperate climes. The plenteousness of their blood 
supplies a contempt for wounds and death. 
 
Vegetius’ argumentation concerning the effect of the sun on the blood and hence human 
characteristics that made people in the north fierce warriors has similarities to Vitruvius’ 
descriptions in De Architectura from the first century BC.75 According to Vitruvius, the cold 
climate was the reason why people in the north had an abundance of blood that made them restless, 
lacking intelligence, yet strong to bear wounds: “the races that are bred in the north … [have] a 
great deal of blood, owing the abundance of moisture and the coolness of the atmosphere … their 
wealth of blood enables them to stand up against the sword without timidity … northern nations, 
being enveloped in a dense atmosphere and chilled by the moisture from obstructing air, have but 
sluggish intelligence … men born in cold countries are indeed readier to meet the shock of arms 
with great courage and without timidity, but their wits are so slow that they will rush to the charge 
inconsiderately and inexpertly, thus defeating their own devices”.76 
Because blood and climate were something that people could not change, Vitruvius’ reasoning 
created a strong basis for claims about the characteristics of people who came from the north. This 
might have inspired Tertullian to write about the Scythians as fierce northern warriors: “[in their 
dwelling areas] the whole year is winter … Their [the Scythians’] climate, too, exhibits the same 
rude nature [as the Scythians have] … Nothing there is hot except ferocity … They have no fixed 
abode, their life is rude, their lust promiscuous. … The fiercest nations dwell there, if indeed one 
can be said to dwell in a wagon”.77 Because the Huns came to dwell in the same regions where 
Scythians had lived, Ammianus might have borrowed from Tertullian’s description of them when 
describing the Huns. I would seem that Ammianus used these generalized images of northern 
barbarians because his account of the Huns starts with the notion that the nomadic newcomers 
arrived from regions in the north “beyond the Maeotic Sea near the ice bound ocean”.78 Therefore, 
it is no surprise that Ammianus claims that one would “not hesitate to call them [the Huns] the most 
                                                 
75 Vegetius, Ep. rei mil. 1.2.; cf. Vitruvius, De Arch. 6.1.3; cf. Seneca, De ira, 2.15; see Isaac 2004, 95. Vegetius’ 
argumentation reminds one also of the views presented by Seneca; passus. Isaac 2004, 71, 85, 87. 
76 Vitruvius, De Arch., 6.1.3, 6.1.5, 6.1.10-11. 
77 Tertullian, Adv. Marc., I. 1; Lovejoy, Boas 1973, 342-343.  
78 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.1. 
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terrible of all warriors”.79 Ammianus emphasizes that the Huns are interested in fighting “when 
provoked” and “rushing about in disorder here and there, dealing terrific slaughter” as one might 
expect people from the north to do.80 In his depiction Ammianus creates images of the Huns as so 
impatient to fight that they are: “regardless of their own lives”, and the wild nature of the Huns is 
emphasized by the claim that the Huns “exceed every degree of savagery”.81 At the end of his 
decription Ammianus underlines the restless nature of the Huns by writing that they “keep roaming 
from place to place” and are “strongly inclined to sway to the motion of every breeze of new hope 
that presents itself, and sacrificing every feeling to the mad impulse of the moment”.82 
Claudian, who is the second contemporary author aalong with Ammianus from whom we have one 
of the first accounts of the Huns, also draws attention to the nomads’ arrival from the north and 
their furious nature. Claudian describes the Huns as “the most infamous of all the children of the 
north” giving the most likely reason for their extreme nature the fact that they come from “the 
extreme eastern borders of Scythia, beyond frozen Tanais”.83 It is likely that Claudian emphasized 
the fierce nature of the Huns because Roman authors connected extreme behaviour with remote 
areas.84 It was argued that in the the remotest areas people even lost their humanity - people became 
part animal or they behaved like animals.85 Concerning this idea, the location of the region, north or 
south, was less significant; it was the extreme geographical position that caused the loss of human 
characteristics.86  
Such notions may well have been the reason why Ammianus writes that the Huns, who arrived from 
“hidden nook of the earth” are “so monstrously ugly and misshapen, that one might take them for 
two legged beasts”, and Claudian compares the Huns to Centaurs: “Their double nature fitted no 
better the twi-formed Centaurs to the horses that were parts of them”.87 Claudian’s reference to 
Centaurs clearly emphasizes the image of Huns as people from the utmost regions who are partly 
animals partly humans. 
The image of an extreme climate as the cause of extreme features was also emphasized in the 
stories about the nature of leadership and political organization. It was claimed that laziness in the 
east made people slaves under the strong rule of kings, while people in the north could primarily 
only set up temporary councils on account of their restlessness and stupidity. Because of a lack of 
                                                 
79 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.9. 
80 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.8-9. 
81 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.9., 31.2.1. 
82 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.10-11. 
83 Claudian, In Ruf., I 323-326. 
84 Tacitus, Ger., 46: 1-3. Good example of the view is e.g. Tacitus’ story about Fennis. 
85 Vitruvius, De Arch., 6.1.10.; Tacitus, Ger., 46.4; see Isaac 2004, passim 66-67, 200, 204. 
86 Isaac 2004, 67, 71. 
87 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.2, 31.3.8; Claudian, In Ruf., I 323-326. 
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good rulers, injustice and societal disorganization were part of the image of northern barbarians.88 
This might be the reason why Ammianus argues that the Huns “are subject to no royal restrain, but 
they are content with the disorderly government of their important men, and led by them they force 
their way through every obstacle”.89 
In general, the image of people from some particular point of the compass was useful for Greco-
Roman authors especially when they did not have any direct information about the target; such 
cases they could rely on images and write according to them. However, the location of dwelling 
regions at certain points of the compass was not the only aspect that Greek and Roman authors used 
when creating images of differences between people. There was also the influence of the stars and 
geographical conditions. 
The stars and their connections to each other were claimed to affect one’s human qualities. The 
effect of the stars was based on their connection to the gods and goddesses – stars and planets were 
associated with gods and goddesses who had their own special features, and these in the end 
dictated what kind of characteristics people under their circle of influence had. Ptolemy is one of 
the Late Roman authors who describes in Tetrabiblos/ Quadripartitum how planets affect the 
qualities of inhabitants to the north-west and north-east of the Black Sea, areas occupied by the 
Huns:90 
 
Among the countries before named, Britain, Galatia, Germany, and Barsania have a greater share of familiarity 
with Ares and Mars; and their inhabitants are accordingly wilder, bolder, and more ferocious.  
[…] the nations about Sauromatica, Oxianan and Sogdiana [areas from the Don to the borders of modern 
Afghanistan and India] are influenced by Aquarius and Saturn; and are therefore less polished in manners and 
more austere and uncouth. 
 
Ptolemy’s claims concerning the human qualities caused by the effect of the stars and planets do not 
differ much from those that authors mention to be common for inhabitants in different points of the 
compass.91 However, the explanations made on the basis of planets could lead to quite different 
interpretations than those drawn from the condition of climate and the location of dwelling areas 
                                                 
88 Tacitus, Ger., 45.6, passim. 42.-46; Caesar, Bella, VI 2.23; cf. Isaac 2004, 71-72, 196. Tacitus even claims that a people 
called the Sithones who lived north of the Roman Empire were ruled by women, and this was considered worse than being 
ruled by slaves. On the other hand, Greek and Roman authors also favour an image of people having the happiest life in 
regions that are located at the edge of the world. 
89 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.7. 
90 Ptolemy, Quadripar., II, 3. 
91 Isaac 2004, 100. 
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according to the point of the compass. Hence disagreement is found; Cicero for example, in De 
divinatione speaks out strongly against the plausibility of the astrological explanations.92  
In fact, Roman writers rarely refer to the effect of stars and planets when they describe the human 
qualities of barbarians, and this is also the case with the Huns. However, when Ammianus writes 
that the Huns “exceed every degree of savagery” and that “they are deceitful and ambiguous in 
speech … fickle and prone to anger” it follows Ptolemy’s images of people in the regions near the 
northern and eastern parts of the Black Sea.93  
Another aspect that the Roman authors used to create images of differences in human characteristics 
was the effect of environmental conditions on peoples’ way of gaining living.94 The idea of the 
effect of the environment on human activity and due to this also on human characteristics occurs in 
Herodotus.95 After Herodotus, Cicero also speaks strongly on behalf of the concept in De Lege 
Agraria.96 However, because Cicero argues in terms of social interaction and human factors rather 
than mechanical, already strictly defined forces like the sun, the approach offers a number of 
possibilities for claiming obvious differences in human nature and behaviour.97 In his accounts 
Cicero claims that because the Carthaginians had many harbours, they were often in contact with 
merchants and foreigners, and this encouraged Carthaginians to adopt lying.98 As the Carthaginians 
were competing with the Romans in trade, this might have been the reason why Cicero emphasized 
their negative features. However, in the case of mountaineers, e.g. the Ligurians, Cicero mentions 
that their hard nature is derived from their harsh living conditions: “hardy rustics; the land itself has 
taught them, since it produces nothing except by dint of intensive cultivation and much toil”.99 The 
description reminds one of Ammianus’ notions of Huns as harsh because of their hard living 
conditions, and hence Ammianus’ account stresses the fact that the living conditions affected the 
character of the Huns.100 
Images of the Huns include many similarities to those of mountaineers, and one reason for this 
might have been the fact that the Huns arrived on the borders of the Roman Empire over the 
Carpathians and the Caucasus.101 This offered an opportuniy to use the images of mountaineers 
                                                 
92 Cicero, De div., 2.96; cf. Isaac 2004, 99, 101. 
93 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.1, 31.2.11; Ptolemy, Quadripar., II, 3. 
94 Although Roman authors used arguments deriving from the notion that social environments affect human nature, it 
would seem that the geographical environment created the basis for human qualities that could change under the influence 
of that environment. 
95 Herodotus, Hist., IX: 122. 
96 Cicero, De leg. ag. II, XXXV: 95; see Freese (1930) 1967, 470-473; Isaac 2004, 87-88. 
97 Isaac 2004, 89. 
98 Cicero, De leg. ag., II, XXXV: 95; see Freese (1930) 1967, 470-473. 
99 Cicero, De leg. ag., II, XXXV: 95; see Freese (1930) 1967, 470-473. 
100 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.3. 
101 Ammianus, RG, 31.3.8; Jerome, Ep. LX, 16. 
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when depicting about the Huns. On the other hand, Roman authors’ view of the Huns’ hard living 
conditions, not only in the mountains, but also on the uninhabited steppes could support the image 
of the Huns nature and on their activities as brutish. Ammianus uses the image of mountains to 
emphasize the Huns’ harsh living conditions and life: “roaming at large amid the mountains and 
woods, they [the Huns] learn from the cradle to endure cold, hunger and thirst”.102  
Strabo, a geographer from the time of Augustus, also favours images of people living in severe 
conditions as ruthless raiders who pose a constant threat low-land cultivators, though Strabo also 
emphasizes that “some local characteristics of a people come by nature [location] others by custom 
and practice”. Such claims indicate that Strabo creates images of human qualities as caused by the 
social environment rather than environmental determinism.103 It has been considered that the reason 
for the modification is Strabo’s goal to speak on behalf of constitutional components in favour to 
Augustus’ regime in new regions.104 However, according to Strabo, without the blessing of a good 
regime, people in the mountains are hideous raiders like in Corsica, Sardinia, the Balkans, Lebanon 
and Southern Syria:105  
 
[Corsica] affords such a poor livelihood – being not only rough but in most parts absolutely impracticable for 
travel – that those who occupy the mountains and live from brigandage are more savage than wild animals. [...] 
the nature of wild beasts […] is manifested in them. 
… [in Sardinia] fruitful districts are continually ravaged by those mountaineers […] they live in caverns […] 
they pillage the lands of farmers – not only of the farmers on the island, but they actually sail against the 
people on the opposite coast. 
… [those] who inhabit the greater part of the Haemus Mountain, are called brigands even by the brigands.  
… [in Libanus] all the mountainous parts are held by Ituraeans and Arabians, all of whom are robbers, but the 
people in the plains are farmers; and when the latter are harassed by the robbers at different time they require 
different kinds of help. 
 
Notable in the descriptions of all of the mentioned places is that for Strabo there is no difference at 
what point of the compass the mountain dwellers come from; that is to say, it is the destructiveness 
of their raids that defines their human characteristics and why they are described as the most 
hideous people.  
A reason why I pay particular attention to the descriptions of mountain dwellers is that they are 
described as raiding villages and cities in a similar way to the Huns.106 Therefore, it is no surprise 
                                                 
102 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.4; Jerome, Ep. L X, 16. 
103 Strabo, Geog., 2.5.26; see Isaac 2004, 92. 
104 Strabo, Geog., 2.5.26; see Isaac 2004, 91-92, 407, 410. 
105 Strabo, Geog., 7, 5: 7, 12. 
106 See chapter 2.2. 
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that mountain people are occasionally connected to the Huns. The mountain regions were also 
inhabited by the Huns, e.g. next to the Carpathians and the Caucasus, and contemporary authors’ 
references to the mountains in their descriptions of the Huns offered a possibility to emphasize the 
image of the Huns as mountain dwellers who make unexpected raids and generally caused threat. 
Jerome, for example, compares the Huns to wolves from the mountains when he describes them 
crossing the Caucasus and to pillaging the regions of modern Turkey, Lebanon and Syria at the end 
of the fourth century: “the wolves [the Huns] were let loose upon us from the remotest fastnesses of 
Caucasus and in short time overran these great provinces”.107 Ammianus also mentions mountains 
in stories about the attacks of the Huns that create an image of a threat from afar. In addition, the 
image is strengthened by comparison to the powers of nature, not animals this time but a storm:108 
 
a race of men hitherto unknown [the Huns] had now arisen from a hidden nook of the earth, like a tempest of 
snows from high mountains, and was seizing or destroying everything in its way […] from the fields that were 
already exposed to the thuderbolts of a foreign war [caused by the Huns] 
[…] He [Ermenrichus, leader of some Goths in areas between the Dnepr and the Dniester] was struck with 
consternation at the violence of this sudden storm. 
 
Even if raids were claimed to be common behaviour for mountain dwellers, it was said to be typical 
for nomads as well. Thus even though the varied environmental conditions offered a wide variety of 
images for Roman authors to describe the Huns’ particular features, it was especially their way of 
life, their nomadism, that primarily influenced the way the Huns were depicted.109 In short, even 
though the Huns arrived from the vicinity of the Caspian Sea to dwell in the lower Danubian 
regions at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries, this does not seem to have changed the overall 
tone of the images created for them – the Huns remained fierce warriors who were not expected to 
respect common rules.  
                                                 
107 Jerome, Ep. LX, 16. 
108 Ammianus, RG, 31.3.2, 31.3.8; cf. Livy, Ab ur. cond., 5, 38.17.9.-10; Florus, Ep. bel., 1.27.3-4; see Isaac 2004, 90-91. The 
image of mountains as the site of uncontrolled powers was strengthened by claiming that thunder often occured there. It is 
possible that this might have influenced the connection of the image of thunder with the nomads’ attacks, albeit the 
connection may also be derived from the writers aim to bring more liveliness to the narration by using poetical expression. 
Generally speaking, thunder is one of the most favoured topoi used by the Greeks and the Romans to describe the scene of 
wars and conflicts. 
109 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.17. E.g. Ammianus sees that especially in the case of nomads, the way in which people gain their 
living, i.e. their nomadic way of life, defines their characters. This is apparent in Ammianus’ description of the Alans, where 
he states that “but although widely separated from each other and roaming over vast tracts, as Nomads do, yet in the course of time they have 
united under one name, and are, for short, all called Halani because of the similarity in their customs, their savage mode of life, and their 
weapons”. 
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With reference to this, Isaac interestingly notes that Greek and Roman authors did not consider 
migration from one area to another to have a strong effect on human nature.110 However, mixed 
people were claimed to be the most inferior, especially because people had lost their special 
characteristics when mixing with others.111 Even though the image of mixed people as less 
admirable derived from the interest of the Greek and the Roman elite in defending their position 
against newcomers, still the view also supported authors in creating an image of nomads who 
favoured temporary alliances with changing partners as despiteful people. This might well be the 
reason why descriptions of the Huns often point out that they were a mixed race and that they did 
not know their origin.112 This is the view that e.g. Ammianus stresses when he states: “None of their 
[the Huns] offspring, when asked, can tell you where he comes from, since he was conceived in one 
place, born far from there, and brought up still farther away … In truces they are faithless and 
unreliable … [and] often quarrel with their allies”.113 
To summarize, the descriptions of the Huns by Late Roman authors show that they used images that 
reflected the notion that the environment affected human behaviour and appearance. Because one’s 
way of life was also claimed to cause certain type of human characteristics in general and in the 
case of nomads in particular, the effect of a nomadic way of life on Late Roman authors’ accounts 
of the Huns is the topic of the following section. 
 
 
2.2. Images of Nomads and Nomadic Way of Life 
 
In ancient literature nomads are generally described with negatives; nomads are characterized by 
features what they either do or do not have.114 The common images of nomads and a nomadic way 
of life during antiquity are well presented in the Sumerian poem “Marriage of Martu [nomad]” from 
the third millennium BC:115 
 
And behold, their [nomads’] hands are destructive, (their) features are (those) [of monkeys] 
                                                 
110 Livy, Ab urb. cond., 5, 38.17.9.-10; Florus, Ep. bel., 1.27.3-4; cf. Isaac 2004, 90-91. In general it seems that the location of 
the final living area was crucial and was primarily taken into account. 
111 Livy, Ab urb. cond., 37.8.4; see Isaac 2004, 90-91. 
112 Jerome, Ep. LX, 16; Jordanes, Getica, XXIV: 123-126, Priscus, fr.2 in Blockley 1983, 224-225; cf. Ammianus, RG, 
31.3.1-3. The Greeks and the Romans liked to point out the origin and history of a subject. The crux was that the more 
remote origin, the more admirable. Accordingly, nomads wandering lifestyle and vague mixture of people gave an 
opportunity for writers to create an image of nomads as those who have no clear origin. 
113 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.10-11. 
114 Hartog 1988, 204-205; cf. Man 2005, 48; Isaac 2004, 64; Weiss 2007, 7; Schubert 2007, 34-36; Pongraz-Leisten 2001, 204, 
206-207. 
115 Pongraz-Leisten 2001, 204, 206-207. 
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They are those who eat the taboo [of] Nanna [human flesh] [they have] no reverence  
In their constantly roaming around 
[Being] the abomination [of] the temples of the gods, 
Their [counsel] is confused, [they cause] only dis[turbance], 
a man who is clothed in a leather-sack 
a tent-dweller [buffeted] by wind and rain, [who offers no] prayer, 
He who dwells in the mountains, [knows not] the places [of the gods], 
A man who digs up mushrooms at the foot of the mountain, who knows no submission, 
He eats uncooked meat, 
In his lifetime has no house 
When he dies, he will not be buried; 
My girlfriend – why would you marry Martu [nomad]?! 
 
The poem emphasizes the image of nomads as people free from authority and religion. In addition, 
nomads are described as wanderers who do not have a particular place to live but roam in the 
natural environment whose offerings they fully count on. These features are the opposite of those of 
city dwellers and sedentarists, who have temples and houses, customs of preparing food, and an 
interest in rules to maintain society. Furthermore, because nomads are claimed to behave or even be 
like animals this creates and stresses an image of nomads as outsiders to human society. Thus in 
antiquity nomads were considered to embody all the qualities antithetical to the cultivated ideals 
shared by the city-centred culture of the Mediterranean.116 Furthermore, the descriptions of nomads 
were written in order to speak by contrast on behalf of elements common and important for 
sedentarists and their existence.117 
A feature of nomads that Greco-Roman authors especially used to emphasize the view of nomads as 
outsiders to an organized sedentary world is constant wanderings. This is seen in Herodotus’ 
account of the Scythians, where he praises the movement of the nomads as their most striking 
feature compared to sedentarists: “the most important thing which they have discovered is such that 
none can escape again who has come to attack them, and if they do not desire to be found, it is not 
possible to catch them: for they who have neither cities founded nor walls built, but all carry their 
houses with them and are mounted archers, living not by the plough but by cattle, and whose 
dwellings are upon cars, these assuredly are invincible and impossible to approach”.118  
Herodotus’ emphasized mobility and lack of houses and agriculture as crucial features to the 
Scythians’ nomadic way of life, and these descriptions do not differ from those used to represent the 
                                                 
116 Wells 1995, 27, passus Basilov 1989, 5.  
117 Green 1985, 50-51; Berman 2000, 157. 
118 Herodotos, Hist., IV: 46; Stickler 2007, 19. According to Stickler, Ariteas Prokonnesos, who lived during the seventh and 
sixth centuries BC, has written a similar depiction of the nomadic way of life to Herodotus in Arimaspeia. 
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Huns. In what follows I argue that Roman authors described the Huns in ways that were commonly 
used to write about nomads in general. In addition, I point out that the features mentioned in the 
accounts of the Huns are the opposite of the Romans’ sedentary way of life. I thus claim that the 
stories about the Huns are primarily written to emphasize the connection between the Romans’ 
sedentary way of life and the continuation of the Roman world. 
Roman descriptions of the nomadic way of life stressed mobility. Constant wanderings are also one 
of the first features that Ammianus emphasizes in his account of the Huns: “[Huns do not have a] 
settled mode of life and keep roaming from place to place like fugitives”.119 Even though nomads in 
general are known to be mobile, because Ammianus stresses the feature to be common also for 
fugitives, I would argue that the remark is given in order to point out the difference between the 
Huns and the Romans. Ammianus writes that the Huns do not share the ideals of sedentary Roman 
society where permanent living in houses and a concentration in certain regions was the basis of a 
happy life. The image of a life of perpetual movement as miserable is implied by Ammianus’ 
remark that among the Huns “not even a hut thatched with reed can be found among them. But 
roaming at large amid the mountains and woods, they learn from the cradle to endure cold, hunger, 
and thirst”.120 If a mobile life was claimed to cause hardships, the image was further strengthened 
by claiming that it did not differ from the life of animals. 
The view that a life of constant movement is comparable to that of animals was common in 
antiquity.121 Cicero’s stories about early human society and the first humans, who are described as 
living like nomads, stress this notion. Cicero depicts the first humans as wandering “at random over 
the fields” and hence they lived in “the fashion of beasts”. Furthermore, Cicero claims that the 
wanderings point out that the first humans did not “do anything by means of the reasoning powers 
in their mind; but almost everything by bodily strength”.122 That is to say, Cicero creates an image 
of the wandering way of life gaining a living only directly from nature, as insane and bestial, and as 
opposed to human reason. The lack of interest in gaining living out of the soil is directly contrasted 
with the Greeks’ and Romans’ appreciation of agriculture,123 which was considered to bring welfare 
encouraged logical behaviour.124  Accordingly, rejecting the opportunity to till the soil was seen as 
                                                 
119 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.10. 
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insane and stupid behaviour.125 The view is stressed clearly by Isocrates: “The difference between 
humans and animals lay, in the Greek view, not only in the obvious superiority of human reasoning 
but in the extent to which man had used his powers or reasoning to ameliorate his own condition 
and ensure his survival by growing crops”.126  
Isocrates’ comparison of a lack of agriculture with the life and thinking of animals stresses the 
notion that because agriculture was uncommon for nomads one could claim that they live like 
animals. Ammianus states directly that among the Huns no one “ever plows a field or touches a 
plow-handle”.127 Ammianus strengthens the connection between lack of agriculture and the animal-
like nature of the Huns by stories about their diet – Ammianus states that the Huns “eat the roots of 
wild plants” and “[The Huns] have no need of fire … [they eat] half-raw flesh of any kind of animal 
whatever, which they put between their thighs and the backs of their horses, and thus warm it a 
little”.128 Particularly the reference to eating raw meat created an image of the Huns living like 
animals: they hunted the meat and ate it as such. The view is referred to by Claudian when he 
writes: “the chase supplies their [the Huns] food, bread they will not eat”.129  
Their lack of agriculture and their custom of eating raw food emphasized the animality of Huns,130 
along with their way of gaining a living, namely raiding and pillaging.  
Roman authors not infrequently represented nomadic raids as similar to the attacks of wolves or 
beasts. This is stated directly by Eusebios: “the wild nomad tribes, no better than savage beasts, 
assail the nations of civilized men, ravage their country, and enslave their cities, rushing on those 
who inhabit them like ruthless wolves of the desert, and destroying all who fall under their 
power”.131 Eusebios’ image of nomads as wolves who come from uninhabited regions and cause 
harm for sedentarists is also presented by Priscus when he writes that “like wolves they [the Huns] 
attack and steal”.132 Jerome, too, emphasizes the image of the Huns acting like wolves when they 
pillaged the areas of modern Libanon and Turkey at the end of the 4th century: “the wolves [the 
Huns] were let loose upon us”.133 
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If nomads’ activities and their basic features of life were claimed show that they behaved like 
animals, the image was strengthened by claiming that their human nature was also comparable to 
animals. Seneca the Younger, for example, claims that the Scythians are living “in the manner of 
lions and wolves, who can neither serve nor command, for they do not have the power of a human 
intellect but a wild and unmanageable one”. 134 Ammianus also utilizes the image of nomads as 
those who lack basic human reasoning when he depicts the Huns: “like unreasoning beasts, they are 
utterly ignorant of the difference between right and wrong“.135 Jerome’s representation of the Huns 
does not differ much from Ammianus’, though Jerome describes the Huns as differing from 
common men in their appearance and their close contact with animals. He describes Huns as “men 
who cannot walk afoot and fancy themselves dead if they are unhorsed”.136 Claudian’s comparison 
of Huns with Centaurs is simlar: “Their [the Huns] double nature fitted not better the twi-formed 
Centaurs to the horses that were parts of them”.137 Put briefly, the comparison with Centaurs 
stresses the image of Huns as half-humans, half-animals and thus they are clearly considered 
outsiders to human society.  
The image of nomads acting in general like animals is also found in stories about nomads’ society. 
The general claim was that nomads do not have laws and they are not righteous in their acts. 
Because laws and order were central to the Romans and the Roman world, then the nonexistence or 
dislike to laws clearly emphasized that the nomads were non-Romans. In addition, stories about the 
life of nomads being chaotic and brutish because of a lack of laws emphasized that in the Roman 
world laws and the lawful life were good and should be maintained, otherwise the result would be 
the same as among nomads. Ammianus is one of the late Roman authors whose description of the 
Huns is clearly written according to this view.  
Ammianus claims that the Huns had no permanent leaders, and they chose them according to 
necessity: “when deliberation is called for about weighty matters, they all consult as a common 
body in that fashion. They are subject to no royal restraint, but they are content with the disorderly 
government of their important men”;138 Furthermore Ammianus points out that the lack of 
permanent rule caused disorder to the lives of Huns and they could not form a strong unity or 
society: “[the Huns] often quarrel with their allies without provocation, more than once on the 
same day, and make friends with them again without a mediator”.139 Even though temporary 
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alliances and leaders are common for Eurasian pastoralists to arrange their activities, still 
Ammianus claims that the Huns live “without law” and that they are so disorganized that they 
cannot keep promises: ”In truces they are faithless and unreliable, strongly inclined to sway to the 
motion of every breeze of new hope that presents itself, and sacrificing every feeling to the mad 
impulse of the moment”.140 
Procopius’ description of the Huns emphasizes a similar view of the nomadic way of life as the 
opposite of the organized and good life of sedentarists, because the nomadic way of life is claimed 
to lack the most central features of civilized human society.141 The image is well seen in Procopius’ 
account of the Epthalite Huns, when he compares their sedentary society and that of their cousins, 
the nomad Huns:  
 
the Epthalitae Huns … are of the stock of the Huns in fact as well as in name; however they do not mingle with 
any of the Huns known to us, for they occupy a land neither adjoining nor even very near to them … indeed 
their city, called Gorgo, is located over against the Persian frontier … For they are not nomads like the other 
Hunnic peoples, but for a long period have been established in a goodly land. As a result of this they have 
never made any incursion into the Roman territory … They are the only ones among the Huns who have white 
bodies and countenances which are not ugly. It is also true that their manner of living is unlike that of their 
kinsmen, nor do they live a savage life as they [the Huns] do; but they are ruled by one king, and since they 
possess a lawful constitution, they observe right and justice in their dealings both with one another and with 
their neighbours, in no degree less than the Romans and the Persians.142 
 
Procopius’ view that the sedentary way of life encourage a “good” life becomes especially clear in 
the claim that because the Epthalite Huns “are ruled by one king, and since they possess a lawful 
constitution, they observe right and justice in their dealings both with one another and with their 
neighbours”. At the same time the statement includes an image of the life of the Huns as uncivilized 
because it lacks all the listed features. The view is straightforwardly stated by Procopius when he 
concludes that the Huns’ “live is a savage life”. 
My final remark how Roman authors generally described nomads and the nomadic way of life 
concerns claims of religious behaviour. Roman authors often represented nomads as lacking holy 
places, such as temples. The fact that they do not believe in gods leads them to be ignorant of right 
and wrong in life, a type of behaviour that the Romans by contrast wanted to avoid. Cicero’s 
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description of the life of early human society and the first humans includes features that are 
generally connected to the nomadic way of life, especially a lack of trust in gods and the absence of 
rightful acts: “No attention was as yet paid to any considerations of the religious reverence due to 
the gods, or of the duties which are owed to mankind: no … legitimate marriage, no … equal 
law”.143 Ammianus also presents the Huns as lacking in religion and in trust in faith in gods: “[the 
Huns] are utterly ignorant of the difference between right and wrong … never bound by any 
reverence for religion or for superstition”.144 
In conclusion Roman authors in general depicted nomads and the nomadic way of life as having the 
opposite features with features opposite to the Romans’ sedentary way of life, thus representing the 
nomads as less admirable. Accordingly, the Late Roman authors’ goal to describe the Huns 
nomadic background was merely done so as to emphasize the greatness of the Romans and the 
elements common to their own culture, and not to provide exact information about the nomadic 
newcomers. This is supported by the notion that the accounts of the Huns do not include any special 
characteristics of their nomadic way of life, namely Eurasian pastoralism, but only echo the 
common images of nomads written over the centuries by sedentary authors. I also consider that the 
generally favoured images of nomads dictated how and what the Late Roman authors said about the 
Huns. These emphases were related to education, how to write as a skilled literary man, and in the 
following section I study the effect of the norms and expectations of fluent writing on the accounts 
of the Huns. 
 
 
2.3. Educated Storytelling and the Accounts of the Huns 
 
In Roman literature the way in which a story is told is as important as the story itself.145 
Accordingly, when the Roman authors wrote about the Huns in their history works, letters or some 
other pieces of texts according to their purposes, the depictions of the Huns followed the rules of 
style and ways of presenting favoured in their time and expected by an educated audience.146 Thus, 
all the information we have on barbarians is accessible only through the prism of an “interpretatio 
Romana”.147  
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The purpose of this chapter is to study the different elements of presentation that the contemporary 
Roman writers used when they wrote about history works or descriptions that are related to the 
recent past and include depictions of the Huns. The texts are all unofficial in nature and mainly 
written by writers who lived during the years 370 - 460. That is to say, they are contemporaries who 
wrote at the time when groups of Huns arrived on the borders of the Roman Empire and formed an 
alliance that threatened the Romans, until after the death of Attila when the coalition broke down. In 
other words, it is a question of a time when there were no former descriptions of the Huns or only a 
limited number which writers could utilize in their works. Given these facts, we can detect how the 
writers used what they had learned to represent the newcomers, nomadic Huns.  
I also pay attention to some of the depictions of the Huns that are written at the end of the fifth or 
during the first half of the sixth century, because they contain a number of quotations from former 
authors’ descriptions of the Huns. The most important of the writers is Jordanes and his work 
History of the Goths. Here descriptions of the Huns that were written at a time when most of the 
Hun groups had moved away from the vicinity of the Roman Empire and there were very few alive 
who could have told about the times of the nomadic threat, disclose how the authors’ education 
affected the way Huns and their transactions were depicted. However, at the same time the 
descriptions of the Huns reveal the underlying goals of the authors – stories about the Huns from 
the past are used as camouflage to the views that are important to the author(s). 
The topics of the works that include descriptions of the Huns vary from Jordanes’ The History of 
the Goths/ De summa temporum vel origine actibusque gentis Romanorum [Romana] & De origine 
actibusque Getarum to Sozomen’s History of the Church/ Historia ecclesiastica. By comparison, 
Ammianus and Eunapius devoted themselves to writing a continuation of the former authors’ 
history of Rome: Ammianus extending Tacitus and Eunapius continning Dexippus.148 All of these 
works are preserved completely or almost completely. We lack only some passages from 
Sozomen’s ninth book and from Ammianus’ Res Gestae we have the last 18 books of 31. This 
offers quite extensive material to explore studying how Sozomen’s and Ammianus’ educated 
style.149 By comparison, Eunapius’ Universal History is only preserved as fragments and this is also 
the case with Priscus’ and Olympiodorus’ works.150 Because the fragments belong to a collection of 
passages that concentrates on a certain topic and was written centuries after the 5th century, the 
primary topic of the author is not known with full certainty. Neither can we analyse the style as 
completely as in the case of complete preserved works.151 However, this does not prevent us from 
                                                 
148 Eunapius fr. 15 in Blockley 1983, 20-21; see Dorey 1966, 145; Rolfe 1982, xv;  Blockley 1981, 1-2, 32. 
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observing the elements that were expected to be used in the presentation, with the emphasis on the 
goals and views of an educated writer.  
The fragments of Priscus’ work suggest that his interest was to tell about the connections between 
barbarians and the Romans in the Eastern part of the Roman Empire in the recent past and the 
immediate present.152 Olympiodorus had interests similar to those of Priscus, but he seems to some 
extent to have preferred the style of a commentary.153  Moreover, a fragment from Olympiodorus’ 
work includes a declaration that his purpose was only to collect information about events for others 
who might be interested in writing about the decades at the turn of the 5th century, and not to write 
history himself.154  
Finally, we have a few scanty depictions of the Huns that are found in poems or letters. Claudian 
mentions the arrival of the Huns in a panegyrical poem, whereas the contemporary transactions, for 
example the Hun groups’ raid on Syria, are Jerome’s topics in a letter to a friend.155 Although 
poems and rhetoric had mainly different demands for eloquent presentation than histories, historians 
utilized many of the elements used in poems and rhetoric.156 Furthermore, letters to friends were 
also seen as a piece of work that called for sophisticated presentation not only to delight the friend 
but also because letters could be published later on to demonstrate one’s own or a friend’s 
reputation as a talented writer.157 That is to say, letters and lengthy history works both shared the 
need to be written as elegantly as possible because they were intended for a wide audience. 
Therefore, in every piece of text that includes descriptions of the Huns it is worth considering the 
following two points.  
First, if we know what kind of presentation or style, the “form of a text”,158 contemporary writers in 
Late Antiquity were expected to follow and aimed at so as to write according to educated manners, 
we may discern how these customs affected the way in which information on the Huns was 
presented. Second, did the authors use educated manners to comment on a topic important to 
themselves, e.g. political issues, while describing the Huns. 
 
                                                 
152 Blockley 1981, 49-51; Platnaeur 1976, vii, xiv-xiv.  
153 Blockley 1981, 32, 47. 
154 Olympiodorus, Testimonium, in Blockley 1983, 152-153. 
155 Jerome, Ep. LX; Claudian, In Ruf., 323-331; see Platnauer 1976, 48-51. 
156 Sarasti-Wilenius 2007, 382. 
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Apollinaris. 
158 Kraus, Woodman 1997, 2. 
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Literary presentation had its norms and expectations that were partly influenced by rhetorical 
presentation.159 The traditional form of writing a historical text included a prologue, a praefatio that 
was expected to begin the work and include a declaration concerning the glorious purposes of the 
work. In addition, in the prologue the author praised their famous supporters and stated how 
difficult a task the writing had been.160 This is done by Eunapius and Jordanes, for example, who 
stress the issues in the first passages of their work before giving some remarks on the Huns.161 Also 
the high priorities of a work of history, like telling the truth or educating the younger generations, 
were customarily presented in the opening passages.162  Furthermore, in a traditional declaration the 
author told about the greatness of the brave deeds of the Romans or an Emperor.163 Other common 
topics were moral or humorous lessons.164 Despite the declarations, histories were basically a 
mixture of topics under the main declaration. Accordingly, there were no strict rules what a history 
work should be about, and the works vary from panegyrics to military handbooks or biographies.165 
Despite the many topics that were emphasized, the barbarians were never the main interest of the 
authors; barbarians were only discussed about in relation to Roman political interests.166 This is also 
seen in Eunapius’ work when he refers to the Huns. Eunapius only briefly mentions the Huns as 
groups whom the Emperor Theodosius I hired as his mercenaries.167 Because the Huns were helpful 
to the Romans, it is likely that this is the reason why Eunapius did not present any bitter comments 
on the Huns as he generally did about barbarians.168 
A political perspective, including moral aspects, was always central in the Roman writers’ 
descriptions of barbarians. There were learned stylistic customs, topoi, how barbarians, who were 
mainly considered enemies of the Romans, were to be depicted.169 According to these topoi 
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barbarians were despicted as having the opposite features of those esteemed by the Romans. First, 
barbarians were claimed to live without rightful order or laws and were considered untrustworthy. 
Second, their behaviour and appearance was wild or exceptional, and they were represented as 
neing mentally weaker than the Romans. Claims how barbarians could not speak properly and that 
their diet differed crucially from the Romans were some of the most central elements of barbarian 
topoi. A common claim was also that barbarians are cruel and their life is hard. Jordanes’ 
description of the Huns clearly follows these expectations:170 
 
This cruel tribe […] were fond of hunting and had no skill in any other art.  After they had grown to a nation, 
they disturbed the peace of neighbouring races by theft and rapine […] As many as they captured […] they 
sacrificed to Victory […] they had, if I may call it so, a sort of shapeless lump, not a head, with pin-holes 
rather than eyes.  Their hardihood is evident in their wild appearance, and they are beings who are cruel to 
their children on the very day they are born.  For they cut the cheeks of the males with a sword, so that before 
they receive the nourishment of milk they must learn to endure wounds […] alert horsemen, broad shouldered, 
ready in the use of bow and arrow, and have firm-set necks which are ever erect in pride. Though they live in a 
form of men, they have cruelty of wild beasts. 
 
Because Jordanes lived almost a hundred years later, when the might of the Huns was gone, his 
claims are not based on his own observations, but are written according to barbarian topoi. 
Although it was a commonplace to write disparagingly about barbarians and especially nomads, 
praising words are also found. However, if a writer praised the barbarians other than for their 
strength in battle, it was generally an implicit criticism of the Roman government. This was the case 
e.g. of Tacitus’ Germania: the image of unspoilt barbarians far from the Roman borders was a topos 
itself and a favoured tactic to point to the moral corruption of the Romans.171 This tactic is also 
favoured by Priscus, a member of a delegate sent by Theodosius II in 449, in his narration of the 
trip to meet Attila and the Huns. 
Priscus’ text includes a story about a Greek who he met among the Huns and with whom he had a 
discussion.172 The Greek tells that he had lived among the Huns for many years and his life was 
now better than in the past under Roman rule because there was more freedom: “[the Greek] now 
enjoyed a better life than he had previously. He continued, saying that after a war men amongst the 
                                                 
170 Jordanes, Getica, XXIV, 123, 125, 127-128 in Mierow 1960, 85-87. 
171 Grüen 2011, 354; Dorey 1966, x. 
172 Blockley, 1981, 59. Blockley notes that the story presenting a discussion between a Roman and a local on the state is a 
common topic in histories. Thucydides, for example, tells about a dialogue between two people in which both sides present 
their opinions which explain the background of the political or military situation. Priscus’ story about the dialogue with the 
Greek reminds one in some respects of Lucian’s story about a Greek and a Scythian having a lively discussion about their 
respective cultures in Toxaris/ Amicitia. The topos of placing in the mouths of others opinions that are hostile to the 
authorities is also used, for example, by Ammianus and Procopius. 
 42 
Scythians live at ease, each enjoying his own possessions and troubling others or being troubled 
not at all or very little. But amongst the Romans, since on account of their tyrants not all men carry 
weapons, they place their hope of safety in others”.173 The Greek points out that not even laws bring 
safety or guarantee a good life among the Romans because justice can be gained only by paying out 
money: “In peace misfortunes [in the Roman Empire] await one even more painful than the evils of 
war because of the imposition of the heavy taxes and injuries done by criminals. For the laws are 
not applied to all. If the wrongdoer is rich, the result is that he does not pay the penalty of his 
crime, whereas if he is poor and does not know how to handle the matter, he suffers the prescribed 
punishment […] this may be the most painful thing, to have to pay for justice”.174 The Greek’s 
claims lead Priscus to speak about the current political situation in the Eastern Roman Empire. 
The crux of the Greek’s claims is that a happy life is dependent on the ability of society to 
guarantee an individual’s freedom. Priscus’ counterargument is that life without rules, as he claims 
is the case among the Huns, guarantees no freedom at all because everything depends on fat which 
cannot be trusted. To stress this view Priscus contends that the Greek had only achieved his 
freedom among the Huns by accident.175 By comparison to the nomadic way of life, Priscus argues 
that among the Romans laws guarantee freedom, pointing out that because the laws bring order and 
stability, the Romans should have a happier life than the Huns.176 At the end of the dialogue the 
Greek agrees with Priscus that there is nothing wrong in the basis of the Roman way of life,177 but 
he still does not give up his claims that everything is not in order at the moment in the Roman 
Empire as the final phrase of the dialogue indicates: “the laws were fair and the Roman polity was 
good, but that the authorities were ruining it by not taking the same thought for it as those of 
old”.178 That is to say, the Greek still emphasizes that those who govern the Roman polity at the 
moment are ruining the state and making everyone’s life harder than it ought to be because they do 
not respect and act according to laws. The fact that the whole dialogue ends with these words 
indicates that Priscus agrees with the Greek and criticizes the present state of affairs.179 
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The accusation that Roman officials no longer any more respect justice and laws is severe 
especially because fair laws and acting according to them were regarded as the major differentiating 
factor between the Romans and the barbarians.180 Accordingly, Priscus’ dialogue with the Greek 
then implies that the life of the Romans would make no difference to the life of the barbarians, who 
are generally represented as having miserable and chaotic lives where there is no room for sensible 
rules.181 Furthermore, the claims that the laws are no longer respected strikingly points to the 
incompetence of the Emperor. In Late Antiquity the Emperor was conceived of as the living law 
personified, the “incarnate law, or reason, or logos of God” and the one who could bring cosmic 
order and harmony to the Roman world.182 
Priscus’ bitter evaluation of Theodosius II as an incompetent Emperor is claimed to derive from 
Priscus’ resentment of Theodosius policy to weaken the position of the landowning elite, the single 
class that Priscus clearly supported and belonged to himself.183 The reason for the weakening 
position of the elite was Theodosius II’s decision to collect the tribute payments for the Huns from 
the landowning elite.184 What supports this explanation of Priscus’ bitterness is that Priscus praises 
Marcian, who decided to end the payments to the Huns. In addition, Marcian’s regime is in general 
assessed to be a new Golden Age for the landed elite. On the other hand, Priscus’ history was 
published during Marcian’s regime, and hence this might have had an influence on Priscus’ 
judgements on emperors.185  
Lastly, Priscus’ stylistic nuances in the story about the dialogue between him and the Greek also 
suggest an indirect criticism of Theodosius II. The dialogue provided an opportunity for implicit 
criticism because in a dialogue one is forced to respond to a presented opinion and comment on the 
topic raised.186 According to Blockley, Priscus especially used this method to present views about 
the Roman rulers and their policies, placing the commentary in the mouth of a person in the 
narrative.187 This is precisely the case in the dialogue with the Greek – it is the Greek who claims 
that the Romans live in misery, and this forces Priscus to deal the topic. It may also be no 
coincidence that Priscus’ reply to the Greek’s claims about the happy life of the nomads is in oratio 
obliqua. The style offered a good way to persuade readers to accept the views that the author 
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wanted to stress; it also gave a possibility to soften and disguise criticism.188 What indicates 
Priscus’ hidden criticism is the fact that Priscus does not even try to answer the Greeks’ most 
striking accusations but only responds to the minor ones, which gives the impression that Priscus 
mainly agrees with the Greek. Priscus must have done this on purpose, because a talented rhetor, as 
Priscus was, would have noticed the crucial weaknesses in his own counterarguments.189 
The ending also implies that Priscus knew that fine style at the end of a dialogue would stress his 
qualities as a skilful rhetor. First, the author claims that at the end the Greek accepted Priscus’ 
opinion. Second, according to Priscus, the Greek even burst into tears at the end because he was so 
ashamed of his former views and so impressed by Priscus’ counterarguments. Priscus finale is a 
perfect example how to end a speech or dialogue in Roman literature – it was common to tell about 
the effect of the speech on the listener: the greater the effect the better the speaker. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Priscus claims to have spoken with a Greek, his countryman. The 
Greek’s origin gives more weight and reliability to his criticism of the eastern part of the Empire, 
unlike the criticism made by a barbarian. In addition, Priscus’ description of the Greek as a man 
who had proven his skills in many battles, as a decent Roman or Greek was expected to do, also 
reinforces the argument.190 Moreover, Priscus’ claims to have spoken with a contemporary who 
knew the situation not only among the Huns but also in the Eastern Roman Empire gives more 
reliability to the views presented in the dialogue. 
Taken together, Priscus’ dialogue with the Greek does not primarily tell us about the life among the 
Huns but presents his political arguments. Furthermore, the way in which Priscus constructed the 
story about the discussion with the Greek supports his purpose of criticizing the situation among the 
Romans in the eastern part of the Roman Empire under Theodosius II’s rule, rather than telling 
about the life among the Huns. Even if Priscus had met the Greek, he would not have needed to tell 
about the matters they discussed, if he had not been interested in the topic himself.191 
Another Late Roman author who favours speeches in the descriptions of the Huns is Jordanes. His 
work History of the Goths includes a speech that Attila is claimed to have given before the 
important Battle of the Catalaunian Plains in 451 to raise his warriors’ mettle. Even though Jordanes 
was not even born at the time the battle took place, it did not matter because in Antiquity the 
audience did not expect speeches to be authentic. Second, a speech to an army given by a historical 
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figure before a battle was a highly favoured element in history works to carry the story along.192 
The major requirement of the speech was to reflect the situation and to describe the motives for the 
action. In addition, the aim of the speech was to create an image of the speaker.193 Thus, the image 
of a fierce barbarian leader could be emphasized in the speech that was claimed him to have 
given.194 This is the goal that Jordanes’ narration of a speech supposedly given by Attila aims at. In 
order to stress Attila’s eagerness to stimulate his troops to fight Jordanes has written the speech in a 
form of oratio recta, direct speech.195 Moreover, this was the correct form of speech in such an 
occasion, and hence it is clear that Jordanes was well aware of the expectations and rules of speech 
in history works when he wrote Attila’s speech:  
 
[…] Now when Attila saw his army thrown into confusion by this event, he thought it best to encourage them 
by an extemporaneous address on this wise: “Here you stand, after conquering mighty nations and subduing 
the world. I therefore think it foolish for me to goad you with words, as though you were men who had not 
been proved in action. Let a new leader or an untried army resort to that. It is not right for me to say anything 
common, nor ought you to listen. For what is war but your usual custom? Or what is sweeter for a brave man 
than to seek revenge with his own hand? It is a right of nature to glut the soul with vengeance. […] If any can 
stand at rest while Attila fights, he is a dead man”. Inflamed by these words, they all [the Huns with their allied 
troops] dashed into battle.196 
 
Jordanes’ description of Attila draws an image of a brutish barbarian and fierce enemy who loved 
nothing more than slaughter, though he could also inspire his troops. We may agree that it clearly 
follows the topos of a barbarian leader. At the same time Attila’s words emphasize Jordanes’ ability 
to write impressive speeches, and his rhetorical skills in creating passages that influence the 
crowds.197 In other words, the speech does not reveal anything about Attila or the Huns themselves, 
only about the image that Jordanes is eager to create of their leader. 
Even though the barbarians were in many cases only a secondary theme to be discussed, the Roman 
writers were also interested in knowing more about different barbarian groups. Ethnographical and 
geographical digressions were written in order to tell about the living areas and the barbarian 
inhabitants, who dwelled beyond Roman borders. In addition, they could bring liveliness to the 
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overall storytelling and amuse their readers. Generally speaking, ethnographical digressions were a 
topic that was expected to be found in works of history work and may have been written only for 
the purpose of following the expectations of an eloquent presentation. This was also a topos in the 
genre of history writing. Moreover, digression could be used to strengthen authors’ ideas and goals 
concerning what to foster.198 
Ammianus’ digression on the Huns has not only been considered an impressive ethnographical 
study but also a moral evaluation, a summary of barbarian topoi.199 In short, it is claimed that 
Ammianus clearly follows the rules of history writing and in order to fulfil the expectations of his 
audience he contained the centuries old stereotypes about marginal groups to his history work, e.g. 
the comparison with animals and the claims that their lives were the reverse of civilized societies.200 
Equally, it is considered that Ammianus was clearly a historian whose presentation was based on 
classical tradition not only in the imitation of classical models in terms of language but also with 
respect to structure and ideas.201 Accordingly, both Wiedemann and Stickler regard Ammianus’ 
descriptions of barbarians, like those of the Huns, are primarily descriptive. In other words, 
Ammianus did not intend the statements about barbarian tribes to be descriptive ethnography but to 
be presentations of terrible phenomen.202 Wijma disagrees, claiming that in general ethnographical 
passages in classical literature contain a series of stereotypes associated with barbarians and second, 
ethnographical passages are at the same time not objective descriptions but illustrations of the 
marginality of barbarians.203  
Despite the disagreements of the nature of Ammianus’ description of the Huns, I conclude that the 
use of stereotypes and exaggeration reveals that Ammianus’ goal was to write according to the rules 
of classical writing and eloquent presentation.204 He clearly favours to writing according to 
barbarian topoi. Therefore I tend to agree with the claim that Ammianus’ descriptions of barbarians 
should be regarded as moralizing and formal. However, I also agree with Matthews that although 
the depictions are over-simplified and stereotypical, they also say something about the target – 
Ammianus is clearly interested in presenting some special features (whether imaginary or not) 
about the groups’ sedentary or nomadic way of life.205 Although Ammianus makes clear 
distinctions between sedentarists and nomads, the descriptions of nomads themselves are basically 
alike there are only a few differences between the descriptions of nomadic groups either living in 
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the Arabian desert or on the south Russian steppe.206 Because Ammianus’ description of the 
nomadic Alans is almost identical to that of the Huns, and there is a lot of similarity between stories 
about the Isaurians and the Saracens and those about the Huns,207 I consider that this implies that 
Ammianus writes according to the generally favoured images of nomads that Roman writers 
customarily used.208  
If ethnographical digressions were expected to be found in histories, so were also identifications of 
former barbarian groups by name. It has been suggested that the manner of citing earlier barbarian 
names derived from the belief that former authors had known all the barbarian groups.209 In 
addition, it is supposed that representations were based on psychological aspects: the use of old 
barbarian names emphasized the idea that all barbarians were basically the same and that the 
Romans would once again be victorious against them.210 On the other hand, allusions to earlier 
names were also favoured in order to point to one’s own education, which showed a knowledge of 
former authors’ works and stories.211  
According to Maenchen-Helfen, the Late Roman writers from the western part of the Empire 
primarily called the Huns by their proper name by contrast with the eastern authors who identified 
them as Scythians, Cimmerians and Massagetae the Latin authors shunning the circumlocutions and 
equivocations which the Greeks indulged in.212  
However, I consider the argument simplistic because there is no clear bipartition between the Latin 
and Greek writers in addressing the Huns by former barbarian names. Moreover, it is difficult to 
identify who should be regarded as a western or eastern writer because many of them were born in 
the east but made their career in the west or in both parts of the Empire. If we consider the language 
used in texts, Latin or Greek, there is no divergence in how the writers identify the Huns by former 
barbarian names. What affected to the quoted names more than anything else were the writers’ 
personal style choices as well as the nature of the work.  
It is not fully clear if Claudian used the term Massagetae to refer to the Huns or the Alans.213 If 
Claudian used for on the Huns, then I suspect that Claudian’s goal was to use a synonym for the 
word “Huns” so as to give a more eloquent tone to his writings. It is also likely that Claudian 
wanted to illustrate his knowledge of Herodotus’ eight-hundred-year-old-story about the 
Massagetae, who were claimed to dwell in the vicinity of Artaxes or Volga. In any case, Procopius 
                                                 
206 Matthews 1989, 336, 339, passim. 341; Wijma, 3. 
207 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.21-25, 14.2.1-17. 
208 Matthews 1989, 334-335. 
209 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 6-7; Bowersock 1969, 262. 
210 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 7. 
211 Kraus, Woodman 1997, passim. 4. 
212 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 5-6. 
213 Claudian, In Ruf., 312-321; Ammianus, RG, 31.2.12; Herodotos, Hist., 1.201; see Matthews 1989, 334-335. 
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does not hesitate to identify the Huns with the Massagetae: “Massagetae whom they now call 
Huns”.214 By comparison Zosimus even claims that the Huns could be identified with the royal 
Scythians or the snub-nosed men mentioned by Herodotus; and Philostorgius equates the Huns with 
the Neuroi, mythical people living at the extreme edge of Scythia as told by Herodotus centuries 
ago.215 
In fact, the manner in which Late Roman authors attached old barbarian names to the barbarian 
groups of their time suggests that making these connections was more important than giving exact 
information.216 Furthermore, it is noticed that deference to literary authority could be such that the 
writer’s own experiences were rejected in favour of inaccurate, yet canonically ratified information 
from an appreciated author.217 The old stories about barbarians seem to be so important that 
whenever there was even a vague similarity between barbarian newcomers and earlier groups a 
connection was made. This is apparent, for example, from the Late Roman authors’ identification of 
the Huns with the Scythes.  
Even though the Roman authors may have primarily wanted to point out their knowledge of 
Herodotus’ stories about nomads when naming the Huns as Scythes, the writers might also have 
preferred the connection because the Huns like the Scythes lived according to a nomadic way of life 
and were known to dwell in the vicinity of the Black Sea and the Carpathians. Furthermore, since 
the days of Herodotus, the name of the Scythians had lost its specific meaning and it was widely 
applied to all northern barbarians, whether they were nomads or peasants, spoke Germanic, Iranian 
or any other tongue.218 Although, the name had become rather vague it was still mainly connected 
to nomadic groups; e.g. Ammianus favoured using the name of Scythes as a synonym for the 
nomadic way of life.219 Jerome and Priscus also addressed the name “Scythians” to the Huns, while 
on a few occasions Priscus addresses the name to sedentary Goths.220 Blockley considers that 
Priscus uses the name Scythes for the Huns in order to distinguish them from the Ostrogoths,221 
while in the majority of cases Priscus favours the name Scythes when he writes about the forces that 
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include both the Huns and the Goths.222 It is also probable that the reference to the Scythes derives 
from Priscus’ purpose to cite Herodotus’ story about the “royal Scythes”, nomads who had 
centuries earlier been a powerful group like the Huns in the regions called Scythia.223 
The Late Roman historians’ way of addressing former barbarian names to new groups without exact 
identification suggests that it was derived from the convention of write as an educated man. In other 
words, the information concerning the barbarians, the Huns, was not as important as the form of 
telling and writing according to expectations.224  
It is considered that neither historians nor their public demanded the precise truth in the descriptions 
of the northern nomads, but every writer considered it his duty to display his knowledge of the 
classics. The reason for this is presumably that a knowledge of literature was an indication of 
nobility, and quotations emphasized that connection.225 Finally, what clearly shows that the writers 
were more interested in citing former names rather than identifying the groups precisely is that the 
name of the Huns also underwent a similar procedure during the sixth century, when the name of 
the Huns was addressed to groups that lived in the areas where the Huns had dwelled during fifth 
century.226 
Because reference to earlier works was part of eloquent presentation, stories or depictions of similar 
situations were also imitated by Late Roman historians.227 However, it is also noticed that authors 
used references to earlier authors to point out their cultural background. In short, the historian who, 
for example, wished to be seen as Greek rather than Latin, or vice versa, preferred a different kind 
of historiography. A notion that supports this view is the idea that the classical historiographical 
tradition is claimed to survive between the 4th BC and the 7th AD century only on the Greek side, 
whereas Latin historiography had never been strong and there had been only three great names: 
Tacitus, Sallust and Livy who were especially favoured.228 Although the view is perhaps simplified, 
there may be some truth in it; e.g. Priscus’ descriptions of the Huns include passages from 
Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ narratives.229 Priscus’ claim that the Sword of Ares was sacred among 
the Huns alludes to Herodotus’ tale about the worship of the Sword of Ares among the Scythians.230 
In addition, Priscus’ description of a storm is strikingly similar to Thucydides’ account, and 
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Priscus’ depiction of the Hunnic siege of Naissus introduces parallels to the siege of Plataea in the 
History of Peloponnesian War.231 The story about the Huns arrival in the vicinity of the Roman 
world in Eunapius’ is merely as an adaption of Aeschylus’ tale of Io.232 Moreover, Ammianus’ 
attributes to the Huns are noticed to be equivalent to Pompeius Trogus’ descriptions of the 
Scythians and Pomponius Mela’s accounts about the Germans; there is also a similarity to Livy’s 
depictions of the Africans.233 By contrast, Jordanes who refers at least sixteen different authors does 
not make fine distinction between the backgrounds of earlier authors.234 Furthermore, Jordanes 
adopts many of Priscus’ accounts of the Huns, the most likely reason for this being that Priscus’ 
stories were the widest source on the Huns. 
In general the stories of former authors’ works were more modified than copied, especially 
discussion on beliefs was altered to suit the views of the writer, e.g Jerome compared the arrival of 
the Huns to God’s wrath, whereas Ammianus writes about the wrath of Mars.235 The shift from 
Mars to the Christian God was one sign of the new methods of authentication in histories that were 
employed in response to changing ideas of political and religious authority in Late Antiquity.236 Not 
only were the ideas modified or redefined but historians also became more conscious of the authors’ 
and sources’ background concerning whom to cite in order to gain reliability and foster their own 
views among those who supported similar ideas.237 Thus, Orosius often cited non-Christian writers 
to support Christian contentions.238 In addition, it is noticeable that Late Roman historians were 
prone to mention their sources, oral or written, in order to refute or attack, and this was done to gain 
more reliability or weight for one’s own words and view.239 As a case in point, Ammianus mentions 
his scepticism or approval concerning the oral reports and stories that he uses.240 Eunapius also pays 
attention to oral reports and explores their meaning in order to know more about the Huns.241 Even 
though quotations from witnesses’ stories belong to traditional storytelling, personal involvement as 
a witness or with the witnesses of the events as well as visits to the site where the action took place 
                                                 
231 Thucydides, Hist., 5, 70, 1; 2, 75-78; Priscus, fr 11.2, fr 6.2, fr 12.1 in Blockley 1983, 260-263, 230-233, 280-281; see 
Blockley 1981, 54. 
232 Aeschylus; Prom., 681; Eunapius, fr. 41 in Blockley 1983, 58-59; see Vasiliev 1936, 29; Thompson (1999) 2000, 20-21. 
233 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.11; Pompeius Trogus, Fr. Justin II; Pomponius Mela, De sit. orb., III, 3.2; Livy, Ab urb. cond., 
XXIX.3.13; Manechen-Helfen 1973, 13-15; Thompson (1999) 2000, 20-21. 
234 Jordanes, Getica, XXIV, 121, 123, 125, 127-128 in Mierow 1960, 14, 19, 31-33, 36; Blockley 1981, 2, 28; Scott 1983, 159-
160. 
235 Jerome, Ep. LX; Ammianus, RG, 31.2.1. 
236 Rohrbacher 2002, 150; cf. Grüen 2011, 356-357, passim. 4. Grüen interestingly claims that the Roman authors’ ways of  
combining stories and features common to Romans, e.g. the influence of Roman Gods on the life of barbarians, suggest 
that the authors were not only interested in creating barriers but also in finding connections  between them and the 
barbarians. 
237 Rohrbacher 2002, 154-155; Merrils 2005, 21. 
238 Rohrbacher 2002, 155. 
239 Rohrbacher 2002, 155-157; Bowersock 1994, passim. 8-10, 12-13, 22. 
240 Ammianus, RG, 15.1.1; 16.12.70; 28.1.30. 
241 Eunapius, fr. 41 in Blockley 1983, 58-59. 
 51
were also widely favoured by Late Roman historians.242 The “seen or heard” formula is especially 
used by Ammianus, Olympiodorus and Priscus as well as Sozomen.243 It is considered that in 
general the tone of the histories became more personal in nature during Late Antiquity, and most of 
the historians tell us far more about themselves and their personal experiences than had been 
customary centuries earlier.244 Furthermore, it is argued that neither Ammianus, Olympiodorus, 
Priscus nor Procopius believed that anonymity was a virtue or that their own personal experiences 
were of little consequence in the course of history.245 
Equally, it has been observed that from the fourth century onwards there is a discernible shift away 
from treating international relations, such as the wars between the Romans and the barbarians, 
mainly as a matter of violent conflicts towards approaching them more as a matter of negotiation.246 
In other words, it is the trend of the period to prefer to tell about diplomacy rather than war in the 
historiography.247 This is also seen in the accounts of the Huns – they mainly concentrate on telling 
about diplomatic missions or negotiations and treaties between the Romans and barbarian groups, 
not about battles.248 Especially the preserved fragments of Priscus and Olympiodorus’ works 
emphasize that the authors were interested in telling about the Huns in relation to diplomatic 
missions and to stress their own personal involvement in the events. Olympiodorus writes that “The 
historian [Olympiodorus] describes the embassy on which he went to [the Huns] […] He tells how 
Donatus was deceived by an oath and wickedly killed how Charaton, the first of the kings, flared up 
with rage at the murder and how he was calmed down and pacified with regal gifts”.249 By 
comparison, Priscus’ account of the embassy to the Huns also includes another new and favoured 
manner among historians during Late Antiquity, namely documents: 
 
[…] Maximinus by his pleadings persuaded me [Priscus] to accompany him on this embassy. So, we went 
together with the barbarians and reached Serdica … Attila summoned us through Scottas, and we came to his 
tent … Maximinus advanced, greeted the barbarian, gave him the letters from the Emperor and said that the 
Emperor prayed that he and his followers were safe and well. He replied […] 
They [The Romans from the Eastern part of the Empire and the Huns] held a meeting outside the city mounted 
on horseback … [it was agreed] that the Romans should make no alliance with a barbarian people against the 
Huns … there should be safe markets with equal rights for Romans and Huns; that the treaty should be 
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maintained and last as long as the Romans paid seven hundred pounds of gold each year to the Scythian kings 
(previously the payments had been three hundred and fifty pounds of gold). On these terms the Romans and 
the Huns made a treaty […]250 
 
Priscus’ narration emphasizes that documents brought liveliness and reliability to the flow of 
storytelling and were welcomed in histories because they were primarily seen as useful information 
for future generations. On the other hand, it could be argued that the observations were written in 
order to tell more about the opponent and how the Romans could influence them.251 On the other 
hand, Goffart claims that during the Late Antiquity the rules and expectations of eloquent writing 
still formed a barrier to seeing what was happening among the different barbarian groups, and to 
realizing that the barbarians acted differently and had a dissimilar power base than in the time of 
Tacitus or Herodotus.252 
Even if the Late Roman authors wanted to describe the situation as exactly as possible and the 
learned norms of fluent storytelling influenced the presentation, there was still room for another 
way of storytelling, namely exaggeration. In general exaggeration was one of the rhetorical devices 
used to convince and it is widely known that rhetorical tools were used by historians during 
Antiquity.253 Furthermore, because history was understood as a plot – what had happened or what 
was said to have happened plot – different kinds of interpretations were possible, including 
exaggerating the situations.254 I would argue that Jordanes’ descriptions of the Huns, especially his 
claims of the Huns brutish rule over the Goths, include exaggeration.255 This, I suggest, is done in 
order to rewrite the past so as to support his political purposes. However, some of Jordanes’ claims 
in De origine actibuque Getarum might derive from Cassiodorus’ because Jordanes is claimed to 
have updated Cassiodorus’ narration in his work Gothic History in order to to respond to the altered 
political situation.256  
Whether the story about the Huns’ violent rule over the Ostrogoths during the end of the fourth 
century to the mid fifth century had already been told by Cassiodorus is not known, but according to 
Jordanes the Ostrogoths were forced to follow the nomads in their raids and wars in Roman 
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areas.257 However, the first exaggeration in the narration deals with the unity of the Ostrogoths. It 
has been pointed out that there was no such unity as the Ostrogoths during the end of the fourth 
century to the middle of the fifth century plot – instead there were many separate units and groups 
under those names.258 Furthermore, the transactions of the groups show that they acted according to 
their own interests; at least this was the case with the so-called Ostrogothic groups who operated 
with the Huns.259 This is suggested by contemporary authors’ stories about the activities of the 
groups during the first half of the fifth century. Moreover archaeological remains and nomadic way 
of life indicate that not all of the groups would have been under the submission of the Huns. 
Nomads may well have co-operated with each other and formed a confederation.260  
However, the exaggeration of the Huns’ rule over the Ostrogoths was important for Cassiodorus 
and Jordanes because their goal was to praise the Goths and show that the Goths had a glorious past 
as much as the Romans did. In addition, the aim was to stress that the Goths were proper heirs and 
continuator of the Roman Empire and Roman rule – this was especially important for the Goths 
who had achieved a prominent position in the Roman elite of the turn of the fifth and sixth 
centuries.261 Accordingly, the stories about the mighty rule and power of the Huns who forced other 
barbarian groups, including the Ostrogoths, to join them in pillaging could be told to blame the 
Huns for destroying the Roman Empire and to hide the fact that only a while ago the Goths had 
been as eager as the Huns to profit from the Roman Empire in every possible way.262 In general, 
exaggeration is an easy way to conceal as well as to glorify a state of affairs.  
Lastly, I would argue that the goal to create a grand history of the Goths derived from the genre of 
history writing itself. Writers, like Jordanes and Cassidorus, who had adopted the style and manner 
of writing a coherent history would not have written a history about many fragmented groups who 
were disunited and did not share the same objectives. The aim is implied by Cassidorus’ declaration 
that he “turned the descent of the Goths into Roman-style history”/ “Originem Gothicam historiam 
fecit esse Romanam”.263 Also the story about the greedy Huns who submitted the Ostrogoths to 
their rule was well suited to the genre of Roman authors’ storytelling: nomads were described as 
extreme barbarians who caused destruction. 
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I hope to have shown that the views and representations used by the Late Roman writers in histories 
that include descriptions of the Huns follow the expectations and rules that were part of the genre of 
history writing. I conclude that the descriptions of the Huns in histories are primarily written from 
the perspective of the writers’ own interests and are intended to show their sophistication as 
educated men. It is in this light that we should appraise the information they provide about the 
Huns. 
In the following chapters I will study the kinds of descriptions of Huns that are written from the 
370s to the end of the fifth century, and discuss whether they suggest that the Huns had rulers that 
could be considered kings. I discuss whether the activities of the groups of Huns demonstrate a 
transformation in their nomadic way of life, and whether there are signs that show the rise of a 




































3. THE NEW NOMADIC ARRIVALS? THE FIRST DESCRIPTIONS OF THE HUNS 
 
 
It has been widely discussed whether the nomadic groups, the Huns, who arrived on the Roman 
borders at the end of fourth century were really newcomers to contemporary writers. In this chapter 
I study the kind of information that the first descriptions of the Huns provide us with concerning 
their unity and their movements west. I also explore kinds of frames that the Eurasian pastoralists’ 
nomadic way of life gave to the activities of the Huns. Lastly, I discuss whether he groups of Huns 
caused other barbarian groups advance towards the Roman borders. 
 
 
3.1. The Xiongnu, Ourougoundoi, Khounoi and Chuni: Ancestors of the Huns?  
 
The origin of the many fragmented nomadic groups, known as the Huns, who arrived from the east 
to the vicinity of the northern shores of the Black Sea from the 370s onwards is debated.264 It has 
been argued that the Huns came from the areas of modern Mongolia and are descendants of 
nomadic groups called the Xiongnu, groups of nomads who formed an empire during the third and 
second centuries BC and threatened the Han dynasty with various attacks.265 Because some of the 
nomadic groups that had belonged to the coalition of the Xiongnu moved westwards after the might 
of the Xiongnu collapsed during the first century BC, it has been claimed that the Huns could be the 
descendants of the Xiongnu.266 Other reasons for connection the Huns and the Xiongnu are similar 
artefacts, language and genealogical background. 
It has been thought that e.g. zikades (jewellery which the Xiongnu used as emblem of rank) that are 
found in the graves of the Huns, indicate a heritage left by the Xiongnu to the Huns.267 The same is 
claimed on the basis of huge bronze kettles because the form and decoration are very similar.268 
However, because similar bronze kettles have been found among other nomadic groups, such as the 
Scythians and Sarmatians from Ukraine to Mongolia since the fourth century BC onwards until the 
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arrival of the Huns, the kettles are considered to indicate only a similar nomadic culture.269 In my 
opinion this is very likely. It is also argued that because it is thought that the Huns were 
genealogically Mongoloid and spoken Turkic or Iranian language, the Xiongnu would be their 
ancestors.270 However, the claims have been questioned because some of the skeletons that are 
considered to be “Huns” also include Europid features.271 Moreover, the traces that we have 
concerning the languages spoken by the Huns are mainly the names of groups and individuals 
mentioned by Greek and Latin authors, and they are open to various interpretations.272 Furthermore, 
not even Priscus’ observations on the languages spoken among the Huns prove that Turkic 
languages would have been prominent among the Huns, Priscus writes: “Being a mixture of 
peoples, in addition to their own languages they cultivate Hunnic or Gothic or (in the case of those 
who have dealings with the Romans) Latin. But none of them can easily speak Greek”.273 
Accordingly, it is hard to say what kind of relationship Hunnic or “their own languages” had to a 
Turkic language, and hence I am not convinced that Priscus’ texts would prove that a Turkic 
language was spoken among the nomadic arrivals.  
All in all, although we may agree that although some of the Huns’ ancestors might have descended 
from the Xiongnu and the steppes of Mongolia, nevertheless major acculturation changes would 
have taken place among the nomadic groups who wandered thousands of kilometres from the 
borders of China to the vicinity of the Black Sea between the first century BC and the fourth 
century AD.274 After all, it is likely that some of the nomadic groups settled down and new groups 
joined the wanderers, changing the composition of the groups.275 Equally, it is plausible that 
contacts with traders on the Silk Route along with the mighty neighbouring areas of India and the 
Sassanidian Empire influenced the culture of the nomadic groups during these centuries.276 In 
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273 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 266-267. 
274 Wirth 1999, 16-17; Heather 2005, 149-150. 
275 Harmatta 1952, passim. 278-279; Wirth 1999, 13-16. Generally speaking slaves and spouses from new regions might have 
brought cultural and genetic variation to the groups. Harmatta stresses especially the influence of Iranic-speaking groups 
when the so-called groups of Huns lived in the vicinity of the river Talas. 
276 Stearns, Adas, Schwartz, Gilbert 2001 passim. 96-97; Wirth 1999, 17; Stickler 2007, passim 29-37; Maenchen-Helfen 
1973, 452-5; Heather 2005, 149-150. Stearns, Adas, Schwartz and Gilbert argue that nomadic peoples in general have been 
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addition, because the nomadic way of life does not support acting in larger homogeneous groups but 
in small units which are susceptible to transition, this might cause notable changes on a larger scale. 
Therefore, it is preferable to connect the nomadic groups which the Romans called the Huns with 
the Xiongnu.  
It has also been argued that there is a connection between the Huns and the Xiongnu relating to their 
names. It has been suggested that some groups of Huns could have called themselves Xiongnu 
because the name would have evoked fear, and this would have helped the raiders to attack and 
conquer new regions.277 However, it is not certain whether there were people who called themselves 
“Huns”, for the name Hun/Huni was the invention of Roman authors to identity nomadic 
newcomers. Thus,, the connection between the Huns and the Xiongnu on the basis of names 
remains unclear.278 
While it is better not to connect the Huns and the Xiongnu too closely, it is however suggested that 
the Roman authors would have known groups of Huns even to some extent before the end of the 
fourth century. Groups called “Khounoi” and “Ourougoundoi” refer to nomadic groups that might 
have belonged to the groups of Huns.279 If so, closer inspection of their names may possibly clarify 
what contemporary Roman writers could or might have known about the arrivals. 
It is doubtful that groups of Huns coming from thousands of kilometres away would suddenly have 
appeared on the borders of the Roman Empire, especially because pastures are key elements in 
nomad subsistence and hence nomads do not wander around at random. By contrast, nomads move 
cyclically between carefully designated pastures, and shifting from one set of pastures to another is 
never an accident.280 It is therefore likely that groups of Huns would have lived in the 
neighbourhood of the Caucasus and such rivers as the Volga, the Ural and the Don in the beginning 
of the fourth century.281 Furthermore, Maenchen-Helfen states that literary, epigraphic, 
archaeological, and paleoanthropological evidence indicates the presence of the Huns near the 
Black Sea before the 370 AD.282  
                                                                                                                                                                  
key agents of contact between sedentary, farming peoples and town dwellers in centres of civilization across the globe. 
Furthermore, especially the Silk Road from western China across the mountains and steppes of Central Asia to Europe 
established connections between sedentarists and nomads as well as between different kinds of nomadic groups. 
277 Stickler 2007, 24-25. 
278 Jordanes, Getica, XXIV, 126; Priscus, fr. 2, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 224-225, 258-259, 266-267; Wirth 1999, 12-13; 
Stearns, Adas, Schwartz, Gilbert 2001, 88-89; see Pohl 2003, 585. Wirth suspects that the name of the Huns could have 
been the name of a totem animal of the most influential nomadic group and it is this that the Romans picked up on. 
Nomadic clans or tribes often have a totem, usually in the form of an animal figure which illustrates a mythic ancestor of the 
group and is venerated as the group’s progenitor and protector. Stickler also considers that the Huns’ name could derive 
from an old prestigious name among some nomadic groups. 
279 Ptolemy, Tetra bib., III, 5, 8-10; Priscus, fr. 2, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 224-225, 258-259; cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 23, 
402-405, 427, 449-455; Wirth 1999, 12, 17; Thompson (1999) 2000, 25-26. Stickler 2007, 25-26. 
280 Heather 2005, 149-150; Stearns, Adas, Schwartz, Gilbert 2001, 88. 
281 Kazanski 2007, 78-79; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 444, passim. 452-455; Wirth 1999, passim. 17. 
282 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 444. 
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It has been suggested that a group called by Mamertinus, Zosimus and Agathias the Ourougoundoi 
(Urugundi) could have been Huns.283 However the only aspect that connects the groups is that the 
name Urugundi is of middle Asian origin and hence it would seem to indicate their arrival from that 
district.284 Equally, the presence of Turkic-speaking mercenary troops in the Persian army in Dura-
Europos in the third century speaks strongly in favour of the arrival of new Turkic-speaking 
nomadic groups moving towards Europe from the east. In addition, it is stated that because the 
name of the Huns is mentioned in an Armenian source in the third century, this provides evidence 
of the arrival of nomadic groups in the Roman border areas.285  
Even though such argumentation is based on few sources, it is however certain that groups who 
belonged to, or were neighbours of, the coalition of the Huns in the first half of the fifth century, 
consisted of groups whose names (Amilzur, Tungur, Akazir) indicate Turkic origin, suggesting their 
arrival from the east in the 370s onwards at latest. Incidentally, Ptolemy’s stories in his work 
Geography about the Khounoi and the Chuni, who lived in the areas between the Dniester and the 
Bug in the second century AD, have at times been combined with the Huns.286 However, if the 
Khounoi or Chuni had been the same groups as the Huns, the third- and fourth-century authors 
would not have considered Huns to be nomadic newcomers. 
If we cannot say anything certain about the ancestors of the groups of the Huns, the same holds for 
the reasons for their arrival on the Roman borders.  
It has been claimed that the nomadic groups called Hubs by the Romans were attracted by richer 
grazing lands as well as the wealth in the Black Sea area and Rome. Equally, the possibility of 
increasing trade connections with the Mediterranean world is supposed to have stimulated 
movement westwards. Furthermore, it has been thought that some of the nomadic groups might 
have escaped the dominion of the powerful nomad confederation around the Caspian Sea. In 
addition, it is also believed that the steppe areas between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea 
suffered a harsh drought during the fourth century: this would have caused a shortage of fodder and 
                                                 
283 See Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 452-453; Wirth 1999, 17. I am not totally convinced about the connection between the 
Ourougoundoi, the Urugundi and the Huns. First, Zosimus and Agathias are writers from the sixth century and hence they 
are unlikely to have used the name Urugundi for the groups Mamertinus refers to. Secondly, Mamertinus uses the name 
Burgundi in his Panegyric on Emperor Maximian. However, according to Maenchen-Helfen, Mamertinus’ description of the 
Burgundi must mean the Urugundi because the group is said to dwell further east than the Burgundi were in the fourth 
century and it is common in Latin transcriptions that the initial v- in foreign names was frequently rendered by b-. 
Ultimately, these discussions mean that there is still doubts about the exact identity of the Urugundi. 
284 Wirth 1999, 17. 
285 Zosimus 1, 27, 1; 31, 1; Thompson (1999) 2000, 25-26; Wirth 1999, 17. Wirth refers to but does not discuss the 
Armenian source where the Huns would have been mentioned. 
286 passus Ptolemy, Tetra bib., III, 5, 8-10; Priscus, fr. 2, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 224-225, 258-259; see also Maenchen-
Helfen 1973, 23, 402-405, 427, 449-455; Wirth 1999, 12; Thompson (1999) 2000, 25-26; Stickler 2007, 25-26. According to 
Maenchen-Helfen, evidence is lacking that would prove the existence of Turkic-speaking groups in Eastern Europe even 
before the fourth century. 
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have increased the nomads’ need to find new pastures. Drought would also have led to a shortage of 
food and that combined with an epidemic of plague no doubt encouraged a migration towards the 
Black Sea region. In addition, Wirth claims that some nomadic groups in the Caucasus had waited 
for the right moment to invade the Roman Empire, and when the news came that Valentinian had 
suddenly died (375) and the Roman troops were mainly operating in Iberia and Pannonia, nothing 
held them back. It is suggested that at least some of these nomadic groups would have later on been 
called Huns by the Romans.287 In any case, nomads plan their actions carefully because their living 
is dependent on pastures, and hence we might assume that when the groups of Huns wandered 
westwards, there is no question that it was a sudden impulse - it was a well planned activity of many 
families, kin groups and clans, even tribes. Generally speaking, it has been suggested that not only 
the groups of Huns but also the Alans and some Goths had felt a pressure to migrate westwards. 
That is to say, even if the arrival of the Huns had pushed groups of Alans and Goths further west, it 
was not the only reason for large scale movements of barbarian groups westwards.288  
Contemporary authors’ explanations of the movements of Huns are obscure and few. Sozomen and 
Jordanes tell how the Huns found a way through the impenetrable Pripet Marshes to the lands of the 
Goths either with the help of a heifer or a doe or of evil spirits.289  Another story about the arrival of 
the Huns is from Jerome. He gives a vivid description how Alexander the Great had restricted the 
Huns to the Caucasus but finally God decided to release them in order to punish humankind for 
their at the moment sins.290 
The conclusion is that it was the contacts between the Huns and the barbarian groups as well as the 
Romans at the end of fourth century that finally increased knowledge about the new nomadic 
arrivals. This is the topic of the following chapters. 
 
 
3.2. The Arrival of many “Huns” and actions with the Alans 
  
The first contemporary authors’ stories about the actions of the Huns and especially their contacts 
with the nomadic Alans, reveals what kind of group compositions the Huns formed. In addition, 
knowledge of the early actions of the Huns helps us to evaluate the nature of the leadership position 
                                                 
287 Wirth 1999, 19. 
288 Wirth 1999, 18-19, 28; Heather (1996) 1998, 98; 2005, 150. 
289 Zosomen, Hist. Nov., VI: 37.3; Jordanes, Getica, XXIV: 123-125; Eunapius fr. 41.1 in Blockley 1983, 58-59, 140; passus 
Thompson (1999) 2000, 20-21. 
290 Jerome, Ep., LXXVII, 8; cf. Stickler 2007, 46. 
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among them during the 360s and the 370s. This gives basis to consider later on the claim of arising 
kingship and alleged sedentarization among the Huns during the fifth century. 
The first descriptions of nomadic groups called Huns in Ammianus’ and Claudian’s works clearly 
stress that these groups of Huns were not well known to Roman contemporaries and that they 
appeared unexpectedly. This might partly explain why the descriptions rely on stereotypes about 
pastoral steppe nomads and underline the image of the Huns as a sudden threat, and concentrate 
only on information about their movement towards the Roman borders.291 Ammianus and Claudian 
probably never met the Huns but they summarize the information which they had obtained at 
second hand from military officers, inhabitants and refugees from the north-eastern Roman border 
areas and beyond.292 
Even though Ammianus’ descriptions are merely descriptive, his stories about the arrival of groups 
of Huns and the following circumstances can be relied on to some extent,293 especially because the 
manner in which the Huns moved towards the Roman borders follows Ammianus’ claims.  
Those who first met the groups of Huns during the 360s were fragmented Iranic nomadic groups of 
Alans, who lived east of the River Don. What followed was a clash between the two groups and in 
the end some of the Alans were either subdued by the Huns or they formed an alliance.294 
Ammianus does not say what the terms of the alliance were, but it seems obvious that it guaranteed 
their Iranian partners a considerable degree of independence and share in the loot because the Huns 
and Alans were known to act well in tandem in the following decades.295 In addition, there are no 
indications of internal struggles between them, not even during the first decade of the fifth century 
when most of the groups of Alans left the Huns and joined the Vandals.296 As the conquerors of the 
homelands of the Alans, it is likely that the Huns were a leading party in the forthcoming joint 
actions,297 though Maenchen-Helfen might be right when he states that the Alans, as former 
enemies of the Goths, could have influenced the Huns to continue their wanderings further west and 
to attack the Goths.298 This means that it would have been merely in the interest of the Alans to 
head towards the Don and the Dniester, to the land of the westernmost Goths, the Greuthungi.299 
                                                 
291 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.1, 12; 31.3.1; Claudian, In Ruf., I, 321-324. See Chapter 2. 
292 Claudian, In Ruf., I, 321-324; see Thompson (1999) 2000, 31, passim. 9-10; Stickler 2007, passim. 18-19; Kelly 2008, 18; 
Heather 2005, 158, 204. 
293 Kelly 2008, 22. 
294 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.12; 31.3.1; cf. Bell-Fialkoff 2000, 210-213; Thompson (1999) 2000, 26-27; Heather 1995, 6; Heather 
2005, 147, 151, 195-196. 
295 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 22. 
296 Liebeschutz 2003, 63-67. 
297 Kradin 2005, passim. 150, 153-155, 165.  
298 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 20-22. Quoting Maenchen-Helfen “It was almost certainly the concordia with large groups of Alans 
which enabled the Huns to move against Ermanaric [who headed the easternmost groups of Goths]”. 
299 Manechen-Helfen 1973, 20-21. 
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Even though we do not know the primary reason for the allied groups of Huns and Alans moving 
further west, the sixth century author Jordanes gives a plain explanation: a Hun “king” (rex), 
Balamber, prompted it.300 However, Jordanes is the only Late Roman author who mentions 
Balamber, and it is likely that Balamber never existed.301 I suspect that Jordanes invented Balamber 
in order to create an image of the Huns as formidable conquerors who could subjugate the Goths. 
After all, the defeats against obscure nomadic arrivals would not fit into Jordanes’ story about the 
glorious deeds of the Goths.302 What supports the claim that stories about Balamber being at the 
head of united Huns is fiction, are the fourth-century authors’ stories about many fragmented 
groups of Huns and Alans who acted and formed allainces according to their own interests. That is 
to say during the last decades of the fourth century the groups of Huns did not form a united front 
under a leader.  
Although the existence of a strong Hun king is unlikely, nevertheless the groups of Huns were not 
without leaders and central direction. The need for leaders among nomads is especially required 
during mowement to new areas and in attacks or raids; in other words, during the time when groups 
must gather together in order to have joint action. This was especially the situation of the groups of 
Huns heading towards the borders of the Roman Empire. While nomads might form a larger unit as 
the result of a common interest, this might also be generated by a charismatic leader. If so, this 
might lead to the centralization of power and even in the long run to a nomadic empire.  
In the following section I discuss how the groups of Eurasian pastoral nomads gathered together 
and what happened among the groups of Huns when they came into contacts with the Alans and 
other barbarians in the vicinity of the Roman Empire. I also show how the kinds of frames of 
nomadic life common to Eurasian pastoralists made it possible for a leadership position to emerge 









                                                 
300 Jordanes, Getica, XXIV: 130. 
301 Schreiber 1976, 33, 42, 84; cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 59; Wirth 1999, 28-29; Thompson (1999) 2000, 62-63; Heather 
2005, 356-357. According to Schreiber Balamber might have been a powerful Hun king. 
302 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 20. 
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3.3. The Frames of a Pastoral Nomadic Way of Life and the Actions of the Huns 
 
 
The archaeological remnants that can be connected to the Huns are few, but they support the view 
that the Huns were pastoralists.303 According to Priscus, the Huns lived separately from each other 
and still in the 440s greatly valued horses and this shows that their life included features common to 
Eurasian pastoral nomads.304 This is also apparent in the Huns’ interest in estaböishing permanent 
trading links with the Romans, because what all nomads aspired to are good trading contacts with 
sedentarists.305 Furthermore, the Huns’ constant raids on sedentarists’ areas without taking over the 
areas or putting the conquered groups under their control indicate the common predatory behaviour 
of the nomads.306  
On the one hand, the features do not explicitly prove that the Huns would have been nomads 
because the characteristics could also be found among sedentary groups. Nonetheless, if we 
combine all the elements together and add the fact that Roman authors invariably called Huns 
nomads we can acknowledge that the Huns lived according to a pastoral nomadic way of life.307  
Because the environment can be said to determine what kind of activity, herding animals and 
society the nomads in question can have, the onslaught of the Huns from the Eurasian steppe 
supports a definition of them as expansive Eurasian pastoralists.308 Accordingly, it is on this basis 
that their actions should be evaluated.  
The starting points for Eurasian pastoral nomads’ life are private ownership of livestock and 
corporative ownership of pastures.309 Because herds need wide areas and the pastoral areas must be 
easily reached, pastoralists prefer to live in small segmented units – the basic social unit is the 
household. Furthermore, whenever possible patrilineal relatives camp together and share common 
pastures.310 In other words, families311 and primary kin groups312 form the small and transient camp 
groups which are well adapted to pastoral production.313  
                                                 
303 Cribb 1991, passim 6-12; Anke 2007, 219; Anke, Koch 2007, passim. 19-21; Brosseder 2007, passim. 73; Kazanski 2007, 
passim. 77-79;  Kelly 2008, passim. 23-24, 48-49, 51. In general, the archaeological material that is left by nomads is scarce. 
304 Priscus, fr. 15.4., fr.14, fr. 10 in Blockley 1983, 298-299, 292-293, 240-243; cf. Kradin 2005, 157; Khazanov 1984, 21,33; 
Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 174-178. Isaac and Maenchen-Helfen remark that despite the fact that that some of the groups of 
Huns seem have had smallscale agricultural activity, this still does not prevent them from living as pastoralist because 
smallscale agricultural activity is often found among nomads. 
305 Priscus fr.2, fr.46 in Blockley 1983, 226-227, 352-353; cf. Kradin 2005, passim. 152, 157. 
306 Socrates Scholasticus, Hist. ecc., VII, 30; Priscus, passim. fr. 11.1., fr. 49 in Blockley 1983, 242-243, 356-357; cf. 
Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 82; Kradin 2005, 82.  
307 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.17, 31.2.21; Jordanes, Getica, passim. XXIV, 123-126; Procopius, De bel., III: 1- 6; Priscus, passim. 
fr. 49 in Blockley 1983, 356-357. 
308 Heather 2005, 202-203, 204-205.  
309 Barfield 1993, 147; Khazanov 1984, 123-124.  
310 Barfield 1989, 24. 
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While the camp group the forms basis for herders’ lives, they are not permanent constructions. 
When sons marry they might claim their own share of herd animals and move away. Equally, 
extended families break up, if the number of animals they own rises above the carrying capacity of 
the local pasture. In this case migration and disintegration of the camp group follows. That is to say, 
adaptability to new group compositions and flexibility of movement regulates pastoralists’ life.314 
For this reason it is claimed that nomadic society concerns in general two universal institutions: the 
family, which means parents and children; and the community, which means e.g. camp groups, 
clans and tribes. If the first is more or less a permanent unit, the latter clearly not – it creates only 
overall frames for action. Communities can be defined to detect in three different orders, helping 
one to understand the multilevel structure of nomadic society.315 In what follows I explain these 
levels, before evaluating their possible existence among the Huns. 
The communities in the first order are composed of closely-related families, and their function is 
related to reciprocal help in daily life and the use of the same herding areas in the vicinity of the 
camp.316 The communities in the first order provide the basis for the communities in the second 
order. In brief, many families constitute a clan or a tribe, and often members belong to the same 
kin.317 The communities in the second order gather together especially during times of pastoral 
migration or if there is a need for specific forms of mutual aid. Furthermore, the right to use the 
same pastures and/or water resources at specific times of the year links the groups in the community 
in the second order together.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
311 Khazanov 1984, 126-127. As a rule, nomadic families are not large and do not usually include more than two generations 
of adults. In the majority of nomadic societies, nuclear families, consisting of a husband, wife and their unmarried sons and 
daughters predominate. However, larger families usually break up every other generation. In this respect all known forms of 
nomadic families are closer to nuclear families than to extended families. The family is a single and autonomous, ideally self-
sufficient economic unit. 
312 Khazanov 1984, 128; Kradin 2005, 151. A primary kin group is a number of separate and independent families who are 
very closely connected with one another through ties of kinship, reciprocal relations, common residence, etc. The core of 
these families are made up of a very close micro-lineage who are descended from one closer ancestor and who in the past 
have frequently made up one family – brothers, cousins, uncles, nephews etc. Kin groups pasture all year round or for part 
of the year together and help and support each other. A kin group is considerably less stable than an individual family and all 
the families of a primary kin group run their own household and keep their own livestock. 
313 Barfield 1989, 24. 
314 Khazanov 1984, 121-122; Tapper 1979, 49; cf. Barfield 1993, 147.  
315 Khazanov 1984, 126, 120. Communities categorized into different orders is, of course, an academic concept. 
316 Khazanov 1984, 131-132, 135. Nomadic community is generally defined as a small group (c. 15-20 people) of 
independent households (c. 2-5) which move together toughtout the year or for part of the year. Different communities may 
jointly pasture livestock and/or they are linked to each other by mutual aid, and sometimes even by mutual responsibilities 
and for reasons of defence. 
317 Kradin 2005, 162. According to Kradin, among pastoral Rouran nomads were found clan groupings and lineage based on 
reciprocal and other communal relations, periodical labour co-operation, joint possession of the means production and on 
distant, real and fictitious, genealogical relationships. However, the formation of a community fundamentally derives from 
its relationship to the ownership of key resources such as pastures and water resources that are shared. Rouran nomads were 
groups of Eurasian pastoral nomads who lived in the vicinity of the borders of China in the fourth and fifth centuries AD.  
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Finally, the community in the third order is the largest unit which the nomads form; it is formed by 
several communities in the second order. Its main function is related to the need to take care of 
rights to natural resources on a large scale. Furthermore the community in the third order is needed 
when participating in migrations or raids and conquests or to defend one’s own territories.318 
However, because these actions are rare, also the community in the third order is seldom 
mnaifested. However, one exception to this might be caused by a series of constant conquests which 
result in rise of a nomadic empire – in this case the need for the community of the third order would 
prevail.319  
If we consider the situation among the Huns, it is certain that their westward migration required that 
communities of the second or even third order should appear. In brief, there was a need for small 
nomadic units to from a larger unity for at least two reasons. First, the conquests meant nomads had 
to form large troops under the centralized control of temporary military leaders. Second the 
conquests of new areas caused a need to define the rights to use certain pastoral areas. In other 
words, daily life contacts between groups were replaced by the demand to act as a larger political 
and social organization with a centralized, albeit temporary, leadership structure.  
This being the case, it leads us to study and speak about the conical clan among pastoral herders, 
including the Huns. This is because tribal political and social organization is based on a model of 
nested kinship groups, known as the conical clan.320 Genealogies and descent regulate pastoralist 
life and customs; they are, so to speak, the smaller building blocks on which a larger unity is 
constructed.  
Patrilineal kinship and nested kinship groups are likely to have created a strong social order among 
Eurasian pastoralists. Kinship makes an individual part of the “clan” (i.e. a group of blood 
relatives), and many clans form a conical clan. In this way tribes can take the form of a higher level 
political organization.321 
In short a conical clan is an extensive patrilineal kinship organization in which members of 
common descent322 groups are ranked and segmented along genealogical323 lines.324 In addition, the 
                                                 
318 Khazanov 1984, 134; Kradin 2005, passim. 151. 
319 Khazanov, 1984, 132, 136. According to Khazanov the primary or nuclear community is the “co-operative herding unit” 
an association of 2-5 households for the joint herding of livestock. Primary community usually emerges first and foremost 
from the requirements of production, even if they are not always constant ones. At the same time communities of the 
second and third order are functionally more varied. In some cases they (or their core) are founded on the joint possession 
or use of key resources, in others mainly on the fulfilment of social (and political) functions. 
320 Barfield 1993, 147-149. 
321 Basilov 1989, 5; Barfield 1993, 16, 147-149. 
322 Khazanov 1984, 120-121, 139-140; cf. Marx 1977, 358-359; Kradin 2005, passim. 155.  Descent is based on the construct 
of common mythic forefathers, and hence it largely and loosely connects pastoral groups together. Another reason for this 
is that in descent kinship is conceptualized on many levels. Briefly put, descent establishes an individual’s membership in a 
given society as a whole and in specific subdivisions of this society. As Kradin remarks in the case of Rouran nomads who 
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older generations are considered superior to younger ones, and by extension lineages and clans, 
were hierarchically ranked on the basis of seniority. Furthermore, this genealogical charter is 
important because it justifies rights to pasture (the strongest tribes and clans laid claim to the best 
pastures at the best time of year), creates social or military obligations between kinship groups and 
establishes the legitimacy of local political authority.325  
In general, a segmentary structure suits well to pastoralist because incorporation of outsiders to 
benefits the larger unity of tribal groups. However, it is noticed that among inner Asian nomads a 
segmentary structure was reinforced by local permanent chieftains, whose leadership position 
among their small groups went far beyond the needs of simple pastoralism. When a centralized 
political structure was formed it was still based on a kinship idiom, which was much more complex 
and powerful than those observed among nomads in other regions.326 That is to say, the concept of  
a conical clan may help to explain not only well-defined territorial groups in general but also may 
provide a specific explanation of the history of the Eurasian steppe.327 In addition, we should give 
more emphasis to political factors (and less to kinship models) because shared interests of nomad 
groups (e.g. for raids) played a much greater role in tribal formation than kinship.328 
In any case the elements of kingship and genealogical lines given above give eredence to the claim 
that when the groups of Huns moved as a larger front towards the west forming larger troops and 
conquering new areas, this was followed by a need to share the rights of new pasture areas, and 
suggesting that the structure of conical clans may well have affected activities at some level.329 
There could even have been a powerful and appreciated, senior kinship group who decided to move 
westwards and this activated the initiation of conical clans and encouraged groups of Huns to join 
the migration on a larger scale.330 At the same time the situation arequiredd centralized, albeit 
temporary, leadership to emerge among the ranked groups. The groups of clans needed to choose a 
single primary military leader among their warriors to provide direction and unity during their 
wanderings and possible confrontations.331 
                                                                                                                                                                  
were Eurasian pastoralists and lived next to Chinese border during the fourth and the fifth centuries AD, descent may 
involve both corresponding rights and commitments and sometimes even social positions. 
323 Barfield 1993, 147. Barfield notices that among the pastoralists in Central Asia genealogies have interconnected descent 
groups only loosely together, and “genealogical descent” has been similar to what we would today label “ethnic identity”. 
324 Barfield 1993, 147; Khazanov 1984, 138-144, 173-174.  
325 Barfield 1993, 147; Spooner 1973, 24.; Barth 1973, 18; Khazanov 1984, 140, 173-174. 
326 Barfield 1989, 27. 
327 Lindner 1982, 693. 
328 Lindner 1982, 697-698. 
329 Barfield 1993, 144. 
330 Barfield 1993, passim.148-149. 
331 Lindner 1982, 700. Lindner stresses that among pastoralists common interests were expressed on the ground of action 
and coalition; conceptually, it was understood in kinship terms. This held for groups as well as for individuals. 
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However, in order to be even more precise and know what kind of ties there could have been 
between the groups of Huns who encroached upon the Roman borders, we need to study the 
formation and idea of descent and genealogy, as well as clans and tribes that are related to the 
existence of conical clans.332 Moreover, their importance lies in the fact that they are noticed to be 
the basis for the complex and segmentary structure of nomadic society both on a concrete and 
mental level.333 In addition, they explain how and what kind of leadership positions might emerge 
among pastoralists’ larger unity, i.e. ain tribal formation. 
Descent is based on the construct of a common mythic forefather, and for this reason descent 
largely and loosely connects pastoral groups together. Descent groups are ranked and segmented 
along genealogical lines,334 and in descent kinship is conceptualized on many levels.335 For this 
reason descent at some level regulates how the groups of pastoralists might act. To put it bluntly, 
descent establishes an individual’s membership in a given society as a whole and in specific 
subdivisions of society.336 Accordingly, the concept of common descent supports nomads in 
different genealogical lines to form larger unity (e.g. a conical clan)337 and act on a larger front if 
there is a common interest in doing this.338 
Genealogies are flexible and ideologically enable many groups of nomads to incorporate and re-
organize smoothly according to need. Due to this flexibility in genealogical order, pastoralists of 
Central Eurasia routinely employed genealogical descent to rank tribal sections, and descent was 
used to justify the right to lead others. As mentioned earlier, this was based on the idea of older 
generations being superior in rank to younger generations.339 Accordingly, placement in the 
genealogy defines one’s position in society.340 On the other hand, there is also a possibility that the 
reverse takes place because flexibility in genealogies means that genealogical order can be 
manipulated. For this reason Eurasian pastoral nomads’ history includes periods when powerful 
                                                 
332 Khazanov 1984, 120. Although the concept of  a tribe is often considered artificial, especially within the frames of the 
academic definition “family-lineage(s)-clan-tribe-tribal confederacy”, I support Khazanov’s definition. In short, the model 
should be understood as a loose frame that can be used to form some kind of perception of what we are dealing with. 
333 Barfield 1993, 148; cf. Khazanov 1984, 140. 
334 Barfield 1993, 147. Genealogies interconnect descent groups only loosely together. Barfield considers that genealogical 
descent in central Eurasia has been similar to what we call “ethnic identity” today. 
335 Khazanov 1984, 120-121, 139. Social organization of nomads is fundamentally conceptualized in notions of kinship and 
descent. 
336 Kradin 2005, 155; see also Khazanov 1984, 140; Marx 1977, 358-359. Descent may also involve both corresponding 
rights and commitments and sometimes even social positions. As Kradin notices in the case of Rouran Eurasian pastoral 
nomads, when a hereditary leadership position established itself among nomads, then power was transferred by order of 
succession to the direct or collateral line within the ruling clan. This means that kin also regulates the relationships in the 
distribution of power at the level of a community of the second and third order. In this way descent groups are ranked and 
segmented along genealogical lines. 
337 Barfield 1993, 148-149. 
338 Khazanov 1984, 140. 
339 Barfield 1993, 76. 
340 Lindner 1982, 692. 
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individuals have promoted their ancestors at the expense of declining, genealogically senior but 
politically weak lines of descent. Genealogies have been invented that justify changes in the status 
quo.341 In the world of Eurasian pastoralists’ steppe politics rules were often ignored or abused in 
the pursuit of power.342  
If we think of the situation among the Huns, we cannot rule out the possibility that a new leading 
family or families (of junior descent) were emerging among the Huns and trying to create a totally 
new, or reshape the old, order between senior and junior genealogical descent groups to their own 
advantage when moving westwards and conquering new areas. Generally speaking, the existence of 
many competing families (perhaps even with a power-hungry individual as their military leader) 
and possible competition between different genealogical descent groups could partly explain the 
arrival of many fragmented groups of Huns coming in many waves to the Roman borders. 
However, it is also possible that these groups were not concerned with genealogical descent lines. 
In any case, it is clear that there were only weak, or no senior, descent lines among the Huns uniting 
them to act on a larger front.  
Accordingly, the emergence of more united groups of Huns during the fifth century makes it clear 
that the changes and formataion of genealogical lines of descent should be the forms of research 
into the history of the Huns during this period.343 In fact, the history of the Huns could even be a 
history of the role of the family in creating supercomplex chiefdom. 
However, if we wish to know whether Eurasian pastoral nomads formed a larger unity before 
proceeding to supercomplex chiefdoms, the concept of a tribe and tribal confederations cannot be 
ignored. 
It has been argued that a Eurasian nomadic tribe was a social unit and political organism which was 
open to all who were willing to subordinate themselves to its chief and shared the interests with its 
                                                 
341 Barfield 1993, 148-149; passus Kradin 2005, 152-153. 
342 Barfield 1993, 148-149. 
343 Priscus, fr. 2, fr.11.2, fr.15.2, fr. 9.3 in Blockley 1983, 226-227, 246-247, 258-259, 296-297, 238-239. See Chapters 8- 9. 
Priscus tells that Attila insisted that the Huns called Atakam and Mamas who Priscus mentions to be “children of the royal 
house” of the Huns ( ) and who had fled to the Romans to be sent back to the Huns in order to 
be punished for their alliance with the Romans. The story suggests that Attila, Atakam and Mamas all seem to have come 
from the same ruling genealogical descent. Otherwise, I doubt whether Priscus would have mentioned the existence of a 
“royal house” and Attila would not have been concerned, if some of his allies had abandoned him. In addition, Priscus’ 
remark that Attila was “noble descent, having succeeded his father” ( ) could be taken as a sign of the 
existence and division of senior and junior (or superior and inferior) genealogies among the Huns. The existence of a 
hierarchy between leaders of groups of herders also comes clear when Priscus mentions how leaders among Akatziri had 
senior and junior positions ( ).  
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tribesmen. Shared concerns played a much greater role in tribal formation than kinship partly 
because a tribe’s existence is linked to territory.344  
Each major tribe or groups of tribes have their own region of habitation, and land is considered the 
property of an entire tribe or a group of clans.345 The tribe also forms a local military unit.346 In 
other words, behind the solitary group of a few families wandering on the steppe stood a large 
invisible army of fellow tribesmen ready to carry out revenge on anyone who injured one of their 
own or challenged the tribe’s control to their established regions.347 On the whole, joint military 
activities are also needed when raids are planned, or new herding areas are to be conquered. In 
brief, the need to form a tribe emerged in accordance with necessity – this was particularly the case 
when nomads confronted the outside world or other competing nomadic groups.348  
However, we are now talking about an ideal model which means that the reality might be somewhat 
different. A good reminder of this is the uncertainty of the joint activities even among extended 
families.349 In brief, although the extended family was a cultural ideal and had many economic 
advantages, it was not easy to maintain because large groups are inherently unstable. Herders who 
owned their own animals, for example, could break away from the group if dissatisfied. In brief, 
Eurasian pastoral nomads’ activities were fundamentally based on voluntary cooperation, with the 
overall expectation of joint activities.350 
When groups of Huns migrated westwards and conquered new lands they must have formed larger 
units, such as tribes, in order to create larger military units. The same must have taken place among 
groups of Alans due to the need to defend their lands against the Huns. After the fights between 
groups of Huns and Alans it is likely that the tribes integrated and formed a totally new ethnic group 
composition because in general when a tribe grows, the need to justify and express tribal unity in 
some symbolic form easily understandable by all the tribes’ people also becomes more pressing.351 
The creation of a close relationship between groups of Alans and Huns is evident because after their 
confrontation the parties are known to have acted well together for the following 30 years.352 What 
                                                 
344 Khazanov 1984, 151; Lindner 1982, 698-699, 701, 703; Kradin 2005, 162; Kradin 2006, passim. 108-110; Basilov 1989, 5-
6. Basilov notices that tradition traced the origins of the clan back to a single ancestor and frequently even several tribes 
were considered kinsmen, since they also shared an ancestor. This belief in a common origin promoted political alliances. 
345 Lindner 1982, 699; Khazanov 1983, 140, 149, 151; cf. Kradin 2005, 151. The need for tribal unity is crucial especially 
during migrations and wars, or when defence is required or key resources are sought. This unity is also needed when 
establishing and regularizing or controlling pastoral and trade routes. 
346 Kradin 2005, passim. 151, 153; Khazanov 1984, 134, 148, 150-151. 
347 Lindner 1982, 694, 699; Basilov 1989, 4. 
348 Lindner 1982, 697-699, 693; Khazanov 1984, 148. Tribe formations among nomads are receptive to change. This is 
stressed by the fact that tribes and confederations disappear, simplify or reform when the need for them diminishes. 
349 Barfield 1989, 25-26. 
350 Barfield 1989, 25. 
351 Lindner 1989, passim. 696-700; cf. Khazanov 1984, 148, 150-151. Growth in tribal membership created the need to form 
a unity, particularly in order to re-allocate herding areas. 
352 See Chapter 3.4. - 4. 
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supports this is the fact that units of organization at the tribal or supratribal level are more political 
in nature than contacts at the family and clan level.353 This means that new groups were easy to join. 
Consequently, we can conclude that the contacts between the Alans and the Huns gave a basis for 
political organization and stronger leadership positions to form during the following decades. The 
possibilities and frames for strengthening leadership positions are studied further in the following 
chapters, while in next chapter I evaluate whether the actions and nature of the co-operation 
between the Huns and the Alans supported the rise of nomadic political organizations among the 
Huns. This is done in order to show how strong and large units the Huns seem to have formed when 
they arrived at the Roman borders during the last decades of the fourth century. But before that I 
shall now provide a short summary to clarify the means by which Eurasian nomads made alliances 
and the ways in which even a nomadic empire might have been formed. 
The nomads’ way of acting together and forming larger units should be understood as a skeleton:354 
the number of participants, and who they are, varies from occasion to another and is related to the 
need of the groups. However, the nested kinship group structure (conical clan) supports groups who 
are of the same genealogical order to join together. In addition, even those nomadic groups which 
are considered distant or foreign can be adopted as part of the unity, while the leading role remains 
with the nomadic groups who are charged with forming the unity. They are often, but not 
necessarily, from older generations, e.g. senior clans. At the same time the situation stresses the 
importance of leaders at the head of the nomadic troops. Especially significant are contacts between 
so-called elite warriors who are charged with the decisions made during the time of gathering 
together larger units.355 The contacts between the leading warriors create a basis for larger scale 
nomadic groups to emerge, while it also strengthens the head warriors’ position, which in turn 
supports the formation of political organization. On the whole, leading warriors might not be the 
ones who had the position of permanent chieftain among their smaller groups, though this is also 
possible. The position of military leaders at the head of larger troops of nomads is only temporary. 
This once again stresses the fact that shared interest and the acceptance of joint activity provided the 





                                                 
353 Barfield 1989, 27. 
354 Khazanov 1984, 148. 
355 See Chapter 4. 
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3.4. The Huns and the Alans and Contacts with the Goths  
 
According to Ammianus, the clash between groups of Huns and Alans was followed by their attack 
on the dwelling areas of some of the groups of easternmost Goths, the Greuthungi, during the mid 
370s.356 Ammianus describes the situation: 
 
[some groups of Huns and Alans made] a sudden inroad into the extensive and rich cantons of Ermenrichus, a 
most warlike monarch [of Greuthungi, so-called eastern Goths] […] 
[Ermenrichus] was struck with consternation at the violence of this sudden storm […] 
[After Ermenrichus] Vithimiris was made king and resisted the Halani [Alans] for a time, relying on other 
Huns, whom he had paid to take his side […]357 
 
It is likely that because Ermenrichus did not do anything to help the Goths whose regions the allied 
groups of Huns and Alans attacked, these Goths were independent of Ermenrichus’ rule. It is likely 
that they were connected only by trade contacts or mutual friendship to “Ermenrichus’ great 
Ostrogothic kingdom”, if such a thing existed. Ermenrichus’ lack of interest to send troops to help 
his fellow men indicates that he was leader only to those groups of Goths who lived near the Don. 
This would also seem to be referred to in Ammianus’ remarks on Ermenrichus considering the 
attacks of the groups of Huns and Alans as an impending danger, “a sudden storm”.358  
In addition, Ammianus’ story about the arrival of the Huns in the areas of the easternmost Goths 
reveals the fragmentation and disunity of the groups of Huns and Alans in general. In short, 
Ammianus mentions that when Ermenrichus died and Vithimiris took his place as the leader of the 
Goths, he “resisted the Halani for a time relying on other Huns, whom he had paid to take his 
side”.359 Ammianus’ account of the event refers to groups of Alans, not Huns or allied groups of 
Huns and Alans, as Vithimiris’ enemies. In short, the Huns are mentioned only as those whom 
Vithimiris paid to fight on his side. 360 On the other hand, it is possible that the troops of Alans who 
fought against Vithimiris could have included some Huns, as Ammianus’ phrase “Huniis aliis” 
implies, but even if this was the case, the number of Huns in Alans’ troops must have been scarce – 
after all, Ammianus mentions only the Alans as attacking against Vithimiris. Generally speaking, I 
                                                 
356 Thompson (1999) 2000, 27. The groups of Greuthungi are claimed to live in the territory between the Don and the 
Dniester and from the Black Sea to the Pripet Marshes. 
357 Ammianus, RG, 31.3.1-3. 
358 Thompson (1999) 2000, 27; cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 24-25; Heather (1996) 1998, 52-55. The existence of a coherent 
Ostrogothic kingdom is debated. Heather e.g. claims that half-a-dozen independent Gothic units, if not more, probably 
existed north of the Black Sea before the arrival of the Huns. 
359 Ammianus, RG, 31.3.3. 
360 Heather 1995, 6-7; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, 26-27. Thompson speaks of the allied groups of Huns and Alans, whereas 
Heather considers there were only Huns. 
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do not see any reason why Ammianus would have deliberately refrained from mentioning the Huns 
being among the Alans, because Ammianus’ tendency is to represent the Huns as the cause of all  
misery.361 This speaks in support of the view that the Alans were the only enemy of Vithimiris, and 
it was independent groups of Alans and not allied troops of Huns and Alans, who had attacked the 
Goths before.362  
There were clearly many different groups of Alans and Huns wandering according to their own 
plans and their own military leaders in the vicinity of the north and eastern regions near of the Black 
Sea during the 370s and 380s.363 Ammianus’ story about the end of the confrontations between 
Vithimiris’ Goths and the Alans would also support this view.  
According to Ammianus, Vithimiris’ Goths, the Greuthungi, were defeated by the Alans, and hence 
many of them started to retreat from their lands in the eastern parts of the Black Sea westwards. 
These were the dwelling regions of other Goths, the Tervingi, who were led by Athanarichus. 
Greuthungi’s retreat led Athanarichus to prepare a defence the Dniester river, in case they like the 
Greuthungi would be attacked.364 This did in fact take place and according to Ammianus “the Huns 
… made a swift attack on Athanarichus himself”.365 
Because Ammianus mentions only the Huns attacking Athanarichus’ Goths, it is possible that there 
was a new unity among the groups of Huns in question. In short, the absence of the Alans implies 
that there was no alliance of Huns and Alans in the first known attack against the Goths in the Don 
– Volga area. Moreover, it is doubtful wether the Huns who attacked Athnarichus were the same 
ones who allied themselves with Vithimiris to fight against the Alans, because they favoured co-
operation not hostilities with the Goths. The Huns who attacked Athanarichus must have been a 
new grouping of Huns, who acted as they pleased.366 
Taken together, the existence of at least three different united of groups of Huns questions the 
common claim that it would have been the Huns, or to be more precise, an allied group of Huns and 
Alans, who made all the attacks against the Goths and also subdued the Greuthungi when heading 
westwards.367 However, as noticed, it was the Alans who attacked first with some Huns, and then 
                                                 
361 Stickler 2007, 18. 
362 One explanation is that the Alans would have attained the leading position in the alliance with the Huns, but this seems 
unconvincing, especially because as Ammianus reports the Huns conquered the Alans and not vice versa. Another 
possibility is that the alliance between groups of Huns and Alans might have broken down before the attack on Vithimiris’ 
troops, and hence the Huns might have allied themselves with Vithimiris’ Goths. I see this as unlikely however. 
363 Ammianus, RG, 31.3.3; see Heather 2005, passim. 153; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 19-23. 
364 Ammianus, RG, 31.3.3-5. 
365 Ammianus, RG, 31.3.6. 
366 Ammianus, RG, 31.3.6-7; see Heather 2005, passim. 153-154, 202-205. I consider Ammianus’ stories that Athanarichus 
just waited to be attacked like others before him, and that he even sent out scouts to observe who were approaching the 
Tervingi’s regions, suggest that Athanarichus was not sure who the enemy would be – Alans or Huns or both. 
367 Thompson (1999) 2000, 26-27. 
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alone against the Greuthungi, and hence it is likely, if this indeed ever took place, and it was the 
Alans rather than the Huns who subdued the Greuthungi.368 Generally speaking, this is also what 
Ambrose’s account of the arrival of groups of Huns to the regions of the Alans and the Goths 
emphasizes. Ambrose writes: “The Huns threw themselves upon the Alans, the Alans upon the 
Goths, and the Goths upon the Taifali and Sarmatae; the Goths, exiled from their own country”.369 
Orosius is another fourth century author who does not mention the Huns placing the Goths under 
their power, but only pushing them westwards: “The race of the Huns, long shut off by inaccessible 
mountains, broke out in sudden rage against the Goths and drove them in widespread confusion 
from their old homes. The Goths fled across the Danube”.370  
What all this amounts to is that there were many fragmented groups of Huns, Alans and Goths on 
the move. They were primarily interested in moving west and to make new and profitable alliances, 
to acquire booty, but not to subdue groups to their power.371 All in all, the Hun groups’ eagerness 
first and foremost to gain riches is also implied in Ammianus’ phrase that “[the Huns] would have 
crushed him [Athanarichus’ troops] at once on their arrival, had they not been so loaded down with 
booty”.372 The Huns’ lack of interest in vanguishing other groups is also underlined by the notion 
that after they had defeated Athanrichus’ Tervingi, the Tervingi could wait for months for 
permission from Rome to cross the Danube without being disturbed by the Huns who were in the 
same neighbourhood.373 Therefore, it would seem that in 375/6 there was no massive horde of Huns 
hotly pursuing the fleeing Goths.374 In addition, the Huns did not aim to dominate other barbarian 
groups on their way towards the Roman borders as is generally claimed. 
Lastly, because groups of Huns and Alans acted as mercenaries with different parties, including 
groups of Goths, during the last decades of the fourth century, it also suggests that the groups’ 
fundamental reason for alliances with others was to gain more booty. There is little or no evidence 
to indicate that there were strong leaders or a Hun king who would have striven to rule others and 
strengthen his and his followers’ power. There were instead many independent groups of Huns who 
were led by their own military leaders.375 
Finally, I agree with the claim that many of the Huns’ actions that Ammianus reports were not in 
fact done by all the Huns,376 but only those who, so to speak, formed the first wave of the Huns. 
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Heather argues that the Huns arrived in two waves on the borders of the Roman Empire: the first 
groups of Huns arrived in the Pontic areas and the neighbourhood of Carpathians during the 360s–
380s; the second wave occurred during the first decades of the fifth century.377 Moreover, it was the 
second wave that established the Huns in the area near the Danube, on the Great Hungarian plain 
west of the Carpathians.378 The evidence that the Huns’ activities increased during the 420s would 
seem to support Heather’s claims.  
In this chapter I have pointed out how the first wave of Huns arrived near Rome, and how their 
actions do not support the claims of united groups under a strong leader. In the next chapter I 
consider whether the contemporary authors’ stories suggest that leadership positions would have 
strengthened among the Huns. Furthermore, I assess what kind of leadership position might in 
general exist among Eurasian pastoralists, and whether we can notice these kinds of positions 
among the Huns around the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries. In addition, I evaluate what the 
activities of many groups of Huns who arrived to raid and dwell in regions next to Roman Danubian 
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4. GROUPS OF HUNS AND FIRST CONTACTS WITH THE ROMANS 
 
 
During the 360s and at the beginning of the 370s several groups of Huns journeyed towards the 
borders of the Roman Empire of their own initiative. Other groups were located in areas close to the 
northern parts of the Black Sea. In this chapter I study these actions of the groups in order to 
estimate the claim that during this period a powerful Hun leader or united groups of Huns emerged 
who might have sought to gain power over other groups. In addition, I consider what kind of 
relationship began to develop between the Romans and the Huns in the following years. I also point 
out how some groups of Huns joined with others, e.g. Goths, and how their joint activities indicate 




4.1. Acts of scattered groups of Huns near the Danube and the Balkans 
 
After the Huns’ attack against Athanarichus’ troops near Dniester in 375, some other groups of 
Huns pillaged regions close and even south of the Danube after 376.379 At the same time the leaders 
of the Goths, Fritigern and Alatheus and Saphrax, asked a small number of Huns and Alans 
(“Hunnorum et Halanorum aliquos”) to fight on their side against the Romans by promising them a 
cut of the spoils.380 When in 377 the Hun and Alan reinforcements headed from Morava valley to 
Naissus, to outflank the Roman troops, it caused the Romans to retreat.381 However, in the 
following year troops of Goths and Romans met again near Adrionople, and according to 
Ammianus only Alans, and no Huns, participated in the battle, “Halanorum manus”.382 However, 
Huns are listed among those who gathered up booty after the battle, “Hunni Halanisque per 
mixti”.383 Therefore, it is suspected that the Huns did not participate in the battle at all, but waited 
for the end of the clash in order to join in the looting.384 
Even though Ammianus might have mentioned the Huns only in connection with pillaging in order 
to create an image of ruthless nomads, it is also plausible that the Hun warriors might have been 
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charged with securing the flanks and would have been used as reinforcements, if needed.385 
Whatever the case was, the Goths, the Alans and the Huns still seem to have been satisfied with 
their military co-operation because during the years 379-380 contemporary authors often mention 
their names in conjuction.386 This emphasizes the fact that groups of Huns and Alans could act 
according in their own interest without caring about others of their own kind. That is to say, no 
great sense of unity existed among the groups of the Huns. 
During the last years of the 370s groups of Huns, most likely the size of some clans, are claimed to 
have pillaged and devastated the population of Thrace. This might have been part of the Goths’ and 
their allies’ plans to raid the neighbourhood, or just a raid done by the Huns themselves.387 
However, because Orosius mentions the Huns and the Alans before the Goths, this suggests the 
Huns’ and Alans’ proclivities for looting.388 In any case, all we can be sure about is that in 379 the 
Goths, the Huns and the Alans plundered Valeria which caused Pacatus to write “Whatever the 
Goths waste, the Huns plunder, the Alans carry off”.389 Pacatus’ allegation stresses that the Goths, 
Huns and Alans were concerned with looting, not conquering new lands. The same notion is 
stressed by stories about some Huns who joined the Sciri and Carpo-Dacians to cross the Danube 
for a swift raiding expedition in 381.390 
It is likely that both the eastern and western part of the Roman Empire knew about the Hunnic and 
Alanic horsemen dwelling in regions close to their borders. In 384 a group of Huns and Alan rode 
through Norricum and Raetia towards Gaul.391 This time there was no question of raids; the Huns 
and Alans had been commissioned by Bauto, the general in the western part of the Roman Empire, 
to fight against the looting Juthungi in Raetia, who had been hired by the usurper Maximus.392 After 
the Huns and the Alans had fought against the Juthungi, they did not return to their home territories 
but continued westwards. Bauto was keen to stop them because otherwise Maximus could have 
considered their arrival as a declaration of war. Ultimately the Hun and Alan troops gave up their 
westward march, but the nomads must have asked for substantial compensation on account of the 
lost loot.393 The event underlines the fact that the fragmented groups of Huns were clearly were 
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ready for action and for alliances with any party as long as it offered benefits to them. In addition, it 
is likely that some groups of Huns and Alans had settled down in the vicinity of the Roman borders 
in the lower Danube basin, because otherwise Bauto would have had difficulties in reaching them. 
For nomads, the Great Hungarian plain was the best option for settling down, and it seems that 
already in the beginning of the 380s the Huns and their Alan allies had taken over the steppe and the 
regions near the Carpathians, though the Sarmatians, the Jazygian and Germanic groups and the 
original Illyrian population inhabited the same areas too.394 The number of Huns and Alans is not 
known, but because they could provide men as Roman mercenaries, there must have been clans and 
perhaps even tribes. 
The Romans must to have been pleased with their Hun and Alan mercenaries because those who 
fought against the Juthungi were most likely the ones who in 384 or 385 were sent by Valentinian II 
to attack the trouble-making Alamanni near the Rhine frontier.395 However, if there were different 
groups of Huns and Alans, this implies that many independent Hun and Alan groups had come 
close to the Roman borders. Equally, Roman emperors and generals had become aware that the 
Huns would provide military service if they were paid. 
The interest of the Huns in pillaging did not only concer the west, for some Huns are also known to 
have been active around the mouth of the Danube and in Scythia in 384 or 385. During those years 
some groups of Huns had reached the Morava Vardar valley in modern Serbia and Macedonia and 
overrun Roman troops. A few years later the Huns pillaged in Pannonia Prima (387) and thereafter, 
before 388, Goths, Huns and Alans raided towns in Pannonia Secunda and Savia.396 Because 
contemporary authors do not mention great devastation, the troops were most likely small groups of 
hundreds or at the most a few thousands of warriors. 
Even though the Huns looted in the areas of the Roman Empire, making the Huns feared enemies of 
the Romans, the Romans could still profit from their fighting prowess by employing the Huns as 
mercenaries. One of those occasions was in 388 when Theodosius I paid for groups of Huns to join 
the campaign against the usurper Maximus in the west.397 At the same time there was another group 
of Huns who were pillaging in Macedonia. However, it has been suggested that the groups of Huns 
who joined Theodosius I’s army lived inside the Roman borders because they are suspected of 
allying themselves with some Goths who already lived in Roman regions.398 Even if this is so, still 
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the majority of groups of Huns were to be found in the vicinity of the Carpathians and the Black 
Sea during the 380s.  
The border areas inside the Roman Empire, especially in the provinces next to the Danube in the 
east and near the Balkans, were frequently ravaged by groups of Huns, Goths and Alans in the 380s. 
Barbarian groups of mainly Visigoths who had earlier served as Roman mercenaries became 
robbers and are known to have attacked Macedonia during 388-392. In 391 Theodosius I gave 
permission for locals to fight against the brigands. Soon Roman reinforcements arrived but they 
could not bring victory and instead of gaining peace in the area, large hordes of trans-Danubian 
barbarians broke through the limes and poured deep into the north of the Balkans. What until then 
had been a punitive expedition, became a larger confrontation that remained unresolved when 
Theodosius returned to Constantinople in 391.399  
Claudian lists the names of raiders: the Getae, the Sarmatae, the Daci, the Massagetae, the Alani 
and the Geloni, but three years later his account also includes the Huns: “Visi, Bastarnae, Alani, 
Huns, Geloni, Getae, Sarmatae”.400 Because the Huns are ebsent from the first list, it is not certain 
how many of them participated in the devastation, or even if they were involved. However, even 
though Claudian’s narrative leaves a doubt about the activities of the Huns in 391, at least in 392 
groups of Huns crossed the Danube, and raided the Balkan provinces with groups of Goths. At the 
same time, Claudian’s account implies that these groups also negotiated with Rufinus, the general in 
the Eastern Roman Empire, with the consent of Theodosius, and made a foederati treaty.401 
As a result the groups of Huns were ready to serve in the troops of the Eastern part of the Roman 
Empire when asked and they were most likely even granted land for their herds and families in 
Thrace.402 It seems that the Eastern Roman government calculated that it would be more profitable 
to incorporate the trouble-making Huns as part of their system than to constantly repel their attacks. 
Furthermore, the Huns could give useful support to Eastern Roman troops against the raiding 
Goths.403 
The Huns of Thrace were very likely those Huns who fought in Theodosius I’s army against the 
usurper Eugenius (392-394) in the west in the year 394.404 Eunapius tells us that many of the Huns 
from Thrace with their phyklarkhoi took part in Theodosius I’s second battle against Eugenius in 
summer 394.405 It seems that in the beginning of the 390s some of the groups of Huns had 
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established a close relationship with the eastern part of the Empire, while some Huns looted and 
raided in the border areas of the Balkans in the Roman Empire. 
In addition to contemporary accounts about the Huns’ military activities, Ammianus’ and 
Claudian’s accounts provide some evidence about the leadership position among the scattered 
groups of Huns in the last decades of the fourth century. The descriptions reveal how the Huns were 
organized when little by little they arrived on the Roman borders in the Balkans and the lower part 
of the Danube. In addition, the position of leaders can also explain the basis on which the contacts 
between the Romans and groups of Huns evolved during the fifth century. I should next discuss the 
nature of the leadership position among the Huns, and the question whether a mighty Hun leader, 




4.2. Primates and Phylarkhos – Military Leaders of the Huns? 
 
During the last decades of the fifth century a number of Hunnic groups were involved with a variety 
of allies and this suggests that the Huns operated in disparate and hence presumably, relatively 
small groups, under a variety of military leaders. This is also referred to in Ammianus’ account of 
the exercise of political authority among the Huns:406 
 
And when deliberation is called for about weighty matters, they all consult as a common body [in commune 
consultant] in that fashion. They are subject to no royal restraint [aguntur autem nulla severitate regali], but they 
are content with the disorderly government of their important men [tumultuario primatum ductu contenti], and led 
by them they force their way through every obstacle.  
 
Although Ammianus’ description of the Huns is a cursory account, we may still rely on the picture 
that it gives of the nomadic leadership position because the listed features are common to leadership 
position that were generally found among Eurasian pastoral nomads.407  
The starting point for understanding the basis of leadership positions among Eurasian pastoralists is 
that the combination of low population density and high mobility inhibits in general the 
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development of a strict hierarchy or of political centralization among nomads.408 This seems to be 
the case among the Huns as Ammianus’ phrase “they [Huns] are subject to no royal restraint” 
implies. Also the arrival of the Huns as many independent groups points to the lack of a centralized 
and relatively permanent leadership position, which Ammianus refers to as “regalis” among the 
Huns.  
That is to say, the groups of Huns were led by someone, especially during attacks, and even though 
these military leaders’ might have formed an “elite”, this does not mean that military leaders would 
have had a permanent position which entitled them to rule over others after the military actions.409 
In brief, while an elite and an aristocracy existed from time to time among Eurasian pastoral 
nomads they did not necessarily possess any real power. In other words, they are respected, but they 
are not allowed to interfere in others’ affairs.410 The position of the elite differs from common 
nomads primarily in two aspects: they seize the best parts of pastures and they are often wealthy.411  
Although the members of the elite do not possess power, they do, however, operate as leaders when 
needed. This and the right to command others always manifest themselves in a period of military 
danger in the form of military leadership.412 Therefore, it is clear that the wanderings of the groups 
of Huns towards the west, which included attacks against locals and the distribution of conquered 
regions for herding, produced a need for military leaders – this is supported by Ammianus’ remark 
on primates. 
Along with the likelihood of strengthened leadership positions, the question arises whether the 
wanderings of the groups of Huns, at least partly, was motivated by the need of nomad warriors to 
increase their power?413 An alternative explanation is that migrations were a consequence of the 
need to have new pastures because of drought, for example, and this provided a setting for military 
leaders to lead their groups to new regions. The question remains what kind of position did the 
primates/primas which Ammianus tells about have among the Huns? 
The starting point for studying leadership among nomads is that there are two kinds of leadership 
positions as chief and as military leaders. The positions are separate, but do not exclude each other. 
The precondition for a chief to take care of the duties of military leadership is the trust and support 
of his by fellow nomads. Furthermore, the position of military leadership is generally only 
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temporary – it occurs and lasts according to need.  Generally speaking, the role of a leader is highly 
important in military situations, but he does not retain his position once the conflict is over.414 
The position of chief is an ad hoc institution which largely exists for the convenience of those ruled. 
A chief is needed because there is a demand for an accepted arbitrator to resolve disputes.415 
However, a chief wields no coercive power, although his range of potential duties could be wide. 
He might for example, religious activities in some scale; also arrange ceremonial feasts, give gifts 
to fellow tribesmen and redistribute resources, such as herding animals during unexpected periods 
of hardship.416 In addition, when required, chiefs arranged and participated in meetings and 
negotiations with representatives from closelyrelated groups. But despite this rang of of tasks, the 
chiefs did not rule over areas or people, instead their position was based on others’ support and 
acceptance.417 On the whole, the chiefs were local and were heads of local lineage-tribal 
structures.418 In short, permanent chieftains provided internal order for lineages, clans and whole 
tribes.419 However, although the position of chief often went according to family line and was 
hereditary, a chief could still lose his position if his actions did not please others. This could also 
happen when members of the society considered that the chief could no longer maintain good 
fortune and balance in the society.420 
Despite the existence of chiefs, there was still a demand for military leaders whom the warriors had 
confidence during times of confrontation or raids.421 Although the position of a chief was usually 
based on genealogy, this was not always the case.422 Lindner remarks that a genealogical hierarchy 
model does not fit the history of the Eurasian steppe because fluidity of movement and allegiance 
has historically been the defining characteristics of nomadic steppe politics.423 Therefore, disputes 
related to succession were ultimately decided on the basis of who would be the fittest to act as chief. 
Moreover, the tribesmen supported the candidate who could best represent their interests. This has 
been especially the case when there has been a need to decide who would be the supreme military 
leader to lead the nomad troops.424 
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The tasks of a military leader are not only related to leading troops, but also to taking care of 
foreign policy.425 Even though the position of military leadership is separate from the position of 
chief, nevertheless the chief could be considered the most qualified candidate as military leader.426 
Thuss the position of military leader was dependent on followers’ considerations of who they 
thought was most capable of winning victories.427 Chief who, for example, had already attracted 
and gathered followers who had sworn exclusive loyalty to him would be considered a very 
promising military leader.428 Generally speaking, personal charisma and clear goals what to do as a 
leader of troops had a strong influence on the choice.429 Furthermore, the position of military leader 
was similar to the position of chief in that it was partly related to the candidate’s background. 
Because of the strong influence of kinship, belonging to an elite was a common way of determining 
the legitimacy of leadership.430 This meant that mainly those who belonged to a respected kinship 
line would gain a position of political leadership and military leadership.431 Yet this was not 
decisive because, as has been noted, among Eurasian pastoral nomads chiefs are made, not simply 
born,432 and the political system of nomads was created by its military organization. 
Taken together, Ammianus’ remark on the position of primates among the Huns, is consistent with  
the overall nature of leaders among Eurasian pastoralists. Ammianus mentions that primates got 
their position after group gatherings, where it was collectively decided what would be thebest to do 
and to whom to give the charge. What is, however, important to notice in Ammianus’ account, is 
that he tells only the position of military leaders, namely those who acted at the head of the Hunnic 
troops. If we can count on his word that primates got their position as a result of general choice, this 
strongly suggests that Hun chiefs did not try to strengthen their power by going against the 
decisions of the majority.  
According to Thompson although primates’ ability to lead troops would have been the main reason 
why they were chosen for the task of military leaders of tribes,433 the wealth of the primates could 
also have affected the choice. In short, there would have been unequal distribution of herding 
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animals among the Huns and the wealthiest members in the community profited from their position 
to gain leadership positions. Moreover the position of primas was more easily gained by those 
whose family had successful military leaders before, or primates were military leaders who 
belonged to the upper class and this guaranteed their position.434 
Clearly, the ability to act as a military leader must have been the main reason to be chosen as 
primas. Hun warriors who formed the troops in a tribe, or a group composition comparable to that, 
first choose their own military leaders and then among them the most skilful one was chosen as 
primas. The primas was the military leader who was in charge of all troops during a war, though 
after the war the position of primas ceased.435 It is likely that after victorious raids the same military 
leader was supported to lead the next raids as well, or the chief who inspired others to have a new 
raiding expedition became primas because those who were attracted to the idea of looting also 
accepted him as the military leader. Be this as it may, after the looting the need for the position of 
military leader at the head of troops was gone, and the leader also lost his right to rule others.  
What speaks against the idea that wealthier Huns would have taken advantage of their position over 
others, is that reciprocity and redistribution are an indistinguishable part of the nomadic way of life 
– poor households, for example, are supported by others which prevents them from dropping out of 
nomadic societies.436 Moreover, among pastoralists, property differences are often only temporary. 
Even if property differences might encourage social mobility, high status or rank, and a certain 
degree of social differentiation, they are rarely capable of creating stable and hereditary social 
stratification;437 e.g. a rich stock owner does not get any more power over others because of his 
wealth, he is merely acknowledged as a rich man and gains respect to some extent on account of 
that.438 Furthermore, wealth may also lead to expense and loss of wealth because a rich stock owner 
is expected to share his wealth. Accordingly, social gains sometimes turn into property losses.439 
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What also speaks against the view of wealth guaranteeing the position of primates is that 
pastoralists have a strong sense of co-operation, mutual aid and a tendency to limit differences.440 In 
addition, centralized accumulation of livestock is practically impossible and when economic 
inequality occurs, it tends to be the result of continuous war and trade – it is not inherent in the 
internal functioning of the nomadic economy.441 When it comes to the Huns, we do not know, 
whether they had trade connections with the district of the Don when they arrived in the lands of the 
Alans during the 360s. If they had engaged in trade to any large extent, it is likely that the Huns 
would have been known by the Romans. However, because the Huns were a new barbarian group to 
the Romans, I suspect that trade did not play a fundamental part in the Huns’ daily life in the last 
decades of the fourth century, and it is unlikely that there was any substantial accumulation of 
wealth among them. Equally, the fact that the Huns arrived in many scattered groups suggests the 
absence of continuous wars, which means that the groups of Huns could not have gathered wealth 
from wars either. If the Huns had been fighting constantly, they would have formed a more 
formidable military force and not several scattered groups when they approached the borders of the 
Roman Empire. 
Nonetheless, the existence of an upper class, or at least rich persons among the groups of Huns is 
implied by the graves found in the Volga district of the Danube, dating from the last decades of the 
fourth century to the fifth century.442 Some of the graves contain precious gold jewellery and 
weapons, signifying the importance of the buried person. However, rich burials do not explicitly 
signify the existence of an elite which had power and wealth. Likewise, we cannot be sure, whether 
increases in wealth caused by the Huns’ raids on the Roman world during the fourth and fifth 
centuries eventually supported or led to the existence of an upper class or social differences and 
inequality among the Huns. In general, wealth does not bring power among nomads, even though 
wealth is appreciated and related to flaunting and self-assertion in nomadic cultures.443  
Taken together, it is hard to say, whether those who gained wealth among the Huns actually had 
real power over others. In short, the burials might only show the wealth of the person or that the 
community was eager to bury someone with wealthy offerings. Accordingly, I am sceptical of 
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speaking about a rich elite on the basis of few wealthy Hun graves. In addition, descriptions of the 
Huns do not provide any crucial evidence concerning the argumentation either.444  
I emphasize that the position of military leaders (as primates) should not be understood as a 
hereditary or permanent position. This is stressed by the notion that leadership position among 
pastoralists is generally diffused and decentralized, and oscillation, not “progress”, is the rule.445 
This does not only derive from the nomadic way of life, but also from the fact that the group 
composition changes from time to time.446 If primas, a leader of an individual tribe was a successful 
leader once, this did not guarantee that he would have been chosen for the task on a subsequent 
occasion because the communal composition of the tribe might have been different. The changes in 
group compositions or alliances are also alluded to by Ammianus in his description of the Huns.447 
Even if Ammianus’ remark derives from a barbarian topos,448 nevertheless alliances with different 
parties on different occasions crucially belongs to the nomadic way of life. Furthermore, the 
accounts of many fragmented and independent groups of Huns allying themselves with whoever 
they pleased suggest that this was a common practice  among the Huns during the 370s and 380s. 
Actions under many leaders and with the most lucrative partner are also emphasized by Eunapius 
who tells us about phylarkhoi ( ) among groups of Huns in the 390s.449 
Eunapius narrative is the first contemporary description in which Hun leaders are, if not specified 
by individual name, at least specifically addressed as leaders of groups of the Huns: they are named 
phylarkhoi. This gives us a starting point to study whether there really were signs of stable 
leadership or the development of kingship among the Huns during the 390s. Eunapius writes about 
the contacts between the Eastern Roman Empire and some Huns:450 
 
he [Theodosius I] also summoned many of the Huns of Thrace, who served under their tribal chieftains (tois 
phylarkhois) 
 
The title phylarkhos is considered to mean a leader of a tribe,451 but it is suggested to be comparable 
to titles such as hegemon (officeholder),452 arkhon (a leader, chief, commander),453 and basileus 
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(king, prince, master, ruler).454 Therefore, it is unclear what kind of position the title exactly refers 
to among the Huns.455 I consider that phylarkhoi were “leaders of large groups” or to be more 
precise military leaders of tribes because they as a rule could gather nomadic groups together to act 
under a centralized lead.456  
Because Eunapius uses plural form of phylarkhos ( ): phylarkhoi/ tois phylarkhois (
/ ), it is uncertain how many military leaders there were, and how large 
were the troops they led.457 If each of the phylarkhos led many, or at least two tribes, and we 
suppose that there were at least three phylarkhoi, the number of troops that they led would have 
been remarkable according to the following estimations. If a Hun tribe consisted of 5 000 members, 
it could have provided 1 000 warriors. Accordingly, many phylarkhoi would then mean thousands 
of Hun warriors, for example 5 000, and at the same time that would mean 25 000 Huns in Thrace. 
It is likely that Theodosius would have thought twice before giving permission for so many Huns to 
enter Thrace and their arrival would no doubt have been mentioned not only by Eunapius but also 
by other contemporary authors. Therefore, estimations of only a few thousand Huns in total in 
Thrace are plausible.458 
Concerning the tasks of the Hun phylarkhoi, they were likely to be responsible for the duties that 
were part of the treaty made with the eastern Roman Empire, namely acting as mercenaries 
whenever asked. Phylarkhos was in fact the title that Romans officially granted nomad leaders with 
whom they had made a treaty.459 Genereally speaking, it has been suggested that the title 
phylarkhos derived from a treaty that granted land from Thracia to groups of Huns while they 
promised to serve as Theodosius I’s mercenaries when required.460 This is not certain, but at least 
the plural form of phylarkhos in Eunapius’ account ( ) fundamentally speaks 
against the idea that there was a single king of the Huns, phylarkhos, under whom Hun military 
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leaders would have served.461 Accordingly, there is evidence to argue that there was no single Hun 
ruler who could have prevented all the tribes of Huns from acting as they pleased in the 390s.462 
The view is supported by accounts of fragmented groups of Huns living in the lower Danubian 
basin to the northern shores of the Black Sea and as far as the Caucasus, and accounts of a raid by 
Hun troops on Persia in 395 under the leadership of Basich and Kursich.463 
 
 
4.3. Raiding Troops of Basich and Kursich in Contacts with Persia and the Western Roman 
Empire 
 
The story about Basich and Kursich is part of a fragment of Priscus. Priscus writes that during his 
visit as a member of a delegation sent by Theodosius II to Attila in 449 he met envoys from the 
Western Roman Empire among the Huns. According to Priscus, one of the envoys, Romulus, 
reported that the Huns knew the way to the Medes, Persia, because some of the Huns had raided the 
regions a long time ago ( ). Furthermore, the Huns had been led by Basich and Kursich, who 
later came to Rome to make an alliance.464 
The date of Basich’s and Kursich’s arrival to Media has been disputed; it has been claimed that 
their attack took place either in 395 or around 420.465 The general view supports the earlier date 
because most of contemporary sources suggest that some Huns were living in the Caucasus and 
causing havoc in the mountain regions during the 390s.466 To me Heather is right in noticing that if 
Basich and Kursich had already appeared near the Danube, they surely would not have dragged 
themselves and their horses thousands of kilometres around the north and eastern shores of the 
Black Sea and across rugged mountain range.467 Instead, it is more likely that groups of Huns had 
                                                 
461 Bona 1991, 29, 35. 
462 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 51. Maenchen-Helfen considers that Hun groups north of the Danube may have formed a larger 
unit under a leader. Furthermore, the Huns in Thrace did not wish to join with other Huns and hence made a treaty with 
Theodosius I. 
463 Stickler 2007, 51; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 51; Heather 2005, 193, 202-203. Stickler argues that the Huns in Thrace also 
controlled areas in the Great Hungarian plain at the end of the fourth century. I doubt this and would argue that there were 
some other groups of Huns living in the Great Hungarian plain. The reason for this is that some Huns are known to have 
raided Pannonia at the end of the fourth century, but this is an action that the Huns in Thrace would have avoided. 
464 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 276-279. 
465 Altheim 1959, 15; Altheim 1962, IV, 319; Gordon 1960, 202; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 54-55; Thompson (1999) 2000, 35, 
65-66; Heather 1995, 8; Wirth 1999, 30-31; Stickler 2007, 52-53; Kelly 2008, 40. 
466 Wirth 1999, 30; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 54-55. 
467 Heather 1995, 8-9; cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 55. Stickler 2007, 52. Maenchen-Helfen and Stickler believe that the Huns 
who followed Basich and Kursich would have lived in the lower Danubian region.  
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spread to regions stretching from the lower Danubian basin to the northern parts of the Black Sea 
and the Caucasus by the end of the fourth century.468  
Priscus mentions Basich and Kursich leading a “large force” ( ) in the eastern parts of the 
Black Sea. This is combined with the fact that only small fragmented groups of Huns are known to 
have acted in the vicinity of Rome’s Danubian frontier, this all suggests that the majority of groups 
of Huns would have still lived in the east in the late fourth century. I agree in principle, but 
Romulus’ estimation of the size of Basich’s and Kursich’s troops ( , “a large force”) is too 
vague and inadequate to show that the main body of Huns was in the northern parts of the Black 
Sea. I also doubt the claims that Basich and Kursich would have ruled over all the groups of Huns 
in the vicinity of Caucasus, because when Hun troops rode into Persia and Roman provinces to the 
south and southwest of Armenia in 395, there were two or three different Hun groups, each of them 
heading in different areas.469 
One group of Huns devastated the areas south and west of the Anti-Taurus470 and when they crossed 
the Euphrates, the Romans attacked and destroyed them. Simultaneously, another group of Huns 
ravaged Asia Minor and Syria. Lastly, Hun troops under the leadership of Basich and Kursich rode 
as far as Ctesiphon through the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates, and when they turned back 
the Persian army marched against them. The result of the clash was, as Priscus informs us, that 
Basich’s and Kursich’s troops had to abandon the majority of their loot and retreat back to the areas 
where they had come from.471  
I suspect that Basich and Kursich were leaders of only one of the Hun troops, because 
contemporary authors tell us that Huns looted and caused terror over a wide area simultaneously. 
However, it would seem that Basich and Kursich led the largest band of warriors because their 
names were known by contemporaries.472  
The nature of Basich’s and Kursich’s leadership position and the goal of the Hun troops’ intrusion 
in the east becomes clear from contemporary sources, such as Jerome’s letter to a friend.473 
                                                 
468 Heather 1995, 9-10; Kelly 2008, 40, 45. 
469 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 276-279; Stickler 2007, 52; Kelly 2008, 39-41; Wirth 1999, 30, 41-42, passim. 33-34; 
Manechen-Helfen 1973, 51-53, passim. 69; Thompson (1999) 2000, 66; Heather 1995, 8-9; Heather 2005, 202. I consider 
that Priscus’ inexact estimation implies that he lacked precise knowledge on the size of the troops, or the troops were 
considered “large” as a result of the fear they incurred in the areas they raided. The number of nomad warriors is often 
exaggerated in Roman contemporary sources due to the nomads’ ability to move quickly and spread out over a wide area, 
which makes writers think they were more numerous than they actually were. 
470 Anti-Taurus is a mountain range located in modern southern and eastern Turkey. 
471 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 276-279; see Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 52. 
472 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, passim. 58. Maenchen-Helfen stresses that the Huns’ invasion in the east shows what a great 
distance the Huns were able to cover in one campaign. However, it is not certain which campaign he means or whether he 
means that all the military actions were led by Basich and Kursich. 
473 Jerome, Ep. LX, 16; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 58, passim. 52-53. Maenchen-Helfen refers to a contemporary source called 
Liber Califarum. 
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Contemporary accounts mention that the goal was to plunder and capture slaves, not to conquer new 
regions. This is also emphasized by Priscus’ remark that Basich and Kursich were “overrunning 
and plundering the land”.474 In addition, these actions can be taken as an indication of Basich’s and 
Kursich’s military leadership position. In short, the Hun leaders clearly wanted to please their 
follower warriors and guarantee them as much booty as possible.475 Priscus also explicitly mentions 
Basich and Kursich as “commanders of a large force” ( ). Priscus 
calls them “Scythian royalty” ( ) which I consider to refer to their 
leadership position and not unambiguously to their upper class status.476 After all, the leadership 
title that Priscus attributes to them is archont ( / ) which does not include 
any indication of a hereditary or upper class position but is a neutral term that means the position of 
“leader, commander, chief, master, captain”.477 All this would suggest that Basic and Kursich were 
military leaders chosen by their followers for a military task. 
Another aspect that Basich’s and Kursich’s position as military leaders is that when the Hun troops 
withdrew from Persia and the eastern parts of the Roman Empire in 397, or at the latest in 399, they 
continued to lead their troops and to ensure profits for them.478 According to Priscus, Basich and 
Kursich made an alliance with the Western Roman Empire, which indicates that the Huns were 
interested in acting as Roman mercenaries.479 Because Hun troops served in the Western Roman 
Empire army in the years 407 and 409, Basich and Kursich are supposed to have made treaty with 
the Western Roman Empire in 404 or 407.480 The fact that once again Basich and Kursich were not 
interested in gaining land but to gain profits for their warriors and troops shows that they 
concentrated on military issues, as was expected from military leaders.481 
What happened to Basich and Kursich after their co-operation with the Western Roman Empire is 
not known, but in the first years of the fifth century other Hun leaders also made themselves known 
to the Roman Emperors. Because the leaders are said to have led the Hun troops and to have been 
                                                 
474 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 276-279. 
475 Priscus, fr. 2, fr. 9.3, fr. 11.2, fr. 14 in Blockley 1983, 226-227, 236-237, 264-269, 292-293; cf. Stearns, Adas, Shchwartz, 
Gilbert 2001, 93; Khazanov 1984, 159-160; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 199-200; Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 64. Nomads 
are interested in having slaves primarily for trade reasons. Only on rare occasions are slaves taken to live among nomads, 
and if so they often serve as warriors to strengthen the nomads’ troops and to acquire booty for their masters. However, it is 
not uncommon for slaves to eventually be accepted as full members of the nomadic community. The reason for this is that 
there is little social differentiation in nomadic societies, largely because of the lack or low level of occupational 
specialization. Priscus mentions that the characteristic features of nomadic Huns in the 440s are still found in the middle of 
the fifth century. 
476 See Chapter 2. It is likely that Priscus calls Basich and Kursich “royal Scythians” in order to indicate his knowledge of 
Herodotus’ stories about the Scythians, nomads who also caused terror in the same regions in earlier centuries. 
477 Liddell, Scott, Jones 1968, 254. 
478 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 55; Heather 1995, 8; Kelly 2008, 41.  
479 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 276-279. Priscus passus “[…] who later came to Rome to make an alliance […]”. 
480 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 55; Stickler 2007, 53.  
481 Thompson (1999) 2000, 188, 49; Fox 1936, 43, 47, 77, 106.   
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excellent warriors, this may be taken as a sign that their position was based on military leadership. 
Furthermore, the view is strengthened by the notion that after an unsuccessful campaign the lead 
was questioned by Hun troops, as happened to a Hun leader known by the name of Uldin. His role 













































5. AIMS TO INCREASE THE POWER OF HUN LEADERS? A HUN LEADER ULDIN 
 
 
Uldin is the first Hun leader who is mentioned by name in contemporary authors’ stories about the 
Huns and their activities at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries.482 This speaks on behalf of the 
Romans’ interest to know more about the Huns and to have contacts with them.  
At the same time when the number of descriptions of Huns increas and these descriptions become 
more detailed, it gives a stronger basis to evaluate the possible changes that took place in the 
leadership position among the nomads.  
Accordingly, the main questions are what kind of leadership position did Uldin have. Second, how 
united were the groups of Huns, and do their activities suggest that they kept their nomadic way of 
life? Finally, are there signs that Romans tried to generate a more permanent leadership position 
among the Huns in general in order to control the nomads more efficiently? 
 
 
5.1. A Friend and an Enemy of the Eastern Roman Empire 
 
Zosimus’ description of the movements of barbarians in the lower Danubian region includes a 
remark on the activities of a Hun leader Uldin during the last years of the 390s or the year 400. 
Zosimus writes:483 
 
Uldin, who was at that period chief of the Huns [
], considering it unsafe to permit a Barbarian [Gainas and his army] followed by his army 
to fix his habitation beyond the Ister ; and at the same time supposing that by expelling him from the country he 
should gratify the Roman emperor, provided means to oppose him. Having mustered a considerable number of 
troops, he drew them up in order of battle against the enemy. On the other hand, Gainas, perceiving that he could 
neither return to the Romans, nor in any other manner escape the attacks of Uldin, armed his followers and 
encountered the Huns. After several conflicts between the two armies, in some of which the party of Gaines was 
successful, many of his men being slain, Gaines himself was at length also killed, having fought with great 
bravery. 
The war being terminated by the death of Gainas, Uldin, the chief of the Huns [], sent 
his head to the emperor Arcadius [Emperor in the eastern part of the Roman Empire during the years 395 – 408], 
and was rewarded for this achievement. He, therefore, entered into a league with the Romans. Affairs being now 
                                                 
482 The reason why I consider Uldin to be the first Hun leader known by name is that the time when Basich and Kursich 
acted as leaders of the Huns cannot be dated in Priscus’ narrative. 
483 Zosimus, Hist. nov., V, 22:1-3. 
 91
conducted without any order, through the emperor's want of prudence, Thrace was again disturbed. A band of 
fugitive slaves, and others who had deserted from the armies, pretending to be Huns, pillaged all the country, and 
took whatever they found out of the walls.  
 
Zosimus’ description of Uldin’s activities emphasizes that Uldin wanted to have diplomatic 
relations with the Eastern Roman Empire by sending the head of Gainas, former magister of militum 
and usurper in the eastern half of the Roman Empire to Arcadius. Although Uldin could achieve 
good relations with the Eastern Roman Empire by fighting against Gainas, nevertheless the primary 
purpose for the act was most likely, as Zosimus implies, the defence of the Huns’ and their allies’ 
herding and living areas.484 Uldin seems to have been a good military strategist for his supporters: 
he not only eliminated an enemy but also used this action to establish relations with the Eastern 
Roman Empire.  
Uldin offers an opportunity to study military leadership among Eurasian pastoralists. He represents 
a leader figure of temporarily united groups who needed to defend their pastoral territories and were 
interested in acquiring riches especially by raiding and by other profitable contacts with 
sedentarists, such as establishing relations that would at least include the exchange of gifts that 
would profit his own groups of nomads.485 
The beginning of the relationship between Uldin and the Romans in the east seems to have been a 
success as Zosimus informs us: Uldin was rewarded by the Romans and good relations were 
formed. Uldin and Arcadius concluded an alliance and Thompson considers that the treaty would 
have involved payment of an annual tribute to the Huns.486 This is, however, uncertain because we 
do not know anything more about the situation than Zosimus tells us. Therefore, what we might 
only count on is that apparently Uldin and the eastern part of the Roman Empire ended in 
friendship.487 I see this as revealing two major developments that took place between the Romans 
and the nomads. 
First, Uldin strengthened his image as a capable leader who could bring profits to his followers 
among the Huns. Second, the Eastern Roman Empire was clearly interested in establishing firm 
contacts with the Huns, indicating that Huns were recognized as a playing an active role on the 
Roman frontier. Overall, the Romans’ interest in seeking out contacts with Hun leaders in the East 
                                                 
484 Stickler 2007, 54. 
485 Barfield 1993, 151, 149, 157. 
486 Thompson (1999) 2000, 37. 
487 Wirth 1999, 31. 
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implies that the Huns had arrived in increasing numbers to dwell on the Roman frontiers in the 
middle Danubian region during the first decade of the fifth century.488 
Turning to Arcadius’ view of Uldin, he seems to have wanted to establish a relationship with Uldin 
in order to provide a stable and Roman-minded Hun ruler on its frontiers.489 This, after all, was the 
policy that the Romans had favoured with barbarians on the frontier for centuries, and especially 
during the fourth and fifth centuries.490 It was easier for the Romans to deal with a few chieftains 
than large numbers of independent tribesmen.491 Moreover, a Hun leader friednly to Rome could 
form a barrier against unexpected barbarian invasions on the Roman borders.492 Furthermore, if 
Uldin could control the area, this would release Roman troops to fight elsewhere.493 Thus the 
Romans considered Uldin a barbarian leader who could bring a degree of control to the border 
regions of the Eastern Roman Empire.494 
Whatever efforts the Romans made or planned to make to strengthen Uldin’s position, still the 
descriptions of Uldin and his acts clearly suggest that his position was based on military leadership. 
First, as Zosimus reports, Uldin’s tasks were fundamentally related to military actions: he led 
nomad troops and arranged for the defence of areas of groups he was charged with. Second, 
Zosimus mentions Uldin as the “present” [ ] leader which might indicate that Uldin’s 
position was temporary, a common feature of military leadership among Eurasian pastoral 
                                                 
488 Heather 2007, 8, 13. 
489 Batty 2007, 456, 563; cf. Heather 1997, 68. According to Batty, the Danube frontier had always been problematic for the 
Romans. In short, the Romans had never been able to form a strong enough defence against nomadic groups in the 
neighbourhood, and hence the most effective solution had been to establish good relations with the barbarian leaders. Albeit 
a necessity, hiring mercenaries from among the friendly barbarian groups in the frontier areas of the Roman Empire also 
helped establish good relations there. 
490 Heather 2007, 12-13, 19. 
491 Goldsworthy 2009, 107; Heather 2007, passim. 13. 
492 Batty 2007, passim. 428-432; Stickler 2007, 54; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 59. Uldin is claimed to be the military leader of 
the Hun groups to be found in the lower Danube region, east of the Olt river and to the west and to the east of the 
Carpathian Mountains. Therefore he and the Huns lived in an area that part of Roman interests. Batty argues that the 
Romans had wanted to have friendly relations with Bosporan monarchs for centuries to block raiding northern tribes from 
gaining access to Asia. 
493 Zosimus, Hist. nov., V, 22:1-3. Zosimus passus ”A band of fugitive slaves, and others who had deserted from the armies, pretending to 
be Huns, pillaged all the country, and took whatever they found out of the walls” implies that undefined and scattered groups of raiders 
pillaged areas in the lower Danube regions at the turn of the 4th and 5th centuries. That is to say, barbarian raids and 
invasions of Roman territory were not the only events that caused insecurity and called for military actions in the territories 
in the lower Danube basin. 
494 Stickler 2007, 54; Heather 1997, passim. 69, 71; Millar 2006, 76-77. Millar claims that if the Empire of Theodosius was 
under serious threat, it would have been caused by barbarians who were crossing the Danube. Furthermore, according to 
Millar, an aspect that underlines the Danube frontier as “the key frontier” for the Eastern Roman Empire, were the plans to 
change the military structure. Two separate Magistri Militum were established in Illyricum and Thrace, each with an 
extensive field army; and four Duces with forces were spread out along the Danube, in the provinces of Moesia Prima, 
Dacia Ripensis, Moesia Secunda, and Scythia. 
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nomads.495 An aspect that also supports the assessment of Uldin as a military leader is the word 
hegemon ( ), used by Zosimus to describe Uldin’s influence.  
The word hegemon is a neutral title for leadership and it usually refers to “leader, commander, 
chief” and “officeholder”, and hence the interpretation of “ ” as “one who does a thing 
first” or “shows the way to others” is plausible.496 I would argue consider that the word hegemon in 
the case of Uldin indicates that the other Huns, especially Hun warriors, had agreed to his 
leadership position. In addition, because the title  includes the idea that the one in that 
position was expected to take care of certain duties, I suspect that this refers to Uldin being trusted 
to lead troops and make peace treaties in times of confrontation. On the whole, I agree with the 
claim that Uldin would have been the first Hun phylarkhos known by a name.497  
However, the number of groups whose military lead Uldin was trusted to take charge of could not 
have been many, if we are to believe Zosimus’ story about the many and long-lasting battles 
between Uldin and Gainas before Uldin was victorious.498 In short, if Uldin had been in charge of a 
led large troop, it would have been easy for him to destroy Gainas’ weaker troops.499 It is estimated 
that Uldin would have lead about three to five tribes from the Romanian plains to the Great 
Hungarian Plain, meaning c. 20,000 nomads. I suspect that the groups who counted on Uldins as 
their temporary military leader could also consist of local barbarians.500 
During the first years of the fifth century Uldin is claimed to have been in charge of many attacks 
and raids on Hun troops in Roman territories in the lower Danubian basin, but I am doubtful about 
this because no Late Roman author mentions the name of Uldin in connection with the raids. My 
next consideration is whether accounts about activities of some Hun troops, whose leader we do not 
know by name, can be connected to Uldin or not. This gives a stronger basis to consider, whether 
Uldin was in charge of only a few military actions, as seems to have been the case. If so, this 
implies that on the Roman borders in the lower Danubian basin there were other confederations of 
Huns led by military leaders other than Uldin during the first decade of the fifth century. 
Accordingly, the situation implies that Uldin’s position was not fundamentally different to other 
Hun military leaders of that time, and hence challenges the claims about Uldin being a Hun king 
during the first decade of the fifth century. 
 
                                                 
495 This no doubt derives from the fact that Zosimus wrote about Uldin almost a hundred years later and knew how the 
story of Uldin ended – Uldin lost his position at the head of his troops in 409. 
496 Liddell, Scott, Jones 1940, 763. 
497 Stickler 2007, 53, 50. 
498 Thompson (1999) 2000, 67. 
499 Thompson (1999) 2000, 67. 
500 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 67; See Chapter 3. 
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5.2. Leader of All the Actions of the Huns? 
 
After the Gainas episode Uldin’s next action is supposedly to have led a Hun raiding party to 
Thrace in 404/405. However it is not certain whether Uldin really was in charge because Sozomen’s 
account of this raid does not include the name of any Hun leader. Sozomen writes:501 
 
The Huns crossed the Ister [the lower reaches of the Danube] and devastated Thrace. The robbers in Isauria, 
gathered in great strength, ravaged the towns and villages between Caria and Phoenicia. 
 
Because Sozomen only refers to an invasion, Maenchen-Helfen suggests that it may have been only 
a quick raid, or alternatively the Huns looted the unfortunate provinces for months.502 Although 
Sozomen does not mention that the invasion was led by Uldin, this was most likely the case because 
the invasion was launched from the regions next to Thrace, where the groups who formed the troops 
under Uldin’s lead are supposed to have dwelt.503 Moreover, Maenchen-Helfen points out that 
Nicephorus Callistus (1256-1311) mentions Uldin in his account, indicating that Sozomen’s stories 
might have originally contained Uldin’s name.504 However, I suspect that Callistus might have 
summarized the actions of fragmented groups of Huns under the name of Uldin in order to write a 
coherent narration about the actions of many Huns. It is equally plausible that not every group of 
Huns in the areas where Uldin’s troops were gathered would have belonged to the supporters of 
Uldin, but would have acted and raided on their own. That is to say, the raiding party to Thrace 
might have come from the areas where Uldin is known to have lived, but the troops were not led by 
him.  
Because we do not know for sure who led the Huns’ looting expedition to Thrace, it allows to 
suspect that there were also other groups of Huns than those under Uldin’s command in the vicinity 
of the Roman Empire, and they were also keen to profit from and have contacts with the Romans.  
What supports this idea is Sozomen’s story about some Huns in Thrace before Uldin invaded the 
territory in 408.505 Some groups of Huns are likely to have made their way to Thrace before Uldin’s 
invasion, Huns, who were not connected to Uldin. If Priscus’ story about Basich and Kursich “who 
                                                 
501 Sozomen, Hist. ecc., VIII, 25, 1. 
502 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 63. 
503 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 59, 62-63; Wirth 1999, 32; Stickler 2007, 54. Uldin was chosen as a military leader of Hun groups 
to be found in the lower-Danube, east of the Olt River and to the west and east of the Carpathian Mountains. 
504 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 63. Callistus’ narration is a summary and he might have added the name himself. According to 
Maenchen-Helfen, because Callistus’ source was probably a compilation written in the tenth century, based on Philostorgius, 
Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret and Evagrius, it is possible that the name of Uldin came from Philostorgius’ or Sozomen’s 
narration. Still, I think there is room to doubt whether Uldin led the invasion. 
505 Sozomen, Hist. ecc., IX: 5.  
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later came to Rome to make an alliance” is to be dated to the beginning of the fifth century, it is 
possible that the Huns looting in Thrace were led by Basich and Kursich.506 Another option is that 
the Huns in Thrace belonged to Basic’s and Kursich’s group of Huns, but when Basich and Kursich 
came arrived from their raiding expedition in the Middle East to the Western Roman Empire, the 
groups decided to live in Thrace, in the regions near the Marus River and the Diocese of Pannonia, 
west of Uldin’s Huns.507 Finally, the main body of Huns came from the north of the Caucasus to the 
Great Hungarian Plain in 395 - 425, and this suggests that the Hun raiders in Thrace could have 
been some of these Huns and not necessarily those who normally chose Uldin as their military 
leader.508 
The reason why all the actions done by the Huns during the first decade of fifth century are linked 
to Uldin, seems to derive from the aim in modern research to create a continuous line of 
development among the Huns leading to the growth of kingship.509 I would argue, however, that 
Uldin should only be seen only as a military leader whose name we simply happen to know from 
the Late Roman authors’ descriptions from the first decade of the fifth century. There is not 
sufficient evidence to suggest that Uldin was more notable Hun leader than any others during this 
period.510 It is likely that Uldin led the largest temporary coalition of Huns, but this does not mean 
that he would have been in charge of all actions of the Huns in 400-409.  
If indeed it was Uldin’s troops who raided Thrace, it would appear that Uldin was more interested 
in gaining profits for his troops than in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations with the Eastern 
Roman Empire. This would imply that Uldin’s position was based on temporary military leadership, 
because Uldin was more interested in pleasing his troops by looting than in strengthening his own 
position with the Romans.511 Even if Uldin had wanted to strengthen his position as leader of the 
Huns, the help given by the Romans would not have been enough.512 The Huns still lived according 
to the norms of a nomadic way of life, and it is within this framework that we should evaluate the 
position of Hun leaders. It is far more propable that Uldin was a minor figure in Hun society, indeed 
the very fact that Uldin sought service in the Roman armies shows that he was not the ruler of a 
                                                 
506 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 276-279. See Chapter 4. 
507 Basich’s and Kursich’s troops must have lived in the western part of the Roman Empire in order to make an alliance with 
the Romans. However, there are no contemporary narratives that tell about the event. 
508 Heather 2005, 203. 
509 When contemporary authors mention the name of a Hun leader all the actions of Hun groups with or without an 
immediate connection to the leader are liked to this name. This has led scholars to claim that leader positions among the 
Huns would have evolved into kingship during the first half of the fifth centuries. 
510 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 71. 
511 Kradin 2005, 158. Kradin notices this in the case of Rouran nomads. The Rouran nomads were Eurasian pastoralists 
who lived in the vicinity of the China during the fourth and the fifth century AD. 
512 Heather 1997, 71. Heather points out that the Romans were eager to give gifts and payments to friendly barbarian leaders 
in order to maintain peace. We may thus suppose that the Romans also sent gifts to Uldin. However, these gifts do not seem 
to have reduced the Huns’ appetite for raiding. 
 96 
great state north of the Danube.513 Uldin’s interest in acting as a Roman mercenary is further proof 
that Uldin was a temporary military leader.  
Military co-operation between Uldin and the Western Roman Empire took place in 405 when the 
Gothic leader Radagaisus invaded Venetia, Lombardy and Tuscany with a huge army (estimated to 
be 400,000 strong) and Stilicho, magister militum in the Western Roman Empire, hired Uldin’s 
Huns to strengthen the Roman army. The situation reported by both Orosius and Zosimus: 
 
[…  Radagaisus made] a sudden invasion with an army reported more than two hundred thousand Goths. […] 
Against Radagaisus, our most savage enemy, God granted that the minds of our other enemies should be disposed 
to help us with their forces. Uldin and Sarus, leaders of the Huns and of the Goths, came to the aid of the Romans 
[…]514 
 
Radagaisus, having collected four hundred thousand of the Celts, and the German tribes that dwell beyond the 
Danube and the Rhine, made the preparations for passing over into Italy […] Stilicho took with him all the forces 
that were stationed at Ticinum in Liguria, which amounted to about thirty cohorts, and all the auxiliaries that he 
could procure from the Alans and Huns, and without waiting for the approach of the enemy, crossed the Danube 
with all his forces.515 
 
Unlike Zosimus, who only mentions Alans and Huns as Stilicho’s mercenaries,516 Orosius claims 
that there were both Goths and Huns. Moreover, Orosius even mentions the leaders of the troops by 
name: Uldin and Sarus.517 Whether Stilicho’s mercenaries included both Goths and Alans is 
uncertain, but we can at least count on the fact that there were Huns, and supposedly they were led 
by Uldin, as Zosimus informs us.518 Stilicho had no time to lose in forming a defence against 
Radagaisus, and this supports the view that Hunnic auxiliaries could not have arrived from far away 
                                                 
513 Thompson (1999) 2000, 66; cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 67; Wirth 1999, 32. Thompson claims that Uldin was “the leader 
of a mere fraction of the Huns, and that it is quite certain that he did not lead them all”. Maenchen-Helfen on the other 
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rough approximation. 
514 Orosius, Hist. ad. Pag., VII: 37. 
515 Zosimus, Hist. nov., V, 26:2-4; see Wirth 1999, 34; Thompson (1999) 2000, 37-38.  
516 When Roman authors write about barbarian mercenaries it is common practice that they first mention the name of the 
largest group. Accordingly Zosimus’ story about “Alans and Huns” implies that the mercenary troops consisted of mainly 
Alans but there were also some Huns. Therefore this might indicate that Huns had not subjugated the Alans, but the latter 
were independent groups who had made a temporary alliance with the Huns. I take this as a sign that the groups of Huns 
would not have subjugated barbarian groups, whose areas they arrived to dwell in the end of the 4th century. 
517 Thompson (1999) 2000, 37.  
518 Orosius lived his last years when Stilicho gathered his mercenaries, while Zosimus was not even born. Accordingly we 
might count more on Orosius’ account than Zosimus’; after all, Zosimus could only rely on stories written or told about the 
situation. Nonetheless, this does not exclude the fact that Orosius may have been inexact.   
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but from the vicinity of the Danube, where Uldin’s Huns are known to have come.519 Equally, the 
Gainas episode and the supposed raid on Thrace might have made Uldin known also in the western 
part of the Roman Empire as a Hun leader who was in charge of a large band of warriors, and that 
inspired Stilicho to turn to Uldin.  
The fact that Zosimus tells about Alan, not Goth auxiliaries in connection with the Huns might 
derive from the fact that Uldin’s Hun troops had not arrived alone but had supposedly formed a 
coalition with other barbarian troops – Goths or Alans, perhaps with both.520 Hence it would have 
been difficult for contemporaries to be certain what kind of troops and allies there actually were. 
The notion that once again Huns, Alans and/or Goths were fighting alongside each other in Roman 
troops, strongly implies that Uldin’s Huns, or Huns in general, had not subjugated other barbarian 
groups on their way west. On the contrary, there would seem to have been alliances and 
confederation between the Huns and other barbarian groups,521 and it is very unlikely that Uldin’s 
Huns had only a temporary confederation with the Alans or the Goths when joining Stilicho’s army. 
What may well have facilitated the alliance was the expectation of payment, a satisfactory 
arrangement for both Uldin and his warriors.  
The friendly relationship with Rome and especially mercenary activity could have strengthened the 
notion among the Huns that they could gain wealth from the Roman Empire not only by raiding but 
also trough co-operation. This, along with interest on the side of the Western Roman Empire, seem 
to have increased contacts and strengthened friendly relations because Priscus’ accounts tell that the 
Western Roman Empire and the Huns started to exchange hostages during the early decades of the 
fifth century.522 However, whether it was already Uldin and “his Huns”, who sent some Huns to the 
court of the Western Roman Empire and received some upper class Romans in return to live among 
them is not certain.523 For the Romans exchange of hostages was a common policy to gain control 
of barbarian groups through friendly relations, and actions like these during  this period indicate 
                                                 
519 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 61, 62-63; Thompson (1999) 2000, 37-38. 
520 Because Zosimus was dependent on Orosius’ account of the mercenaries who Stilicho hired, I am more inclined to rely 
on Orosius’ report that the Hun troops were under Uldin’s command and they were accompanied by other barbarian 
troops. 
521 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 71-72; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, 66; Heather 2007, 8, 10, 27. The fact that the Huns did not 
subjucate other barbarian groups living on the borders of the Roman Empire would explain why Huns could have formed a 
huge coalition that operated successfully in the 440s. Maenchen-Helfen considers that groups of Huns and Alans would 
have allied together, though this ended when the Alans became tired of being the junior partner in the alliance, and hence 
joined the Vandals. 
522 Priscus, fr.11.2 in Blockley 1983, 256-257. The exchange of hostages between the Western Roman Empire and some 
Huns during the first decades of the fifth century are implied by Priscus’ accounts of the Huns in the 440s. 
523 Stickler 2007, 55. 
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Rome’s increasing interest in controlling the Huns and show that the Huns had become a factor that 
could not be dismissed by the Romans.524 
Even though friendly relations with the Romans clearly attracted the Huns, it would seem that it 
was not a lucrative enough option to restrain raiding, especially in the areas of the Eastern Roman 
Empire. Whereas the Western half of the Roman Empire was not raided by Uldin’s troops, Thrace 
was not spared in 408, as Sozomen mentions. Sozomen’s account of this raiding expedition is also 
the last report we have on Uldin.525 The account of how Uldin disappeared as leader of the Huns 
and what it can tell us about his leadership position are discussed in next section. At the same time I 
consider whether the actions of other fragmented Hun groups indicate the rise of a stronger, 
autarchic leadership among them. 
 
 
5.3. Abandoned during a Raiding Operation: The End of Uldin 
 
 
The last remark that we have on Uldin is from Sozomen.526 He tells about the situation in Thrace at 
the end of 408: “the Huns, who were encamped in Thrace, retreated disgracefully and cast off many 
of their number although they had neither been attacked nor pursued”, and after this “Uldin, the 
leader [ ] of the barbarous tribes who dwell near the Ister, crossed that river at the head 
of a large army, and encamped on the frontiers of Thrace”. When Uldin attacked with his troops, 
they were victorious because Sozomen mentions that Uldin “took possession by treachery of a city 
of Mœsia, called Castra Martis, and then made incursions into the rest of Thrace, and insolently 
refused to enter into terms of alliance with the Romans”. Uldin seems to have counted on his power 
because, according to Sozomen, even though “the prefect of the Thracian soldiers made 
propositions of peace to him [Uldin], but he replied by pointing to the sun, and declaring that it 
would be easy for him, if he desired to do so, to subjugate every region of the earth that is 
enlightened by that luminary”. However, Uldin’s trust in his own powers seem to have been 
mistaken because Sozomen claims that “while Uldin was uttering menaces of this description, and 
                                                 
524 Heather 1997, passim. 66, 69, 74. Heather’s remarks on the exchange of hostages in the relationship (foedus and deditio) 
between the Romans and the Goths, who were led by Athanaric in 432, are remiscent of the exchange of hostages between 
the Huns and the Romans in the 410s – 440s. However, it is not known, whether the Huns and the Romans would also 
have established foedus. In any case, according to Heather actions varied widely though the title, foedus, was the same. That is 
to say, the Romans were willing to adapt diplomatic means to suit the needs. Therefore, it is likely that the Romans favoured 
a similar policy with the Huns as with the barbarian groups with whom they had established foedus, though the Romans and 
the Huns would not have established foedus.  
525 Sozomen, Hist. ecc., IX, 5:2; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, 64; Stickler 2007, 56. 
526 Sozomen, Hist. ecc., IX, 5:2; cf. Wirth 1999, 35, 160; Thompson (1999) 2000, 38. 
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was ordering as large a tribute as he pleased, and that on this condition peace could be established 
with the Romans or the war would continue“ his followers withdrew their support for his military 
leadership position and, to quote to Sozomen “for shortly afterwards, the immediate attendants and 
the leaders of the tribes of Uldin ( ) were discussing the Roman form of 
government, the philanthropy of the emperor, and his promptitude and liberality in rewarding the 
best and good men. It was not without God that they turned to the love of the points so discussed 
and seceded to the Romans, to whose camp they joined themselves, together with the troops ranged 
under themselves”. What followed, according to Sozomen, is that “finding himself thus abandoned, 
Uldin escaped with difficulty to the opposite bank of the river. Many of his troops were slain; and 
among others the whole of the barbarous tribe called the Sciri. This tribe had been very strong in 
terms of numbers before falling into this misfortune. Some of them were killed; and others were 
taken prisoners, and conveyed in chains to Constantinople”.527 
Before turning to what Uldin’s sudden loss of power tells about his position and the unity of the 
Hun groups, I first consider what Sozomen’s comment about some Huns in Thrace reveals about the 
fragmented Huns’ ways of life and goals. 
Sozomen remarks of the Huns in Thrace without any good reason they moved away from the areas 
before Uldin’s invasion (“retreated disgracefully and cast off many of their number although they 
had neither been attacked nor pursued”). This strongly suggests that the Huns had not settled down 
in one place, and were moving from time to time to new pastures, as is common for herding 
nomads. The Hun groups’ movements in Thrace also indicate their fragmentation and the likelihood 
of their being a substantial number of Hun leaders besides Uldin in the border areas of Rome.  
On the whole, I suspect that the Huns in Thrace in 394 were those who promised to act as 
Theodosius I’s mercenaries, when needed, and in return they were allowed to live in Thrace.528 
Sozomen’s claim that the Huns retreated disgracefully might refer to the treaty between the Huns 
and Theodosius I, stressing that the Huns were expected to defend the territories against the 
invaders as agreed upon in the treaty.529 However, this does not seem to have happened, and it 
indicates that the Huns were not eager to settle down. On the other hand, it is possible that the Huns 
would have been those attacked Thrace in 404/405.530 In any case, the existence of Huns in Thrace 
before Uldin’s attack together with their lack of interest in joining Uldin’s invasion, indicates that 
there was no integrity between Hun groups, or at least connections were loose. 
                                                 
527 Sozomen, Hist. ecc., IX, 5:2; cf. Wirth 1999, 35, 160; Thompson (1999) 2000, 38. 
528 Eunapius, fr. 60 in Blockley 1983, 88-89; see Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 49; Stickler 2007, 51. 
529 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, passim. 51.  
530 Sozomen, Hist. ecc., VIII , 25:1. 
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A feature that suggests fragmentation of Hun groups and that they were eager to form a coalition 
with other groups according to nomadic customs is as Sozomen mentions that both Huns and Sciri, 
at least, formed part of Uldin’s army (“the immediate attendants and the leaders of the tribes of 
Uldin” and “among others the whole of the barbarous tribe called the Sciri”). Their presence and 
especially Sozomen’s phrase that Sciri were “among others” indicates an alliance between parties 
among the barbarian groups. On the whole, for nomads the background of the allies was less 
important, for what mattered more was the goal that both shared.531 The alliance with the Sciri 
might even go back to 381 when Zosimus informs us that the Huns joined with the Sciri and the 
Carpo-Dacians in crossing the Danube on a raiding expedition.532 The fact that Sciri did not 
withdraw their support from Uldin suggests that the parties had co-operated for some time, and that 
there was trust between them even during hardship. It is unlikely that the Sciri’s participation would 
have been based on submission to Uldin because, as Sozomen mentions, it was the Huns who 
abandoned Uldin and afterwards the Sciri remained with Uldin. In short, there were no Hun troops, 
at least in any large numbers, would force other barbarian groups, such as the Sciri, to still follow 
Uldin. Furthermore, the existence of the Sciri among Uldin’s troops indicates, as Heather states, 
Uldin’s mixed powerbase.533 All this suggests an alliance between groups rather than a stable unit.  
The fact that Uldin’s closest Hun warriors ( )534 or “Uldin’s own people 
and captains”, as Maenchen-Helfen puts it,535 withdrew their support from him because of 
disagreement about decisions in battles, strongly suggests that there was an alliance between the 
groups – if the leader was found wanting, Hun groups were ready to act on their own. It seems that 
the majority of Huns went over to the Roman side in order to gain wealth. In doing so the Hun 
warriors acted according to nomadic custom: one alliance would be renounced in order to make a 
                                                 
531 Lindner 1982, 702, 698; Vasjutin 2003, 52-54.  
532 Zosimus, Hist. nov., IV, 34:6; see Heather 1995, 10; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 40. 
533 Heather 2007, 23. 
534 Liddell, Scott, Jones 1968, 1062, 1202. In general  refers to a near friend, kinsman, a relative, a person from 
the same household, family or relatedkin. I consider that by the word  Sozomen refers to Hun warriors who 
belong to the same tribe or smaller group composition as Uldin came from or from among who Uldin was chosen as the 
main military leader. It is also possible that some of the  might have been Uldin’s relatives.  generally 
refers to a rank or office, the position of leader in an armed band, a commander of a company,  or a captain. Thus when 
Sozomen uses the word, he is alluding to military leaders of Hun troops. 
535 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 65-67. Maenchen-Helfen remarks that the meaning of the word , “Uldin’s own 
people” is not quite clear because “the word may mean nothing more specific than the people who usually stayed with him”. 
Maenchen-Helfen also stresses that kinsmen may not necessarily be implied. However, Sozomen’s remarks on
state that there was a close connection between and  . Accordingly, this might mean that all
and   would have been warriors who had joined Uldin and formed his troops, but   would 
have been those who led minor sections of the troops under Uldin. It would seem that Sozomen by using the word 
wanted to refer only to Hun and not to no other barbarian leaders. 
 101
new, more profitable alliance.536 Moreover, breaking an alliance suggests that Uldin’s position at 
the head of his troops was not an unquestionable or one that would have been self-evident.  
Uldin led Hun troops on different occasions during 400 – 409 but even after all these years his 
warrior followers were willing to bypass him if displeased by his decisions. This suggests that the 
coalitions between groups of Huns were temporary. In addition, the withdrawal of support for Uldin 
can be taken as a sign that his and other Hun warriors’ positions derived from temporary military 
leadership. On the whole, I consider that Uldin’s position and fate did not make any difference to 
the events that took place among the Eurasian pastoralists. This is precisely the situation that 
Sozomen says Uldin faced: when he could not convince his followers of his ability to lead, he lost 
his followers’ trust and his position as their leader. At the same time the unity of the groups that 
Uldin had led was gone. Accordingly, I agree with the claims that during the first decade of the fifth 
century no single and continuously growing confederacy of Huns existed.537 Furthermore, Uldin 
was leading only a confederation that was based on a temporary union of groups interested in 
joining together for raiding expeditions.538 
Sozomen’s account indicates that first Uldin had the main lead and the responsibility for actions 
during raids and battles. Second, at the same time as Uldin’s supreme military leadership position, 
military leaders under Uldin also maintained the lead of their own troops. Moreover, Sozomen’s 
phrase “the immediate attendants and the leaders of the tribes [who discussed with the Romans 
Uldin’s treaty because they were displeased with Uldin’s decisions]”539 implies that temporary 
military leaders were chosen from among their own groups on certain occasions. Furthermore, this 
supports the idea that military leaders under the supreme military leader were responsible for their 
actions to those who had trusted the military lead to them. All this strengthens the notion that the 
troops were first and foremost loyal to their own military leaders and members of their own clan or 
kin, not to Uldin. If the troops had been loyal to Uldin, they would not have followed the other 
leaders who withdrew their support for Uldin. Equally, because “ ” 
(“attendants and leaders of tribes”) discussed the treaty proposed by the Romans together, this 
emphasizes the fact that the position of military leaders in a tribe depended on their groups’ support. 
Accordingly, Uldin could not have had ultimate command over his Hun troops, and instead it was 
                                                 
536 Lindner 1982, passim. 700-701. According to Lindner, the Huns’ actions indicate that they formed tribes in similar ways 
to the mediaeval Eurasian nomads. First, a tribe was a political organism open to all who were willing to subordinate 
themselves to its chief and who shared an interest with its tribesmen. Second, a tribe’s rise or fall was related to the wisdom 
and success of its chiefs’ actions, e.g. in representing the tribal interests in negotiations. 
537 Thompson (1999) 2000, 64-66. 
538 Kradin 2005, 152-153. 
539 Sozomen, Hist. ecc., IX, 5:2. 
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question of a coalition bestowing the upmost command of troops on Uldin for a particular purpose 
and a certain time. 
Thus, it would appear that the leaders of the individual tribes retained their position of authority and 
responsibility even when serving under a “tribal leader”, Uldin.540 That is to say, Uldin was not the 
ultimate leader of the Huns but was instead a temporary supreme military leader. Moreover, Uldin 
had fellow temporary military leaders of tribes acting as subordinate commanders who, however, 
maintained their sovereignty to a certain extent and were ready to withdraw if they or their warrior 
followers were not pleased with Uldin’s lead.  
Generally speaking, if Uldin’s leadership position were based on something other than temporary 
military leadership, it is hard to believe that the Hun warriors and their troops would, or could, have 
slipped out of Uldin’s rule. Moreover, Sozomen’s description of Uldin losing his followers’ 
suggests Uldin’s weak power over the other Hun military leaders. Accordingly, I am not convinced 
that Uldin would have been “king of the Huns” or that he would have ruled over a “kingdom” as 
well as strengthened his “incipient royal power“ as it has been claimed.541  
What speaks against the view that Uldin would have strengthened his leadership among the Huns is 
that neither his actions nor the elements that refer to his leadership position differ in any crucial way 
from those of Hun leaders in previous years.542 Moreover, a sign that implies that Uldin’s position 
would not have changed from previous years is shown by Sozomen (400-450) calling both Uldin 
and Zosimus (400-500) by the title “ ”. While Zosimus might have utilized Sozomen’s 
description of Uldin in his narration, nevertheless the meaning of the word “ “ as a leader 
whose position does not imply a strong political basis but an overall position of leadership defined 
by the community, refers to the facts that Uldin’s position is based on others’ acceptance of his 
lead. 
Thompson argues Uldin’s position would have arisen from primitive kingship among the Huns: 
“the disappearance of Uldin as soon as he was unsuccessful in war is one more sign of that 
democratic character of primitive kingship”.543 However, because Thompson does not define what 
kind of features indicate “primitive kingship”, the claim is hard to consider. Thompson also argues 
that kingship seems to have become a permanent institution among at least one body of Huns by 
412. I am not convinced by this claim because the descriptions of Uldin and his actions do not 
                                                 
540 Thompson (1999) 2000, 64, 68. 
541 Homeyer 1951, 31; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 61, 67, 69. Maenchen-Helfen is not the only scholar who claims that Uldin 
would have been king of Huns. Homeyer also refers to Uldin as “king”. However, Homeyer thinks that kingship would 
have already existed in Uldin’s time, and there would have happened transformation towards kingship, as sketched by 
Maenchen-Helfen. 
542 Thompson (1999) 2000, 64. 
543 Thompson (1999) 2000, 64. 
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suggest the emergence of kingship, or any stronger leadership position than was commonly found in 
military leadership among nomads. 
Moreover, I am not convinced by Bona’s estimation that Uldin was a military leader who acted 
under a king, “Grosskönig”, Charaton, a Hun leader known from 412 or 413.544 Generally speaking, 
there are no descriptions or any other attestations about the connection between Charaton and 
Uldin, not to mention signs of Charaton’s position as king, “Grosskönig”, or the existence of kings 
besides military leaders among the Huns in general. All this leaves Bona’s argument ungrounded.545  
Although, I disagree with Bona, I tend to agree with Heather that Uldin could be seen as a leader 
who ultimately did not have enough power to act as a conqueror.546 I consider that Uldin’s main 
interest was not to conquer land, but to gain booty in order to please his troops who had granted him 
the temporary position of supreme military leader. On the whole, I suspect that Uldin arranged the 
raid on Thrace because the many groups of Huns and other barbarians who formed Uldin’s troops 
were keen to have more booty. It would have been that interest that bestoyed on Uldin the 
temporary position of a military leader who was expected to bring victory.  
In the following section I point out that along with Uldin’s troops there were also some other groups 
of Huns on the move who aimed to gain riches. Uldin and the warriors who followed him seem to 
have been only one of three Hun groups that made contacts with the Roman Empire and were active 
on its borders.547 Uldin’s position seems to have based on temporary military leadership, and this 
was also likely to the case with the leaders of the smaller groups of Huns as well. The existence of 
temporary military leaders is also supported by the fact that all the actions carried out by scattered 
groups of Huns are related to military actions, and were primarily motivated by the wish to gain 
wealth by raiding.548 Accordingly, this strengthens the notion that there was no single Hun king 
who would have united the Huns under his leadership but many independent groups with their own 






                                                 
544 Bona 1992, 35. 
545 The position of Charaton is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
546 Heather 2005, 202. 
547 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 62, 71. 
548 Zosimus, Hist. nov., V, 46. Zosimus states that “the emperor called ten thousand Huns to his assistance in the war against Alaric, in 
order that he might have provision ready for them on their arrival”, suggesting that the possibility of gaining wealth led to the the 
Huns’ contacts with the Roman Empire. 
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5.4. Scattered Groups of Huns in the Beginning of the 410s 
 
Zosimus’ story about the Hun troops that joined Alaric’s brother-in-law, Athaulf’s invasion of 
Rome in 408, at the same time as Uldin led his troops to Thrace tells us about the existence of Hun 
troops that were not led by Uldin.549 Moreover, a group of Huns were hired to strengthen the 
Western Roman Empire army against Athaulf. According to Zosimus, 300 Huns, supposedly the 
Emperor’s regular auxiliary, were sent from Ravenna to the battle.550 In addition, Zosimus mentions 
that in 409 the Emperor hired 10,000 Huns to fight against Alaric.551  
While 10,000 Hun warriors is very likely an exaggeration (it would have meant around 40,000 
Huns in all dwelling on the Roman borders),552 still Zosimus’ account points out that there were 
Hun military leaders other than Uldin who took an active role with the Romans. Lastly, the 
existence of Hun leaders similar to Uldin is suggested by the fact that still in 395 the majority of 
Huns seem to have centred mainly around the Volga steppe. It was not until the early fifth century 
(c. 410 - 420) when more groups of Huns moved to the fringes of the Roman Empire and many of 
them occupied the regions of the Great Hungarian Plain.553 Put briefly, a large number of scattered 
bands of nomads, so-called Huns, were arriving in regions close to those occupied by Uldin.554 
While there were many groups of Huns acting together with Uldin’s coalition, I still partly agree 
with the assessments that the downfall of Uldinled to a power vacuum among the Huns close to the 
Roman borders.555 In short, there was no longer a Hun leader who commanded considerable 
influence among his warriors with whom the Romans could have negotiated. In the eyes of the 
Romans the Huns once again formed an uncontrolled threat on its borders.556 On the other hand, the 
situation could also be seen as advantageous for the Romans: it was easier to control tiny groups of 
Huns and the regions where they dwelled because these fragmented Huns could not form a strong 
opposition. Furthermore tiny groups were easy for the Romans to hire as mercenaries when needed. 
According to Stickler the Romans would have even gained control over the regions that were earlier 
                                                 
549 Zosimus, Hist. nov., V, 37. 
550 Zosimus, Hist. nov., V, 45; Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 276-279. It is likely that the Roman auxiliaries would have 
been Basich’s and Kursich’s troops, if Priscus’ account about Basich and Kursich “who later came to Rome to make an alliance” is 
to be dated to the turn of the 4th and 5th centuries. 
551 Zosimus, Hist. nov., V, 50:1; see Wirth 1999, 30, 34, 159. Wirth remarks that the number of 10,000 Huns is derived from 
literary conventions and the actual number of Huns must have been much smaller.  
552 There are no contemporary authors’ descriptions or archaeological remains that would indicate nomads living in the 
vicinity of the Danube in such large numbers. Accordingly Zosimus’ account only implies that a large numbers of Huns, 
strengthened perhaps with allies, had joined the Roman army. 
553 Heather 2005, 202, 204-205; Heather 2007, 24, 28; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, 66. According to Heather, the intrusion of 
the Huns into Europe was a two-stage process: occupation of the land north of the Black Sea happened during the 370s, 
and the occupation of the Great Hungarian Plain during the first decade of the fifth century. 
554 Heather 2007, 12-13,  
555 Stickler 2007, 56-57. 
556 Batty 2007, 563. 
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inhabited by the groups of Huns who had trusted in Uldin, because Honorius’ weak troops did not 
confront opposition when passing through regions from the Alps in modern Bavaria to regions in 
present-day Croatia.557  
For this reason I conclude that during the first decade of the fifth century Huns still seem to have 
acted according to their nomadic way of life: groups acted together and formed troops when it was 
question of raids that were intended to bring profits. Secondly, they also had allies, other than Hun 
groups. Thirdly, the leadership position among the Huns is clearly a military leadership. Taken 
together, I argue that around 410 the Huns lived and acted according to nomadic customs and their 
society had not become sedentary nor had a kingship emerged, a leadership position which was 

































                                                 
557 Stickler 2007, 56-57. 
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6. VARIATIONS IN THE TITLES OF NOMAD LEADERS 
 
 
In this chapter I discuss what kind of leadership positions occurred among the fragmented groups of 
Huns in the 410s. In addition, I show how Roman authors defined the position of nomad leaders not 
only in imaginary and descriptive stories but also in official accounts. This reveals whether Greco-
Roman authors considered that leadership positions common to sedentarists, addressed as rex and 
basileus, could emerge and exist among nomads. 
 
 
6.1. The Hun leader Charaton as “the first of the kings” 
 
After Uldin’s fall from power the Huns who had from time to time been eager to choose him as 
their military leader and join in the raiding operations seem to have lost interest in having a similar 
leader again because many groups of Huns acted independently in the regions between the River 
Drau and the middle Danube basin, east of the Alps around the year 410.558 This is also referred to 
in Olympiodorus’ account of his visit to certain groups of Huns in 411/412 or 413 which includes 
the notion of the Huns having many “ ”, leaders:559 
 
[Olympiodorus] discusses Donatus and the Huns and the natural talent of their kings [ ] for archery. 
The historian [Olympiodorus] describes the embassy on which he went to them [the Huns] and to Donatus and 
he waxes tragical on his wanderings over the sea and the danger he faced. He tells how Donatus was deceived by 
an oath and wickedly killed, how Charaton, the first of the kings [ ], flared up with rage 
at the murder and how he was calmed down and pacified with regal gifts. This marks the end of the first group 
of ten books. 
 
There is disagreement whether Olympiodorus was sent from the Eastern or Western Roman Empire 
to establish good relations between the Huns and the Romans, and whether Donatus was a Hun at 
all. Because Olympiodorus saw some service in the West under Honorius, I consider that his 
diplomatic mission was carried out on behalf of the court of Ravenna. Moreover, Olympiodorus is 
known to have made a trip to Athens in 415 that, which suggests he was active in the Balkan 
regions during the first years of the 410s. In fact, the Huns seem to have lived in the areas of 
                                                 
558 Blockley 1981, 27; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 73; Heather 2005, 324; Stickler 2007, 57. 
559 Olympiodorus, fr.19 in Blockley 1983, 182-183. 
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modern Hungary during this time. Furthermore, because Donatus clearly had close contact with the 
Huns, it indicates Donatus’ prominent position amongst the Huns.560 
Olympiodorus’ preference for the word reks ( ) has led to claims that Donatus or at least 
Charaton would have had a position comparable to kings in sedentary societies. However the word 
itself does not reveal Charaton’s strong leadership position among the Huns. Olympiodorus did not 
make careful distinctions concerning the political structure of barbarian peoples when he used 
words like  or , phylarkhos.561 Equally, Maenchen-Helfen emphasizes that late 
Roman contemporary authors used the Latin word rex and the Greek reeks,  with no strictly 
specific meaning – it was only used in order to indicate some kind of leadership within a group.562 
In fact, Charaton’s position was not much different to that of other Huns because he and others like 
him were called kings, reges ( ). The only difference in the leadership position between 
Charaton and the other Hun reges is that Charaton is mentioned as “the first” of them. The only 
time when nomads need a primary leader or leaders at the head of larger groupings is during 
wanderings and military activity.563 This is precisely the situation of the Huns when they arrived on 
the Roman borders and established relations with the Romans. Thus, I consider that reges were 
military leaders of clans and tribes, and Charaton had the position of primary military leader.  
Even though the importance of military leaders among the Huns is recognized, nevertheless the title 
reks ( ) and Olympiodorus’ account in general has been claimed to indicate either the 
strengthening position of Hun leaders or to signify the rise of kingship among the Huns. Moreoever, 
it has been suggested that Charaton was the great king (“Grosskönig”) of the Huns under whose rule 
Uldin and Donatus served as military leaders.564 I however doubt these claims. First, there are no 
contemporary texts or any other piece of evidence that suggests that such circumstances took place 
among the Huns. Nor is there any evidence that supports the idea of a divided leadership position 
among the Huns or a connection between Charaton and Uldin.565 For these reasons Charaton’s 
position as a great king of the Huns is very doubtful. 
Charaton is a Hun leader who scholars prefer to refer to as king rather than to other possible 
leadership titles. In addition, the title of king is used to point out the similarity between Charaton’s 
                                                 
560 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 74; Stickler 2007, 58; Blockley 1981, 27-28; Thompson (1999) 2000, 38-40; Heather 2005, 324-
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564 Bona 1991, 24, 35. 
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position and that of the Hun kings after him, such as Rua and Attila. Because Rua and Attila led a 
large Hun coalition, this implied that Charaton’s position was mightier than other kings ( ) 
during the first years of the 410s. It is also argued that Charaton’s position would have included, as 
e.g. in the case of Rua, rulership over tribes. I disagree with this view because Olympiodorus’ 
description and the fragmentation of the groups of Huns during the earlier decades do not speak 
about a strong unity and leadership positions among the Huns.566 
It is also suggested that the increased amount of military activity led to the rise of a permanent 
kingship, at least among the Huns connected to Charaton during the 410s. It is argued that when 
raids became more successful, the greater number of warriors was persuaded to form a confederacy 
that strengthened the leadership position, and hence the position of primary military leader turned 
into a kingship.567  
I do not share this view, however because Olympiodorus’ account does not tell us that the position 
of “the first king” would have become a permanent one among the Huns. Olympiodorus does not in 
fact say that Charaton would have gained the position of “first king” after Donatus. Olympiodorus 
says that Charaton was “flared up with rage” when he heard about the murder of Donatus. Thus, 
there is no reason to believe that Charaton was immediately appointed to fill Donatus’ place and 
this would signify a permanent kingship. 
It is true that military success was the basis for strengthening leadership position among the groups 
of Huns, but this does not suggest that it would have turned into a kingship.568 I argue that the 
position could strengthen in the limits of Huns’ nomadic way of life, and hence we should see this 
position as a supreme military leadership. This is a position that could became stronger when 
leading a growing number of temporarily allied nomadic groups. It is doubtful if this happened 
among Charaton’s Huns but the increasing military activity during the 420s means that it was 
possible in the case of the next known Hun leaders, e.g. Rua and Octar and Bleda and Attila. 
The relationship between the Romans and the Huns during the 410s can be seen as twofold. The 
large number of small groups of Huns on the borders of the Roman Empire decreased the Romans’ 
interest in having contacts with them because a good relationship with a particular group would not 
help to control the others. Therefore, the Romans preferred to follow the situation among the 
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Huns.569 However, there is also the opposite view, namely that Olympiodorus’ visit to the Huns 
signifies the Romans’ interest in having connections with the Huns and their leaders. 
It is claimed that Olympiodorus’ primary task was to establish official relations between the Huns 
and the Romans in order to reduce the possibility of sudden raids by the Huns.570 Furthermore, the 
military threat caused by the Huns would explain why Olympiodorus needed to meet, “the first of 
the kings”, Charaton. As a primary military leader Charaton would have been the one who 
controlled the Hun troops and many Hun military leaders, reges ( ). One aspect that speaks 
that suggests the interest of the Western Roman Empire in establishing an official relationship with 
the Huns is that Aetius, a Western Roman Empire general, was sent as a Roman hostage to the Huns 
during the first years of the fifth century.571 There are even doubts that Aetius spent these years 
among the strongest coalition of Huns, which might or might not have been led by Charaton. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the Romans sought contacts with the Huns because good relations 
with them provided the opportunity to hire the nomads as Roman mercenaries and helped to keep 
the border areas calm in the lower-Danubian basin.572  
Even if the Romans sought connections with Hun groups in general and tried to control them in this 
way, there was according to Heather, a new wave of groups of Huns arriving on the Roman borders 
during the first decades of the fifth century. This new wave finally established the Huns in the areas 
of the present-day Great Hungarian plain and in the vicinity of the Danube, the Pontic areas and in 
the neighbourhood of the Carpathians.573 It is not certain, however, whether the groups of Huns that 
Charaton represented were newcomers or not – if they were new arrivals, it could have prompted 
the Romans to seek good relations with them. Again it is as equally likely that Charaton was a 
spokesman of a new coalition of Hunnic groups who were already living either in the areas of 
modern Hungary or near the northern parts of Black Sea, and they could even have been partly 
known by the Romans.574  
In any case, the fragmentation of the Huns helps us to evaluate the situation of the Hun leaders.575 It 
would seem that during the 410s the Huns lived in a loose tribal organization, tribes joining together 
only when it was considered a necessity. In short, there was no broad or large-scale tribal coalition 
                                                 
569 Wirth 1999, 37. 
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that would have been led by a mighty Hun leader. I also consider that Charaton’s coalition would 
have been the largest among the Huns, thought even his position can be claimed to be particularly 
strong.576 
The Huns’ preference for acting as scattered and independent groups during the 410s is also 
deduced from a number of contemporary remarks. Two short accounts in Codex Theodosianus are 
claimed to refer to the Huns’ activities. The first is a short notice concerning the Romans’ sudden 
need to strengthen their fleet on the Danube in Moesia and Scythia in 412.577 This is taken as a sign 
of the Huns raiding these areas again. This would suggest that these groups did not consider 
Charaton to be their leader, or if they did, they were not bound by any of his agreements but acted 
as they pleased. It is also possible that there could have been totally new Hun arrivals in these 
areas.578  
The groups who lived close to the mouth of the Danube, were unlikely to be Huns connected to 
Charaton, who in addition to many groups of Huns, lived in the areas between the  River Drau and 
the Middle Danube basin and the lowland areas of modern Hungary. In addition, Olympiodorus’ 
text includes no hints about Charaton being charged with raiding, and he Charaton seems to have 
operated with the Western and not the Eastern Roman Empire. Finally, the fact that the walls of 
Constantinople were also rebuilt and enlarged in 413 implies that the Romans were well aware of 
the need for constant readiness against an enemy nearby.579 Therefore, I consider that the Huns 
mentioned in the Codex Theodosianus were not acting with Charaton.580  
The Eastern Roman Empire seems to have continued its struggle against the impending threat of the 
Huns’ attacks in their neighbourhood throughout the 410s. This comes clear from Theodosius II’s 
letter to Praetorian Prefect of Oriens in 419/420. In the letter Emperor forbids merchants from 
selling products related to war in the Black Sea coastal areas.581 However, unlike earlier similar 
restrictions, this time the Emperor prohibits the use of ships in exporting forbidden goods. The 
regulations are related to the activities of the Huns in the immediate vicinity of the Black Sea and 
imply that the Huns turning had turned to pirating, though with poor success.582 Generally speaking, 
I suspect that the Huns would have been involved in piracy. It is likely that the pirates were local 
Gothic sedentary dwellers, who were eager to have trade connections with the Huns especially 
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because the local groups around the Pontic Danubian region had been active pirates for centuries.583 
This suggests that when the Huns arrived in these new areas they increased the number of trade 
connections and alliances with locals.  
To sum up, there is nothing to suggest a strong unity between the groups of Huns, and hence a 
strong leadership position among them in the 410s. The situation changed through during the 420s 
or at the latest in the 430s when new Hun leaders, the brothers Rua and Octar, are mentioned in 
contemporary authors’ accounts.  
Because Rua and Octar could unite many groups of Huns into a larger coalition, it is claimed that 
the leadership position was strengthened among the Huns and even a dual-kingship could have 
arisen. It is further argued that their centralization of power would have caused the Huns to give up 
their nomadic way of life and adopt a sedentary way of life.584 I shall discuss these claims in the 
following chapters, but first, in the next section I shall investigate the relationship between the 
image of nomad leadership and actual encounters: in other words, even though the Late Roman 
authors created images of wild and unorganized nomadic dwellers, what were contemporaries’ 
views when they negotiated with nomads? That is to say, do contemporaries consider nomad 
leaders to be kings in official meetings such as peace negotiations? 
 
 
6.2. Images of Nomadic Kingship in Antiquity 
 
The Romans adopted their views of barbarians, including the concept of nomads, from the Greeks. 
This was strengthened by the tradition of imitating former writers’ descriptions. Therefore, we 
might suppose that the views which Hartog claims were included in Herodotus’ image of the 
Scythians and the leadership position among them, also influenced the views of the Huns presented 
by Late Roman authors. 
In Herodotus’ Historiae the conception of nomadic kingship is considered to be impossible owing 
to the contradiction between being both herdsmen and subjects. Hartog writes ”the minute the 
figure of a king appears among the Scythians in the narrative, they can no longer be nomads” and 
“nomad power is something inconceivable; if it is a power, it cannot be nomad”.585 Or at least it is a 
question of a hybrid, which signifies impurity. The ground for this is that those who are claimed to 
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have no laws, no cities, no specific dwelling sites or who form no specific unit, cannot have a 
leadership position which includes stable power or had defined subjects. The image of kingship is 
impossible because there are no precise areas and no defined population to rule over among 
nomads.586 
Despite the fact that kingship and kings are considered to be impossible among nomads, nomad 
leaders are nonetheless addressed as  (basileus), (reeks) and rex in the narratives.587 
Even though the nomad “king” is sometimes depicted as a military leader, and this matches the 
reality of the leadership position among nomads,588 nevertheless this leader is primarily represented 
as a brutish despot. This derives from contemporaries’ customs of describing nomads as barbarians 
and their leaders in a similar fashion.589  
On the whole, it was argued that barbarians who are ignorant of the rule of polis could only live in 
conditions of subjection or slavery to cruel masters, often called kings but also despots or tyrants.590 
In other words, the difference between Greek and barbarian rule was emphasized or marked by the 
titles used for their leaders, and writers followed the convention of naming barbarian leaders 
kings.591 
Furthermore, the Greeks’ conception of how climate and the environment affected and determined 
human nature supported to a large extent the argument that barbarians lived under the unpleasant 
and oppressive rule of kings.592 Especially people living south of the Greeks were claimed to be 
lazy because of the warm weather and richness of nature; and consequently easily fell under the 
suppressive rule of kings. By contrast, the cold climate in the north was explained to make 
inhabitants so restless that only weak social organization or rule of kings was typical for them.593 
Indeed, the most pitiless kings, who were represented as supporting slavery, were said to rule in the 
utmost northern areas.594 The nature of barbarian leadership at every point of the compass was the 
same: the oppressive rule of kings. This went for nomad leadership too – because nomads were 
barbarians they could only have one kind of power, and this was royal power because that was 
synonymous with non-Roman leadership.595 
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The nature of “royal power” or the concept of kingship was connected with the definition of 
barbarians.596 Because barbarians were described in every way as opposite to Greeks and Romans, 
their leadership too could only include repellent features. Thus, barbarian kings were often said out 
to treat their subjects like slaves, including whipping and branding.597 Indeed, violation of the body 
was common among them, and they were claimed, for example, to cut or mutilate themselves. 
Barbarian kings were claimed to have lurid sexual behaviour and said to be so full of hubris that 
they did not even respect the Gods. That is to say, the terrible features of kings reflected the nature 
of their hideous rule over their subjects.598 
The crucial connection between kings and subjects directs us towards the problem of nomad kings. 
As mention above before, the overall essence of a nomadic way of life did not support the idea of 
permanent rulers as kings; and this seems to have been in the minds of Ammianus and Claudian 
when they wrote about the absence of kings among the Huns.599 However, both authors connect 
mutilation a common feature of barbarian kings to Huns in general.600 This is an indication that 
even though contemporary authors started to have more contacts with Hun leaders, there was no 
other possibility than to emphasize the image of Hun leaders similar as barbarian kings and also to 
name them using the titles rex and . In other words, if there was a leader among the nomads, 
such as the Huns, it was plausible to use words like rex and (reeks) or 
, “the Scythian kings”, as Priscus refers to the Hun leaders in the 440s.601 Accordingly, I 
disagree with the claim that when Late Roman authors address the words rex and to Hun 
leaders this implies that leadership position is similar to that of sedentary barbarian leaders, namely 
king who has a permanent position among the groups he leads.602 For Roman authors rex and 
are only words that are used to refer to barbarian leaders in their narrations. It is in fact the 
background of the barbarian group that dictates what kind of leadership position leaders called rex 
and  might have had in reality.  
In the following section I discuss how Roman authors wrote about nomad leaders when they were 
telling about official contacts, as opposed to the titles given to leaders in narrative accounts. This 
reveals what kind of titles authors used in addressing nomad leaders in official situations. 
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6.3 The Liberty of Storytelling: The Countless Titles of Nomad Leaders 
 
In written sources where Roman authors tell about actual dealings with nomad leaders the titles 
addressed to the leaders are not rex and  but  (phylarkhos), (strategos), 
 (ethnarkhes),   (egemon) and also on a few occasions, such as when referring 
to Hun leaders,  (basileus). This points out how differently the authors considered 
nomad leadership position when they had to deal with it in reality than when they only referred to or 
wrote general accounts about nomads.  
Even though the terms which Roman authors used for nomad leaders tell us about the images the 
Romans’ had concerning nomad leadership, texts that are connected to actual contacts, such as 
negotiations, can best reveal how Roman authors conceived of nomad leadership. 
The written sources that include titles of nomad leaders and tell about dealings between nomads and 
Romans form two main categories.603 First, there are historical accounts, e.g. descriptions of 
negotiations and treaties between the Romans and nomads which include current, but not 
necessarily official, terminology addressed to a nomad leader. Although these accounts are narrative 
accounts, they are written in the context of actual events.  
The second category is formed by imperial documents which include official usage of titles for 
nomad leaders that are related to treaties and officially established relations between the Romans 
and the nomads. However, there are two subcategories. First, there are titles given to nomad leaders 
who were living within the Empire. Another subcategory is formed by titles which were given to 
nomad leaders who lived outside the Roman borders, e.g. the Huns. The titles that were officially 
granted to nomad leaders, especially when these nomads lived within the Empire, merely reflect 
Roman bureaucracy rather than the kind of position that the nomad leaders would have actually had. 
After all, the Romans wanted to secure their interests in treaties, and hence a title given to a nomad 
leader merely reflects the position that the Romans were ready to offer for a nomad leader, and not 
the position of a nomad leader among his own people.  
In order to analyse whether the titles hint to kings or kingship among the nomads, I will mostly 
study the written sources in the first main category, rather than imperial documents. That is to say, I 
study accounts that are written in relation to dealings with Romans and nomads but are not imperial 
documents. When Roman authors told about Romans dealings with nomads without bothering with 
officially granted titles, they could use words they considered to be most suitable to reflect the 
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situation, and hence they are a better indication of what was going on among nomads and their 
leadership position. 
In written accounts titles such as  (phylarkhos), (strategos),
(ethnarkhes),   (egemon) and  (basileus) were especially addressed to leaders of 
nomads who lived within the Roman Empire in the deserts of Syria and ancient Palestine.604 They 
enjoyed a large amount of autonomy and according to Chrysos their chiefs had no administrative or 
political duties entrusted to them by the Roman Empire. Nonetheless, they were recognized as the 
leaders of their tribes on the battlefield and in their own autonomous affairs,605 and it reminds one 
of the situation between the Romans and groups of Huns during the fifth century.606 Given this 
context, we are able to consider how the Romans officially named the nomadic leaders who lived 
outside the Roman borders but with whom the Romans had established some kind of relationship, 
albeit not an official treaty. 
Titles, such as (ethnarkhes) and  (egemon)607 do not explicitly tell us the basis 
of a leadership position. Although  (ethnarkhes) refers to “a ruler of a tribe or nation”, it 
still does not indicate the basis for a leadership position and what it derives from.608 Since the word 
was generally attached to a Arab nomad leader or “sheikh”, the allusion is to a leader who had 
followers because they trusted his ability to lead, or he was the oldest, and hence was trusted among 
the group.609 Accordingly, we might deduce that the position of the leader was strongly based on the 
trust in his capabilities. The titles  (phylarkhos) and (strategos), on the 
other hand indicate that the leader was a military leader of groups that could be defined as a tribe.610  
The word phylarkhos is based on the term  (phyle), tribe or larger group composition, and it 
clearly refers to the one with whom one deals concerning the whole unit. Since nomads live in 
scattered groups and only rarely unite as a larger unit, it both supported and encouraged the use of 
the word for nomad leaders in general during antiquity.611 It is probable therefore that all these 
listed titles emphasize the idea of nomad leaders having no permanent or unchallenged position 
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among their groups and hence indicate that in reality nomad kings, that is to say, leaders with a 
fixed position, were considered incongruous.  
While titles  (phylarkhos), (strategos), (ethnarkhes) and  
 (egemon) are favoured for nomad leaders in written accounts, the title  
(basileus) also occurs.612 The title and  (basileus) implies a mighty position and is used 
e.g. by Procopius for the Saracen leader Arethas and the Lakhmid ruler Moundhir during the sixth 
century. Priscus also uses it to address Hun leaders, e.g. Rua and Attila, during the 430s and the 
440s.613 However, the title basileus was never officially applied to any other persons/ rulers than 
Persian kings.614 On the one hand, the title basileus was unofficially used in literary sources for 
Roman emperors after Augustus, though its counterpart was considered the Latin rex, especially 
during the fourth to the sixth centuries, and contained the connotation of brutish (often barbarian) 
rule and rulers, even of tyranny.615 For this reason, the title basileus was not as favoured as kaisar 
for Roman emperors in historical accounts.  
Although the title basileus referred to Roman emperors and the Great king of Persia, we should not 
overestimate the nomad leader’s position, e.g. the Hun leader Attila, when Roman authors 
addressed them by the title basileus. The context of the nomads and their nomadic way of life 
dictated what kind of leadership position a title referred to. The authors’ goals concerning why and 
what to tell about a nomad leader are further starting points for understanding the meaning of a title. 
Thus, for example, Chrysos stresses that when Procopius called Arethas basileus, his purpose was 
to create an image of Arethas’ mightier position over the other nomad leaders in the area.616 
Priscus’ manner of calling Hun leaders like Rua and Attila, basileus refers to the same usage.617 In 
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addition, it has been noted that Greco-Roman authors could address the title basileus to nomad 
leaders in order to criticize the Emperor.618 In other words, when the Emperor is basileus called in 
the same way as a barbarian leader, it creates an image of comparable leadership positions. The 
practice is found, for example, in Priscus when he tells about the Hun leader Attila and is eager to 
point out that in Theodosius II was a weak emperor.619  
Thus even the title of basileus when used for nomad leaders cannot be taken as a sign of nomad 
kings or kingship, but can derive from other reasons such as the political goals of the author. In 
addition, contemporary authors’ ways of referring to barbarian leaders varied from writer to writer. 
On the whole, the majority of Greek sources address the Germanic kings with the title basileus, 
whereas similarly, Malalas, for example, uses only the title  (reeks) for the western kings. Alike 
Olympiodorus never used the title basileus for barbarian leaders but referred to them instead as  
(reeks) and  (phylarkhos).620 
Whereas the title basileus was not officially used to address nomad leaders in imperial documents, 
the situation is reverse with the title  (phylarkhos).621 Equally, titles, such as praefectus 
gentis and magister militum that derived from Roman bureaucracy were also used as officially used 
titles not only to for barbarian leaders but also for leaders of sedentary groups. Thus titles like 
praefectus and magister militum do not solve the question concerning the kind of position the leader 
had. 
First of all, titles were part of treaties, and hence they mainly reveal what kind of duties the Romans 
expected the barbarians and their leaders to take care of in the context of Rome and Roman 
administration.622 Secondly, they imply in what kind of direction the Romans wanted to point the 
barbarian leadership. After all, treaties and titles were formulated in a way that they would best 
support the power of the Romans and their control over barbarians.623 This means that the title does 
not so much tell what kind of position the barbarian leaders had, but what kind of position the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Hun leaders implies that all the leaders had a similar position among their followers. In short, there was no fundamental 
difference in the basis of Rua’s and Attila’s leadership position compared to that of other Hun leaders.   
618 Kawar 1957, 366-369; see also Chrysos 1978, 48; Christides 1970, 5-13. 
619 See Chapter 2.3. 
620 Chrysos 1978, 54. 
621 Chrysos 1978, 42, 44, 49, 51. 
622 Wirth 1997, passim. 15; Chrysos 1978, 60-61. 
623 Chrysos 1978, 63; Batty 2007, 563; Wirth 1997, passim. 15, 32. Chrysos points out that from the 4th century onwards 
Romans favoured abolishing the local kingship tradition in eastern client kingdoms. The old honorary titles given to the 
local leaders were replaced by titles such as comes or dux. At the same time, the leaders became more obviously Roman 
officials who had to act according to Roman bureaucracy like any other official in the empire. Also in the Trans-Danubian 
area the Romans made many attempts to make the locals more firmly part of Roman administration so as to strengthen 
Roman power and rule in the area. 
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Romans wanted to give to the nomad leader when dealing with him. In other words, what kind of 
position the Romans wanted the barbarian leader to have in the context of Roman bureaucracy.624  
The goals of getting the nomad leaders to become part of Roman administration and to transform 
the leadership position to achieve this end, is especially seen in the title praefectus gentis.625 
According to Schubert, Weiss and Kath the title praefectus gentis only occurs in North Africa, and 
because it is elsewhere called praefectus civitatis, gens may indicate a reference to nomadic groups. 
Although the duties attached to the title are not certain, it may have been given to a nomad leader 
who was expected as a Roman administrator to bring the nomads, who had accepted him as their 
leader, more firmly under Roman rule.626 
The Romans’ way of awarding the title magister militum supports the notion that the titles given to 
barbarian leaders mainly tell how they were enrolled in the imperial service, not what kind of 
position the barbarian leader unambiguously had among his followers.  
First of all, magister militum was a title generally awarded to a barbarian leader after a treaty that 
made them Roman foederati. This means that barbarians were allowed to settle on Roman soil. 
Accordingly, the treaty was fundamentally made with barbarians who were sedentarists. When the 
barbarian became part of the Roman Empire, they also partly maintained their political 
independence. In other words, a barbarian leader was still officially recognized as the leader of 
autonomous political units, his barbarian followers, though the barbarians had to recognize the 
sovereignty of the emperor in the Roman Empire. Moreover, the barbarians had to act as imperial 
troops when required. This in general was the duty that the title magister militum, bestowed on a 
barbarian leader, referred to. Equally, the title demonstrated to all sides that these barbarian leaders 
were enrolled in the imperial service. Furthermore, the Empire often used the title as a pretext 
hiding annual subsidies, or “tribute”, to the barbarian leader under the guidance of an ordinary 
salary for military service.627 
Generally speaking, military service seems to have been the reason why the Romans had 
supposedly given the title magister militum to Attila, as Priscus’ account implies: “Roman general 
( ) which the Emperor had granted to Attila, thus concealing the word 
                                                 
624 Wirth 1997, passim. 24, 54. 
625 Schmauder 2009, 80. 
626 Schubert, Weiss, Kath: http://www.nomadsed.de/projects_01-04/c3.html. According to Schubert, Weiss and Kath the 
same goal is implied by Marcus Aurelius’ edict, called the Tabula Banasitana from the year 177, which tells of the granting of 
Roman citizenship to some chiefs from nomadic groups or “tribes” of Baquates in the province of Mauretania Tingitana. 
627 Heather 1997, 58-59; Blockley 1992, 149-151; Chrysos 1978, 60-63.  The relationship between Roman Emperor and the 
barbarian leader who was in charge of the groups that were allowed to settle within the Roman Empire, was expressed 
through the bestowal of imperial court titles, in the first stage military titles, such as comes or magister militum, and later 
political titles, such as exconsul and patricius, and in some cases through the title adoptio per arma. 
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tribute ( ). As a result, the payments were sent to him disguised as provisions issued to 
the generals”.628 
Because the Huns did not live within the Roman Empire, Attila’s title magister militum could not 
include obligations similar to those addressed to barbarians who were allowed to dwell on Roman 
soil.629 According to Wirth, during the third century enemies beyond the frontiers were treated in 
the same way as federates who immigrated to the Empire.630 Therefore, I assume, as the title 
magister militum implies, that the Romans required Hun troops as mercenaries according to need 
and in return for payment. Groups of Huns had since their arrival on the borders of the Roman 
Empire in the 380s served as Roman mercenaries and especially during the 420s when Aetius, the 
Western Roman magister utriusque militiae, had on a number of occasions in the help of Hun 
mercenaries.631 This implies that the Hun leaders had, even before the 440s and Attila’s leadership, 
been eager to supply Hun troops to the army of the Western Roman Empire, and perhaps they were 
also honoured with the title magister militum, though this is not known for sure. When the Hun 
coalition became stronger during the 440s, it would have led to granting the title magister militum 
to Attila.  
However, because Attila is not known to have sent any troops to the Western or the Eastern Roman 
armies, the title could have been given only so as to maintain friendly relations between the Huns 
and the Romans. After all, payments due on account of the honorary title were an expedient for the 
Romans to establish the greatest possible degree of peace and stability on its frontiers at the 
minimum possible cost. First, it gave the leader to whom the payments were given some reason to 
maintain the treaty, thus providing a reasonable return on an investment of Roman military effort. 
Second, the Romans expected that the leader who they gave payments would to redistribute the 
wealth in his own society, and hence make the groups pleased with the co-operation with the 
                                                 
628 Priscus, fr.11.2, fr.20.1, fr.22.2 in Blockley 1983, 278-279, 306-307, 312-313, 387; Heather 1997, passim. 70-71. It is 
uncertain whether the title for Attila was awarded by the Western or the Eastern Roman Empire. However, because Priscus 
heard the title from Western envoys, it could have been conferred by the Western Emperor Valentinian III. But it could 
equally well be Priscus’ parenthetical comment about Theodosius. There is no independent evidence for this “honorary” 
title for Attila. I consider that Priscus’ story how Marcian replied to Attila that the Eastern Roman Empire “would not consent 
to pay the tribute ( ) agreed by Theodosius” implies that the title was awarded by the Eastern Roman Empire. This is 
also supported by Priscus’ story how Marcian continued his reply to Attila; “if he [Attila] kept the peace they [the court of 
Marcian] would give him gifts, but if he threatened war they would bring against him men and weaponry equal to his own forces”. These 
excerpts indicate the practice of paying a barbarian leader on account of his honorary title and gaining in return peace on the 
frontiers. By contrast, Procopius, who most likely referred to Priscus, mentions that “Attila, since no one stood in his way, ravaged 
the whole of Europe without difficulty, compelled both parts of the Empire to obey his commands and forced them to pay tribute ( ). For 
payments were sent to him every year by the Emperors”. According to the claim both halves of the Roman Empire paid Attila 
supposedly because of his honorary title, though as Priscus’ accounts indicate, Attila did not receive the payments every 
year. 
629 Pohl 1997, 6-9; Chrysos 1997, 193-195. 
630 Wirth 1997, passim. 43. 
631 See Chapter 7. 
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Romans. On the one hand, the titles were used as camouflage for the fact that the Romans were not 
so victorious against the barbarians, on the other hand they paid for peace – the Romans bought off 
potential aggression.632 Priscus makes the accusation that Theodosius II “obtained peace by money, 
not by fighting for it”.633 Thus, it is claimed, Attila was awarded the title not because the Romans 
wanted to honour his position as the head of the Huns, but temporarily to solve problem with the 
Huns. 
On the whole, because the title magister militum clearly refers to the duties of a military leader of 
troops, I would argue this was also the case concerning Attila’s leadership position among the 
Huns. Furthermore, the title does not explicitly indicate that Attila’s position would have changed 
and that he would have have had a stronger leadership position among the nomads, such as a 
kingship or a similar position to that which his contemporary German sedentary leaders had.634 
Equally, the title cannot be taken as a sign of the Huns adopting sedentary way of life that would 
ultimately generate a more permanent leadership position than was common among nomads 
because Romans used the names of century-old treaties and honorary titles, and the obligations 
attached varied from one case to another.635 The same is also true of the groups and leadership 
positions which the Romans dealt with. One aspect that implies that the title magister militum 
referred to Attila’s position as a military leader is the fact that when the Huns formed a distinct 
threat to the Roman Empire, the Hun leader was awarded a title which epmhasized his military 
duties.636 Therefore, I consider that in the eyes of contemporaries, a Hun or nomad king, in other 
words, a leadership position comparable to that found among sedentarists, was unthinkable. 
However, there are still claims, especially those deriving from Priscus’ manner of writing about 
Attila as basileus that Huns would have had kings. However, because the Huns seem to have not 
given up their nomadic way of life even during the fifth century a leadership position comparable to 
sedentary kings must be ruled out.637 Nonetheless, another question is whether there could be a 
more permanent leadership position than temporary military leadership in the nomadic way of life? 






                                                 
632 Heather 1997, 70-71, passim. 72-73. 
633 Priscus fr.3.1 in Blockley 1983, 226-227. 
634 Wolfram (1987) 1990, 13, passim 94-95, 144-146, 190, 194, 203-205, 212; Wolfram 2000, 66, 87. 
635 Heather 1997, passim. 72, 74. 
636 Chrysos 1978, passim. 58. 
637 See Chapter 9 - 10. 
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7. UNITING GROUPS OF HUNS AND LOCALS – RUA AND OCTAR 
 
 
In Chapter 7 I study the unity between groups of Huns during the 420s in order to consider, whether 
this strengthened the head leadership position among the Huns. I also ask what kind of activities did 
Hun leaders carry out. This is done in order to evaluate whether their position could be considered a 
kingship. In addition, I pay attention to the relationship between the Huns and the Romans and 
discuss whether the Romans tried to strengthen the leadership position among the Huns in order to 
gain better control over them. Furthermore, I point out that the increasing joint activities between 
the groups of Huns and local barbarians signify confederation, not submission of other groups. Joint 
activities based on joint military activity suggest the Huns’ interest in military action rather than the 
suppression of other groups, and this underlines the position of Hun leaders as military leaders 
rather than permanent rulers. 
 
 
7.1. Contacts with the Romans in the 420s – The Strengthening Position of Hun Leaders? 
 
The first contemporary remark on the acts of groups of Huns in the 420s is the raid on Thrace in 
422.638 The raiding operation is thought to have been led by the Hun leader Rua: he and his brother 
Octar are known by name from Olympiodorus’ account of Charaton.639 However, I am not totally 
convinced that Rua was in charge of the raiding operation because the only information we have 
about the attack is the phrase “The Huns devastate Thrace”.640 Furthermore, the first time Rua is 
mentioned as a military leader of groups of Huns is from the first years of the 430s in a fragment 
from Priscus.641 Even though Priscus’ remark implies that Rua had led groups of Huns some years 
earlier, I still consider this insufficient proof that Rua led the raid on Thrace.  
I also find the claims that the Eastern Roman Empire paid Rua precisely 350 pounds of gold 
annually to ensure peace in Thrace speculative.642 There is, moreover, little certainty when peace 
was made between the Huns and the Romans; estimations date it in 422 or 423.643 Therefore, there 
                                                 
638 Marcellinus Comes, Ann., see Maenchen-Helfen 1973, passim. 76-80. 
639 Jordanes, Getica, XXXV: 180-181; Socrates Scholasticus, Hist. ecc., VII, 30; cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 82-83; Bona 
1991, 47; Wirth 1999, 39-41; Stickler 2007, 57-59; cf. Kelly 2008, 67. Kelly speculates that the raid could have been led by 
both Rua and Octar. 
640 Thompson (1999) 2000, 67, 70; passus Wirth 1999, 40-41; cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 76, 81, 86; Stickler 2007, 57; Kelly 
2008, 67, 70-71. Maenchen-Helfen refers to information given by Marcellinus Comes in Chronicle. 
641 Priscus, fr. 2. in Blockley 1983, 224-225, 379.  
642 Bona 1991, 47; Wirth 1999, 39, 41, 161; Stickler 2007, 59; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, passim. 91. 
643 Bona 1991, 47; Wirth 1999, 41; Stickler 2007, 58-59; Heather 2005, 300-301, 327.  
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is little to support the claims that in the 420s Rua gained a leadership position mightier than “the 
first of the kings”, the position which Charaton had had. Accordingly, I find it unconvincing that 
Rua would have been able to compel others to his will and that the Romans sent the payments to 
ensure peace only and directly to him.644 Furthermore, it is speculative to claim that Rua considered 
the peace treaty a possibility to strengthen his leadership position not only among groups of Huns 
but also among other local Germanic groups.645 
Generally speaking, whoever led the Huns against Thrace in 422, I agree with the claims that 
attacks and raids of Hun troops would have caused more financial loss to the Eastern Roman 
Empire than annual payments to ensure peace.646 Therefore, it is likely that the Eastern Roman 
Empire would have made a peace treaty which guaranteed annual payments to the raiding groups of 
Huns. The advantage of the annual payments for the Romans was that these payments could 
strengthen the position of a Hun leader at the head of a group and also unify the group. All this 
would help the Romans in negotiating with the Hun group and in gaining better control over 
them.647 
If the annual payments brought changes to the relationship, they are also claimed to have brought 
about a crucial change in the history of the Huns. First, Rua is said to be the first Hun leader who 
received gold annually from the Roman Empire, and this made him look like an excellent military 
leader not only to the Huns, who already counted on his lead, but also to other groups, and hence 
this strengthened his position. In addition, as a result of this it is thought that the Romans might 
have considered Rua to be an even more productive partner with whom to co-operate in the 
future.648  
I agree with the claims only to some extent. The Romans might have paid for peace, but because we 
have no accounts of Rua to receiving payments, I suggest that they were given to a Hun leader who 
we do not have knowledge of. I also tend to agree that the payments could have caused changes 
among the groups of Huns. However, I would not mainly emphasize the importance of the 
payments for the leader who received it and for his position, but would instead stress how the 
payments might have changed the nature of the Huns’ nomadic way of life. 
First of all, the payments to ensure peace would at latest make the Huns notice that they were 
dealing with Empire from which they could profit in many ways: a peace treaty would be followed 
                                                 
644 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 51, 91.  
645 Wirth 1999, 41; Stickler 2007, 59. 
646 Stickler 2007, 59; cf. Batty 2007, 429-430. 
647 Batty 2007, 430-432, passim. 447. Batty remarks that the payment policy worked well during Trajan’s regime. 
648 Bona 1991, 46; Wirth 1999, 41-42; Stickler 2007, 58-60; cf. Lindner 1982, 700-701. 
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by diplomatic contacts which would result in supplies of gold and or other profitable offerings.649 
Furthermore, living and herding in the border areas of the Roman Empire offered good 
opportunities for trading and other mercenary activities, and perhaps most importantly, for 
temporary raiding. All this all supports the notion that the Huns would have noticed that there were 
more profitable opportunities for making a living than just herding, though this does not mean they 
would have given up on herding entirely.650  
The Huns’ interest in raiding or gaining riches from the Roman world is also stressed in their 
contacts with the Western Roman Empire. 
When John tried to usurp power in the Western part of the Roman Empire in 424 Hun troops were 
told to participate in the fight in northern Africa.651 It is not precisely known where the Huns came 
from, but it is supposed that the groups formed a part of the regular Western Roman army because 
there was no time to turn to federates beyond the borders and ask them to help652 I suggest that the 
Hun troops could possibly have been those that the Western Roman Empire recruited into their 
army during the first decade of the fifth century.653 If the Hun troops in Africa were a permanent 
part of the Western Roman army, this was not the case with the Huns who the Western Roman 
Empire hired the following year to strengthen their army. This then supports the notion that groups 
of Huns were still acting as scattered units and in accordance with their own interests during the 
first half of the 420s. 
In 425 Aetius, a general in the Western Roman Empire, faced a sudden need to strengthen the 
troops under his command, and he is told to hire Huns as his mercenaries outside the Roman 
borders.654 It is not certain who the Huns were, but they seemingly lived in the vicinity of Pannonia 
because once again the sudden need for mercenaries did not leave time to negotiate with Hun 
groups who lived far away from Rome.  
It is also claimed that Aetius would have already known the Hun leaders whom he made contact 
with, and the one in the supreme position would have been Rua.655 It is supposed that Aetius would 
have established friendly relations with Rua during the first decades of the fifth century when he 
was sent to live among some groups of Huns as a Western Roman hostage.656  
                                                 
649 Priscus, fr. 2, fr. 9.1, fr. 9.3, fr. 10 in Blockley 1983, 224-225, 234-237, 240-243; see Wirth 1999, passim. 54-55, 105-106. 
650 Priscus, fr. 2, fr. 6 in Blockley 1983, 226-227, 230-231; see Heather 2005, 326-329.  
651 Pseudo-Augustine, Ep. IV; see Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 76-77. 
652 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 77. 
653 See Chapter 4. 
654 Philostorgius, Hist. ecc., XII, 14; Socrates Scholasticus, Hist. ecc., VII, 23, 789; see Thompson 1948, 49; Maenchen-
Helfen 1973, 77. 
655 Thompson (1999) 2000, 71; Wirth 1999, 41-42; Stickler 2007, 59-60. 
656 Renatus Frigeridus apud Gregory of Tours, Hist. Franc., II, 8; Priscus fr.11.2. in Blockley 1983, 256-257; cf. Maenchen-
Helfen 1973, 77; Bona 1991, 47, 52; Wirth 1999, 34; Thompson (1999) 2000, 38, 71; Heather 2005, 261; Stickler 2007, 60. 
Bona suspects that Uldin would have led the groups of Huns to whom Aetius was sent as a Roman hostage. However, it is 
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However, there is no certain evidence of Aetius turning to Rua or the Hun troops being led by 
Rua.657 Likewise, nothing proves that Aetius would have already known the leaders of the Huns 
from whom he recruited the troops. It is only in c. 434 when Rua’s name first time appears in the 
sources, and that is a few years after his brother Octar is told to lead the Hun troops which attacked 
the Burgundians.658 Moreover, nothing suggests that Aetius turned to Octar, not Rua, for help. 
Generally speaking, there is a tendency in modern research to construct a continuous leadership 
genealogy for the Hun leaders with whom the Romans were in contact despite thevlack of support 
from contemporary sources. 
Whoever the Hun leaders were, they gathered according to Philostorgius 60,000 men for Aetius.659 
Even though the troops arrived too late, Aetius seem to have rewarded them well.660 At least the 
troops did not get carried away and raid the heartlands of Rome in order to gain something from 
their journey. The number of a Hun troops is most likely highly exaggerated, but even if there were 
even a third of Philostorgius’ estimated number, it is likely that the troops also included warriors 
from Germanic groups who were allied with the Huns.661 
Because the Huns were able to form such huge troops, more than a single nomadic tribe could raise, 
this suggests that Huns’ tribal confederacy was well organized again.662 The situation also indicates 
that during the mid 420s there was talented mediator who could gather together a large number of 
groups for joint military activity. However, this was only temporary, as the last piece of information 
that we have from the 420s about the scattered groups of Huns next to the Roman borders reveals. 
According to the chronicler Marcellinus Comes, the provinces of Pannonia, which for fifty years 
were being held by the Huns, were retaken by the Romans.663 Because the Roman troops met with 
no serious opposition and could easily drive the Huns off from the western parts of the Danube in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
only Gregory of Tours during the 6th century who mentions Aetius as a hostage among the Huns. Priscus mentions only 
Aetius’ son, Carpilio, as having spent some time among the Huns in “his [Attila’s] court“ ( ). 
Because Attila led an alliance of many groups of Huns alone only during the years 443/444 - 453, Carpilio should have been 
among the Huns during the mid 440s. Another possibility is that Priscus’ words “his court” refer to Attila’s extended 
family’s, especially his uncles’, Rua’s and Octar’s, “court”. If so, then it would mean that Carpilio could have been a hostage 
of Rua and Octar during some years from the 430s onwards. We might suspect that Gregory of Tours mixed up Carpilio’s 
stay with the Huns with Aetius’, and Aetius was perhaps never a hostage of the Huns. 
657 Wirth 1999, 41-42; Stickler 2007, 59-60. 
658 Socrates Scholasticus, Hist. ecc., VII, 30; Jordanes, Getica, XXXV: 180-181; see Kelly 2000, 71; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 
82. 
659 Philostorgius, Hist. ecc., XII, 114; see Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 81; Wirth 1999, 40-41.  
660 Maenchen-Helden 1973, 77. 
661 Thompson (1999) 2000, 55; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 80. 
662 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 80. 
663 Marcellinus Comes, Ann.; see Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 78, passim. 79-81. I agree with Maenchen-Helfen that it was the 
Western Roman army that drove the groups of Huns off from certain parts of Pannonia because Marcellinus Comes wrote 
about the situation in the Western Roman Empire before turning to the history of the Eastern Roman Empire in his work 
Annales, Chronicle which covers the years 375-556. However, it is doubtful if the Western Roman army attacked the Huns in 
Pannonia precisely in 427 because Marcellinus Comes lived during the 6th century and hence he could only utilize former 
accounts in his narration of the events during the 5th century. 
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Pannonia, this suggests that the Huns in Pannonia did not receive help from other Huns living in the 
vicinity, and that there was no longer any large scale unity between the groups of Huns. Moreover, 
the Romans would not have attacked if they had thought that this action could spoil the good 
relationship with the united groups of Huns, e.g. those who had raised the supposed 60,000 warriors 
for Aetius in 427.  The lack of unity between groups of Huns implies that strong genealogical ties 
had not yet forme between a large number of tribes or clans, and there was no supreme leader who 
was supported on a large scale.664 However, the Roman action may have led to regroupings. When 
the Huns from Pannonia were searching for new dwelling areas, they might have joined the Huns 
living in the areas between the Danube, Marus and Marisus Rivers to the Carpathians, and hence 
become one of the groups who later on supported Rua’s lead.665 
If Rua really was responsible for the Huns’ successful raid on Thrace in 422 and he had created 
good relations with the Western Roman Empire due to his mercenary activities in 427, he could 
appear to many to be a potential candidate for the position of supreme military leader in the head of 
confederation formed by groups of Huns and local barbarians.666 If this happened during the turn of 
the 420s and 430s is discussed in the following section.  
 
 
7.2. Wars, Treaties and Mercenary Activity between the Groups of Huns and the Romans 
 
The information about groups of Huns and their activities is fragmentary and scarce from the 420s, 
but the situation during the 430s is more revealing especially because there are accounts of Hun 
leaders, the brothers Rua and Octar, at the turn of the two decades. The first description from the 
430s is from Socrates Scholasticus and he depicts in Church History how certain a Hun leader, 
called Octar/ Uptaros,667 was responsible for the Huns’ raids in the areas of the sedentary 
Burgundians near the Rhine:668 
 
There is a nation of barbarians dwelling beyond the Rhine, called Burgundians […] The Huns, by making 
continuous eruptions on this people, devastated their country, and often destroyed a great number of them. … [the 
Burgundians] considered that the God of the Romans defended those who feared him, they all with common 
consent embraced the faith of Christ. … becoming confident thenceforth, they marched against the tyrants [the 
                                                 
664 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 80-81. 
665 Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 67; Bona 1991, 50, 54; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, passim. 77-81, 87, 89; Wirth 1999, 44. 
666 Heather 2005, passim. 365. 
667 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 82. Although the difference in the spelling of the name, Uptaros is claimed to be another form 
of Octar and both indicate the same Hun leader. 
668 Socrates Scholasticus, Hist. ecc.,VII, 30, in Manchen-Helfen 1973, 82. Socrates Scholasticus passus “[…] 
[…]”. 
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Huns]; nor where they disappointed in their hope. For the King of the Huns, Uptaros [Octar] by name, having 
burst asunder in the night from surfeit, the Burgundians attacked that people then without a leader; and although 
few in numbers and their opponents many, they obtained a victory; for the Burgundians were but 3,000 men, and 
destroyed no less than 10,000 of the enemy. 
  
The account of the success of the Burgundians against the Huns after turning to Christianity 
includes many traditional miracle motifs, which decreases the reliability of the narration. Also the 
fact that the Burgundians mainly lived west, and not east of the Rhine during the 430s, makes the 
story about a huge fight between Hun groups and Burgundians doubtful.669 Nonetheless, we might 
take the core of the story as a true: some Burgundians were from time to time attacked by troops of 
Huns, who were led by a supreme military leader called Octar. The period of the raids must have 
been at the turn of the 420s and 430s because Octar seems to have died in the beginning of the 430s, 
supposedly in either year 430 or 431. Furthermore, Socrates Scholasticus’ account makes it clear 
that the main interest of the Hun troops was to gain booty, not to conquer new areas or lands. In 
addition, Socrates Scholasticus’ remark that the raids were regular implies that the groups had 
formed more than only a temporary alliance but a fixed unit. How many clans or tribes of nomads 
trusted in the leadership of Octar is not known, nor is the number of groups other than Huns who 
joined Octar’s raids known.670 One point element that speaks in favour of an alliance between some 
Germanic groups and Octar’s Huns is the fact that Socrates Scholasticus does not mention Octar 
raiding or overpowering any other barbarian groups on the way to fight the Burgundians. Also 
archaeological finds and joint activities of groups of Huns and Germanic origin in the following 
years indicate an alliance or confederation.671 
While Socrates Scholasticus’ description does not tell us much about the nature of Octar’s 
leadership,672 one aspect that comes clear is that his position was related to military activity as head 
of his troops. Accordingly, Jordanes’ description of Octar and Rua having a similar position 
suggests that their tasks did not differ greatly, and hence both of the brothers seem to have acted as 
military leaders of the Huns. This is further supported by the fact that all the known activities of 
Rua are, like Octar’s, related to military duties.673 Jordanes writes about the similar position of 
Octar and Rua:674 
                                                 
669 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 82-83. 
670 Heather 2005, passim. 329-333, 361-365; Wirth 1999, 40-41, 52-53. 
671 See the later parts of Chapter 7. 
672 Wirth 1999, 44; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 81. 
673 See Chapter 7.3. for more Rua’s activities. 
674 Jordanes, Getica, XXXV: 180; Priscus, fr. 11.3 in Blockley 1983, 280-281. Jordanes, who refers to Priscus’ stories, writes: 
“Is namque Attila patre genitus Mundzuco, cuius fuere germani Octar et Roas, qui ante Attilam regnum tenuisse narrantur, quamvis non 
omnino cunctorum quorum ipse“. Blockley’s translation of “regnum” is “kingship”; however, I prefer to translate it “leadership” or 
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Attila’s father was Mundzuc, whose own brothers were Octar and Rua, who are said to have held the kingship 
[regnum] before Attila, though by no means over all the peoples whom he [Attila] ruled. 
 
Jordanes’ account does not reveal, whether Octar and Rua were leading the Huns in the position of 
“regnum” at the same time or not. However, because only Octar is mentioned as leading the raids 
against the Burgundians, it is likely that Octar could for some time have been the only Hun leader at 
the head of a large number of allied groups of Huns and local Germanic groups at the turn of the 
420s and 430s.675 Rua would have attained his position later during the first years of the 430s, at the 
latest after Octar’s death in c. 432.676 On the other hand, it is generally believed that the brothers led 
groups of Huns simultaneously, but in different directions.677 It is probable because Aetius and Rua 
were in close contact during the first years of the 430s, and this suggests that Aetius and Rua knew 
each other earlier.678 Accordingly, the situation is seen to imply that during the turn of the 420s and 
the 430s Octar operated with groups who dwelled north of the Alps up to the Rhein and west to the 
Carpathians. By contrast, Rua was trusted with groups living in area from northern parts of the 
Black Sea to the Carpathians and to the Roman borders in the lower Danubian basin and 
Pannonia.679 The division of the areas is based on the notion that only Rua is mentioned in 
contemporary accounts as charged with the military activities of Huns in the areas near Pannonia 
and the lower Danubian basin during the first years of the 430s.680 There are also claims that the 
regions were divided up by the brothers in order to act more efficiently with both halves of the 
Roman Empire: Rua would have been responsible for contacts with the Western Roman Empire and 
Octar with the Eastern Empire.681 
When and how the brothers attained their leadership positions is not clear. Contemporary authors’ 
accounts do not clarify whether they were elected or whether they gathered supporters of their 
                                                                                                                                                                  
“primary leadership position” because these are more neutral terms. References to kingship and kings strongly suggest the 
idea of a state, but this is highly uncommon among nomads. There is no evidence that a kingship or state er existed among 
the groups of Huns who came to live near the Roman lower Danubian borders during the fourth and fifth centuries. See 
Chapter 9 and 10. 
675 Wirth 1999, 41, 47. 
676 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 86. 
677 Thompson (1999) 2000, 69-70; Wirth 1999, 52-53; Heather 2005, passim. 329-330; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 85-86, 
passim. 81; Stickler 2007, 63. 
678 Priscus, fr. 2, fr. 11.2. in Blockley 1983, 224-225, 256-257; Wirth 1999, 41-42, 47. 
679 Heather 2005, 202-203; Wirth 1999, 44; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 78-81, 85-86, passim. 89-91. 
680 Priscus, fr. 2 in Blockley 1983, 224-225. It is also possible that Octar was already dead during these years. If so, then Rua 
would have been the sole leader of the allied groups of Huns. 
681 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 86. 
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own.682 The same holds for the tasks the brothers were responsible for, either together or alone. 
Speculations vary, but it is generally agreed that both Rua and Octar were in charge of the troops. 
It has been suspected that there could have been a division of duties between the brothers: one of 
them taking care of religious matters and the other military or secular tasks.683 Bona even suggests 
that Rua was the supreme leader (“GrossKönig”) of all the allied groups of Huns, while Octar was 
his military leader.684 I find these views doubtful, however, because both of the brothers are only 
mentioned in contemporary accounts as taking care of military activities and second, religious 
leadership among Eurasian pastoralists was solely associated with shamans, who have no 
administrative power.685 In addition, contemporary authors’ accounts include stories about shamans 
to whom the Hun leaders’ seem to have turned in order to gain the support of divine powers in their 
activities.  
While accounts of shamans are not many, they nevertheless indicate that shamans would have taken 
care of religious duties or contacts with the world of spirits among the Huns. Moreover the accounts 
point out that Hun leaders, like Attila, a nephew of Rua and Octar, greatly respected shamans and 
did not attempt to gain or challenge their position. This is especially implied by Priscus’ story of 
how Attila would have wanted to marry a daughter of a shaman, though Attila already had at least 
one wife.686 Although Attila’s plan may have aimed to strengthen his position among the Huns, 
nevertheless marrying the daughter of a shaman can be taken as a sign of esteem for the shaman’s 
position. Furthermore, Attila’s respect for shamans is clear from Priscus’ account of Attila asking 
shamans about the fate of his rule and the future of his sons – as a result Attila favoured the son 
who the shamans had indicated.687 The 6th century author Jordanes telss a similar story of how the 
shamans’ opinions were trusted by Attila when planning future actions. According to Jordanes, 
Attila requested the result of a forthcoming battle from shamans or witches and acted according to 
their advice.688 While Jordanes’ story might be invented, it is likely that he knew how powerful 
shamans had been among the Huns, or were among nomads in general,689 and what kind of tasks 
they took care of.  
                                                 
682 See chapter 8. 
683 Schreiber 1976, passim. 85-87; cf. Wirth 1999, 40, 44, 52; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 85-86. 
684 Bona 1991, 50. 
685 Kradin 2003, 82; Kradin 2005, 82; Khazanov 2003, 43; see also Skrynnikova 2003, passim. 135-146; Berman 2000, 
passim. 166-172; Werner 1956, passim. 70-72.  
686 Priscus, fr.11.2 in Blockley 1983, 260-261, 274-275; see Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 406. Priscus says that Attila planned to 
marry a daughter of Eskam/ Esqam, whose name is most probably of Turkish etymology, the last syllable “-kam/ -quam”  
meaning shaman. 
687 Priscus, fr.14 in Blockley 1983, 290-291. 
688 Jordanes, Getica, XXXVII, 195-196. 
689 Kradin 2005, 154-155, 158-159; cf. Skrynnikova 2003, passim. 135-146; passus Werner 1956, passim. 70-73; Berman 
2000, passim. 170-171; Wirth 1999, 128-129. 
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Because these are the only stories about religious activities among the Huns and we do not have any 
indication of Hun leaders’ taking care of religious activities, this strongly suggests that religious 
duties alone belong to shamans. Consequently, the justification for the position of Hun leaders’ 
such as Rua and Octar must have been for non-religious reasons. I am also opposed to the idea that 
the leadership position derived from an existing or evolving kingship.690 
The starting point for claims concerning the rise of kingship among the Huns is based on the idea 
that lucrative raids on the Roman Empire, accompanied by payments from the Hun troops’ 
mercenary activities in the Roman army, increased the wealth of the Huns to such an extent that it 
stimulated the scattered nomads into forming a confederation at the latest during the end of the 
420s.691 This would supposedly have led Hun warriors to eliminate each other so as to gain the 
leadership position at the head of the united groups.692 It is assessed that this would have led to a 
concentration of power in the hands of the most powerful military leaders, namely Rua and 
Octar.693 Furthermore, the Hun brothers are said to have stabilized the position to such a degree that 
military leadership would have become more permanent and been transformed into kingship during 
the turn of the 420s and 430s. Simultaneously, a leading stratum would have evolved that is, the rise 
of a wealthy upper class from among the most trusted followers of the king. Moreover, the 
argument goes, they would have helped the king to rule the wide regions where groups of Hun and 
local barbarians had formed a confederation. Finally, the strengthening leadership position would 
supposedly have been accompanied by changes in their nomadic way of life. In brief, at least some 
of the groups of Huns would have at least partially started to adopt a sedentary way of life.694 
It is certainly likely that when the Huns came to live next to Roman Empire they realized that 
raiding and making a profit out of the Roman Empire by mercenary activity was preferable than 
herding. This is affirmed by the acts of groups of Huns during the 420s. Furthermore, this clearly 
stimulated groups of Huns and local barbarians to join together, bringing about the demand for a 
supreme military leader. For these reasons it is highly probable that military duties formed the basis 
for, and authorized the position of, supreme leadership among the groups of Huns and their allies.695 
Accordingly, I suggest that we should not call Rua and Octar “kings” but “supreme military 
leaders”.  
                                                 
690 Schmauder 2009, 126; Stickler 2007, 59; Heather 2005, 325-329; Thompson (1999) 2000, 64, 67-69, 177-179; Wirth 1999, 
47-48, 52-53, 83; Bona 1991, 35; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 85, 91; Harmatta 1952, 297. 
691 Lindner 1982, 702-703; Thompson (1999) 2000, 67-68; Heather 2005, 325, 327. 
692 Heather 2005, 325. 
693 Wirth 1999, 41; Thompson (1999) 2000, 69-71. 
694 Wirth 1999, 52; Heather 2005, 328; Harmatta 1952, 296. 
695 Barfield 1993, 150; Pohl 2003, 573-574. 
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The term “supreme military leader” reflects and describes more accurately the basis of the position 
that Rua and Octar seem to have had.696 I also suggest that we should use the term “supreme 
military leader” for nomad leaders in general. The reason for this is that the position of nomad 
leaders at the head of a larger number of united groups differs from the position of a leader among 
sedentarists, generally named a “king”, due to a different kind of way of life: nomadism as opposed 
to sedentarism. Another reason for avoiding the use of the title “king” for Hun leaders is to avoid 
creating a misleading image of Hun leaders having a similar position to leaders of Vandals, Franks 
and Visigoths during the 5th century who are in general called “kings”. By contras, the duties of the 
Vandal, Frank and Visigoth kings were based on keeping rule among groups who were permanently 
settled in certain regions, and the unity between these groups was expected to last longer than the 
temporary interests in raiding as found among the groups of Huns. Furthermore, the most striking 
difference between the leadership of the Huns and the Vandals, Visigoths and Franks is that the 
latter established a rule in Roman soil, and hence many, if not most of the elements of the newly 
built regime, generally called by researchers a kingdom, were based on the Roman tradition. This 
was not the case with the Huns because they consisted of fragmented groups who herded and 
dwelled in wide regions beyond the Roman borders. As a consequence there was no already 
established strong administration or society that a leader could rule over. In what follows I shall 
discuss some of the common elements among Vandal, Visigoth and Frankish kings and kingdoms 
in order to point out the different situation among the Huns. 
First, a Roman lifestyle and administration continued in kingdoms, and the same is true of the 
imperial demesnes which became the basic possessions of new kings. That is to say, royal fiscs and 
the monetary system continued to exist. Also charters and codification of laws did not vanish. In 
addition, kings adopted imperial titles and epithets and established capitals as centres for their 
regimes. Furthermore, the position of king was important in creating the idea of unity among a 
certain people, at times a form of ethnic consciousness. Moreover, kings created and maintained 
unity by supporting the church and favouring Latin on official occasions. Finally one of the most 
important tasks of kings was to be a military leader and keep contact with leading elites whose 
acceptance the kings’ power depended upon.697 
The only similarity that the Huns shared with these features is that the leadership position was 
connected to the military lead, which required others’ acceptance. Moreover, the leadership position 
among nomads and sedentarists is different because nomadic administrative structures are derived 
                                                 
696 The Hun leaders Bleda and Attila would appear to have had a similar position to Rua and Octar, and Isuggest that we 
should not name any Hun leader a king. See Chapter 8 - 10. 
697 The listed elements in barbarian kingdoms are based on Goetz’s, Jarnut’s and Pohl’s study. Goetz, Jarnut, Pohl 2003, 
611-613, 617, 623-625. 
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from the development of their military organization in the course of military conflicts with their 
neighbours.698 Another striking difference is that the so-called nomadic state, that is a supercomplex 
chiefdom or strong unity between groups of nomads in the steppe, simultaneously contains both a 
tribal and state hierarchy, each with separate functions.699 It is thus clear that the different kinds of 
way of life and society produce a different kind of stability and power position to the leadership 
position and rule, and this should also be reflected in the concepts used to research this field.700 
Because acceptance by groups is the basis for a leadership position among nomads,701 Rua and 
Octar would have had to convince others that they were the best candidates for military leadership, 
and would then have been chosen to lead the confederation of the groups of Huns and local 
barbarians. Having said that the way in which Eurasian nomads generally form larger units, such as 
tribes and tribal coalitions, would have had an effect on their choice.  
It is generally agreed that nomads’ contacts with outside world, that is to say, sedentary cultures, is 
a crucial reason for the emergence of tribalism among nomads and activated the political functions 
of tribes.702 Moreover, such contacts increased the need for a leader to head the many groups that 
clans and tribes contain. In the formation of nomadic tribes, the conception of an ancient common 
descent is particularly strong when groups combine to act together and form tribes and tribal 
coalitions,703 and the supporting concept of a conical clan becomes more significant.704 As a result 
of this, some of the clans and lineages are claimed to be senior and hence more justified in leading 
the junior ones, which helps the most skilful leaders or candidates from the senior clans and 
lineages to gain the position as head of the tribe and of allied tribes in joint ventures.705 
Accordingly, it is likely that Rua and Octar belonged to a senior clan and lineage which helped 
them become supreme military leaders. Priscus’ remark about Rua’s and Octar’s “noble descent” 
might thus imply that they were members of an appreciated clan or lineage.706 Furthermore, I am 
inclined to think that the existence of a conical clan structure – the concept of junior and senior 
clans would explain why it was two brothers from a particular family who gained the leadership 
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position among the many scattered groups of Huns over a wide area, and not on account of killing 
or forcing others to accept their rule.707 
I also propose that it was the general interest of groups of Huns and local barbarians in forming a 
larger confederation that made Rua and Octar act as head of a larger number of groups. In brief, it is 
unlikely that many, if not all, of the local barbarian groups formed a confederation with the Huns 
because they considered it a good choice.708 This is also referred to in Priscus’ remark concerning 
an alliance ( ) between the Huns and some Goths.709 In my assessment because the 
Huns still acted as many independent and scattered groups during the 420s, they could not have 
forced others to follow them, and hence the unity of the groups of Huns and local sedentary groups 
was most likely based on alliance and co-operation. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that 
nomads would not have been interested in conquering agrarian territories because the rule of 
agrarian societies would require nomads to relinguish their nomadic lifestyle, at least to some 
extent, and this they are ill disposed to do.710 Accordingly, it would seem that the relationship 
between the Huns and local barbarian groups was not based on the Huns’ interest in dominating 
local groups, but in forming a confederation which could be summoned when needed, especially 
during times of military activity. Generally speaking, I agree with the claims that it was political 
and economic advantage which brought the groups of Huns and local barbarians together, and 
further booty or the possibility of increasing one’s prosperity maiontained these alliances.711 
Rua and Octar operated over a huge area, from the Rhine to the Caucasus and the lower Danubian 
basin, and the size of the groups in these regions would have been impossible to connect together 
without confederation.712 These regions were inhabited not only by groups of Iranic-speaking Alans 
and Sarmatians but also by Germanic-speaking Gepids, Rugi, Sciri and Heruli. There were also 
Lombards and Thuringians and at least some subgroups of Alemanni and Franks. Finally, at least 
three separate clusters of Goths clearly acted with the allied groups of Huns.713 Consequently, it has 
been estimated that the number of Germanic-speaking barbarians among the Huns would have been 
                                                 
707 Priscus, fr.2 in Blockley 1983, 224-225; Khazanov 1984, 151; Lindner 1982, passim. 696-700; Barfield 1989, 28. 
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710 Kradin 2002, 381. 
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tens or even hundreds of thousands – this means that there were probably many more Germanic 
speakers than Huns acting together during the 430s and the 440s which formed the large troops for 
raids.714 It would have been very difficult for the Huns to act together with so many people if there 
were no shared interests and the Huns had been forced to compel the others to participate in their 
activities.715 It would thus seem likely that the Huns welcomed the leaders of the local barbarians 
groups as friends and companions to the confederation they had formed, and allowed these 
sedentary collaborators to retain control over their own affairs.716 
Archaeological evidence support this connection between the Huns and local barbarians. According 
to Heather, archaeological remains, especially graves in areas of Eastern Europe where Huns are 
known to be active during the fifth century, show a clear division between rich and poorly furnished 
graves.717 Compared to earlier centuries, there is in this period a remarkable growth in graves 
suggesting staggering wealth.718 The rich grave goods consist especially of jewellery and gold-fitted 
pieces, also with weapons decorated in the “Danubian” style that was highly popular among 
Germanic groups from the northern parts of the Black Sea to the west and south of modern 
Europe.719 Even though the style was especially favoured by Germanic groups, it is hard to 
demonstrate whether those who were buried with these artefacts were actually Germanic speaking. 
However, it is believed that the majority of graves from the Volga steppe to the Hungarian Plain 
and north of the Black Sea were the graves of Germans, and only a few can be said to be those of 
nomads or Huns.720 Taken together, the significant number of rich German graves suggests that the 
Huns distributed quantities of the gold gathered from raids to their Germanic neighbours.721 It is 
likely that local rulers accumulated considerable wealth when acting with the Huns.722 Such wealth 
is hardly likely, if the relationship between groups of Huns and local barbarians had been based on 
the Huns’ strong domination over the locals rather than a confederation. 
Another factor suggesting good relations between Huns and local barbarians is the fact that the 
Danubian style is common to the entire region where the Huns operated, but on the basis of 
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archaeological evidence it is hard to place different local barbarian groups.723 It would seem that the 
Huns generated some degree of unity in the physical culture within their domain,724 the Danubian 
style showing cooperation between the Huns and Danubian Germans. Wide dispersion of the 
Danubian style, moreover, is thought to signify respect by other barbarians for the confederation 
between the groups of Huns and Danubian Germans.725 On the whole, the distribution of Danubian 
style artefacts at least tells us that trade connections worked well and connected the groups to each 
other in the region. Danubian style artefacts seem to have been popular merchandise and were 
bought over a wide area in such quantities that they even replaced the local decoration styles. The 
style had reference to the Huns, and if the Huns had been widely despised, the style would not have 
achieved the popularity it did. For these reasons I see the spread of the Danubian style as a sign of 
co-operation between groups of Huns and those who dwelled near the lower Danubian region and 
the Black Sea. 
The time when goups of Huns were living next to local Germanic groups near the Danube was a 
period, which supported unity rather than the isolation of groups. Priscus also remarks that Huns 
were a mixture of people and in addition to their own languages they cultivated Hunnic and Gothic, 
again suggesting the Huns’ interest was not to isolate but to co-operate with other groups on a more 
or less constant basis.726 
My final remark in support of the argument that there was a coalition between Huns and local 
barbarians with Rua and Octar as overall leaders concerns the general forms of tribalism among 
Eurasian pastoral nomads. Put briefly, a tribe is first and foremost a political organization, never a 
purely territorial unit. New members are joined to the tribes whenever the overall situation permits, 
and nomadic societies are never closed societies.727 Because formation into a larger unit is needed 
for military activity, and groups of Huns and local barbarians were interested in continuing their 
joint activities as long as they were profitable,728 the leadership position that best answered this call 
was a military one. For these reasons Rua’s and Octar’s position must have based on supreme 
military leadership. 
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In conclusion the joint interest of groups of Huns and local barbarians to make more lucrative raids 
in the beginning of the 430s led to the formation of a confederation that also strengthened the 
position of Hun leaders as supreme military leaders at the head of the confederation. The 
confederation needed a supreme leader who could maintain contact with leaders of their own groups 
and make plans for future actions. Moreover, a supreme leader was needed who would be 
responsible for peace negotiations and for updating other military leaders who headed smaller 
groups.  How this all continued during the 430s is the topic of the next section. 
 
 
7.3. Rua Confidently Leading the Confederation during the 430s 
 
One of the first comments on the activities of the Huns at the beginning of the 430s is the first 
account of Rua. The account comes from Priscus and refers to the year 432 or 433:729 
 
When Rua was king of the Huns [ ], the Amilzuri, Itimari, Tounsoures, Boisci 
and other tribes who were living near to the Danube were fleeing to fight on the side of the Romans. Rua decided 
to go war with these tribes and sent Eslas, a man who usually handled negotiations over differences between 
himself and the Romans, threatening to break the present peace if they [the Romans] did not hand over all who 
had fled to them. The Romans wished to send an embassy to the Huns. 
 
Interestingly, Priscus’ account does not mention anything about Octar, but implies that only Rua 
took care of the negotiations with the Romans and was charged with attacking against the tribes 
who wanted to ally themselves with the Romans. Because Octar is not mentioned in this case, or 
afterwards either, it is assumed that Octar would have died at the beginning of the 430s. This is 
likely because it is Attila and Bleda, Rua’s and Octar’s nephews, who are mentioned as leaders of 
the confederation after Rua’s death.730 If Octar had still been alive after Rua’s death, in all 
likelihood there would not have been a need to choose the new leaders, Attila and Bleda. This then 
indicates that Octar died before Rua. Because Rua could take care of the lead of the confederation 
alone, this suggests out that the brothers had a similar position. If this had not been the case, a 
leader would have been needed to take care of the duties of Octar.731  
The fact that Rua could act alone at the head of the Huns is a further proof that the leadership 
position among the Huns was based on military leadership. First, nomads are familiar with suddenly 
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losing their military leaders, and there is no immediate need to fill the place as long as there is 
someone responsible for leading of troops on a large scale. This is what happened after Octar’s 
death, when Rua alone remained head of the confederation. Second, after military activity, groups 
of nomads do not even need military leaders as they are not then fundamentally required. 
Furthermore, Priscus’ notion that Rua sent Eslas to negotiate with the Romans as he had used to do, 
implies that Rua had also taken care of military tasks during earlier years when Octar was alive.732 
Moreover, Rua’s interest in going to war against the tribes who fled to the Romans’ side, strongly 
suggests that the leadership position at the head of the confederation was based on military duties 
and hence constituted the position of supreme military leader.  
It is likely consider that Rua’s demand to get the tribes fled to the Roman side back came from his 
interest in preventing any nomad groups from fighting on the side of the Romans because it would 
make military operations against the Romans in the future challenging. That is to say, as a supreme 
military leader of the groups of Huns and their allies, Rua was responsible for eliminating 
forthcoming threats to his supporters. Another possibility, which however does not totally exclude 
the first option, is that the fled groups had promised to be loyal to Rua or they belonged to some of 
the clans who should have been loyal to him according to the genealogical order among the Huns. 
In general, breaking an alliance, or disloyalty, is taken as a strong insult among nomads.733 
Accordingly, in order to show other members of the confederation that he was a capable leader and 
would not accept disloyalty Rua demanded that the tribes be returned in order to punish them.734 In 
any case, the situation reveals that not every tribe or groups in the northern parts of the Black Sea 
and from the lower Danubian area to the Carpathians belonged or wanted to be part of the 
confederation led by Rua. In addition, if the Amilzuri, the Itimari and others were some of the 
Huns, it is obvious that the Huns were not a political unit.735 Therefore, the situation speaks strongly 
against the idea of the existence of a Hun Empire at the beginning of the 430s. However, I shall 
next consider whether the situation changed as a result of Rua’s contacts with the Romans. 
Rua’s contacts with the Western Roman Empire during c. 431-433 involved Aetius, one of the 
leading generals in the Western Roman Empire who hired Huns as his mercenaries.736 According to 
fifth century contemporary sources, Aetius was attacked by some of the leading figures in the 
Western Roman Empire and in order defend himself he gathered troops and marched on Rome. 
Because Aetius’ troops also included also Huns, who are said to be old friends of Aetius, and Aetius 
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left Rome in 433, the Huns are seen to be those led by Rua.737 There is disagreement on the 
compensation that Aetius gave to Rua – did he grant parts of Pannonia to Rua as payment of his 
help or not, though it is obvious that Rua’s troops were rewarded somehow.738 Priscus’ remark that 
Aetius’ son, Carpilio, might have been held hostage by the Huns during the 430s could signify an 
official treaty alliance between Rua and Aetius made during 433 at the latest.739  
In any case, the co-operation between Aetius and Rua is claimed to indicate that Rua and his 
confederation were a powerful force that could greatly influence Roman politics. Thus, it would 
seem that Rua really did have the capability of increasing the might of the groups he led and they 
worked well in together.740 
If Aetius could benefit from the co-operation with Rua, Rua might also have been pleased with it 
too. In short, the contacts with Aetius certainly made Rua look like a talented military leader who 
could bring profits to his followers and take good care of the military operations and peace 
negotiations with important partners, such as the Roman Empire.741 Therefore, it is reasonable to 
think that all this pleased those who had formed the confederation, and this must have strengthened 
Rua’s position at its head.742 There are also claims that Rua used the contacts with the Roman 
Empire to strengthen his leadership position and attract new followers.743 I would argue that this 
was also the result of Rua’s contacts with the Easter Roman Empire. 
The main issue between Rua and the Eastern Roman Empire was the dispute over tribes, namely the 
Amilzur, the Itimari and other groups who had fled to the side of the Romans and Rua demanded 
that they be handed over on pain of attack.744 I consider that Rua used his demands as a pretext for 
war because the Eastern Roman Empire was tied to military activities in Africa.745 Thus, I would 
agree with the claims that Rua demanded the tribes back with cash in mind and the plans for the 
new war were made so as to bring profits for the groups in the confederation and please his 
supporters.746 On the other hand, I disagree with the claims that Rua’s demand for the return of the 
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tribes would signify that he had reached such a position where he could enforce other tribes to bend 
to his demands, and that if they did not do this, their only option was to flee.747 
It is likely that the military activities of the Eastern Roman Empire in Africa were the reason why 
Theodosius II was ready to negotiate with Rua to keep the peace from 433 onwards.748 Furthermore, 
Rua’s powerful help to Aetius in the Western Roman Empire might have been a clear indication 
that Rua was leading a large band of troops with whom a clash could be severe. On the other hand, 
it is also possible that the Eastern Roman Empire might have calculated that even though diplomatic 
relations and annual gold payments for peace required money, they would consolidate the groups of 
Huns and this would prevent more costly unexpected attacks of scattered nomads and other 
barbarian groups coming from the Danubian frontier. That is to say, the costs would be price to pay 
in order to support the formation of a buffer zone against unexpected attacks from regions next to 
the lower Danubian frontiers.749 
In any case, the Eastern Roman Empire and Rua could not solve the dispute by negotiations and the 
parties clashed in 434 or 435 or perhaps even later.750 This was followed by peace negotiations and 
perhaps some kind of peace treaty in 434 or possibly later. This is implied by Priscus’ claim that 
Rua used to send Eslas to negotiate with the Romans and the Huns.751 Priscus’ reference that the 
Eastern Roman Empire had agreed to pay 350 pounds of gold annually to Rua also implies an 
earlier treaty.752 In my opinion both aspects strongly suggest that there would have been peace 
negotiations before the dispute concerning the handing over of the fled tribes was finally solved. 
According to Priscus, Rua never saw the end of the negotiations because he died suddenly during 
the process. Even though the year of his death is not certain, it seems to have happened during the 
second half of the 430s.753 Despite Rua’s death, negotiations were continued, and Priscus mentions 
that the new Hun leaders ( ) were Rua’s nephews, Bleda and Attila.754 
Although we cannot be certain when the peace treaty or negotiations between the Eastern Roman 
Empire and Rua would have been, nevertheless the most important aspect in the on going peace 
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negotiations is that the Eastern Roman Empire had been ready to pay gold annually to Rua. In short, 
this must have emphasized the might of the confederation led by Rua, and especially Rua’s position 
as a talented military leader.755 
The riches that Rua gained from the negotiations with the Romans and the fact that he could share 
these riches with his followers is claimed to have both strengthened and changed the nature of 
Rua’s leadership position.756 It has been argued that the increase in riches caused socio-economic 
changes and led to the rise of an elite leadership and finally to a nomadic empire or state. 
It has been thought that when wealth grew as a result of victorious raids this increased the 
differences between rich and poor nomads and allowed differences between classes to emerge. 
Furthermore, the leading elite or aristocracy is said to have become even more interested in raiding 
so as to strengthen their social position. In addition, it is assumed that the Hun aristocracy had to 
create a more powerful political framework in order to maintain its privileged economic and social 
position within Hun society, as well as its rule over its subject peoples.757 This is claimed to have 
resulted in the birth of a class society and a feudal or primitive class state in the second quarter of 
the fifth century. In addition, the Hun ruler is no longer a mere chieftain but an absolute monarch, 
like the emperor of Byzantium.758 All these development have been argued to support possible 
transformations in the pastoralist way of life: from scattered herders to a close-knit community in 
certain areas and the partial adoption of a sedentary way of life.759 In other words, the increase in 
riches alters former clan and tribe relations and creates a new leading stratum under the lead of a 
powerful autocrat.760 Moreover, the leadership position among the Huns was no longer any more 
connected to military prowess but to wealth, which could be inherited, and this supported the 
emergence of a hereditary nobility.761 
I would argue, however, that there is insufficient evidence to prove that increase in wealth would 
have led to the rise of separate classes in the steppe, not to mention a state.762 
I am also not convinced by the theory that the growth among larger units of nomads derived from 
the goal of ambitious autocrats to combine ever-greater numbers of nomads into their control, and 
this led to the creation of a nomadic empire.763 However, in this case the power of a steppe autocrat 
is claimed by others to come not from riches but to be purely personal: power is said to be based on 
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a leader’s skilful manipulation of force and wealth within an elaborate tribal network, and such a 
ruler is a usurper of power and at his death his personal empire dissolves back into its component 
parts.764 
However, I would argue that this did not happen among the Huns when Rua was leading the 
confederation. First, we know that not every group living next to groups that supported Rua’s lead 
wanted to act with Rua. Second, after Rua’s death the confederation did not collapse but gained new 
leaders, Bleda and Attila. That is to say, Rua had not established an empire that was dependent on 
his leadership. I claim instead that Rua’s position and the existence of a confederation that formed a 
unity with larger regions must have been based on the common acceptance of participants in the 
confederation.  
Furthermore, I suggest that leadership positions are respond to need.765 A nomadic leader is the 
popular choice of a political movement within a nomadic society and choice is a complement to 
coercion in any nomadic empire because rising leaders attracted voluntary followers by their 
success in war and raiding.766 A general need to have a leader at the head of a confederation would 
explain why Octar and Rua, and after them Bleda and Attila, obtained their positions. Confederation 
had proved to be successful and that raised an interest in having new leaders to continue joint 
activities.767 After all, the Huns were after gold and the riches that were gained and shared kept 
allies happy.768  
I would argue that the might of the leadership position of Rua, and Bleda and Attila after him, 
increased naturally and as a result of contacts with the Roman Empire, which brought wealth to the 
confederation.769 Equally, I consider that the leadership position changed from a temporary to a 
more permanent position because peace negotiations with the Romans and contacts with the groups 
who formed the confederation over a wide area required time.770  
In the following chapter I study what kind of leadership position the Hun leaders after Rua, Bleda 
and Attila, seem to have had and discuss whether their position was accompanied with elements that 
would lead to the rise of a supercomplex chiefdom rather than a state or empire. I also analyse 
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whether the increasing contacts with the Romans and the flow of riches from the Roman world 















































8. STENGTHENING THE MIGHT OF THE CONFEDERATION – THE HUN BROTHERS 
BLEDA AND ATTILA IN THE 440s 
 
 
8.1. From Uncle to Nephews - Bleda and Attila in the Footsteps of Rua 
 
The only contemporary account we have on the rise of Bleda and Attila to the head of the 
confederation is Priscus’ remark that Bleda and Attila continued their uncle Rua’s peace 
negotiations with the Eastern Roman Empire and the result is given of the negotiations in the city of 
Margus in the last half of the 430s.771 The fragment from Priscus tells:772 
 
When Rua died, the kingship of the Huns devolved upon Attila and Bleda [
] […] [in the peace treaty between Bleda 
and Attila and the Eastern Roman Empire in Margus] <it was agreed> not only that for the future the Romans not 
receive those who fled from Scythia, but also that those who had already fled should be handed back together with 
the Roman prisoners-of-war who had made their way back to their own country without ransom, unless for each 
one of who escaped eight solidi were given to those who had captured him in war; that the Romans should not 
make an alliance with a barbarian people against the Huns when the latter were preparing for war against them; 
that there should be safe markets with equal rights for Romans and Huns; that the treaty should be maintained and 
last as long as the Romans paid seven hundred pounds of gold each year to the Scythian kings [
] (previously the payments had been three hundred and fifty pounds of gold). On these terms the 
Romans and the Huns made a treaty and, having sworn their native oaths, they returned each other to their own 
country. The fugitives amongst the Romans were handed back to the barbarians, amongst whom were Mama and 
Atakam, children of the royal house [ ]. Those who 
received them exacted the penalty for their flight by impaling them near to Carsum, a fortress in Thrace. When 
they [Attila and Bleda] had made peace with the Romans, Attila, Bleda and their forces marched through Scythia 
subduing the tribes [ ] there and also made war on the Sorosgi. 
 
The term  informs us that Rua’s leadership position was passed on or transferred to 
Bleda and Attila.773 Priscus does not stress or refer to the fact that the situation would have involved 
any festivities or that it would have been a remarkable turning point among the groups who formed 
the confederation. In Jordanes we have another account though it does not say how Bleda and Attila 
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became leaders.774 As a 6th century author Jordanes would have relied on earlier authors, such as 
Priscus, for descriptions of the event. It would seem that there was not a great deal of information 
among the Romans how and why Bleda and Attila acquired their position, or, as seems likely, it 
was not regarded as a grand event.  
This all makes perfect sense, if we consider that the position was only a temporary one and not a 
hereditary or mighty leadership position. However, because Priscus uses the term basileus and 
Jordanes addresses the Hun leaders as “rex”,775 it is claimed to signify a leadership position 
equivalent to the term “kingship”.776 According to Harmatta, basileus would even signify a position 
of an absolute monarch, like the emperor of Byzantium.777 I am not convinced by these arguments, 
especially because Priscus is writing narrative text and thus the title should be understood as 
descriptive.778 We should evaluate the meaning of the title and what it refers to in the frames of the 
nomadic way of life. Generally speaking, because Priscus previously used the term basileus for 
Rua,779 this implies that they all, Rua, Bleda and Attila, had a similar position. Bleda’s and Attila’s 
position derived from a general interest in having a military leader and they acted as supreme 
military leaders, as did their uncles. Furthermore, Priscus’ reference to Bleda and Attila as  
and  indicates that Bleda’s and Attila’s position was not comparable to that of a Roman 
emperor.780 The view is strengthened by Priscus’ way of using the title basileus for the leaders of 
some nomad tribes who did not belong to the confederation led by Attila but were living in the 
neighbourhood of the groups who belonged to it.781 This clearly shows that Priscus’ use of the term 
basileus does not refer to a unique and mighty leadership position among the nomads and Huns. 
Nonetheless, we might suspect that because Bleda and Attila led a large confederation, the basis of 
their leadership position was more influential than the others named by the same title, though the 
basis of the position might have been the same. 
Taken together, because Bleda and Attila took care of military activities immediately after they 
acquired the leadership position, this indicates that they were military leaders and their position at 
the head of the confederation was connected to the responsibilities and tasks of military leadership. 
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Accordingly, it implies that Bleda and Attila must have been capable and appreciated warriors, or 
perhaps even military leaders of smaller troops, otherwise they most likely would not have been 
trusted with the leadership position at the head of the confederation.782 
Priscus’ account also shows that Bleda and Attila were fully capable of the task. In brief, the terms 
of the treaty with the Eastern Roman Empire that the brothers negotiated immediately after the 
death of Rua were very profitable for the members in the confederation.  
First, nomads’ living depends greatly on trade, and Bleda’s and Attila’s demand to have safe market 
places with equal rights with the Romans must have been a highly welcome condition.783 Second, 
the groups in the confederation could feel more secure because they would now only expect 
confrontations from the Eastern Roman Empire due the Romans’ promise not to ally themselves 
with any barbarian groups living near the areas of the Huns. In addition, warriors could earn money 
from the Roman captives they had acquired during a confrontation, since the Romans were obliged 
to pay 8 solidi for every captive. Moreover, Bleda’s and Attila’s achievement in raising Rua’s 
annual peace payment from 350 pounds of gold to 700 pounds must have underlined the Hun 
brothers’ success in the negotiations and their ability to profit the confederation. Finally, Bleda and 
Attila could show by impaling some of the members from the fled tribes that disloyalty to the 
confederation was followed by punishment.  
Even if the so-called fled tribes did not belong to the confederation, but instead aimed to ally 
themselves with the Eastern Roman Empire, nevertheless Bleda’s and Attila’s actions showed that 
the security of the confederation was taken seriously. Bleda and Attila wanted to guarantee that the 
Eastern Roman troops would not be strengthened by barbarian mercenaries coming from groups 
who formed the confederation. In this way, Bleda and Attila could also have calculated that if the 
Eastern Roman Empire wanted to hire barbarian mercenaries from the lower Danubian regions, they 
should ask for the troops led by Bleda and Attila, as this would bring payments to the confederation. 
It would seem that Bleda and Attila had planned their demands for the Eastern Roman Empire well 
so as to gain good profits for the troops and groups they led not only then, but also in the future. 
While Bleda and Attila could be pleased about the peace treaty, the brothers had no other option 
than to be successful in their negotiations. They were obliged to bring riches for the members in the 
confederation in order to show their power and also in that way try and keep the leadership position 
and the unity of the groups. Bleda and Attila also had to convince those who had earlier trusted in 
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Rua’s leadership that they were as capable leaders as their uncle, and that acting together as a larger 
unit would still be profitable to all those in the confederation.784  
Perhaps Heather is right when he suggests that Bleda’s and Attila’s war immediately after the treaty 
in Margus, against some tribes in Scythia and a group called the Sorosgi was motivated by the need 
to prove themselves worthy new leaders. According to Heather, the war was against those who had 
split up the confederation, something that Bleda and Attila could not accept.785 However, because 
the peace treaty in Margus was very profitable for the members in the confederation, I find the idea 
of deserting the confederation doubtful. A more likely reason is that the tribes had attacked the 
regions of the groups that belonged to the coalition, and Bleda and Attila as the leaders of the 
confederation needed to rush and defend both the areas and the groups which trusted in their lead. It 
may have been concerned a fight over pastures, because when groups of Huns started to live in the 
regions next to the Roman lower Danubian borders they were faced with a shortage of pasture 
lands.786  Groups of Huns might have faced competition and disputes over pastures or gaizing rights 
especially after the 420s when the second wave of Huns came to live in the regions near the Black 
Sea.787  
While the reason for the wars against groups in Scythia remains unknown, nevertheless the situation 
emphasizes that at the end of the 430s not every group in the regions where Bleda and Attila led the 
confederation were members. I therefore consider that we should not speak about the existence of a 
Hun Empire at this time.788 
There are also claims that the fights signified Bleda’s and Attila’s lust to increase their power 
position among the new tribes,789 or even a rivalry between genealogical lines, especially because 
Bleda and Attila killed some of the members of the fled tribes, namely Mama and Atakam.790  
The only thing we know about background Mama’s and Atakam’s is Priscus’ remark that they were 
“ “ which by Blockely translates as “children of royal 
house”.791 However, we should be careful about using the term “royal” because nothing denies the 
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possibility that “basileiou” would only refer to a leadership position.792 Therefore, I suggest that the 
term paides … tou basileiou genous could well refer to Mama’s and Atakam’s position as military 
leaders. Alternatively the term refers to some of the leading warriors among their groups who were 
appreciated in genealogical order, because Priscus also tells us that Basic and Kursich, who led 
troops of Huns over the Caucasus to the areas of the present day Middle East either during the last 
decades of the 4th century or at the beginning of the 420s, were men of “Scythian royalty” [
], while there is no reference to them being relatives of Octar, Rua, 
Bleda and Attila.793 
But even if Mama and Atakam were relatives of Bleda and Attila, I still suggest that the primary 
reason why Bleda and Attila killed Mama and Atakam was the fact that they were among of those 
who had had a leading position among the fled tribes, and as mentioned earlier among nomads 
disloyalty is heavily punished.794 This was clearly the case among the Huns because Priscus informs 
us that the death penalty was also the punishment for those who had killed their master in war, or 
those who had spied on the acts of the Huns for the Romans.795 The death penalty was seemingly a 
common punishment in cases of disloyalty. 
However, even if the tribes of Mama and Atakam had not belonged to the confederation, 
nevertheless killing those who had allied themselves with the Eastern Roman Empire could be taken 
as an act that would have threatened the safety of the confederation, and hence it would have been 
thought necessary to eliminate those who were guilty of this.796 Therefore, in my opinion the reason 
for killing Mama and Atakam derived from the fact that there seem to have been many groups who 
wanted to profit from the Eastern Roman Empire by trying to co-operate with it, and not all of the 
groups belong to the confederation led by Bleda and Attila. Accordingly, this made the leaders of 
those groups enemies of Bleda and Attila, because if the others had allied themselves with the 
Eastern Roman Empire, they would not only have strengthened the Roman army but they would 
also have challenged Bleda and Attila as leaders.797 
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Wirth they were members of the tribe of the leading dynasty: “die offenkundig dem Stamm der Herrschenden Dynastie 
angehören”. 
793 Priscus, fr. 11.2. in Blockley 1983, 278-279; See Chapter 4.3. Priscus tells that Basic and Kursich were ”
” which Blockley translates ”members of the Scythian royalty”.  
794 Vasjutin 2003, 53; Kradin 2002, passim. 375; Kelly 2008, 88-89, passim. 51-52, 54; Barfield 1989, passim. 26; Barfield 
1993, 160. 
795 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 264-265, 272-273, 292-293 
796 Kelly 2008, 88-89. I see this as the main reason why Bleda and Attila killed Mama and Atakam, I am not convinced about 
the idea of rivalry between the lineages among groups of Huns concerning power positions. 
797 Kelly 2008, 89; cf. Barfield 1993, 149-151; passus Kradin 2002, 375-376; Kradin 2005, 158. 
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Another hypothesis is that Atakam and Mama belonged to a competing lineage to Attila’s and 
Bleda’s, leading to fights between members of these lineages and their supporters. If so, then it 
means that the conical clan structure that commonly shapes social ties and provides unity between 
groups on a larger scale among Eurasian pastoralists had become active.798 
I doubt, however, whether there was a rivalry between noble lineages over the leadership position 
among the groups of Huns at this time. I am also sceptical that belonging to an elite family could 
have given the leadership position to Bleda and Attila, and that it would have become hereditary. 
Stickler even speaks about “dynastische Kontinuität”, the continuation of a leadership dynasty in 
relation to Attila and Bleda.799 Such claims are based only on Priscus’ remark that “When Rua died, 
the kingship [ ] of the Huns devolved upon Attila and Bleda” and 
Jordanes’ account of the same event: “Attila’s father was Mundzuc, whose own brothers were Octar 
and Ruas, who are said to have held the kingship [regnum] before Attila, though by no means over 
all the peoples whom he [Attila] ruled”.800 Although Bleda and Attila became leaders of the 
confederation after their uncles, nevertheless the claims of a hereditary dynasty position are 
exaggerated,801 and we lack sufficient evidence to make such a claim.802 However, Priscus’ remark 
on Attila’s eugeneia, [ ] “noble birth” in Blockley’s translation, is also claimed to 
indicate the rise of a leading elite, with the leadership position becoming hereditary in the extended 
family of Rua and Octar and Bleda and Attila.803 Priscus writes:804 
 
Eslas [whom Rua used to send to negotiate with the Romans] was then to say directly that Theodosius was the son 
of  a nobly-born father, and Attila, too, was of noble descent [ ], having succeeded his father 
Mundiuch. But whereas he [Attila] had had preserved his noble lineage, Theodosius had fallen from his and was 
Attila’s slave, bound to the payment of tribute. 
 
I am, however, sceptical of interpreting eugeneia as a sign of an upper class that signifies the 
development of differences between the classes and a class society for the following reasons. First, I 
                                                 
798 Barfield 1989, 148-149. 
799 Stickler 2007, 66; see also Kelly 2008, passim. 51-52 
800 Jordanes, Getica, XXXV: 180; Priscus fr. 2., fr.11.3 in Blockley 1983, 224-225, 280-281. 
801 Seeck 1920, 282; Harmatta 1951, 140; Bona 1991, 29, 35, 37, 46, 54; Wirth 1999, 51. According to Seeck, Octar and Rua 
could have been the sons of Uldin, while Harmatta claims that leadership positions would always have belonged to the 
wealthiest families or groups among the Huns. Equally, Bona claims that the leadership position, “Grosskönigtum”, would 
not have been passed to outsiders, hence he claims that it went from the mythical Balamber to Uldin, Donatus and 
Charaton, ending up in the hands of Rua and finally of Bleda and Attila, and perhaps earlier in the hands of Attila’ and 
Bledas’ father Mundzuc/Mundiuch. Because the only definite family contact between the Hun leaders was between the 
brothers Octar and Rua and their nephews Bleda and Attila, I am not convinced that there would have been a hereditary 
leadership position among the groups of Huns on a large scale and for many decades or even centuries. 
802 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 85. 
803 Blockley 1983, 296-297; Wirth 1999, 52-53, 57,58; Stickler 2007, 66-67; Thompson (1999) 2000, 177-178. 
804 Priscus, fr. 15.2. in Blockley 1983, 296-297. 
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because Priscus places Attila at the end of the 440s, eugeneia might only refer to the fact that Attila 
came from a family that was famous for its former appreciated military leaders.805 Furthermore, if 
we take it for granted that Eslas really made a comparison between the Emperor and Attila, his 
opinion might derive from the fact that in the eyes of nomads those who pay for peace can not have 
a higher position than their own leaders. Accordingly, the position of Attila and Theodosius II could 
not be anything else than comparable.806 Finally, it is also likely that Priscus’ story about Eslas’ 
bold comment is invented and originates from Priscus’ dislike of the emperor as I have already 
pointed out.807 In any case, it is still true, as Basilov notes that “From ancient times the nomadic 
societies were divided into two major classes, the aristocracy and the common people”, though it is 
also a fact that “the aristocracy did not necessarily possess any real power”.808  
Taken together, although eugeneia would mean aristocracy, this still does not prove that because of 
this Rua and Bleda and Attila received their position. Generally speaking, e.g. in the case of 
Genghis Khan, Temüdjin had the proper descent to compete for leadership, but in order to have it 
he needed to attract followers as a successful warrior chief.809 To sum up, descent is one eredential 
for a leadership position among Eurasian pastoralists, but background alone does not guarantee it.810 
Therefore, it is primarily their own abilities that brought leadership positions for Rua, Bleda and 
Attila.811 As I have pointed out in earlier chapters, wealth simply cannot bring or guarantee 
leadership position among Eurasian pastoral nomads.812 However, the leadership position can be 
linked to a family or an elite or aristocracy when there is a long-term need for a leadership position 
                                                 
805 Kelly 2008, passim. 70; passus Barfield 1993, passim. 132; cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 198-199. 
806 Barfield 1989, passim. 156-157; Khazanov 1984, 160. 
807 See Chapter 2.3. Priscus’ account about Eslas’ statement that Theodosius II had as honourable a background as a 
barbarian leader simply does not show respect to the emperor. 
808 Basilov 1989, 6. 
809 Barfield 1993, 159, 76, 83; Khazanov 1984, 236. Barfield states that among Eurasian pastoralists descent was used to 
justify power. 
810 Kradin 2005, 159; see also Barfield 1989, passim. 26-28; Khazanov 1984, passim. 236-238, 178-179. Kradin also points 
this out in the case of Rouran nomads from the fourth century AD next to the Empire of China – if the leader was 
considered incapable of his tasks, his followers did not mind changing their loyalty to another leader or replacing the present 
one on a new leader, although the former leader would have belong appreciated family. 
811 Thompson (1999) 2000, 178. I disagree with Thompson’s claims that one family had succeeded in making the military 
leadership a hereditary office held by a successive generations of brothers, and hence Romans can refer to Attila’s “progeny” 
as ruling the Huns. Furthermore, Thompson claims that this is an innovation in Hun society and implies that hereditary 
nobility had arisen. The leaders differed now from the primates of Ammianus’ day in that they derived their authority not 
from military prowess, which cannot be inherited, but from wealth, which can. 
812 Khazanov 1984, passim. 145-147, 154-158, 161, 164, 154-157, passim. 167. According to Khazanov on some special 
occasions the relationship between power and an aristocracy based on social differentiation might emerge, but this 
fundamentally would derive from the nomadic units’ long-term relations with the sedentary agricultural urban world. 
Furthermore, the existence of leadership is also in these cases fundamentally connected to a large-scale need for a leader, 
and this makes the claims of acquiring a leadership position on the grounds of belonging to a wealthy family who have 
earlier had that position erroneous.  
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and for contacts with sedentary societies, though even in this case need for and acceptance of the 
leadership position remained crucial preconditions for its existence.813 
Distinct political power might occur among nomads in the following three circumstances.814 First, 
when groups form a larger unity. Second, when united groups need to establish contacts with other 
nomadic groups who do not belong to the unity. Third, when contacts between nomads and 
sedentary agricultural-urban societies increase. All these cases might strengthen the position of 
leaders among their groups, and especially strengthen the position of the supreme leader who is 
responsible for all actions. Moreover, certain leaders might present themselves as suitable candidate 
by e.g. creating an interest in new raids and by demonstrating their military prowess.815 
This course of events could have taken place among the Huns as a result of contacts with local 
barbarian groups and the Roman Empire and the needs of the groups who formed the confederation, 
but I doubt this would have taken place before the 440s when Bleda and Attila became the leaders 
of the confederation.  
It was not until the 430s when the confederation under the lead of Rua seems to have taken shape 
and grew bigger because of increased contacts with both the Western and the Eastern Roman 
Empire. This persuaded local barbarians to act with the Huns and form a confederation in order to 
gain their share of the booty and increased wealth. In general, it has been noted that external links 
with sedentary agricultural societies are better able than anything else to encourage the growth and 
consolidation of social differentiation within a society. This might have transformed status 
differences to create rank, estate and even class differences, and hence there could have been people 
who theoretically may be referred to as a nomadic elite, nomadic nobility, or a nomadic aristocracy 
during this time.816 
The strengthening leadership position and the possible rise of an elite among the Huns and the 
groups who formed the confederation in the 440s leads us to study the existence of a 
(supercomplex) chiefdom, because these features are often, though not always, connected. As 
Khazanov points out nomadic societies can reach a stage of development which directly precedes 
the emergence of a state, that is, that stage which is now usually referred to as “a stratified society” 
or “chiefdom”.817 However, before turning to these topics, I will first briefly evaluate why Bleda 
and Attila could have been elected as military leaders. 
                                                 
813 Khazanov 1984, passim. 158-167, see especially 161-162, 164. 
814 Khazanov 1984, 161. 
815 Khazanov 1984, 161. 
816 Khazanov 1984, 164-165. Khazanov states that the internal development of nomadic societies does not provide 
sufficient opportunities for stable social differentiation and a further external factor is needed as a stabilizer. 
817 Khazanov 1984, 165. 
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The primary reason why Bleda and Attila gained the leadership position must have been their 
suitability for the position – in other words they must have been capable warriors, otherwise they 
would not have been accepted to act as head of the confederation.818 Second, I consider that the 
sudden need to have leaders who knew the goals of the negotiations between the Eastern Roman 
Empire and Rua could have supported Bleda’s and Attila’s claim to take care of the task. Moreover, 
as nephews of Rua, Bleda and Attila would have known the terms and conditions of the 
negotiations well, and this made them fitting candidates for the task. Rua’s dealings with both the 
Eastern and the Western Roman Empire also emphasized an acute need for leaders, and especially 
for two leaders, and Bleda and Attila could share the responsibility. It has been suggested that Bleda 
was responsible for the regions on the borders of the Eastern Roman Empire and Attila on the 
Western Roman Empire border.819 By contrast, Wirth suggests that Attila mainly dealt with the 
Eastern Roman Empire and Bleda inherited from Octar the lead of the regions in the west.820 
However, there is no clear evidence that the regions were divided between the brothers, or whether 
the brothers ruled everything jointly.821 However, because the regions where the groups of the 
confederation dwelled were large, it is plausible that the division would have helped the leaders 
keep contacts with the groups and plan joint activities. I can certainly agree that Bleda and Attila 
simply continued the tasks that their uncles left behind, but I am not fully convinced by the idea that 
their goal was to make their position even stronger.822  
It is clear that Bleda and Attila must have acquired the leadership position because of their skills 
along with their interest in the task. Moreover Bleda and Attila must have had the charisma required 
for the leadership position, because without it a nomad leader would not have been able to gain his 
followers’ support.823 Bleda’s and Attila’s charisma and personal skills are suggested by the fact 
that Rua and Octar also had at least one brother, Oebarsius, still living at the time of Bleda and 
Attila, and Oebarsius might well have been an alternative choice for the leadership position.824 
Other potential candidates for the leadership position of the confederation, such as brothers or their 
uncle’s sons were also possible.825 However, according to Priscus, Bleda and Attila acquired their 
position from Rua with dispute. Accordingly, it seems that there was agreement as to which of the 
younger generation the leadership position of the confederation would go. Lastly, I consider that 
                                                 
818 Barfield 1989, 28. 
819 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 85-86; Schreiber 1976, 87; cf. Bona 1991, 54, Wirth 1999, 52. 
820 Wirth 1999, 52. 
821 Thompson (1999) 2000, 85, 178; Kelly 2008, 69-70; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 85. 
822 Wirth 1999, 53. 
823 Kradin 2005, 158-159; Kradin 2002, passim 375. 
824 Priscus, fr. 14. in Blockley 1983, 290-291. 
825 Kelly 2008, 71. Kelly suspects that Bleda and Attila had rivals for the leadership position among the Huns and they killed 
them, though contemporary sources do not refer to this.  
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Bleda and Attila might have won the leadership position because they belonged to a senior clan, and 
in accordance with steppe politics their kinship links could have supported them to act as head of 
other groups.826 
I suggest that we should not to exaggerate the power position of Bleda’s and Attila’s leadership at 
the head of the confederation and as head of military activities. The same holds for claims of an 
upper class and a leading elite that would signify the rise of a state and the partial adoption of a 
sedentary way of life or a transformation in the nomadic way of life. All this could have taken place 
within the frames of the nomadic way of life and the rise of a supercomplex chiefdom, which does 
not mean that nomads would had to give up their nomadic way of life – the rise of a stronger unity 
among them is also possible without adopting a sedentary way of life. In short, we should study the 
“nomadic alternative” and “nomadic pathways”, not “Hunnenreich”.  
In the next section I turn to study the kind of activities that Bleda and Attila were in charge of and 
what this tells us about the nature of their leadership position. In addition, I assess what kind of 
contacts the Hun brothers seem to have had with the Roman Empire and whether this affected their 
leadership position and the unity of the confederation to such an extent that an increase in nomadic 
power could be observed. 
  
 
8.2. Creating Security and Bringing Profits 
 
After ending the peace negotiations arising from Rua’s disputes with the Eastern Roman Empire on 
fled tribes, the first action we know Bleda and Attila to be responsible for is a large-scale raiding 
operation in the Danubian regions in the Eastern Roman Empire in 440.827 
The reason for the attack is considered to derive from the fact that the Eastern Roman Empire had 
not paid the promised annual gold payments to Bleda and Attila.828 Consequently, the Hun leaders 
would not have been able to share the promised profits with the groups in the confederation and this 
would have been led to an increased interest among both the Hun leaders and the groups in the 
confederation in new attacks on the areas of the Eastern Roman Empire.829 Khazanov has noted that 
in some cases, if raiding continues for some time, it becomes a constant part of nomads’ life and 
eventually speeds up the cycle of raiding.830 This might have been the case of the groups who 
                                                 
826 Kelly 2008, passim. 51-52; passus Barfield 1989, 26, 76, 83. See Chapter 7. 
827 Kelly 2008, 88. 
828 Priscus, fr. 9.3 in Blockley 1983, 236-237; Stickler 2007,  67. 
829 Stickler 2007, 67. 
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formed the coalition, and hence Bleda and Attila as head of the confederation would have led the 
raiding operations. The Hun leaders were no doubt aware that the time was ripe for attacking 
because at the turn of the 430s and 440s the Eastern Roman Empire was tied down with 
confrontations with the Persians and the Vandals.831 
The first target for the troops led by Bleda and Attila was the market place that had been agreed 
with the Romans in the peace treaty of Margus a few years earlier and the fortress of Constantia 
directly across the Danube.832 After the attack the Romans accused the Huns of abandoning the 
treaty between them. However, according to Priscus the Huns answered that the raid wasrevenge 
attack on the Romans because a Roman bishop had robbed valuable items from the graves of the 
Huns. Bleda and Attila also threathened that if the bishop and the fugitives which the Romans had 
promised to send back were not handed over to them, their troops would make further invasions of 
the Eastern Roman Empire. While the Romans considered the demands unreasonable, the troops 
under the command of the Hun brothers continued their move and according to Priscus their troops 
“crossed the Danube and ravaged very many cities and forts along the river, amongst which they 
took Viminacium, a city of Moesia in Illyria”.833  
After this the Romans were no doubt eager to negotiate with the Huns again, but what followed in 
441 was Bleda’s and Attila’s decision to lead an attack on the city of Margus.834 After the fall of 
Margus, it seems that the troops resumed their attacks during 422, leading to the Romans suing for 
peace with the Huns.835 In short, the Romans made a tempting offer to pay 6,000 pounds of gold 
immediately and 1,000 pounds of gold annually to ensure peace, though this was not accepted by 
Bleda and Attila and they went on to sack the city of Ratiaria in Upper Moesia and Naissus in 
Illyria.836 These were heavy losses for the Eastern Roman Empire because both cities contained an 
imperial arms factory and were densely populated.837  
The Eastern Roman army seems to have been too weak to prevent the attacks of the troops of Bleda 
and Attila because next the brothers devastated the cities of Singidunum (Belgrad) and Sirmium 
(Sremska Mitrovica).838 The destruction that the troops caused was heavy and it took decades for 
the cities to recover.839 The Huns’ attacks continued and Serdica (Sophia), Philippopolis, 
Adrianople, Heraclea and Arcadiopolis were also ravaged, as were many important fortifications, 
                                                 
831 Stickler 2007, 68; Thompson (1999) 2000, 86-87; Kelly 2008, 90-92. 
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such as Athyras.840 It is calculated that over seventy cities and villages faced the raids of troops led 
by Bleda and Attila in the Balkans.841 The destruction of the Huns and their warrior followers was 
clearly considerable, and therefore, it is no surprise that the Eastern Roman Empire was ready again 
for peace negotiations in 443, but before that occured the parties clashed in Chersonesus.842  
The battle ended in victory for the Huns, and as a result of a peace was concluded in Nomus in 
443.843 According to Priscus the terms of the treaty were as follows: “the fugitives should be handed 
over to the Huns, and six thousand pounds of gold be paid to complete the outstanding instalments 
of tribute (); that the tribute henceforth be set at 2,100 pounds of gold per year; that for each 
Roman prisoner of war who escaped and reached his home territory without ransom, twelve solidi 
were to be the payment, and if those who received them did not pay, they were to hand over the 
fugitive; and that the Romans were to receive no barbarians who fled to them”.844 Thus, once again 
Bleda and Attila were able to achieve favourable terms from a treaty with the Eastern Roman 
Empire. The Hun brothers must have been pleased because the treaty underlined their capability as 
military leaders to gain victorious battles and profit their followers. Furthermore, in all likelihood 
this also strengthened their position as head of the troops.845  
On the Roman side, the best option for them to end hostilities had been to buy the Huns off. Annual 
payments could be delayed and war against the nomads was difficult, expensive, time consuming 
and not always successful.846 Accordingly, Theodosius II’s policy to pay the Huns to ensure peace 
seems to have been a reasonable policy.847 
The Huns’ demand that the Romans pay 12 solidi in ransom for each Roman prisoner no doubt 
enriched the Hun warriors on a large scale and supported the view of Bleda and Attila as competent 
military leaders. This was also emphasized by Bleda’s and Attila’s renewed demand for members of 
the earlier fled tribes to be returned in order to be punished.848 In short, it clearly showed Bleda’s 
and Attila’s ability to act on behalf of the security of the confederation. First of all, the Eastern 
Roman army would not be strengthened by any barbarian troops from the vicinity of the dwelling 
areas of the confederation. Second, groups hostile to the confederation of Huns and local barbarians 
would be eliminated.  
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Moreover, Bleda’s and Attila’s demand that the Eastern Roman Empire should not receive any 
barbarians who fled to them from the regions of the groups who formed the confederation was most 
likely drawn up to secure the security of the confederation. Moreover, the goal of the demand was 
likewise to calm the groups who formed the confederation. However, what the demand also shows 
that the groups in the confederation were still fragmented and not all of them wanted to take part in 
the activities led by Bleda and Attila. Furthermore, as Priscus notes, among the fugitives there were 
still members of “Scythian royalty” ( ) which refers to the military 
leaders of some other groups.849 This would suggest that during the first years of the 440s the Hun 
brothers still acted only as head of a union of groups, and were not rulers of certain regions and its 
dwellers. In fact, the claim that a Hun Empire existed around 443 is highly implausible. 
I agree with Anke and Koch that the leadership position among the Huns was based on success in 
military actions and that the success attracted followers who expected to profit from their promise 
of loyalty to the leaders.850 Consequently military leaders of the Huns needed to gain profits for 
their followers, whose living was no longer dependent solely on herding, but was also based on 
riches derived from military victories.851 Anke and Koch emphasize, however, that the Huns clearly 
did not give up their nomadic way of life at any stage of the fourth and fifth centuries.852 Also for 
this reason I fully agree with Anke and Koch that the Huns never had kings and leadership positions 
never allowed hereditary dynasties to emerge.853 
Further evidence that Bleda and Attila only led as military leaders some groups to whose support 
the brothers’ leadership position based on, comes from Priscus’ remark that in the peace treaty with 
the Eastern Roman Empire the Hun brothers demanded “to pay tribute ( ) not only to the 
Scythians but also to the other barbarian neighbours of the Roman Empire”.854 While it is not clear 
whether Priscus meant by “the Scythians” only Bleda and Attila, or the confederation they were in 
charge of,855 still there is little doubt that the Hun brothers wanted to enrich not only themselves 
butt also others. 
If “the other barbarian neighbours” refers to groups who did not belong to the confederation, then 
it once again makes clear that Bleda and Attila wanted to calm the regions, in which the groups who 
                                                 
849 Priscus, fr. 9.3, fr. 6.1  in Blockley 1983, 238-239, 230-231. In Chapter 4 I showed that Priscus’ term “Scythian royalty” 
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formed the confederation lived. In addition, it implies that Bleda and Attila were gaining friendly 
relationship with groups who had not previously allied with them, and perhaps they tried to achieve 
this end. This is likely because nomad leaders among Eurasian pastoralists generally shared profits 
not only with their supporters, but also with for the potentially rebellious component tribes in order 
to secure their position in the confederation and their leadership position over a wide area.856 On the 
other hand, if the term “other barbarian neighbours” referred to groups who belonged to the 
confederation led by Bleda and Attila, but were not nomads, “the Huns”, then it underlines Bleda’s 
and Attila’s evident goal and urge to profit their supporters. This points to two crucial aspects of the 
nature of the brothers’ leadership position.  
First, it was dependent on enriching those who supported the Hun brothers in heading of the 
confederation and leading troops on a large scale. Second, Bleda and Attila did not have a highly 
powerful leadership position, but needed to strengthen their position in order to keep it, and this was 
done by providing riches to their supporters, or bands who were living in the neighbourhood of 
groups who belonged to the confederation. This common feature of nomadic leadership shows that 
leadership positions were framed by nomadic ways of life. This suggests that talk about the change 
in the Huns’ nomadic way of life during the 440s, or as Heather claims the “adaption away from 
nomadism”, is somewhat contrived.857 The claim that the increase of riches among the Huns would 
have led to changes in the nomadic way of life needs in my opinion further study, hence I shall 
evaluate the view a little here. 
The Huns’ invasion of the Eastern Roman Empire in 441-443 and the peace treaty which followed 
in 443 benefitted both Bleda and Attila and their followers. The attacks had provided booty, 
prisoners of war could be sold back to Romans and mercantile exchange was ensured.858 In 
addition, supporters of Bleda and Attila could expect their share from the annual tribute paid by 
Theodosius II’s regime. Accordingly, an increase in wealth is supposed to have caused some 
changes especially in the leadership position and in power structures among the groups who formed 
the confederation.859   
At least what can be agreed is that the flow of riches led to some visible changes in daily life, e.g. 
the number of gold objects increased in graves found in the dwelling areas of groups who had 
formed the confederation during the fifth century.860 While we cannot say anything certain about 
                                                 
856 Barfield 1993, 149. 
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the connection between jewellery and actual power positions, at least we can assess what kind of 
power or appreciated position objects found in graves seem refer to. This is especially the case with 
small, c. 70 – 100 cm long composition bows which have a golden plate cover.861 
Generally speaking, composition bows did not exist among other groups living close to the northern 
borders of the Roman Empire until the arrival of groups of Huns at the end of the fourth century.862 
Furthermore, a composition bow seems to have been the most important weapon of the Huns.863 
Accordingly, the archaeological finds of miniature composition bows made of gold in the living 
areas of the confederation (especially in Jakuszowice, in modern southern Poland and in Pecsüszög, 
in modern Hungary) imply that military prowess was appreciated.864 This is supported by the fact 
that the bows are smaller and covered fully or partially with the golden plates that made the bows 
unsuitable for shooting, or at least diminishing their best shooting qualities,865 and hence it is 
suggested that the golden composition bows would have been made as badge.866 On the other hand, 
it is also proposed that the golden bows were signs of conquest of new regions or the bows were 
only objects for trade because they are found in the vicinity of the Huns’ trading routes.867 The third 
option is that the bows indicated the position of their holder, especially because bows are not 
generally found in nomad burials and the bows were not used for shooting.868 This has led to claims 
that the golden bows signify changes in the power structure among the Huns during the fifth 
century, especially under the lead of Bleda and Attila in the 430s and 440s.869 In short, it is argued 
that the existence of more than one golden bow can be taken as a proof that they were used as 
badges, and the bows would have been used by warriors who had enriched themselves in wars and 
gained popularity as competent leaders. Moreover, this leadership would have supported them in 
                                                 
861 Bona 1991, 135, 170, 174, 180-182, 167, 141; Laszlo 1951, 91, 93, 96; Harmatta 1952, 281; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 221-
222. Bona remarks that bows are not generally found from burials of nomads. However, for Huns composition bows are 
typical for Huns, though they have their own particular form. Maenchen-Helfen writes that “Hunnic bow” is a “reflexed 
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862 Bona 1991, 167-170. 
863 Bona 1991, 135, 174, 170, 167; Harmatta 1951, 133-134; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 221-222. 
864 Laszlo 1951, 91, 93, 96; Harmatta 1952, 281; Bona 1991, 135, 170, 180-182, 120-121.  
865 Laszlo 1951, 96, 97. While the number of golden plates in the bow from Pecsüszögis is considerably smaller than in the 
one from Jakuszowice, this according to Laszlo refers to the fact that the bow from Pecsüszögis could have also been used 
as a normal weapon. In addition, Laszlo claims that because the bow was accompanied in the grave with arrows that had 
iron peak, this could also imply the normal usage of the bow. Accordingly, Laszlo considers that by contrast to the 
Jakuszowice bow which could only be a badge and signify its holder’s position, the bow from Pecsüszögis would also have 
been actively used for shooting. 
866 Harmatta 1951, 107, 148; Laszlo 1951, 93, 96; Bona 1991, 181-182. 
867 Alföldi 1932, 35; Fettich 1940, 244. 
868 Bona 1991, 167; Laszlo 1951, 101. 
869 Harmatta 1951, 133-134, 137, 139; cf. Bona 1991, 182. According to Bona the golden bows would have been worn by 
the aristocracy in the confederation led by Rua, Bleda and Attila in order to indicate their position. 
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becoming more powerful than the old leading aristocracy, and ultimately the richest warriors would 
have formed a new leading upper class among the Huns.870 I am not, however, fully convinced of 
these claims. 
On the one hand, I agree that because a bow, a weapon, is taken as a sign of one’s position, it 
strongly implies that being a warrior was not only a respected position but also that it had some 
kind of relation to power, and most likely indicated a leadership position among the Huns.871 
Generally speaking, this makes perfect sense because Eurasian pastoralists are known to appreciate 
at warriors most and only military leaders could lead others on a large scale from time to time.872 
On the other hand, I disagree with the view that the golden bows signify changes in political and 
social structures, and that the richest warriors would have formed a new leading upper class among 
the Huns, especially during the 430s and 440s.  
I consider that an artifact that more likely referred to its holder’s position would be cicadas – they 
are also found in graves that are considered to belong to Huns.873 Cicadas are small golden objects, 
in the form of a fly or a drop that were used among nomads dwelling near the borders of the Empire 
of China over the centuries as a sign of rank or officialdom, and this is also seen to be the case also 
among the Huns.874 It is also likely, however, that cicadas could be worn without signifying any 
special power position.875 
In conclusion, it is clear that the wealth increased among the groups in the confederation as a result 
of the contacts with the Roman world. However, it is another matter whether it really caused some 
changes in the Huns nomadic way of life and in the leadership position of Bleda and Attila, or in 
the relationship between the groups who belonged to the confederation. In order to consider this 
further, I shall next examine what kind of activities Bleda and Attila took care of at the head of the 
confederation and what kind of relationship they seem to have had with the Roman Empire and the 






                                                 
870 Harmatta 1951, 133-134, 137, 139. 
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872 Barfield 1993, 131, passim. 147-151, 158-161; Kradin 2005, 158. See Chapter 3. 
873 Bona 1991, 196-197; Thompson (1999) 2000, 180. 
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8.3. Friends and Foes – Hun Leaders and Contacts with the Romans 
 
The first year of the Hun brothers, Bleda and Attila at the head of the confederation included two 
successful treaties with the Eastern Roman Empire. In the eyes of the Romans the might of the 
Huns must have increased and the Romans tried to make the best of the situation. It seems that both 
the Eastern and the Western Roman Empire acknowledged Bleda and Attila as Hun leaders, with 
whom theu could co-operate in order to control the possible flood of the Huns and groups acting 
with them from the lower Danubian region to the Roman regions.  
The magister militum of the Western Roman Empire, Aetius, who had most likely already 
established good relations with Bleda’s and Attila’s uncles, especially Rua, seems to have wanted to 
maintain good contacts with the Huns. At least Priscus’ remark how one of Attila’s secretaries, 
Constantius, was sent by Aetius refers to this.876 This is also implied by the story that Aetius had 
sent his son, Carpilio, as a hostage to the Huns from the Western Roman Empire.877 Furthermore, 
visit to the Huns by Western Roman delegations’ seem to have been common.878 
Although there is no information on major disputes between the Western Roman Empire and the 
Huns in the 440s, it is likely that the delegations were sent so as to maintain good relations between 
the parties. However, all this did not differ in a crucial way from the common policy of the Romans 
with barbarian leaders, hence reference to an exceptionally friendly relationship between the Hun 
leaders and Aetius might be doubted.879 
Nonetheless, compared to the apparently calm relationship between the Huns and the Western 
Roman Empire, the court of Theodosius II was constantly waging war with the Hun leaders. Even 
though the Huns and the Romans had concluded peace treaties, even after the last peace treaty of 
443 Bleda and Attila sent delegations to the Eastern Roman court, claiming that everything was not 
in order. Priscus writes that the Hun brothers had not received every fugitive back that the Eastern 
Romans had promised to send them, and hence the disputes did not cease. Priscus claims that the 
Hun envoys were sent to the Romans in order to gain rich presents and nothing else.880 While this 
might have been the case, at least partially, nevertheless Priscus’ accounts reveal that both the 
Eastern and the Western Roman Empire wanted to keep contacts with the Hun brothers calm and 
                                                 
876 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 252-253, 262-263. Priscus passus “Constantius, who was an Italian and secretary of Attila, sent 
to him by Aetius, the general of western Romans” … “Constantius whom Aetius had sent to Attila as his secretary” … “Constantius, had been 
sent by Aetius to Attila and Bleda as secretary”. 
877 Priscus, fr.11.2 in Blockley 1983, 256-257. See Chapter 7. 
878 Priscus, fr.11.2 in Blockley 1983, 262-263, 276-277. 
879 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 107. 
880 Priscus, fr.10, fr. 9.3 in Blockley 1983, 240-243, 237-241. 
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for this reason they were also ready to please them in order to improve their relationship in the 
future.  
Taken together, it seems that the Romans were eager to see Bleda and Attila at the head of groups 
who formed confederation, and they might have even helped to strengthen the Hun brothers’ 
position. It is likely that the goal of the Romans might have been to foster a strong and stable 
Roman-minded leadership to ascend to the head of uncertain barbarian groups. It is thus likely that 
the Romans supported Bleda and Attila to show their might to their followers and to keep Hun 
leaders at the head of a confederation with whom the Romans could co-operate because of the 
already established and strengthened relationship.  
It would seem propable that the Late Roman authors’ way of emphasizing the Hun brothers’ 
position at the head of the confederation might derive from the fact that the authors knew that 
Romans supported Bleda’s and Attila’s leadership, though the position of the Hun brothers would 
not necessarily have been so strong among the group who formed the confederation after all. 
Generally speaking, this is supported by the fact that still in the 440s Priscus’ accounts stress that 
the Hun brothers needed to gain support of groups who belonged to the confederation and there 
were also groups who preferred not to join the confederation.881  
Bleda’s and Attila’s need to please their supporters by enriching them with new raids and victories 
and more booty might have been the reason why the Hun brothers started to again raid the Roman 
regions in 444, only a year after the treaty with the Eastern Roman Empire. This time the target was 
the border areas of the Western Roman Empire in the Balkans. 
Only a short reference from Merobaudes, who was a 5th century Latin rhetorician and poet, informs 
us that the Huns invaded Pannonia in 444; at least according to Maenchen-Helfen, Merobaudes’ 
remark on “the threat that arrived from the utmost north” could only mean the Huns and the groups 
who formed the confederation. The Huns were in fact the only larger groupings dwelling in the 
vicinity of the Carpathians, the Caucasus and the Don.882 How large the attack in question was is 
not known, but according to Maenchen-Helfen after a clash with the Western Roman troops at the 
end of 444, Bleda and Attila, “saevi reges” as Merobaudes calls them, started peace negotiations 
with Aetius.883 The terms of the peace negotiations are not known, but what we do learn from 
Cassiodorus’ description of his grandfather’s visit to the Huns to agree with the peace, is that in the 
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year 445 only Attila led the confederation.884 The reason for this was, according to Cassiodorus, that 
Attila had murdered Bleda.885 Cassidorus reports: 
 
After their death [Octar and Rua] he [Attila] succeeded to the throne of the Huns, together with his brother Bleda. 
In order that he might first be equal to the expedition he was preparing, he sought to increase his strength by 
murder. Thus he proceeded from the destruction of his own kindred to the menace of all others.  But though he 
increased his power by this shameful means, yet by the balance of justice he received the hideous consequences of 
his own cruelty. Now when his brother Bleda, who ruled over a great part of the Huns, had been slain by his 
treachery, Attila united all the people under his own rule. Gathering also a host of the other tribes which he then 
held under his sway, he sought to subdue the foremost nations of the world the Romans and the Visigoths.886 
 
Bleda’s death is said to have happened either at the end of 444 or at the beginning of 445.887 
Butwhether Attila did really murder his brother might be doubted. It is likely that Cassiodorus drew 
for his information from earlier source, just as Jordanes did. However, the fifth-century authors who 
most likely supplied this account are Priscus and Prosper Tiro. A fragment from Priscus that is in 
Theophanes’ chronicle tells us that “Attila, the son of Mundius, a Scythian and a brave and haughty 
man, killed his elder brother Bleda, became sole ruler of the kingdom [
] of the Scythians (Whom they also call “Huns”)”.888 Prosper Tiro’s account of the 
situation is similar: “Attila, king of the Huns [rex Hunnorum] killed Bleda, his brother and 
colleague in the royal office [consortem in regno], and forced his people to obey him”.889 
Because we do not know of any disputes between the brothers from the years that they led the 
confederation together,890 nothing prevents us from assuming that Bleda died naturally. I suspect, in 
fact, that the story about the murder could be a topos. In Roman literature stories of murdering ones 
own relatives are always condemned; e.g. the story of Romulus and Remus emphasizes Romulus’ 
lust for power; and the stories about Roman Emperors killing their relatives create an image of 
brutish acts and improper behaviour. For these reasons I suspect that contemporary authors’ might 
have invented the story of Attila killing his brother in order emphasize Attila’s lust for power and 
the brutish behaviour found among fierce barbarian leaders – this is the image that Cassidorus 
stresses: “the madman [Attila] who fancied himself about to grasp the Empire of the world. He 
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found the king [Attila] insolent; he left him pacified. […] [Attila] driven by some fury, seems to 
strive for the domination of the world”.891 Priscus’ account of Attila’s behaviour also crates an 
image of a man who is greedy for power “the unreasonableness of the barbarian [Attila] … 
[Attila’s] very great fortune and the power which it had given to him had made him so arrogant 
that he would not entertain just proposals unless he thought that they were to his advantage”.892 In 
addition, Jordanes stresses Attila readiness to kill and use arms to strengthen his rule: “[Attila] was 
a man born in the world for the shattering of nations, the terror of all the lands … [Attila says] “Or 
what is sweeter for a brave man than to seek revenge with his own hand? It is a right of nature to 
glut the soul with vengeance. […] If any can stand at rest while Attila fights, he is a dead man”.893 
The image of Attila clearly underlines him to gaining strong rule and a power position not only 
among the Huns, but also among neighbouring powers, including the Roman Empire. Accordingly, 
I suspect that the purpose of late Roman authors might have been to create an image of Attila as a 
barbarian leader who would do anything to increase his power because this would help to explain 
why Attila and the Huns were victorious against the Romans.  
I doubt, however, whether Attila would have been ready to risk his leadership position at the head 
of the confederation as well as the unity of the groups by killing his brother. The murder of his 
brother seemingly would not have pleased or been agreed upon by all who belonged to the 
confederation, especially those who had mainly been supporters of Bleda in the regions that he had 
primarily taken care of.894 In addition, according to Priscus, murders were punished by death among 
the Huns, and this makes it doubtful that Attila would have been willing to risk his already achieved 
position at the head of the confederation.895  
While we remain uncertain about the cause of the death of Bleda, it is clear that Attila must have 
needed to gain the loyalty of the groups who had earlier mainly dealt with Bleda.896 This was not a 
new situation for the groups in the confederation because Rua had also faced something similar 
after the death of Octar. Despite this, it has been argued that Attila reached such a powerful 
leadership position that he could murder anyone without being worried that he was acting against 
tribal obligations and the limitations which a tribal society imposes upon the excessive growth of 
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individual’s power.897 If this is the case, I see it as doubtful that Attila would have needed to 
strengthen his position with divine signs as Priscus’ story about the sword of Ares implies.898  
Priscus tells us that an ox was unpredictably wounded while herding and this led the Huns to find a 
sword that was buried in the ground. The discovery of the sword was claimed to signify Ares’ 
support for the Huns and this made Attila triumphant over all his foes.899  
I suspect that Priscus might have invented the story so as to explain Attila’s might against the 
Romans. The fact that Priscus mentions the Greco-Roman god of war to support Attila’s and Huns’ 
military prowess implies that the purpose of the story was primarily to create and emphasize the 
image of Attila and the Huns as warlike and a threat to the Romans, and not to narrate actual events 
among the Huns. This is not to say that the Huns would not have had a similar story and it could 
have helped Attila to strengthen his power among the groups who formed the confederation, 
especially those who had earlier mainly operated with Bleda.900 However, I doubt this. 
Be the background for the story as it may, Attila’s position and tasks at the head of the 
confederation do not seem to have altered from the time he held the joint lead with Bleda. That is to 
say, Attila took care of tasks common to nomad leaders among the Eurasian pastoralists. This 
included extracting revenues from outsiders so as to redistribute them not only to one’s own 
supporters but also to potentially rebellious tribes so as to keep them happy and taking exclusive 
control of foreign affairs in order to gain profits from surrounding regions and secure one’s own 
regions against neighbours.901 All this Attila did immediately after the death of Bleda.  
Attila continued the peace negotiations with the Western Roman Empire and the negotiations seem 
to have ended with the Romans ceding large tracts of Pannonia to the Hun leader. In addition, Attila 
was granted gold payments and the honorary title of magister militum.902  
While all this must have pleased Attila, especially the supply of new regions that could be used for 
herding, it would still seem that Attila wished to gain further profit. Briefly, according to Priscus, 
Attila was negotiating with the Eastern Romans and demanded that they send him the missing  
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annual gold payments and the fugitives who were still among the Romans. In addition, Attila 
warned that if the Romans failed to do this, war between the parties would result.903  
I consider that Attila’s marked interest in gaining new profits from the Roman Empire implies that 
his position was relatively weak among the groups who formed the confederation. I strongly doubt, 
moreover, that his position would have evolved from a military leadership dependent on others’ 
support to a monarchy or a position of an autocratic khan or kingship as has been argued.904  
To me, Attila’s noticeable interest in a new war derived from his concern to strengthen his position 
at the head of the Hun groups, for futher victories would emphasize his competence as a military 
leader.905 The fragmentation of groups and the lack of support from some groups for Attila’s lead 
comes clear from Priscus’ remarks – the author tells us that even though Attila continued peace 
negotiations with Theodosius II, some troops were already attacking the regions of the Eastern 
Roman Empire. Priscus writes:906 
 
During the reign of Theodosius the Younger, Attila, the king of the Huns [ ] collected 
his army and sent letters to the Emperor concerning the fugitives and the payments of tribute [ ], 
commanding that all that had not been handed over under the pretext of the present state of war should be sent to 
him with all speed. Moreover, concerning the future tribute [ ], ambassadors should come to him for 
discussion, for, if they prevaricated or prepared for war, he would not willingly restrain his Scythian forces.  
 
Priscus’ remark about “the present state of war” clearly indicates that not all of the groups from the 
regions of the confederation supported Attila’s military leadership or rule.907 It is possible that the 
groups who were already raiding Roman regions in 466 could have been the same groups who had 
never belonged to the confederation and hence they were unconcerned about Attila’s plans. On the 
other hand, the groups of Huns could have been those who had been loyal to Bleda.908 It is also 
possible that they were groups who no longer wanted to support Attila as their supreme military 
leader, and hence began attacking on their own. However, I see this as unlikely because, as Priscus 
writes, Attila could deprive “his troops” from attacking. In other words, it is likely that the raiding 
groups would not have been under Attila’s command. it has also been proposed that Attila might 
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have been reluctant, or even helpless, to prevent groups in the confederation from attacking the 
Eastern Roman regions because the annual gold payment from Theodosius II’s regime had not 
arrived and the groups in the confederation were keen to enrich themselves.909 However, there still 
seem to have been troops who were loyal to Attila’s wishes and refrained from raiding.910 
Therefore, Attila might have used the attacks as a trick to create more pressure on the Eastern 
Roman Empire to send him the missing annual gold payments and fugitives. But ultimately, the 
need to gain riches seems to have been the crux in the events that eventually led Attila himself to 
gather troops under his command and attack Thrace in 447.911 
Before turning to the events of war, I shall briefly consider the basis of Attila’s leadership position 
after Bleda’s death in order to understand the nature of his leadership position more profoundly. 
First, the fragmentation and initiative of the groups in the regions of the confederation shows that 
after the death of Bleda Attila’s lead over the confederation was not strong. At least, the claim of 
Attila’s leadership being supported by a rich upper class is unconvincing,912 especially because the 
alleged military activity of the groups who had earlier supported Bleda as their supreme military 
leader, indicates mistrust and disinterest in supporting Attila in the same position. Generally 
speaking, because the distraction among the Huns was particularly caused by troops slipping their 
own raiding operations, I see that this strongly implies Attila’s position to derive from military 
leadership – it was the position where Bleda and Attila could have controlled the groups. 
Accordingly, I suggest that also Attila’s eagerness to have a war once again against Eastern Roman 
Empire points out his position still to have its justification because of acting as supreme military 
leader. By profiting the groups in the confederation Attila could keep his position, and bringing 
richness was also the task he was expected to take care.913  
The disputes with the Eastern Roman Empire could not be solved, and Attila led his troops on a 
large-scale attack on Dacia and Thrace at the beginning of 447.914 In Thrace Attila’s troops 
destroyed some fortresses and headed towards Dacia Ripensis where also the Eastern Roman 
Empire had sent some troops to stop the invasion. The parties clashed in Moesia, near the River 
Utus (Vid), and after some battles the Romans were defeated.915 Attila then led his troops towards 
further new cities to be conquered, and this was the fate of Marcianople, the capital of Moesia 
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Secunda. After this the might of his troops was felt in regions of Thrace, Illyricum and the 
provinces of Dacia and Scythia. According to Callinicus, who was a monk in the Bithynian 
countryside, the Huns conquered almost a hundred villages and cities, and this terrified the 
inhabitants of Constantinople.916  
Once again Attila’s attacks came at a time when the Eastern Roman Empire was not at its 
strongest:917 in 444 the winter had been exceptionally cold, and the harvest was poor. People and 
cattle died of cold. In the following year the Eastern Roman Empire faced heavy rains and once 
again the harvest was smaller than usual. At the same time, plague had spread among the Romans 
and the miseries of the inhabitants were not alleviated by earthquakes in many parts of the Eastern 
Roman Empire, such as in Constantinople, where the city wall was badly damaged during the first 
months of 447.  The wall was soon renovated but its strength was tested when Attila led his troops 
towards Constantinople.918 
While Constantinople did not fall into the hands of Attila’s troops, it did not diminish the troops’ 
interest in continuing their invasion and they headed for the region in Macedonia, as far as the pass 
of Thermophylai.919 By the end of 447 or during the first months of 448 Theodosius II was ready to 
negotiate a peace with Attila.920 When the negotiations started, Attila demanded only ambassadors 
came to him. As Barfield has noted, here Attila did what other talented Eurasian pastoral military 
leaders have done: only by influencing decision making at the very highest levels of government 
could nomad leader could gain the decisions they required.921  
Theodosius II accepted Attila’s wish and sent an embassy to agree on the terms of peace, though 
there was little to negotiate as the Eastern Roman Empire was eager to conclude the peace even on 
heavy terms.922 This suggests that the Eastern Roman army was weak and the Romans did not want 
to face more destruction at the hands of the Huns. For Attila the most important aspect of the treaty 
was clearly the annual gold payments because, according to Priscus, Attila demanded that the 
Romans pay 6,000 pounds of gold immediately in lieu of the unsent annual peace payments from 
earlier years, and 1,000 pounds of gold every following year in order to keep the peace. 
Furthermore, the new market place was agreed to be Naissus.923 In addition, this time Attila also 
forced the Romans to hand over to the Huns wide area of the lower Danubian Basin - the new 
                                                 
916 Callinicus, Vita S. Hyp., 139. 21.; Thompson (1999) 2000, 101-102; Bona 1991, 85-86; Wirth 1999, 73. 
917 Thompson (1999) 2000, 98-100. 
918 Thompson (1999) 2000, 100; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 120, 123. 
919 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 119, 123; Bona 1991, 85-87; Thompson (1999) 2000, 102. 
920 Thompson (1999) 2000, 108; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 123-125. 
921 Priscus, fr. 9, fr. 11 in Blockley 1983, 234-235, 242-243, 246-247; Barfield 1993, 151. According to Priscus, Attila also 
demanded during the last years of the 440s that “ambassadors come to him and not just ordinary men but the highest ranking of 
consulars“. 
922 Priscus, fr. 9.4 in Blockley 1983, 240-241; see Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 124. 
923 Priscus, fr. 11 in Blockley 1983, 242-243; see Thompson (1999) 2000, 108. 
 166 
border between the Huns and the Eastern Roman Empire went through the city of Naissus and the 
Romans lost the whole of Dacia Ripensis and wide areas from Moesia Prima and Secunda to Attila. 
Even though the regions along the new border line seem to have become partially abonded because 
of the insecure situation, e.g. the city of Naissus, still Attila’s demand that the Romans empty the 
areas of inhabitants proved out to be a hard task.924 Moreover, people still cultivating the land were 
an additional source of tension between Attila and the Eastern Roman Empire. It is thought that 
Attila’s interest in emptying the regions of inhabitants was for military purposes because the 
uninhabited regions would provide easy access for confederation troops into the heart lands of the 
Eastern Roman Empire.925  
On the other hand, I would also argue that Attila’s eagerness to empty the regions could also derive 
from the need to have new herding areas.926 After all, herding and the grazing areas that support it, 
are crucial to nomadic life, along with trade and raiding that Attila had already taken care of in the 
new peace treaty.927 A further point that supports the view is that Attila did not want the local 
sedentarists to stay and benefit the regions – if locals had stayed in the regions, the Huns could have 
raided their products, but not even this aspect seem to have been lucrative enough for Attila. 
Therefore, it is likely that Attila’s demand to have the regions uninhabited derives from the need to 
provide new herding areas for his nomad supporters. If this was the case, it suggests out that the 
groups of Huns who belonged to the confederation had not given up the nomadic way of life. 
After the treaty with the Eastern Roman Empire Attila could clearly consider that he had been able 
to show others his competence as a military leader and could expect his supporters to be pleased 
with him. This does in fact seem to have been the case, because contemporary authors’ accounts do 
not refer to any reference to fragmentation of groups in the confederation or independent groups 
gaining the Romanss attention in the vicinity of the regions of the groups who had formed the 
confederation. Although Attila would no doubt have been pleased with the situation, there were still 
some disputes with the Eastern Roman Empire that Attila needed to take care of. Attila, for 
example, did not give up on the old demands that Theodosius II should send him the fugitives who 
had fled to the Eastern Roman Empire. 
Attila’s persistent demands during 448-449 to have the fugitives returned does not make sense, if it 
was a matter of few ordinary pastoralists going over to the Romans’ side especially because, as 
                                                 
924 Priscus, fr. 11, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 242-243, 248-249.  
925 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 124-125. 
926 Barfield 1993, 162, passim. 163; cf. Khazanov 1984, 159. Barfield notes that Genghis Khan was also not interested in 
having the conquered regions permanently occupied. The main idea was to keep the conquered areas within the orbit of his 
rule, but without establishing and having to take care of an administration. Khazanov also points out that the nomadic elite 
had nothing against owning land, but they despised cultivation and made sure that the regions under their control were not 
used for this purpose. 
927 Basilov 1989, 5; Barfield 1993, passim. 18, 143-144. 
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Priscus mentions, Attila seems to have known them by name. It seems more likely that the fugitives 
were military leaders of smaller groups or clans who had earlier acted under the command of Bleda 
and Attila. Furthermore, they were most likely nomads because Priscus mentions that they were 
Attila’s ( ) “own race” as Blockley translates it; whether they were Attila’s relatives or 
not can only be speculated.928 However, because Priscus also writes about the fugitives using the 
terms barbarian or Scythian race ( ), it implies that there could have also 
been fugitives from local e.g. Germanic groups.929 Priscus’ description of Attila’s claims reveals 
some crucial aspects of Attila’s position and the formation of the confederation:930 
 
[Attila] ordered the secretaries to read out their names … [Attila told them] to tell the Romans to return to him all 
the barbarians who had fled to them from the time of Carpilio (the son of Aetius, the general of the Romans in the 
West), who had been a hostage at his court [supposedly during the 430’s or the 440s]. He would not allow his own 
servants [] to go to war against himself, even though they were unable to help those who 
entrusted to them the guarding of their own land.  
 
First, groups who belonged to the confederation and supported Attila as supreme military leader 
might have reconsidered their promise to act with Attila if he could not take care of duties related to 
his position, such as bringing security to the areas where the groups lived. As Priscus tells, the 
reason why fugitives, so to speak abandoned Attila, was that “they”, which in my opinion refers to 
Attila and troops under his command, had not secured their land. Furthermore, as Priscus’ account 
stresses, Attila admitted that he had not been able to do what was expected. 
Second, Priscus’ narration points out that groups had trusted in Attila’s lead to secure “their”, not 
“Attila’s” land, and this implies that what linked the groups and Attila were joint interests, not 
Attila’s rule over the regions where the fugitives had dwelled. In other words, what comes clear is 
that groups could keep their own areas and their own leaders, though they supported Attila’s 
supreme leadership for certain activities. What supports this idea is Priscus’ notion that Attila was 
angry with the fugitives because they had planned to act on their own.931 Priscus refers in this case 
to the possibility of the fugitives engaging in their own wars, and no longer requiring Attila’s lead, 
pointing out that Attila was especially entrusted with leading wars.  
                                                 
928 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 256-257. 
929 Priscus, fr. 9.3, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 238-241, 254-257; see Thompson (1999) 2000, 108. Translations are based on 
Blockley. In Chapter 2.3 I pointed out that Priscus uses the name Scythians to refer to members in the confederation in 
general and not just to the Huns. Generally speaking, Priscus’ way of using the term “gene” ( ) varies because he also 
uses it to refer to clans among the groups of Huns, e.g. when Priscus writes about the Akatziri, who were nomads. 
930 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 256-257. 
931 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 256-257; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 196-197. 
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With reference to this, the third crucial aspect that Priscus’ account points out is that still in the 440s 
the confederation seems to have based on military activities and the military leaders’ temporary 
support of Attila’s position as their supreme military leader when needed.  
Still in the 440s every group, or clan, in the confederation chose their own military leaders to lead 
their own troops, and when the groups formed larger unity in order to participate in activities of the 
confederation in time of war, smaller groups were placed under military leader(s) who were 
responsible for the command of troops on a larger scale. Ultimately, the groups had a supreme 
military leader who was responsible for all the troops, and this would have been the position of 
Attila.932 
Another account from Priscus that shows that Attila did not to have a permanent rule over those 
who followed him during the military activities, but only when joint activities were agreed upon, 
concerns of groups who were called the Akatziri and who seem to have been Huns and nomads. 
Priscus tells us that Theodosius II tried to get groups of Akatziri to change their loyalty from Attila 
to the Romans by sending them gifts.933 Priscus’ account and especially the sentence “the Emperor 
Theodosius sent gifts to them [leaders of the groups of Akatziri] to the end that they might 
unanimously renounce their alliance [ ] with Attila and seek peace with the Romans” 
indicates that the Romans knew that the groups were generally loyal to Attila concerning their 
shared and agreed activities, but that Attila was not regarded as their supreme leader.934 I argue that 
this was also the case with the other groups who joined Attila’s temporary military activities and 
supported his lead during those periods.935 Furthermore, because Priscus refers to groups who 
supported Attila’s lead and expected him to arrange security in their areas when needed, I suspect 
that Attila’s task was also to defend groups when their graizing rights for certain pastures were 
violated.936 
All this supports the notion that still at the end of the 440s when Attila is claimed to be at height of 
his power, the groups of Huns and local barbarians in the confederation acted as independent groups 
and were only loyal to Attila when it was a question of war or raids or forming troops. At the same 
time they expected to benefit from their support of Attila – Attila was expected to provide security 
                                                 
932 Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 182, 184. 
933 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 258-259. 
934 Thompson (1999) 2000, 106. If the Akatziri were under direct rule of Attila and not merely allied with him, Theodosius 
II most likely would not have tried to break the Akatziri’s loyalty to Attila because this would have been a direct attack 
against Attila’s rule. In the case of an alliance between Attila and the Akatziri Theodosius II’s act was an indirect attempt to 
weaken Attila’s position. 
935 Barfield 1993, passim. 149-151; cf. Basilov 1989, 6; Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 187-188. 
936 Barfield 1993, 144-145, passim. 150-151. If Attila was unable to bring security for pastures or solve disputes between 
groups using these pastures, I even suspect that the groups who had expected Attila to send troops to defend their areas 
might have been groups who belonged to the same lineage and tribe as Attila. This is because kinship defined the rights to 
use pastures and the strongest tribes and clans laid claim to the best pastures at the best time of year. 
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for their land areas and to profit them with riches derived from joint military activity, wars or 
raids.937 All this again suggests that the Huns had not given up their nomadic way of life at the end 
of the 440s.  
This argument is also supported by Priscus’ story about a Greek who he met among the Huns when 
visiting Attila in 449. According to Priscus, the Greek had ended up living among the Huns in the 
440s and enjoyed his life with the nomads because “after a war men amongst the Scythians live at 
ease, each enjoying his own possessions and troubling others or being troubled not at all or very 
little”.938 Even though Priscus’ account could be a topos of the nomadic way of life or a criticism of 
the present living conditions in the Eastern Roman Empire939 still the fact that the author defines the 
life of the Huns according to general features of nomadic way of life, very likely reflected reality. 
Even though wars and peace treaties with the Romans enriched groups in the confederation, I still 
consider that the Huns could have continued their nomadic way of life. If the position of Attila 
strengthened and changes occured in the social structure, these could have taken place within the 
framework of the nomadic way of life because, as has been noted, nomadic societies can reach a 
stage of development which directly precedes the emergence of a state – this stage is usually 
referred to as “a stratified society” or “chiefdom”.940 Furthermore, this is the basis for the strongest 
form of society among nomads, namely a supercomplex chiefdom, to emerge and exist.941 
Generally speaking, in specific situations nomad polities can temporarily create very centralized 
systems of government in order to accomplish specific aims; however, when the aims are fulfilled 
the systems cease to exist.942 It has also been pointed out that nomads do not need to “borrow the 
state model” because they are able to form their own peculiar form of nomad unity and higher level 
organization in order to deal effectively with their larger and more highly organized sedentary 
neighbours without giving up their own way of life.943 Therefore, I argue that the only phenomenon 
that we should consider to have evolved among the Huns is a supercomplex chiefdom or nomadic 






                                                 
937 Thompson (1999) 2000, 187-188. 
938 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 268-269. 
939 See Chapter 2.3; Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 205-209, 217, 219. 
940 Khazanov 1984, 165. 
941 Kradin 2008, 121. Also see my Introduction. 
942 Khazanov 1984, 166. 
943 Barfield 1989, 7. 
944 Kradin 2008, 114. 
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9. THE RISE OF A SUPERCOPMPLEX CHIEFDOM AMONG THE HUNS? 
 
 
It has been noted that sedentarists are often puzzled by the rapid rise and fall of larger and mighty 
nomad confederations because they fail to see the temporary nature of nomadic politics.945 Nomads 
are very sensitive to changes, and hence easily adapt to a new situation, such as the sudden 
formation of a larger unity or its collapse. This being the case, with changes in nomadic politics, 
especially in the case of the possible rise of a supercomplex chiefdom or nomadic state, an external 
influence is always required. This fundamentally occurs when nomads deal with more organized 
sedentary societies on a continual basis.946 
There is no doubt that groups of Huns did not face this kind of situation when they arrived to settle 
in the lower Danubian and Black Sea regions next to the Roman Empire during the fourth and fifth 
century. After all, the groups of Huns were not only dealing with local sedentary groups, but also 
with the Romans and the Roman Empire’s administrators. Therefore, we might agree that there was 
at least from this point of view a certain basis for a supercomplex chiefdom to evolve.  
Another aspect that leads to the study of the possible rise of a supercomplex chiefdom among the 
Huns is the fact that the emergence of a nomadic state is directly linked to conquest, as a rule 
conquest of sedentary areas, while not every conquest led to the rise of a supercomplex chiefdom or 
nomadic state.947 It has been argued that the subjugation and conquest of sedentary agricultural and 
urban societies is a specific manifestation of external factors which, together with internal 
particularities, especially differentiation, can lead to the rise of a nomadic state among the 
nomads.948 That is to say, not only external, especially long lasting conquest, but also internal 
changes must take place among scattered but temporarily united groups of pastoralists to cause the 
possible rise of a supercomplex chiefdom or nomadic state. 
With reference to this, an element that we need to study is the existence of limited internal social 
development, mainly social differentiation, among the groups of Huns. However, because strong 
social differentiation does not exist as such among nomads, but requires external input and 
influence, namely existence of agricultural sectors, I shall evaluate also, if these are to be found 
                                                 
945 Barfield 1993, 3; cf. Kradin 2008, passim. 147. 
946 Kradin 2008, 120-121; Barfield 1989, 7; Khazanov 1984, 147, 164-165, 162, 168, 228-231, passim. 150-151. Barfield 
remarks that the rise of a nomadic state is never in response to internal needs but is always related to external influences. 
947 Khazanov 1984, 229, 233; cf. Kradin 2008, 120.  
948 Khazanov 1984, passim. 228-229. Khazanov remarks that the increase of social differentiation might happen in the 
course of expansion or as a result of successful expansion. While this may be so, it does not explicitly cause the rise of a 
nomadic state. 
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among the groups of Huns to such an extent that they could have supported possible rise of a 
supercomplex chiefdom.949 
A supercomplex chiefdom has some similarities to an early state which is why some scholars speak 
about or use the term nomadic state on the same phenomenon.950 Accordingly, in the next section I 
discuss research, where scholars speak about nomadic states.951 However, whenever I refer to these 
scholars’ views on features which are common to the nomadic state, it should be understood that 
they are at the same time features agreed to be common in supercomplex chiefdoms. Moreover, 
because a supercomplex chiefdom has some specific features, I also list these features in order to 
see whether a supercomplex chiefdom evolved among the Huns, and whether Attila’s position was 
such that it can be said that he had a leadership position commensurate with a supercomplex 
chiefdom. However, before discussing these issues, I shall first point out the features that precede 
and support the rise of a supercomplex chiefdom.952 
  
 
9.1. Internal Conditions and External Influences – Towards a Supercomplex Chiefdom?  
 
It is not clear, if internal social differentiation existed among the groups of Huns before they started 
to dwell in regions in the vicinity of the lower Danubian basin and the Black Sea during the 5th 
century. In addition, it is uncertain, if it ever emerged. Emergence would have been marked by a 
clear distinction in the positions between members in different groups: some of the members would 
have had a more powerful position than others. Furthermore, when we speak about internal 
differentiation, this also refers to differences in how to make living. Groups would have appeared 
who would mainly have concentrated on harvesting, while the majority would have remained as 
pastoralists concentrating on herding, trade and raiding.953  
I claim that internal differentiation did not primarily exist among the groups of Huns when they 
arrived at the borders of the Roman Empire, and that it did not evolve among them for the following 
reasons. First, the fact that Huns arrived in the vicinity of the Roman borders as several independent 
and scattered small groups during the 380s to the 420s without hostilities towards each other 
implies that there was no strong class or group of warriors who would have wanted to increase their 
                                                 
949 Kradin 2008, 120-121, passim. 113-122; cf. Khazanov 1984, 163-165, 232-233. 
950 Kradin 2008, 114; Kradin 2008, 148. A supercomplex chiefdom and an early state are primarily the same phenomenon if 
when ignoring the existence of specialized administrative institutions which is common to the definition of state. 
951 Kradin 2008, 113, passim. 107-114; Kradin 2008, 144; See my Introduction. I prefer to use the term “supercomplex 
chiefdom” to “early state”/ “nomadic state”/ “dispositional state” because the former term brings out more clearly the 
specific nature of the situation among nomads, and especially among the Huns. 
952 Kradin 2008, passim. 107-122. 
953 Khazanov 1984, 147, 162-164, passim. 151, 157-161; Kradin 2008, 120-121. 
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power over others. Furthermore, internal social differentiation is generally weak in small pastoral 
units or groups where daily living takes place.954 But having said that it is also possible that we 
simply do not know about the rivalry between the groups of Huns from the end of the fourth century 
because of a lack of sources. Nevertheless, Ammianus’ remarks about the Huns mainly favouring 
temporary alliances with each other points to peaceful or mutual relationships between the 
groups.955 In addition, the archaeological material that can be connected to the Huns does not imply 
that there would have been unusually strict differences between the positions of the members of 
nomad groups when they arrived on the Roman borders.956 Furthermore, there are no signs of large 
scale agricultural activity that would indicate internal differentiation in the division of labour.957 
To conclude then, I claim that because internal differentiation is an unlikely explanation to Huns’ 
expansion, it could not have caused the rise of a nomadic state or a supercomplex chiefdom during 
the first decades of the fifth century when the groups of Huns arrived in the vicinity of the lower 
Danubian regions next to the borders of the Roman Empire.  
However, it is a totally different question whether internal differentiation started to evolve among 
the groups of Huns when their contacts increased with other groups of nomads and sedentarists (e.g. 
Alans and Tervingi) due to their wanderings near the Roman borders, and could this have supported 
the rise of a nomadic state or a supercomplex chiefdom from the 420s onwards.  
First, the groups of Huns started to form a larger confederation with each other and local, mainly 
sedentary barbarian, groups from the end of the 420s onwards, which might have led to the rise of a 
leading elite and later to internal differentiation. Furthermore, from the 420s onwards, groups of 
Huns started to live in regions next to the Roman lower Danubian borders next to local sedentary 
groups of agriculturalists which might have led to the rise of internal differentiation and a 
supercomplex chiefdom or nomadic state. After all, it was nomads’ contacts with sedentarists which 
played an indisputable part in the rise of the nomadic state, as Khazanov’s following typology of 
three different types of nomadic states emphasizes.958 I shall nextexplain each of the three different 
forms and then I analyse, whether they could have taken place among the Huns. Although the 
following typology is evolutionary and points out how different phases follow each other, still 
                                                 
954 Khazanov 1984, 164, 151, 162-163; Barfield 1993, passim. 150. 
955 See Chapter 3. The only time when a contemporary author, Ammianus, mentions groups of Huns fighting against each 
other is when Tervingi hired some Huns to strengthen their troops against some Huns who were attacking them. The 
groups of Huns allied themselves with Tervingi because they were paid for their services. 
956 Schmauder 2008, 157. 
957 Ammianus, RG, 31.2.8.; Sozomen, Hist. ecc., IX, 5; see Wirth 1999, passim. 11-14, 35, 160; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 177-
178; Thompson (1999) 2000, 38. See Chapter 3. 
958 Khazanov 1984, passim. 231-233. I regard Khazanov’s classification of nomadic states into three different types as 
plausible, because it is generalized in nature. The classification leaves enough room for smaller and specific characteristics. 
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according to Khazanov all the three phases can be understood as a nomadic state in their own 
right.959 
Characteristic to the nomadic state of the first type (I) is that nomads’ conquest is followed by the 
subjugation of sedentarists and vassal-tribute exploitation, and the single Mongol Empire and 
especially the Turkic qaghanat in the Middle Ages and the Golden Horde are clear examples of 
this.960 Even though the nomads had the leading position, sometimes a sedentary population could 
preserve its own state, in which case there would only be vassal dependence on the nomadic state. 
Sometimes nomads and sedentarists joined together within one and the same state. At any rate, it is 
primarily in the political sphere where limited integration takes place. Moreover, even if this 
happens, it does not prevent nomads from continuing their predatory activity towards sedentarists. 
Nomads’ acts neither touched the social and economic foundations of sedentary society nor did they 
entail the emergence of a single socioeconomic system. Equally, the situation does not support the 
formation of a political system by nomads and sedentarists. However, when the vassal dependence 
of a sedentary state on a nomadic one is established, changes to nomadic societies are stimulated. 
Generally speaking, the emergence of a nomadic state is linked to limited sedentarization.961 A 
reason for this is that nomadic aristocracy could not do without towns – they are the centres of 
political power, handicrafts and trade, all important aspects to maintain rule and control the new 
areas and its population. On the other hand, sometimes the emergence of towns looks artificial – 
they have been established because they provide a possibility for a nomadic aristocracy to maintain 
their rule, not because the towns themselves would be crucial for trade and other matters. The 
situation prevailed as long as nomads’ external expansion continued; when the situation changed, 
new forms in the evolving nomadic state also emerged.  
One possibility is that nomads’ withdrawal from sedentary territories would have caused the decline 
and fall of towns. This would have occurred when the socio-political structure in nomadic society 
became fairly simple, leading to the disintegration and downfall of the nomadic state. On the other 
hand, the development could have continued as before, leading to nomadic society becoming an 
agricultural-urban society, or in other words, the sedentarization process entered into nomadic life. 
Another possibility was that a nomadic state of the first type was transformed into a state of the 
second type.  
While the nomadic state of the first type is the starting point for speaking about the existence or rise 
of the nomadic state in the first place, the features would very propably have become established to 
                                                 
959 Khazanov 1984, passim. 231-233. 
960 Khazanov 1984, 255, 236. 
961 Kradin 2008, 121. 
 174 
some extent in the contacts between Hun and local sedentrary groups. However, before I turn to 
study this, I will briefly introduce the nomadic state of the second and third types which the Huns 
might have reached. This is especially the case during the 440s when the coalition formed by Hun 
and local Germanic groups was at its strongest in the areas from the Carpathians to the lower 
Danube and the Crimea. 
In the nomadic state of the second type (II), nomads, agriculturalists and townsmen are integrated 
into a single socio-political and, even partly, economic system; e.g. this kind of formation existed 
during the second Scythian state and among Hsiung-nu nomads bordering on the Chinese Empire in 
the second century BC, and also in some sense among the Mongols after the death of Jenghis Khan 
under the rule of Ögödey and Mögke.962 A crucial feature is that the integration of nomads and 
sedentarists affected certain strata and classes in both sedentary and, more particularly, nomadic 
societies. In addition, the fact that nomads started to utilize the same ecological zones as 
sedentarists supported this integration. Equally, because the conquered sedentarists had more 
complex social relations than their nomadic conquerors, the latter were susceptible to adopt the 
system. The basis of an emerging nomadic state lay in the structures of sedentary societies that 
nomads became part of. 
Finally, in the third type (III) of nomadic state, nomads and sedentarists have a single 
socioeconomic and political system, though the division of labour between pastoralists and 
agriculturalists is still differentiated. However, social stratification and the formation of classes 
were based on economic specialization and ethnic differences. In other words, both nomads and 
sedentarists fused into a unit, and differences between inhabitants in the state are not fundamentally 
based on or defined by a nomadic or sedentary background. The third Scythian state and Mongols 
in the Maveraunnehir region in the 14th century had elements which were characteristics of this kind 
of formation.963 
With reference to the typology of nomadic states, the essential features for their rise were contacts 
with sedentary societies and even states. Accordingly, the alleged rise of nomadic state among the 
Hun groups demands that these kinds of connections would have taken place already when they 
arrived on the borders of the Roman Empire from the 380s onwards. However, it is known that the 
former dwellers of these areas had largely moved west before and during the arrival of Hun 
groups.964  
                                                 
962 Khazanov 1984, 254-255, 241-242. 
963 Khazanov 1984, 254, 249-250. 
964 Heather 2009, 3, 10, 29. 
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Even if the Germanic groups had not moved westwards because of the Huns, contemporary authors’ 
descriptions and following historical developments (e.g. Visigoths establishing a strong rule in 
Gallia) indicates that the areas which became dwelling sites for the Huns near the Roman borders in 
the lower Danube did not consist of strong sedentary states or societies with stratified classes. 
Accordingly, a sedentary kind of society did not exist that could have generated the rise of the 
nomadic state of the Huns, or to be more precise, a strong and united upper class stratum that many 
fragmented groups of Huns could have become part of could not have existed. 
It is also true that the areas from the Carpathians to the lower Danube and the Crimea did not 
become completely deserted. However, the size of the Alan, Sarmatian and Germanic groups that 
continued to inhabit the areas, as well as the new Hun dwellers, was small.965 Moreover, because 
the Hun groups arrived in many waves, the fragmentation of groups and lack of strong unity 
between them inhibited rather than spur on the emergence of a nomadic state during the first 
decades of the fifth century. To summarize, no sedentary state existed to be conquered, nor was 
there a strong or great army of conquerors but only small nomadic groups who arrived over a period 
of many decades. Thus, the catalyst for crucial or potential changes that would have led to the rise 
of the nomadic state either did not exist or was very small. 
If neither the background of the Hun or Alan and Germanic groups alone can be taken as a 
substantial basis for the rise of the nomadic state, another issue is, whether the contacts between the 
Hun and local Alan and Germanic groups gave birth to a new society which was followed by the 
rise of a nomadic state. On the whole, limited political integration in the political sphere is a crucial 
prerequisite for the development of a nomadic state.966  
Another important question is whether the supposed political integration was based on an alliance 
or on the submission of the local groups to the Huns. This leads us to consider three different 
options. First, did the Huns wield unquestionable power over local groups? Another option is that 
the Huns subdued the local groups but their leaders formed a new leading stratum together with 
Hun military leaders. The third possibility is that the relationship between groups of Huns and local 
barbarians was based on alliances, and accordingly the Huns would not have subjugated other 
groups under their rule and no leading stratum emerged. In other words, in this case groups of Huns 
and locals would have maintained their own leaders and the groups would have acted together only 
according to temporary need, e.g. when there was an interest in participating in the activities of the 
confederation, especially for military operations like raids. 
                                                 
965 Heather 2009, passim. 5-6, 10, 13, 22-23, 25-26.  
966 Khazanov 1984, passim. 151, 228-231. 
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I claim that the small size and fragmentation of the groups of Huns makes it doubtful that the Huns 
could ever have subdued local barbarian groups under their control. The lack or small-scale 
submission of groups under the rule of the groups of Huns is also emphasized by Priscus’ story 
about Akatziri whom Theodosius II tried to persuade into co-operating with the Eastern Romans 
instead of continuing their alliance with Attila.967  
In short, the relationship between Attila and Akataziri was such that Romans could expect Akatziri 
to change side without having too much trouble from Attila. In addition, Priscus’ descriptions of 
constant disputes between the Eastern Roman Empire and Rua, Bleda and Attila in the 430s and 
440s concerning some Huns who had decided to ally with the Eastern Roman Empire, emphasizes 
the fact that the groups knew who they wanted to link themselves to and that they had not agreed 
that Rua, or Bleda and Attila should have a permanent right to decide about their doings.968  
All these refer to temporary joint activities between groups, and hence it is unlikely that only 
leaders from the groups of Huns formed a leading stratum to wield power and control others. In 
other words, I claim that some of the groups of Huns and their leaders had leading position in the 
confederation but they were joined with leaders from local barbarian groups who also belonged to 
the confederation.969 Laszlo takes this view by pointing out that when the Huns started to dwell in 
areas close to the Roman Empire in many cases the old leaders seem to have carried on ruling over 
their peoples as before.970 What also speaks in favour of this view is the fact that nomads commonly 
preferred alliances and predatory activities especially in their dealings with sedentarists rather than 
establishing strong and direct control over others.971  
Furthermore, it is likely that a shared interest in joint activities, rather than blood lines, was the 
basis for how nomads generally formed larger groupings, especially tribes, and hence it is possible 
that the relationship between groups of Huns and local barbarians was not based on the former’s 
submission to the latter but on a shared interest in acting together.972 Moreover, there are the 
considerations that it was in the interest of Germanic groups to form a larger confederation with 
groups of Huns because they were interested in gaining a share of the booty which raids on the 
Roman Empire would no doubt have involved.973 The fact that the Huns needed a large number of 
trustworthy warriors, especially during the 430s and 440s for their large-scale raiding operations in 
                                                 
967 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 258-259. See also Chapter 8. 
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areas of the Roman Empire speaks on behalf of the claim for alliance. Also Priscus’ story about the 
relationship between groups of Huns and Goths implies an alliance or confederation between 
groups of Huns and local barbarians: 
 
[Huns] have no concern for agriculture, but, like wolves, attack and steal the Goths’ food supplies, with the result 
that the latter remain in the position of servants and themselves suffer food shortage. Yet the Gothic people have 
never had a treaty [ ] with the Huns and from the time of their forefathers [c. in the early fifth century] 
have sworn to escape from the alliance [ ] with them.974 
 
Though Priscus’ story might be a familiar topos concerning nomads, nevertheless his remarks might 
have some truth in them because the activities of groups of Huns strongly imply that they 
continuously acted as nomads (e.g. favouring raids in order to gain extra for living). This supports 
the claim that they had not adopted farming or had become sedentarists.975 In addition, Priscus’ 
account implies that groups of Huns and local barbarians had not formed a combined society, nor 
was there no strong integration between them on the political level.976 Therefore, it seems clear that 
the Huns had not subjugated local barbarian groups but, as was common with nomads, they 
favoured an alliance or the formation of a confederation for temporary purposes as Priscus’ words 
suggest. 
The word , “alliance” refers to “union for battle” and “a relationship in which two 
countries, political parties or organizations work together for some purpose” or “a group of 
countries or political parties that are formally united and working together because they have 
similar aims”.977 By contrast, Blockley’s translation of  as “a treaty” has the meaning of 
“agreement between countries to do a particular thing or to help each other”.978 That is to say, the 
difference between the terms is that a treaty refers to an action that both parties have agreed to take 
care of on a firm basis, while an alliance implies actions that the parties might both undertake 
together but the basis of the joint activities is uncertain.  
Accordingly, I see that the difference between the words “alliance” and “treaty” concerning the 
Huns and local Goths implies that between the groups and their ways of life assimilation would not 
have taken place, at least not to any large extent. Likewise, political integration between the Huns 
                                                 
974 Priscus, fr. 49 in Blockley 1983, 356-357. 
975 The limited sedentarization which is a prerequisite for the rise of a nomadic state does not seem to have taken place 
among the Huns. 
976 Priscus’ story is most likely to be dated to the 440s or between the 430s and the early 450s. Firstly, during those years the 
Huns dwelled among Gothic groups in areas from the Carpathians to the lower Danube and the Crimea. Secondly, from the 
430s to the 440s many of the Alan and Germanic groups belonged to a coalition led by the Huns. 
977 Liddell, Scott (1992), 1045. 
978 Liddell, Scott (1992), 234. 
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and local groups was limited, taking place only within the parameters of the temporary need for an 
alliance. It is likely that Huns did not command local groups as they pleased but local leaders 
maintained their position at the head of their groups.979 Groups of Huns and local barbarians would 
have had their own leaders and they co-operated according to the need, e.g. when the Huns were 
eager to ally themselves with other groups for larger-scale raiding operations.980 
Even though there would seem to have been at least some sort of temporary alliance between 
groups of Huns and locals, Priscus’ words clearly shows that Huns dominated the action and would 
have been the leading party. Although Priscus states that the Goths disliked notion of an alliance 
with the Huns, I myself doubt this claim. I would propose instead that Priscus wished to suggest 
that activities with the nomads can never be beneficial.981 After all, some of those who had the most 
prominent positions among the Huns during the 440s seem to have had a Germanic background.982 
In addition, the joint activities of Huns and other barbarian groups clearly seem to have profited all 
parties, e.g. Attila demanded that the Eastern Roman Empire paid to ensure peace, and this involved 
both Huns and other groups.983 
If Priscus was right, that the idea of an alliance with the Huns was unpleasant for the Goths, it leads 
us to think of the possibility that there was vassal-tribute exploitation between nomads and local 
groups. This would also signify the rise of the so-called nomadic state.984 However, I highly doubt 
that this was the case, especially because at least limited sedentarization would have had to have 
taken place among the nomads for a vassal-tribute relationship to exist,and this does not seem to 
have occured among the Huns. 
However, there are some claims that sedentarization would have taken place among the Huns 
because during his visit to Attila Priscus mentions seeing villages and huts, as well as two palaces 
that were built for Attila and his close friend Onegesius.985 In addition, Priscus reports his 
astonishment at a bath house that Onegesius had ordered built for a Roman who was a prisoner of 
the Huns.986 With reference to the buildings and villages, I would argue that they more likely 
belonged to local Germanic groups, and hence they do not signify that the Huns had adopted a 
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sedentary way of life.987 I suggest that Attila’s and Onegesius’ palaces were built to demonstrate 
their wealth and prestige rather than being their permanent homes. This is supported by Priscus’ 
many accounts of Attila living in a tent.988 Priscus’ general remarks about Huns living in tents also 
emphasize that they still lived according to a nomadic way of life.989  
As it seems highly unlikely that a state would have ever existed among the Huns, I shall next turn to 
the notion of a supercomplex chiefdom among the Huns. Did long lasting conquest, the formation 
of a confederation and continuous raids and contacts with the wealthy Roman Empire lead not to 
the rise of a state but to the rise of a supercomplex chiefdom, and if so, would this have supreme 
military leadership becoming more permanent in nature? 
 
 
9.2. A Supercomplex Chiefdom Evolving among the Huns – Evidence in Support of the View 
 
The fact that when nomads form larger and more long-lasting confederations and still no significant 
changes generally take place in their life is often taken as a dilemma. The responses have been 
either to argue that state exists and that the tribal sub-structure is just hollow shell, or that a tribal 
structure exists but it never forms a true state.990 Accordingly, in order to solve the problem of the 
inapplicability of the terminology of settled societies to the history of pastoral nomads the term 
“supercomplex chiefdom” was taken into use.991  
The term “supercomplex chiefdom” refers to a situation when many groups of nomads have united 
into a larger unity or confederation but some features common to a state are lacking, especially a 
large number of special officials in the state machinery.992 A supercomplex chiefdom includes the 
following main features. First, when nomad groups form a unity or confederation, the unity of 
groups within the confederation is based on tribal relations. Second, in a supercomplex chiefdom 
the nomadic elite perform functions which link military and civil administration at the higher level, 
while ordinary nomads form the main body of the army. Third, the power of the supreme leader at 
the head of a confederation is based on his ability to organize military campaigns and to redistribute 
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990 Barfield 1989, 5. 
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wealth acquired from trade, tribute and raids on neighbouring countries.993 All these listed elements 
seem to have been in place among the Huns during the first half of the fifth century, especially 
during the 440s when Attila was the supreme leader of the confederation. I shall consider each of 
the features to decide whether a supercomplex chiefdom did actually take place among the united 
groups of Huns. As the listed features include some subfeatures,994 I also deal with each of them 
separately. In addition, I investigate characteristics common to the phenomenon called “imperial 
confederation” which has many similar features to a “supercomplex chiefdom”.995  
“Imperial confederation” is the highest form of unity that Eurasian pastoralists might form and it 
consists of three levels. The uppermost level includes the imperial leadership or supreme leader 
who the confederation. The next level is made up of appointees of the supreme leader, usually 
appointed as governors to supervise the indigenous tribal leadership in each region. The appointees 
serve as key links between the central administration and indigenous tribal leaders. The third level 
of the imperial confederation consists of local tribal leaders who are members of the indigenous 
elites of each tribe and, although structurally inferior to imperial appointees, they retain 
considerable autonomy because of their close ties to their own people, who would even follow them 
in revolt if the imperial commanders overstepped their authority. Definition also shows that 
Eurasian pastoralists does not need to give up their nomadic way of life in order to have strong ties 
between groups, and strong unity between groups under a cclear leader figure can be formed in 
within the framework of a nomadic way of life.996 This leads to a consideration of whether these 
kinds of structures rose among the Huns. 
A supercomplex chiefdom consists of a number of united groups who together form a confederation 
amounting together to tens of thousands of people.997 It has been estimated that a confederation 
would have included much more than 15,000 Huns, and the many local barbarian groups would 
have consisted of approximately fifty thousand people.998 Groups combined together on the basis of 
tribal relations, and  a political hierarchy existed between groups. In addition, this forms presence of 
centre and groups (communities, tribes etc.) dependent on it.999 It is likely that tribal relations and 
political hierarchies regulated how the groups of Huns and local barbarians combined together in 
the confederation, as the following remarks by Priscus would indicate.  
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Priscus’ writes that Attila sent his eldest son to rule over the Akatziri, who were seemingly nomadic 
groups who had become Attila’s subjects only a few years earlier and this would signify a political 
hierarchy between groups.1000 Furthermore, I claim that this to point out that there is centre where 
other groups are dependent on and connected to. In other words, if Attila and the groups close to 
him decided to do something then others were seemingly expected to follow. Priscus’ remarks 
concerning the relationship between Attila and the Akatziri also imply that a political hierarchy 
would have existed among the tribal groups who were part of the confederation. Priscus writes:1001 
 
The Akatziri, a Scythian people [ ] that had submitted to Attila for the following reason. This 
people had many rulers [ ] according to their tribes [ ] and clans [ ], and the Emperor 
Theodosius sent gifts to them to the end that they might unanimously renounce their alliance [ ] 
with Attila and seek peace with the Romans. The envoy who conveyed the gifts did not deliver them to each of the 
kings by rank [ ], with the result that Kouridachos, the senior in office [ ], 
received his gifts second and being thus overlooked and deprived of his proper honours, called in Attila against his 
fellow kings [ ]. Attila without delay sent a large force, destroyed some and forced the 
rest to submit. He then summoned Kouridachos to share in the prizes of victory. But he, suspecting a plot, 
declared that it was hard for a man to come into the sight of a god: “for it is not possible to look directly at the 
sun’s disc, how could one look at the greatest of the gods without harm?”. In this way Kouridachos remained 
amongst his own folk and saved his realm, while all the rest of the Akatzirian people submitted to Attila. 
 
In this account Priscus’ remarks about “rank”, “honour”, and “seniority in office” between leaders 
of groups, strongly suggests that a tribal structure existed not only in the upper level but also on the 
local level of the pastoral groups who can be considered Huns.1002 I suspect that even among the 
Akatziri some groups or lineages were more appreciated than others, and hence they formed a 
hierarchy where some leaders were considered to be above others.1003 I would also suggest that 
Kouridachos’ refusal to share his victories with Attila could signify that he might have ended up 
under Attila’s rule if he had accepted Attila as a partner. If so, then we might expect that a political 
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hierarchy prevailed among the groups in the confederation, and that Attila came from a lineage that 
held the strongest position. Then this would imply that a supercomplex chiefdom might have 
evolved among the Huns during the 440s. However, there is still room for a counterargument – we 
cannot rule out the possibility that Kouridachos’ reference to Attila as his superior (as Kouridachos 
claimed the comparison of Attila to the sun implied) derived from a common lineage hierarchy and 
had nothing to do with the possible rise of a supercomplex chiefdom. 
If the tribes seem to have formed a hierarchical structure common to Eurasian pastoralists, in order 
to speak about a supercomplex chiefdom there should be a supreme leader and an elite to ensure 
unity.1004 A supreme military leader would have had an elite to help him in the highest levels of 
management, and it was formed not only by persons who were connected to the supreme military 
leader through clan relations but also though private contacts. In addition, a nomadic elite 
performed functions at the highest levels of military and civil administration, while ordinary 
nomads formed the main body of the army.1005 Generally speaking, Priscus’ accounts of Attila 
suggest that these kinds of arrangements could have taken place among the Huns during the 
440s.1006 
When Priscus visited the Huns in 449 as a member of a delegation sent by Theodosius II to sort out 
disputes with Attila, he participated in an evening event in which Attila’s uncle Oebarsius was also 
present.1007 Briefly, this means that Attila did not only surround himself with his own trusted 
followers ( ),1008 his relatives also supported his position. Furthermore, Priscus’ remark 
that in 449 Bleda’s widow ruled a village1009 while Attila was in power, implies that Attila did not 
prevent members of his extended family from having good positions and gave them important 
duties or appreciated positions. In an “imperial confederation” of Eurasian pastoralists that is 
similar to the concept of supercomplex chiefdom,1010 the supreme leader has “imperial appointees” 
who are often members of the imperial lineage. Bleda’s widow’s position implies that this might 
have been the case among the Huns. However, Priscus’ accounts of the “logades” ( ) do 
not refer in any way to the logades being relatives of Attila.1011 By contrast, they seem to have been 
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friends or close companions of Attila as Priscus term  (“friends”) for the logades 
implies.1012 
The existence of the logades is generally claimed to signify a crucial change among the Huns,1013 
and they might refer to rise of similar structure as it is claimed to be common to both an imperial 
confederacy and a supercomplex chiefdom.1014 There are three levels at which activities and power 
are arranged. The upper most level consists of an imperial leader who is the supreme leader of all 
the united groups in the confederation. The second level is formed by imperial governors who do 
not necessarily need to be relatives of the supreme leader, but they are chosen by the supreme leader 
to act as his closest companions and to maintain contacts with allied tribes and tribal leaders.1015 
Finally, the third level consists of local tribes and their leaders. While at the uppermost level the 
supreme leader has a strong influence over those, who make up the second level, this is not 
generally found among nomads. Moreover, at the third and so-called local level, the tribal structure 
remained intact under the ruler of chieftains, whose power was derived from their own people’s 
support, not from imperial appointment.1016 
I am not certain, if logades imply the existence of an imperial confederation or a supercomplex 
chiefdom among the Huns in the 440s because some of crucial elements to leaders, logades are not 
known to have existed among the Huns, though some elements might have. In any case, I disagree 
with the general claim that the logades would signify Attila’s position as a king who had increased 
his power above the normal limits of a pastoral ruler and established his own court and courtiers 
who were fundamentally loyal to him and not to their clans.1017 In addition, it is claimed that this 
development signified the rise of feudalism among the Huns and that the position of a rich upper 
class strengthened to such an extent that belonging to it guaranteed a powerful leading position in 
Hun society.1018 I doubt such claims for two reasons.  
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First, Priscus tells us that one of the logades, Onegesius, still maintained good contacts with 
members of his clan, hence he was seemingly not only loyal to Attila but also to the groups from 
which he came.1019 In addition, Priscus informs us that one of the logades, Berichus ruled over 
many villages.1020 This refers to the fact that the logades had not become imperial appointees who 
would only serve a supreme leader.1021 Second, Priscus’ short accounts of the tasks of the logades 
point out that the reason why they are mentioned as forming a close relation with Attila was not 
because of their wealth, on account of the (military) assistance they provided Attila. Furthermore, 
because the duties and names of the logades refer to the position of military leadership, I would 
argue that the logades could have been military leaders of their own groups, not imperial appointees 
of Attila,1022 and this would have made them companions of Attila, the supreme military leader. I 
thus agree with the view that the logades were a military elite consisting of military leaders of Huns 
and local barbarians in confederation.1023 
I see that when the tasks of the supreme military leader increased as a result of constant fights and 
negotiations with the Romans then they would have needed support on the local level. This, 
moreover, would have led need to military leaders cooperating with Attila on a more permanent 
basis, including sharing the duties of ongoing tasks, such as participating in negotiations on peace 
treaties with the Romans and maintaining contacts with groups in order to plan new raids and 
attacks. I suggest, therefore, that the logades could also have included military leaders who were not 
chosen by the Huns but by local barbarians, e.g. Goths, from among their own groups to lead them 
in times of war.1024 I also agree with the views that argue that the position of the logades could have 
been similar to “ ”/ “people and captains”, as Sozomen writes in the case of 
the Hun military leader Uldin in 409.1025 That is to say, that the logades would have had a 
prominent position because they were military leaders and not just at the head of their own clans or 
                                                 
1019 Priscus, fr.11.2 in Blockley 1983, 266-267. Priscus mentions how Onegesius’ wife invited the most important men of 
Onegesius‘ clan to meet Priscus. To me this as a sign that Onegesius still had good relation with the members of his clan 
and was loyal to it. 
1020 Priscus, fr.14 in Blockley 1983, 292-293. 
1021 Thompson (1999) 2000, 181-182. I disagree with Thompson that as with Berichus other logades would have ruled over 
a village. No contemporary authors support this. In my opinion the story about Berichus being a leader of many villages in 
Scythia might well imply that he came from a local barbarian group. In fact, Berichus’ position does not imply a change in 
the Huns’ nomadic way of life towards sedentarism, but suggests that during the days of Attila the leaders from local 
barbarian groups were also part of the leadership of the confederation. Furthermore, I consider that Berichus and Onegesius 
acted as mediators between the uppermost leader, Attila, and the local level, consisting of their own clans or groups. 
1022 Thompson (1999) 2000, 183; Heather in Thompson (1999) 2000, 231; Stickler 2007, 79-80. 
1023 Stickler 2007, 80. 
1024 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 250-251. In my opinion because Priscus writes about the logades as “the leading men 
of the Scythians” and not “the leading men of the Huns” this indicates that not only groups of Huns, but also local 
barbarians participated in leading the confederation.  
1025 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 193, 65-67; Thompson (1999) 2000, 182; Heather (1999) 2000, 231. See chapter 5. 
 185
groups, but also on a larger scale in the confederation.1026 This is suportedby Priscus’ remark on 
Edeco as a famous warrior (“Edeco, a Scythian who had performed outstanding deeds in war”) and 
Onegesius as a military leader of large troops like other logades (“they were in command of very 
many men”).1027 Because Priscus also compares other logades to Edeco it seems obvious that the 
logades in general would have been military leaders.1028  
Priscus’ tells us that Edeco “was one of Attila’s intimates [ ] and that he, together with 
others selected from amongst the leading men [ ] was entrusted with guarding Attila (he 
explained that on fixed days each of them in turn guarded Attila under arms)”; this suggests that the 
uppermost leadership among the Huns was in the hands of military leaders in which Attila had the 
supreme position.1029 The fact that Priscus does not mention any differences in the tasks of the 
logades would also support this interpretation. The only difference that Priscus mentions among the 
logades is that Onegesius’ “power amongst the Scythians was second only to that of Attila”,1030 
though Priscus also tells us that Scottas claimed that he too had “influence with Attila“ and would 
speak and act “before Attila on an equality with his brother [Onegesius]”.1031 It is likely, therefore, 
that all the logades basically had the same position in relation to Attila, and most likely also among 
their own groups (they were all military leaders of their own groups), while Onegesius and Attila 
had the closest connection.1032  
Further support for the argument that the relationship between the logades and Attila refers to the 
structure of military organization is Priscus’ notion that Scottas and Onegesius were strongly 
committed to supporting Attila and refused to betray him.1033 This could refer to the promise of 
loyalty between warriors and a supreme military leader that was common among Eurasian pastoral 
nomads.1034 The names of the logades also refer to their military skills. 
In general meaning of names suggests what kinds of images and issues or even positions were 
appreciated, though in the end they do not reveal unequivocally the background or position of a 
                                                 
1026 Thompson (1999) 2000, 182, cf. Pohl 2003, passim. 592, 579-580. Pohl’s study on Avars points out similar situation.  
1027 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 250-251, 268-269. 
1028 Priscus, fr. 11.1 in Blockley 1983, 242-243; Thompson (1999) 2000, 181-182; Stickler 2007, 79-80. Priscus passus “Edeco, 
Orestes, Scottas and others of the leading men amongst the Huns”. 
1029 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 244-245; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, 181; Stickler 2007, 80. 
1030 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 264-265. 
1031 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 254-255. 
1032 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 266-267. Priscus mentions that “in order to please the wife of a close friend [Onegesius], he 
[Attila] ate while sitting on his horse“. 
1033 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 250-251, 274-275. Onegesius’ and Scottas’s strong loyalty to Attila could have derived 
from the fact that Onegesius and Scottas were brothers and Onegesius was said to be second in command after Attila and 
was his very good friend. That is to say, we cannot be sure of the level of loyalty of the other logades to Attila – if the 
logades formed their own group, as the term logades suggests, then I suspect that they had all promised loyalty to Attila. 
1034 Barfield 1989, 26. 
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person.1035 In the case of the Huns, the etymologies of the names of the logades reveal that the 
persons close to Attila seem to have had names of both German and Hun origin. These etymologies 
indicate to what extent Attila’s closest companions could have been Hun or German by origin, or 
the persons acting next to Attila favored names from others languages. It is generally thought 
assessed that Germans would have widely adopted Hunnic names, while it is thought less likely that 
Huns adopted German names.1036 Overall, the origin of the names of the logades is largely 
speculative, because the names only occur in Late Roman authors’ accounts in their Latin or Greek, 
or sometimes even German, versions. Nonetheless, I still consider that the etymologies of the names 
can clarify, at least to some extent, the situation between Attila and the logades – that is to say who 
the logades might have been and what kind of collaboration they seem to have formed. Therefore, 
in what follows I shall discuss the background of the names that Priscus mentions in his accounts of 
the Huns written in Greek. 
The name Onegesius ( ) is claimed to be Turkish in origin and its correct form would be 
Oniisios, deriving from the word on-iyiz: “the tenth who is in the company”. It has also been 
proposed that the name refers to the tribal organization among the Huns: every one of the logades 
would have led one of the ten tribes.1037 However, I consider that the reference to “the ten” could 
also derive from Onegesius’ position as a military leader because among Eurasian pastoralists, e.g. 
among the Mongols under Chinggis Khan, troops in the army were divided up in multiples of 
ten.1038 However, it has also been argued that Onegesius’ name did not mean “the tenth” because 
the name is too modest for a notable Hun leader and the name is a Greek version of a German 
name.1039 Instead, it is possible that Onegesius was a Gothic name “Hunigis”, which had been 
hellinized because O- is roughly equivalent to Hu-, and in old German i~ is closest to the Greek 
.1040 For these reasons, Onegesius’ name is claimed to be formed of two parts: Huni + gis. The 
first part would refer both to the word “Hun” but also to “strength”, “huni”, in old German. 
Similarly, gis- would derive from the old German word ger=gaiza-, which is similar to the old 
English gar, old Icelandic geirr “throwing spear”, geisl “skiing rod”, geisli “stick, stave, ray, flash”, 
modern German Geisel, “whip” and to the word gisil “shaft of an arrow” among Langobards.1041 
Moreover, it is noticed that –gis is a very common ending in German names, e.g. Gunthigis, 
Witigis, Radigis, hence Onegesius could well have been German name Hunigis. Taken together, the 
                                                 
1035 Heather 2005, 329 
1036 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 406, 411; Harmatta 1951, 144-148. 
1037 Altheim 1951, 27; 1959, I, 25. 
1038 De Plano Carpini, Hist. Mong., VI: 2-3; Jansson, Ruotsala 2003, 69-70; Kradin 2005, 155, 162; Barfield 1993, 160.  
1039 Harmatta 1951, 146-147; cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 388, 441; also Heather 2005, 329. 
1040 Harmatta 1951, 147. 
1041 Harmatta 1951, 147; Walde-Hoffman 1938, 576. 
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possible origin and meaning of the name Onegesius imply military associations or some kind of 
leadership position at the head of larger groups. If so, similar connotations are also possible for 
Onegesius’ brother, Scottas. 
It has been speculated that Scottas’ ( ) name is of Turkish origin. Furthemore, it is 
suspected that Priscus would have given an old Greek version of the name to remind readers of the 
word “Scythian”.1042 This is plausible because Priscus used the term “Scythian” for Huns, like in 
general on the groups who formed the confederation led by Rua, Octar, Bleda and Attila during the 
430s and 440s. However, it is also suggested that Skottas could be of Germanic origin,1043 and the 
name could be derived from thee word skutta, which is similar to old Icelandic skjötä and skyti, 
“shooter”, Old English skoetan or scytta, old Saxon sciota and Old German skutjan, “shooter” or in 
a more elegant form skuzzo or skiossan, “schiessen”, “to shoot, rush, burst”.1044 While both of the 
etymologies might be correct, nevertheless the conclusion is that Scottas’ name would have implied 
either shooting or a barbarian background. 
The third logades, whose name is claimed to be a Greek version of the original German name, 
“Edika”, is Edeco ( ).1045 While Priscus mentions Edeco to be of Scythian ( ) 
origin,1046 this does not help us clarify whether this points to his Hun or German origin. However, it 
is suggested that Edeco was of Germanic origin, and what might support this is the 6th century 
author Jordanes’ claim that Edeco was a Scirian.1047 In addition, it is possibile that Edeco would 
have come from the name Edika, which that originally refers to old German aibs, “oath, vow, 
pledge, promise”.1048 From this it is deduced that the original form of Edeco would have been 
aibiweihs, “the one whose promise of loyalty is solemn” as would have been the case with the 
names, Edovichus among the Franks and Erduich- ( airba-weichs, uf-aibeis “to swear”) among the 
Easternmost Goths.1049 The name is said to suggest a relationship between Attila and Edeco: Edeco 
would have been one of the trusted companions of Attila, and this would signify that the leaders of 
Germanic groups would also have had a strong position at the head of the confederation 
leadership.1050 To summarize, the least we can say about the name and person of Edeco is that he 
                                                 
1042 Priscus, fr.2 in Blockley 1983, 224-227; see Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 420. 
1043 Heather 2005, 329. 
1044 Harmatta 1951, 148. 
1045 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 388, 441; Heather 2005, 329. 
1046 Priscus, fr.11.1 in Blockley 1983, 242-243. 
1047 Jordanes, Getica, LIV, 277; cf. Harmatta 1951, 144-145. 
1048 Schönfeld 1911, 73. 
1049 Harmatta 1951, 145. 
1050 Harmatta 1951, 144-145. 
 188 
acted in close contact with Attila, and hence I would suggest that his name could refer to a promise 
of loyalty and he was one of the logades because of his outstanding success in warfare.1051 
Lastly, the name Berichos ( ) is considered to be either Turkish or Germanic in origin, and 
could have had the form Berich, “strong” which was also a name of a mythical Goth leader.1052 
However, it is thought that the Goths would not have given their leader a Hun name, and hence the 
German version would have been Berg, Berigh or Berich.1053 Furthermore, it is suggested that 
because Priscus wrote the name Valamir on a form , Berichos might originally have 
had the German name Wereka or Werika, which was favoured among Goths in the forms Wera or 
Vera.1054 Wera and Werika are reminiscent of wers, “real, truthful” used by Goths and in old 
Icelandic värr, “pleasing” and in plural värar, ”promise, vow, pledge”, also in old German the more 
elegant form wär, “real, truthful, genuine” and in old English vär, “loyalty, constancy, allegiance”. 
Therefore, it is believed that Berichos’ name is “the one who is loyal and keeps his vow”. On the 
other hand, it is also considered that Berichos’ name might derive from the word warjan used by 
Goths or in old Icelandic varja and in the more elegant form in old German werren, weren, wehren, 
“defend, fight back“ or weri, “defence” or wer(e), “defence, concession”, and hence Berichus could 
mean “protector, defender”.1055 It seem likely that Berichus’ name refers to his position as one of 
Attila’s loyal guards and trusted companions, one of the logades who would have sworn an oath of 
loyalty to Attila.1056 On the other hand, the possible meaning of “defender” or “promise, faithful, 
real”, could also imply Berichus’ position as a military leader because the characteristics related to 
his name could well reflect this.   
Taken together, because the etymologies of all the names of the logades could refer to military 
prowess or to leadership and loyalty, I would argue that military skills would have been appreciated 
among the groups of Huns and local barbarians who formed the confederation. Clearly, military 
skills and the position of military leadership were important in the life of those who acted at the 
head of the confederation, namely Attila and the logades. However, it is another question whether 
the activities of the logades shows them to have been responsible not only for military but also for 
some other activities in the supercomplex chiefdom or imperial confederacy e.g. organizing levies 
of troops and leading troops at the uppermost level, participating in negotiations and keeping 
contacts with local groups on behalf of Attila.1057 This is what I shall consider next. 
                                                 
1051 Thompson (1999) 2000, 179. 
1052 Jordanes, Getica, IV, 26; Harmatta 1951, 144-145; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 406, 441; cf. also Heather 2005, 329. 
1053 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 406. 
1054 Harmatta 1951, 146. 
1055 Harmatta 1951, 146. 
1056 Harmatta 1951, 146; cf. Barfield 1989, passim. 26. 
1057 Barfield 1993, 150; cf. Kradin 2008, 114-116; Kradin 2009, 42. See Chapter 9.3.  
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The most important tasks of those who shared the uppermost tasks in the large confederation of 
Eurasian pastoralists were related to military duties and negotiations.1058 With the Huns in the 440s, 
the main tasks of the logades seem to have been maintaining a good relationship the Roman Empire 
with the help of Attila. In essence this meant participating in negotiations, such as peace treaties or 
solving disputes.1059  
Priscus’ accounts reveal that the connections between the Romans and the logades were primarily 
based on solving disputes and negotiating with the Romans according to the instructions given the 
logades by Attila.1060 The supreme leaders among the Eurasian pastoralists have generally delegated 
negotiations by enlisting nearby sedentary societies as their supporters because they have not been 
able to do everything alone. Such negotiations usually involved the giving of gifts.1061 Accordingly, 
the negotiations were an easy way for a supreme leader to gain profits and revenues for their 
supporters and closest companions, which they in turn expected due to their support of the supreme 
leader. This also seems to have taken place among the Huns because Priscus claims that Attila sent 
repeated delegations to the court of Theodosius II to acquire rich gifts which also benefitted 
logades.1062 However, Priscus’ stories about Attila’s banquets to some of the most important 
members in the confederation also implies that Attila felt obliged to thank those who acted in close 
contact wit him and helped him to run lead the confederation.1063  
Another of Priscus’ remarks that refers to the logades taking care of duties that were common tasks 
for the closest companions of the supreme leader in a supercomplex chiefdom, is Attila’s interest in 
sending one of the logades, Onegesius, to meet and deal with some ongoing business with one of 
the groups who belonged to the confederation.1064 In short, this might refer to the fact that the 
logades acted as mediators between the supreme leader and local tribal leaders.1065 Moreover, 
Priscus’ story how he and Maximus were requested to meet some of the most important members of 
Onegesius’ clan implies that the logades felt the need to create and keep contact between those who 
                                                 
1058 Barfield 1993, 149-151; Kradin 2008, passim. 114; Kradin 2005, passim. 155-156. 
1059 Thompson (1999) 2000, 181; Stickler 2007, 80; Barfield 1989, 8. 
1060 Priscus, fr. 11.2, fr. 11.1, fr. 14 in from Blockley 1983, 250-251, 242-245, 272-273, 288-291, 254-255. Priscus passus 
“Edeco, Orestes and others of the leading men amongst the Huns came and asked what we [Priscus and Maximus] hoped to achieve in making 
the embassy [of Theodosius II to Attila]” and “Edeco […] came again as ambassador together with Orestes […] This Edeco came to the 
court [of Theodosius II]  and handed over the letters from Attila, in which he blamed the Romans in respect of the fugitives […] when the 
letters had been read out to the Emperor, Edeco departed with Vigilas” and “[Edeco] should be sent off to report to Attila upon the embassy 
and that Vigilas should be sent with him to receive Attila’s reply on the subject of the fugitives”, “Onegesius addressed Maximus, thanking both 
him and the Emperor [Theodosius II] for the gifts and asking what he wished to say in sending for him”, “[Onegesius] said that Attila was 
willing to send us [Priscus and Maximus] away. After a short time he deliberated with the leading men upon Attila’s views and had the letters 
drawn up to be delivered to the Emperor”. 
1061 Barfield 1989, 8; Barfield 1993, 149-151, passim. 157; Thompson (1999) 2000, 181. 
1062 Priscus, fr. 10, fr. 11.2, fr. 14 in Blockley 1983, 240-243, 246-249, 254-257, 272-273, 292-293. 
1063 Priscus, fr. 13.1, fr. 14 in Blockley 1983, 282-287, 288-293. 
1064 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 258-259, 266-267; Barfield 1993, 150. 
1065 Kradin 2009, 42; Barfield 1989, 8; Barfield 1993, 150. 
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acted not only at the uppermost levels of the confederation but also at the local level.1066 On the 
other hand, Onegesius’ good relationship with his clan members might also mean that a 
supercomplex chiefdom had not taken place among the Huns, and military leaders at the head of 
larger groups still owed their rank and prestige to those clans who supported them in their military 
leadership positions and those positions were not given them by the supreme military leader. 
Finally, a similar dilemma concerns two of Priscus’ accounts. First, Priscus mentions that the 
logades discussed the way in which to carry out one of Attila’s orders concerning letters to be sent 
to Theodosius II: “After a short time he [Onegesius] deliberated with the leading men upon Attila’s 
views”.1067 Here the logades’ deliberations might refer to their administrative duties. On the other 
hand, if the logades’ discussion refers to their slight disagreement with Attila’s plan or orders, then 
it might signify that although the logades were military leaders under Attila’s supreme military 
leadership, nevertheless Attila’s position was not so all powerful that his closest companion could 
not affect his decision making.1068 Indeed, Attila would have been dependent on others, especially 
on his supporters’ approval to take actions.1069 After all, leaders among Eurasian pastoral groups 
have in general listened to the opinions of others, especially elders, in their decision making in order 
to avoid overstepping their power.1070 Accordingly, the logades’ manner of discussing Attila’s 
decision might refer to this practice of communal decision making, and reveals how a leader was 
expected to act in a nomadic society. This excerpt from Priscus suggests that Attila had not freed 
himself from all tribal obligations and that tribal societies impose limitations on any one 
individual’s power.1071 
The second account by Priscus that might either support or conflict with the idea that the logades’ 
position and activities indicated the existence of a supercomplex chiefdom. The relevant passage 
from Priscus tells of Attila encouraging logades to give gifts to Roman ambassadors. On the one 
hand, one could argue that Attila had achieved such an influential position that he could demand 
what his closest companions needed to do on behalf of his interests. On the other hand, it is also 
likely that Attila wanted all the groups in the confederation to present gifts from their own groups to 
the Romans.1072 
                                                 
1066 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 266-267. 
1067 Priscus, fr. 14 in Blockley 1983, 288-289. 
1068 Heather in Thompson (1999) 2000, 230-231; cf. Stickler 2007, 80. Heather claims that Attila’s authority was absolute and 
autocratic. By contrast, Stickler argues that the logades could offer advice to Attila and acted as his advisers in times of peace 
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1069 Priscus, fr. 14 in Blockley 1983, 288-289; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, 179. 
1070 Kradin 2008, 149. 
1071 Thompson (1999) 2000, 179. 
1072 Priscus, fr. 14 in Blockley 1983, 292-293. Quoting Priscus “Attila had ordered each of his leading men [ ] to show 
friendship to Maximus [the Ambassador sent by Theodosius II] with gifts, and each of them, including Berichus, had sent him a horse“. 
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Taken together, many of the tasks that Priscus mentions that the logades took care of support the 
claim that supercomplex chiefdom could have evolved among the Huns in the 440s. That is to say 
that the logades were an elite who performed the functions of the highest ranks of military and civil 
administration while ordinary nomads made up the body of the army. In addition, they could have 
been related to the ruler by private contacts and from this position they would have formed an 
administrative staff machinery in a supercomplex chiefdom.1073 However, what makes the 
considerstions complicated is that there are also features that do not support the claim, as I shall 
next point out.  
 
  
9.3. Elements of a Supercomplex Chiefdom that Are Missing 
 
It is claimed that one of the crucial elements for a supercomplex chiefdom are special officials and 
their assistants who help the supreme leader carry out special tasks.1074 There should in particular be 
officials who are juridical specialists and take care of legal questions.1075 Because all the logades 
seem to have had similar position, I would argue that they did not act as officials responsible for 
certain tasks and there are no indications that any of them would have been responsible for laws.1076  
Priscus’ only provides a brief reference to Attila’s way of solving diputes: “I [Priscus] saw a group 
of persons advancing and heard murmuring and shouts around the place, since Attila was coming 
out […] when he had come out, he stood with Onegesius in front of the building, and many persons 
who had disputes with one another stepped forward and received his judgement. Then he re-entered 
the house and received the barbarian envoys who had come to him”.1077 Priscus’ account of Attila 
listening and then making his judgement also suggests that Huns did not have a written code of 
laws, which is a feature of a supercomplex chiefdom.1078  
Social stratification is also a feature of supercomplex chiefdom requiring research to study long 
genealogical lists and any tendencies to separate off an endogamic elite from commoners.1079 
However, once again Priscus’ short reference to Attila’s and his relatives “noble” descent 
( ), to “Scythian royalty” ( ), “members of a royal house” 
                                                 
1073 Kradin 2008, 114. 
1074 Kradin 2008, 114; Kradin 2009, 42; cf. Barfield 1993, 149-150. 
1075 Kradin 2008, 115. 
1076 Thompson (1999) 2000, 183; Heather in Thompson (1999) 2000, 231. 
1077 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 276-277. 
1078 Kradin 2008, 115; Kradin 2008, 149; Kradin 2005, 159. Even though Eurasian nomad leaders gave sentences, this 
according to Kradin does not imply that the leaders had a power similar to that of an autocrat.  
1079 Kradin 2008, 148; Kradin 2008, 114. 
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( ), “well-born attendants upon the queen” ( ) 
and “nobles” ( ) hint that some kind of genealogical order and classification could have 
prevailed among the Huns.1080 However, interpreting Priscus’ notions on the situation among the 
Huns and then translating his words, as Blockley does to is likely to introduce exaggerations and 
misjudgements. The thruth is we lack strong and clear proof about a genealogical order and ranking 
among the Huns,1081 and we should avoid fabricating any. 
For the same reason we cannot claim that social stratification followed from restricted access to key 
resources among groups who formed the confederation in the 440s. This would have signified the 
existence of a supercomplex chiefdom at some level.1082 The same holds for income acquisition by 
the administrative elite, and this would have been based on the exploitation of subjects and on 
renumerations received from the centre.1083 With reference to these features, we do not have any 
Late Roman authors’ accounts that would suggest that these kinds of elements prevailed among the 
Huns.1084  
Likewise, the same can be said about the notion that an elite would have received presents from the 
common pastoralists,1085 or that a system involving the collection of taxes or levying tribute or 
requisitioning a share of the surplus product and using forced labour existed – we simply lack 
contemporary authors’ descriptions of these kinds of proceedings.1086 Generally speaking, none of 
the Hun leaders expected to receive wealth because of their position – acquiring riches always 
depended on one’s own activity.1087 Concerning the existence of slaves among the Huns, Priscus’ 
accounts point out that the Huns wanted to have slaves but primarily they wished to make money 
out of them, e.g. by selling them or by using them as warriors to acquire booty.1088 
To summarize, the number of absent features does not support the claim that a supercomplex 
chiefdom would have existed among the Huns during the days of Attila. This argument is 
                                                 
1080 Priscus, fr. 11.2, fr. 13, fr. 13.2, fr. 15.2 in Blockley 1983, 226-227, 278-279, 284-285, 286-287, 296-297; cf. Wirth 199, 
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1081 See Chapter 7. 
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1085 Kradin 2008, 114-115.  
1086 Priscus, fr.11.2, fr. 14 in Blockley 1983, 264-269, 288-289, 292-293; Kradin 2008, 114-115; Thompson (1999) 2000, 182. 
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1087 Priscus, fr. 11.2. in Blockley 1983, 268-269. Priscus mentions that the leaders of larger troops could choose the captives 
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done for them. 
1088 Priscus, fr. 2, fr.9.3, fr. 11.2, fr. 14 in Blockley 1983, 226-227, 268-269, 292-293. 
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strengthened when we consider the position of the supreme leader at the head of a supercomplex 
chiefdom or imperial confederation. There is indeed little evidence to suggest that Attila attained 
such a mighty position. 
The first and foremost feature of a supreme leader in this context is military leadership. The power 
of the supreme leader at the head of a confederation is fundamentally based on the leader’s ability 
to organize military campaigns, to redistribute the wealth acquired from trade, tribute and raids on 
neighbouring countries,1089 and to manage foreign and military affairs.1090 Contemporary accounts 
of Attila stress that he took pains to gain booty and riches to his supporters,1091 and that he seems to 
have arranged raids and attacks on the Roman Empire for the following reasons.  
First, he knew that he was expected to provide wealth because that was his main responsibility.1092 
Second, the raids would make his supporters pleased with his lead because the raids provided booty, 
slaves to sell, and the possibility to gaining payments to maintain peace.1093 Priscus reports that the 
peace treaties with the Huns always included an agreement on the ransom money that the Huns 
would get when selling captured Roman soldiers back to the Romans.1094 In addition, Priscus 
mentions that Attila demanded that the Eastern Roman Empire made payments to maintain the 
peace not only for him, but also for the other groups: “they [the Eastern Roman Empire] submitted 
to pay tribute not only to the Scythians but also to the other barbarian neighbours of the Roman 
Empire”.1095 That is to say, Attila clearly wanted and could redistribute wealth from tribute and 
raids on the neighbouring countries to groups who counted on his lead. This is also the case with 
trade because the peace treaties with the Romans also included agreements on markets.1096 Finally, 
we have Priscus’ account about Attila explaining to Theodosius II that if the Eastern Roman Empire 
did not pay the promised and lacking payments for peace, Attila could not hold back his troops from 
large-scale raiding in the Eastern Roman Danubian border areas (and some were already doing 
this). This shows that Attila was responsible for controlling the acts of his Hun troops.1097 
Moreover, if Attila could not arrange profitable military activities, he would lose his position at the 
head of the groups in the confederation because the groups could arrange raiding expeditions on 
their own.1098 Taken together, all the features mentioned above imply that Attila’s position derived 
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from the position of supreme military leadership. However, because tasks related to military 
leadership are common both to military leaders among Eurasian pastoralists in general and to the 
position of a supreme leader in a supercomplex chiefdom, we must still consider whether Attila’s 
position signified the existence of a supercomplex chiefdom or whether the activities merely show 
that Attila was the leader of large-scale raiding bands.  
An element that supports both of the evaluations is the notion that Attila clearly controlled foreign 
and military affairs, and these are common tasks for the supreme leader in a supercomplex 
chiefdom.1099 First, Attila maintained contacts with the Romans not only because he needed to 
negotiate the on-going disputes and peace treaties, but also because of his personal contacts and 
interests. In addition, according to Priscus Attila and his brother Bleda had received as a gift an 
interpreter from Aetius, the magister militum of the Western Roman Empire.1100 Moreover, Priscus 
tells us that Aetius had sent his son as be a Roman hostage among the Huns in order to guarantee 
friendly relations between the Huns and the Western Roman Empire.1101 Attila also seems to have 
been interested in increasing contacts with the Romans via marriage because, according to Priscus, 
Attila required the Eastern Roman ambassadors to arrange for the marriage of a wealthy Eastern 
Roman lady to of his Roman interpreters.1102 Finally, it is also claimed that Attila would have been 
interested in marrying Honoria, the sister of Emperor Valentinian.1103 
Even though these elements are the same as those we expect to find in a supercomplex chiefdom, 
we have a number of features common to a leadership position in a supercomplex chiefdom that are 
not mentioned by any Late Roman author as part of Attila’s leadership position. Accordingly, this 
makes it doubtful whether Attila had a position that is similar to leadership position in a 
supercomplex chiefdom. First, we do not have any remarks from Late Roman authors that Attila 
would have taken on the responsibility of arranging redistribution of foodstuffs and resources.1104 
Briefly, the only issue that could be interpreted as a sign of this is Priscus’ comment that the Huns 
from time to time raided local Germanic groups.1105 However, because this does not differ in any 
way from the general habit of nomads periodically raiding sedentarists, Priscus’ account does not 
imply that change would have occured in the Huns’ ways of gaining or redistributing food.1106 
                                                 
1099 Kradin 2009, 42; Kradin 2005, passim. 154-156, 158; cf. Barfield 1993, 149-151.  
1100 Priscus, fr. 11.2, fr. 14 in Blockley 1983, 253-254, 262-263, 290-291. 
1101 Priscus, fr. 11.2 in Blockley 1983, 256-257. 
1102 Priscus, fr. 14 in Blockley 1983, 290-291; Wirth 1999, 139. 
1103 Priscus, fr. 17, fr. 20.1, fr. 20.3 in Blockley 1983, 300-301, 304-305, 306-309. 
1104 Kradin 2008, 148. 
1105 Priscus, fr. 49 in Blockley 1983, 356-357. 
1106 Thompson 1999 (2000), 182. I disagree with Thompson’s claims that Priscus’ remark shows that one of the tasks of the 
logades was to collect tribute and foodstuff from the Goths. In addition, Thompson sees that “Goths had the status of 
slaves and labour for the sustenance of the Huns”.  However, Thompson also admits that “we have no details as to the 
manners in which they [the Huns] extorted the grain from their subjects or as to the amount taken”. 
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Another feature that I see as absent among the Huns, or groups who formed the confederation, is a 
common ideology or common cults and rituals that would have created unity among the 
confederation.1107 First of all, Priscus’ stories about Attila’s evening feasts, and the manner of 
raising a bowl as a greeting to every participant, together with the fixed seating, refers only to the 
general welcome and should not be interpreted as a ritual.1108 First, only a small number of people 
participated in the ritual, and second, Priscus mentions the common fashion of raising a cup as a 
feature of Scythian hospitality to guests.1109 Therefore, I consider that Priscus’ accounts of the 
evening feasts only underline the view that every culture has its own way of welcoming guests. 
Another greeting custom is shown by Attila being welcomed by a row of girls walking under a large 
piece of cloth when he entered a village.1110 The greeting could well have been a way of welcoming 
a famous and appreciated warrior. Another reason for the warm greeting might have been that 
Onegesius, Attila’s closest friend, lived in the village, and hence because of the friendship 
Onegesius’ wife, who also came to greet Attila, would have arranged the notable welcome. Even 
though Priscus’ remarks might imply the existence of common cults or rituals, nevertheless we 
cannot say for certain that they would imply rituals common to a supercomplex chiefdom. 
The same can be said on the basis of archaeological material. The only findings that possibly 
signify cult practices are large bronze cauldrons which were common among Eurasian 
pastoralists.1111 While cauldrons were in general claimed to be used for ritual purposes,1112 we can 
only guess the purpose of the rituals and who participated in them. On the other hand, some 
scholars argue that the cauldrons would have been cooking vessels.1113 For these reasons, I consider 
it better not to say anything definite about the cauldrons, especially in relation to the existence of a 
supercomplex chiefdom among the groups of Huns in the 440s.  
I conclude that if we consider the few features that could refer to common cults and rituals among 
the Huns in the 440s, they are simply too few to speak about a supercomplex chiefdom. The same 
can be said about the sacral character of power and the presence of a theocracy that are listed as 
characteristics of a supercomplex chiefdom.1114  
                                                 
1107 Kradin 2008, 148. 
1108 Priscus, fr. 13.1 in Blockley 1983, 282-287. 
1109 Priscus, fr. 14 in Blockley 1983, 290-291; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 182. 
1110 Priscus, fr.11.2 in Blockley 1983, 264-265, 260-263. Priscus informs us that in general female company was used as a 
sign of hospitality among the Huns because when Priscus and Maximus needed to stay overnight in a village that was led by 
Bleda’s wife, they were offered women. 
1111 Wirth 1999, 133-134; Stickler 2007, 11, Bona 1991, 140-147; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 306-337; Werner 1956, 57-61; 
Koch 2007, 287-292; Schmauder 2009, 103-106. 
1112 Wirth 1999, 133; Stickler 2007, 11; Koch 2007, 288-289; cf. Werner 1956, 60; Bona 1991, 140-142; Schmauder 2009, 
105-106. 
1113 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 326-327; Kelly 2008, 24; cf. Werner 1956, 60; Bona 1991, 140-142; Schmauder 2009, 105-106. 
1114 Kradin 2008, 148. 
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I have studied the characteristics of the sacral character of power and the presence of theocracy 
among the Huns in earlier chapters, hence I shall now only briefly deal with these supposed signs of 
Attila’s power.1115 I am doubtful whether Priscus’ story about how the Huns found a sword of Ares 
and how this sword was taken as a sign of the god’s approval of Attila’s power would truly inform 
us about the beliefs of the Huns or signify the sacral character of Attila’s power. I would also 
suggest that the story might have been invented by Priscus.1116 Similarly I consider that stories that 
recount how Attila would have trusted the shamans’ opinion that his youngest son would continue 
his father’s victories have little to do with reality.1117 Even if they are true, they provide slender 
proof of the sacral character of the leadership position among the Huns. The same holds for claims 
that one of the two Hun leaders at the head of the confederation, Rua or Octar and Bleda or Attila, 
would have had a temporal leadership position and the other a religious or sacral leadership 
position.1118 Taken together, there are no signs of the presence of theocracy among the groups who 
formed the confederation under the leadership of Attila in the 440s. 
Therefore, I would argue that because all the activities we know that have taken place in the 
confederation are related to military activity, this supports the conclusion that still during the days 
of Attila the confederation was based on a temporary union of groups that were interested in raiding 
so as to enrich themselves. Because too many, albeit not all, of the features that would signify the 
existence of a supercomplex chiefdom are lacking among the groups of Huns and local barbarians 
who formed the confederation, we should stop speaking about the phenomenon of a supercomplex 
chiefdom – not to mention of a state or an empire – in the case of the Huns. I consider the 
confederation of the groups of Huns and local barbarians to be that of a temporary unity of like-
minded groups who could potentially have reached a form of society that could be called a 
supercomplex chiefdom, but as I shall point out in the final chapter, this never happened.  
But before turning to the final years of the confederation and Attila’s leadership, I shall briefly 
discuss how the confederation of the Huns also included some signs that would refer to imperial 
confederacy as Barfield defines the phenomenon.1119 Potentially this kind of phenomenon could 
have evolved among the Huns, thought in practice this never occurred. 
An “imperial confederacy” adopts the principles of tribal organization and indigenous tribal leaders 
to rule at the local level while maintaining an imperial state structure with an exclusive monopoly 
that controlled foreign and military affairs. It had three basic levels of organization. At the top is the 
                                                 
1115 See Chapter 7 and 8. 
1116 Priscus fr.12.1, fr. 12.2 in Blockley 1983, 280-281, 280-283. See Chapter 8. 
1117 Priscus fr.13.1, fr. 13.3 in Blockley 1983, 284-285, 288-289. 
1118 See Chapter 7. 
1119 Barfield 1993, 150-151. 
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imperial leadership of the empire that is drawn from the ruling lineage of the tribe that founded the 
so-called state. The second level is formed by the collateral relatives of the ruler, who are usually 
appointed as governors to supervise the indigenous tribal leadership in each region. These imperial 
appointees serve as the key links between the central administration and the indigenous tribal 
leaders. The local tribal leaders constitute the third organizational level. 
There is no evidence that Attila would have come from a ruling lineage, even though we might 
suspect that this could have been the case because he and Bleda had been the next leaders after their 
uncles. Second, a feature that refers to imperial confederation is Attila’s manner of using logades in 
order to have contacts with some of the local groups. Priscus recounts how Attila sent one of the 
logades, Onegesius, to accompany his son and visit the Akatziri, a group of nomads who had been 
subdued by Attila after a clash.1120 Priscus also writes that the most important members of 
Onegesius clan were also invited by Onegesius’ wife to dine with Priscus and the Roman 
ambassador, Maximus.1121 This would suggest that Onegesius acted as a link between Attila and the 
local groups, or the key links between the central administration and the indigenous tribal leaders. 
Finally, the third level in the “imperial confederation” is formed by the local tribal leaders, who are 
members of the indigenous elites of each tribe and, although structurally inferior to imperial 
appointees, they retain considerable autonomy because of their close ties to their own people, who 
would even follow them in revolt if the imperial commanders overstepped their authority. 
Priscus’ stories about the primary and secondary leadership positions among the groups of Akatziri 
(who joined the confederation during the 440s) suggest that a local elite existed and were influential 
within their own groups.1122 In addition, especially Priscus’ story about Kouridachos, who was one 
of the leaders among the Akatziri and wanted to avoid being too close a companion to Attila, could 
indicate that Kouridachos primarily wanted to keep his autonomy and close ties to his own people 
rather than swear allegiance to any other, such as Attila.1123  Furthermore, Priscus’ remark that 
Kouridachos independently raised and led troops from his own groups, who later on were asked to 
accompany Attila’s troops, shows two aspects.  
First, Kouridachus was a military leader among his own groups who had more influence over his 
own groups and troops than Attila. Second, Attila could not take it for granted that the local tribal 
leaders would follow his orders and he needed to gain their loyalty and approval to maintain his 
position. This leads us to the last crucial element in an imperial confederation, namely the 
responsibility of a supreme leader to provide economic benefits to local tribal leaders especially in 
                                                 
1120 Priscus, fr.11.2 in Blockley 1983, 258-259. 
1121 Priscus, fr.11.2 in Blockley 1983, 266-267. 
1122 Priscus, fr.11.2 in Blockley 1983, 258-259. 
1123 Priscus, fr.11.2 in Blockley 1983, 258-259. 
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exchange for their military support.1124 Accordingly, as long as the imperial confederacies 
continued their financial success, the ruler could keep his position. Because this is related to 
relationships with the neighbouring states or empires that generated the revenues for nomads, the 
control of foreign affairs is central to ruler’s power.1125  
As I have pointed out, activities related to both of the above aspects were clearly were crucial to 
Attila’s position in the 440s. Furthermore, as I study in the next chapter, the basis for the leadership 
position did not change during the turn of the 440s and 450s, the last years of Attila’s leadership. 
While I also point out that Attila’s unsuccessful raiding operations caused the groups in the 
confederation to disperse, we might consider that the history of the Huns has many similarities to an 
imperial confederation. Accordingly this once again challenges the claims of Hun leaders’ position 
as an autocrat, monarch or king common to society that would have transformed away from 





















                                                 
1124 Kradin 2009, 42; Barfield 1993, 149-151. 
1125 Barfield 1993, 149-151. 
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10. THE FALL AND DISPERSAL OF THE HUNS 
 
 
Priscus’ accounts about his visit as a member of a delegation sent by Theodosius II to solve disputes 
between the Eastern Roman Empire and the Huns in 449 suggest that Attila was taking care of 
issues related to the war and the peace treaty that followed it. Judging from these accounts Attila’s 
tasks seem to have derived from duties common to the position of supreme military leadership. The 
same can be said about the activities that Attila was occupied in until his death in 453: he once 
again led attacks at the head of troops formed by groups of Huns and local barbarians in the 
confederation. Attila was also associated with other plans that would have brought in a supply of 
riches. However, when his operations ceased to gain wealth the unity of the groups in the 
confederation faded and vanished in a few years. The only thing that lasted decades later was the 
stories about the fear of attacks from Huns. 
 
 
10.1. Attila’s Constant Need to Gain Riches 
 
Attila’s disputes with the Eastern Roman Empire continued after the visit of the embassy that 
Priscus participated in 449. However, there were no arguments about unpaid annual payments for 
peace because they seem at least to some extent to have been paid to Attila from 447 onwards.1126 
Attila was nevertheless annoyed with the Eastern Roman Empire because of its inability to move 
inhabitants away from the areas next to the Danube that were promised to the Huns in the previous 
treaty.1127 Another reason for Attila’s discontent was that Theodosius II had still not sent all the 
promised Hun fugitives to Attila.1128  
The issues remained unsolved when Theodosius II died suddenly in July 450 and the new Emperor, 
Marcian, refused according to Priscus “to pay the tribute ( ) agreed by Theodosius and that if 
he [Attila] kept the peace they would give him gifts, but if he threatened war they would bring 
against him men and weaponry equal to his own forces”.1129 
                                                 
1126 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 182. 
1127 Priscus, fr. 11.1 in Blockley 1983, 242-243. 
1128 Priscus, fr. 11.1 in Blockley 1983, 242-247; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 196-197. 
1129 Priscus, fr. 20.1 in Blockley 1983, 304-307, cf. Kelly 2008, 186. 
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Here we might believe Priscus that Attila was displeased with Marcian’s answer.1130 It would mean 
a lack of riches that members in the confederation had got used to in earlier years. Therefore, it is 
no surprise that Attila started preparations for a new war. Another reason for Attila’s plans for a 
new raiding operation might have been that for five years the groups in the confederation had not 
fought any war and the members in the confederation would by this time have been eager to acquire 
booty and enrich themselves. After all, it is suggested that the reason why Germanic groups would 
have allied themselves with the Huns and Attila was the possibility of gaining booty.1131  
While Marcian’s refusal to pay the annual sums for peace to the Huns may have prompted Attila to 
attack the Eastern Roman Empire, the Hun did not however direct his troops towards the East but to 
the West, Gaul. According to contemporary sources, the reason for this was Honoria’s, the sister of 
the Emperor Valentinian, marriage arrangements with Attila during the last years of the 440s. 
According to Priscus the marriage proposal was warmly welcomed by the Hun because it gave 
Attila the possibility of claiming the right to rule in the Roman Empire:1132 
  
[Attila] sent men of his court to Italy that Honoria might be handed over. He claimed that she had been betrothed 
to him and as a proof sent the ring which she had dispatched to him in order that it might have been shown. He 
said also that Valentinian should resign to him half of his empire, since Honoria had received the sovereignty of it 
from her father and had been deprived of it by her brother’s greed. When the Romans maintained their earlier 
position and rejected all of his proposals, Attila pressed on more eagerly with his preparations for war and 
mustered all of his fighting force […] 
 
[…] the western Romans replied that Honoria could not come to him in marriage since she had been given to 
another and that she had no right to the scepter since the ruler of the Roman state belonged not to the females but 
to males […] 
 
I agree with the claims that Honoria never offered marriage to Attila and that the story is fully 
invented by the late Roman authors.1133 First, the story emphasized the image of Attila as a 
barbarian leader who tried by fair means or foul to seek to rule over the Roman Empire, and this 
                                                 
1130 Kelly 2008, passim. 210. It is likely that Marcian considered that it was useless to pay the annual payments to ensure the 
unity of the Hun and local barbarian groups for two reasons. First, if the payments were initially planned to support the 
creation of a sense of unity among the barbarians that would prevent unexpected attacks by different barbarian groups on 
Roman borders in the lower Danubian regions, this motive had lost its meaning – after all, it was the confederation of Attila 
that in the 440s became the most severe barbarian threat in the lower Danubian regions for the Romans. Therefore, I 
consider that Marcian did not want to support the existence of this threat with new payments but calculated that small 
bands of robbers would be a better option than a large united group. That is to say, Marcian seems to have adopted a new 
way of dealing with the Huns on the borders – he forced them, even at the risk of war, to adopt a friendly approach towards 
the eastern Romans. If this were to be followed by new attacks by the Huns and even by fragmented groups, the Eastern 
Roman Empire seems to have been ready to face it. 
1131 Lindner 1982, 702-704. 
1132 Priscus, fr. 17, fr. 20.1, fr. 20.3 in Blockley 1983, 300-309, 312-313; cf. Wirth 1999, 94; Kelly 2008, 177, 181. 
1133 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 130. 
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emphasized the considerable threat that the Huns represented to the Romans of this time.1134 
Second, the story would explain why Attila suddenly led his troops against the Western, not the 
Eastern Roman Empire. Furthermore, Honoria’s alleged attraction to the nomad leader could be 
juicy gossip in the Roman court aimed at blackening Honoria’s reputation and preventing her from 
becoming an Augusta.1135 It seems unconvincing that Honoria would have ever considered being 
one of the wives of Attila living in the steppe.1136 
On the one hand, claims that Honoria would have proposed the marriage to Attila in order to gain 
the strength of the military troops of the Huns on her side and in this way rise to the throne in the 
Western Roman Empire are plausible.1137 There would have been nothing extraordinary in this 
because close alliances and ties with mighty barbarian leaders were part of everyday political life 
and was away of gaining power in the Late Roman world.1138 Galla Placidia, the daughter of the 
Emperor Theodosius I, for example, had married Ataulf, the supreme leader of the Visigoths in 414, 
and the marriage was related to power rivalries in the Western Roman Empire.1139 
On the other hand, if we think of the story as true it emphasizes the fact that Attila was leading a 
large and strong army and the Huns had reached a powerful position in the Roman world with their 
confederation.1140 Furthermore, it is possible that Attila used Honoria’s marriage proposal as an 
excuse to finally carry out the plan made in the early years of the 440s to attack the Western Roman 
Empire.1141 On the other hand, it is also argued that the reason why Attila led his troops to Gaul was 
that the region had been promised as Honoria’s dowry.1142 Another probable explanation is that the 
leader of the Vandals, Gaeserich, would have sent gifts to Attila and encouraged him to attack Gaul 
because in this way the Western Roman army would have been occupied with fights in Gaul and 
not in Africa against the Vandals.1143 At the same time Attila could have considered that if he could 
win Gaul, then Italy would be easier to conquer and this would finally make him one of the 
mightiest leaders in the Roman world.1144 However, I disagree with the last claim because nomad 
leaders in general are typically uninterested in becoming rulers of sedentary societies because 
nomads’ primary goal is to profit from their sedentary neighbours as much as possible and maintain 
                                                 
1134 Jordanes, Getica, XXXIX: 202-204, 206; Priscus, fr. 11.2, fr. 22.2 in Blockley 1983, 278-281, 312-313. 
1135 Heather 2005, 335-336; cf. Stickler 2007, 90. 
1136 Kelly 2008, 181, passim. 177-181; cf. Stickler 2007, 90-91.  
1137 Priscus, fr. 17 in Blockley 1983, 300-303; cf. Wirth 1999, 93; Kelly 2008, 177-178. 
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1139 Heather 2005, 335, 238-240; Kelly 2008, 171. 
1140 Wirth 1999, 94. 
1141 Wirth 1999, 66; Stickler 2007, 91-92. 
1142 Priscus, fr. 20.3 in Blockley 1983, 306-309; see Wirth 1999, 95; cf. Heather 2005, 335-336, Thompson (1999) 2000, 150. 
1143 Kelly 2008, 172. 
1144 Stickler 2007, 91-92; cf. Barfield 1993, passim. 132. I consider that the claims that Attila was interested in gaining the 
position of Roman Emperor are based on a misinterpretation of the Eurasian pastoralists’ nomadic way of life and political 
and social structure.  
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their nomadic way of life.1145 Therefore, I suggest that Attila’s decision to lead his troops to raid 
Gaul was not done in order to gain the title of Emperor but to acquire riches wherever he could.  
First, an attack on the Western Empire would bring more rich booty than the areas near the Danube, 
which the troops in the confederation had already been raiding for many decades. Moreover, if 
Attila needed of gaining new herding or farming areas for groups in the confederation then the west 
would offer a new option for this as well. Furthermore, Attila’s attack on the west might have been 
his attempt to profit from both halves of the Roman Empire. Marcian had promised to send him 
gifts stopped if he could keep the peace, and by attatcking the west, nothing stopped Attila from 
benefiting from these gifts. However, it is claimed that Attila and Aetius were such good friends 
and allies that it stopped Attila attacking the Western Roman Empire earlier.1146 On the other hand, 
others have said that the level of friendship and alliance would not have been that close. In short, 
Aetius was no more a friend with Attila than any other barbarian leader, and Attila’s main interest 
was to please his troops, not the Romans.1147  
Another issue that might have delayed Attila’s plans of attacking the Western Roman Empire until 
now is that he might have received a tribute, “ ”, for keeping the peace from Ravenna.1148 
However, this is uncertain because Priscus’ accounts explicitly mention the Eastern Romans having 
sent “tribute” payments to Attila, and they only shortly refer to the fact that this could have also 
been the case also with the Western part of the Roman Empire.1149 However, there was never the 
question of tribute payments in the official meaning of the word “tribute”, because that would have 
signified that the Roman Emperor was subject to Attila’s power.1150 Accordingly, we can only guess 
what kinds of payments there were because Priscus clearly uses the word tribute in its official 
meaning. Moreover, it is also suggested that Attila was forced to attack the west in order to continue 
the process of building an empire on lines similar to the Romans.1151 I am, however, not convinced 
that Attila’s goal was to build an empire similar to the Roman Empire, what scholars call 
“hunnischen Alternative”,1152 because, as explained earlier, there are no signs that the Huns gave up 
their nomadic way of life. Accordingly, I see it likely that Attila’s main interest in the raiding 
                                                 
1145 Barfield 1993, 162. 
1146 Thompson (1999) 2000, 152; Kelly 2008, 173, 177. 
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1148 Priscus, fr. 22.2 in Blockley 1983, 312-313; Stickler 2007, 88. 
1149 Priscus, fr. 11.2., fr.20.1 in Blockley 1983, 278-281, 304-307; cf. Kelly 2008, 173. 
1150 Kelly 2008, 186-187. 
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operation on Gaul was to bring wealth to the groups in the confederation.1153 After all, this was 
what the groups in the confederation had always expected Attila to do, and Attila had previously 
answered their demands. 
If Attila was expected to marry Honoria,1154 the groups in the confederation must have started to 
prepare for the attack against the west at the latest in the second half of 450 because at the 
beginning of 451 Attila’s troops were on the move towards Gaul along the Danube and towards the 
Main.1155 The Western Roman Empire seems to have known what to expect because Valentinian 
and Aetius were doing the same in the west as Attila in the east, namely strengthening their troops 
with new allies.1156 Especially Valentinian’s alliance with Theoderic, the leader of the Visigoths, 
and Aetius’ adoption of the son of Thorismund, the king of the Franks, signifies the goals of beefing 
up the military power of the Western Roman Empire in Gaul.1157 Furthermore, this is seen when 
Attila beging to break relations with Aetius and continues his preparations for war.1158 Attila is 
claimed to have collected together many warriors as possible for his troops, while some of the 
cavalry remained in the regions near the lower Danubian basin.1159 This is indicated by the fact that 
during the summer of 451 some Hun cavalry men are known to have raided Thrace and when 
Marcian sent troops to attack them, they were resisted by Huns.1160 
Because some Huns raided Thrace at the same time as Attila invaded Gaul, we might consider this 
to imply that not all groups of Huns belonged to the confederation even in 451. Or, if they did, they 
did not mind arranging attacks and raiding operations on their own. On the other hand, we might 
suspect that they could have been advised by Attila to arrange the attacks while he was in Gaul in 
order to prevent Marcian from sending troops to Valentinian.1161 However, if this was not the case, 
and some groups in the confederation wanted to go on raids without Attila, then this implies 
considerable discontent from Attila’s supporters about his leadership, and it also emphasizes 
Attila’s apparent need to arrange new raiding operations, to bring booty to the groups who belonged 
to the confederation. In any case, it is clear that still in 451 groups of Huns could arrange their own 
raids and they trusted in the military leadership from among their own groups. In addition, interest 
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in new booty seems obvious. Therefore, we might consider that Attila’s position at the head of the 
confederation was not especially powerful but rested on the support of others as well as Attila’s 
ability to acquire wealth for his followers. 
It is likely that Marcian would have sent his army against the Huns in order to help the troops in the 
Western Roman Empire in Gaul. In other words, the Eastern Roman army could at least prevent 
some Huns from moving off to join Attila’s troops.1162 On the one hand, it has been argued that 
Attila was not particularly interested in having all his cavalry men in Gaul because the size of the 
troops that he had been able to gather from the groups that belong to the confederation did not 
support the use of cavalry.1163 However, the result was that the Huns were prevented from using 
their most efficient tactic, namely sudden and rapid cavalry attacks.1164 For this reason, it is 
considered that Attila might even have wanted to increase the number of infantry in his troops, and 
hence by promising profits tried to recruit new groups for his large-scale attack and invasion of 
Gaul.1165 In brief, the newcomers would have consisted of groups of Franks and Alans, while the 
majority of other warriors came from groups of Easternmost Goths, Gepids, Rugi, Sciri and most 
likely from some Slavic groups who had already belonged to the confederation for years.1166 It is 
thought that Attila’s success in recruiting new troops made the Western Roman Empire realize that 
the Romans also needed to gain new allies, and hence concluded an alliance with the Visigoths as 
late as spring 451.1167  
Even though the new allies increased the number of warriors, it also caused some problems. In 
brief, Wirth assesses that Attila had faced problems in leading his troops towards Gaul because 
some of the groups would have obeyed more the wishes of their own leaders’ than his, and this 
caused unwanted delay in advancing.1168 On the whole, the delay crucially prevented the sudden 
and unexpected attacks that had earlier brought the victories for the Huns, and hence it is assessed 
that the Huns needed to defeat their opponents as soon as possible in order to prevent them from 
strengthening.1169 While a mixed bunch of warriors was the problem of the Huns, the situation is 
claimed to have been the same among the Western Romans. Briefly, Aetius had gained allies from 
groups of Franks, Alans and Sarmatians but also some of the Burgundians and the Goths in Gaul, 
the Visigoths.1170 
                                                 
1162 Wirth 1999, 97. 
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During the spring of 451 Attila’s troops started to attack cities and the first that fell into their hands 
was Trier. After this the troops headed towards the city of Metz and conquered it most likely at the 
beginning of April.1171 After that the troops moved to Orleans where the troops of the Visigoths 
were seemingly able to prevent Attila from conquering the city in June.1172 The city of Tongeren 
was also saved, though not Reims.1173 At the same time the Western Roman army arrived to 
accompany the Visigoths, and the troops of Attila retreated to the northern parts of the modern 
province of Champagne, to the fields of Catalaunia, near the city of Troyes. Finally, in the fields of 
Catalaunia the large troops of Attila and Aetius clashed at the end of June.1174 
Knowledge of the battle in the Catalaunian fields is scarce because the sixth-century author, 
Jordanes, is the only author from whom we have a description of the event. Even though, he most 
likely copied the stories of the clash from fifth-century authors’, it is also likely that he invented 
something of his own.1175 Nonetheless, in my opinion we might rely on the main features of 
Jordanes’ description of the battle, especially its final result, which was a terrible loss for Attila.  
According to Jordanes the turning point was the battle for the hill in the middle of the fields that the 
troops under the lead of the Western Roman Empire were able to conquer. The result was that Attila 
and his followers were forced to retreat.1176 However, the two forces never came to a final clash 
because, according to Jordanes, the king of the Visigoths, Thorismund, was killed during the battle 
and Aetius decided that it was vital that the Visigoths chose a new leader as soon as possible in 
order to prevent rivalry between groups and their leaders.1177 The disintegration of the Visigoths 
could have caused insecurity in the regions of the Western Roman Empire and that seemingly was a 
more severe threat to Aetius than the Huns.1178 Attila’s defeat had ended the Huns’ westward 
progress, and it was more important for the Romans to maintain stability in the lower Danubian 
frontier than to destroy Attila and his troops.1179 United groups of Huns and their allies under the 
leadership of Attila, whom the Romans already knew, would help to solve disputes and control the 
situation more than if there were many fragmented and independent groups with their own goals 
and leaders.  
                                                 
1171 Gregory of Tours, Hist. Franc., II.6; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, 153. 
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The clash in the Catalaunian field which ended in July 451, had been a severe setback for Attila.1180 
Jordanes estimates that 165,000 warriors in total would have been killed in the battle,1181 and while 
the amount is most likely highly exaggerated and also includes losses on the Roman side, still it is 
likely that Attila lost thousands of warriors. It is certain that this, like the lack of new peace treaty to 
enrich his followers, did not strengthen his position at the head of the confederation. In addition, the 
fact that some of the Hun groups had been raiding in Thrace at the same time as Attila had been in 
Gaul could suggest that there were other military leaders whose lead the troops were ready to follow 
and act in smaller units than as a part of a confederation. I suspect, therefore, that Attila would have 
shared as much booty as possible with his followers in order to raise their expectations because of 
the obvious failure of the raiding operation.1182  
Taken together, after the serious defeat in Gaul, Attila faced an even more severe need for new 
lucrative and profitable raiding operations than before.1183 This is suggested by his next acts.  
 
 
10.2. Desperate Acts to Please Followers: The Last Years of Attila 
 
Immediately after returning from Gaul, Attila started to plan a new raiding operation, and this time 
the target was the heart of the Western Roman Empire, the city of Rome in summer 452. The fact 
that Attila was eager to make the attack during the summer, which was considered the worst time 
for fighting, emphasizes that he was in the need of victories.1184 Victories would have been seen as 
the only way for Attila to strengthen the support of his followers for his leadership position.1185 
The size of Attila’s troops is not known, but in May and June Attila had led his warriors over the 
Julian Alps and they began raiding cities near the River Po. The Huns had been successful in 
conquering forts in the Alpine passes, and hence it is likely that Aetius had not sent any additional 
troops to prevent the advancement of the Huns.1186 Moreover, the Emperor Valentinian and Aetius 
would have preferred to fight against Attila in the vicinity of the forts south of the Alps and in the 
                                                 
1180 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 130, cf. Wirth 1999, 105. 
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Italian mainland.1187 However, after the Alps Attila continued pillaging the north-eastern parts of 
Italy because even after the three-month siege and victory over Aquilea the Huns faced no severe 
opposition from the Romans.1188 Until the early autumn of 452 the Huns had ravaged and pillaged 
the cities of Concordia, Altinum, Vicentia, Brescia, Bergamon, Milan and Ticinum.1189  
By and large, because Attila allowed his troops to gather booty and raid without hurrying further to 
south or turning back to their own dwelling areas, Attila’s main goal seems to have been to enrich 
his troops.1190 On the one hand, since 451 constant wars in Gaul had decreased the interest of 
Attila’s troops in conquering new areas and they were mainly satisfied with booty.1191 On the other 
hand, it is likely that Attila’s troops had been weakened considerably as a result of food shortages 
caused by the exceptionally dry summer and poor harvest. Furthermore, this led to diseases, plague 
and famine spreading among the troops.1192 It is also suggested that Attila did not hurry the military 
operations because he would have heard that Marcian would have sent troops to help Valentinian’s 
army, and hence Attila could expect serious conflict.1193 Burgess, however, notices that there are no 
sources hinting that any military activity in Italy or elsewhere would have been involved in driving 
the Huns out of Italy or would have affected their decision to go or proceed.1194 By contrast, it is 
also claimed that Marcian would have sent Eastern Roman troops to attack some Huns in the 
Hungarian plain in 452, and this would have eventually caused Attila to end the raids in Italy.1195 
Finally, the Huns had lost their most efficient military tactic on account of their acquisition of heavy 
booty, namely unexpected and rapid attack.1196 Whatever reasons there were, in the early autumn 
Attila’s troops came to wage siege on the city of Rome.1197 
The siege did not lead to a battle for the western the western Romans decided to negotiate with 
Attila. The result was that Attila decided to return with his troops to their dwelling areas in the 
vicinity of Danube and the Black Sea, which contemporary authors depicted as a divine miracle.1198 
However, it is possible that the Western Roman Empire could have promised payments to Attila, he 
agreed to leave Italy and return too his own areas.1199 However, no contemporary author mentions a 
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treaty between the parties, though an obscure passage by the sixth-century author Procopius’ might 
imply this: “After the death of Aetius [in 454], Attila, since no one stood in his way, ravaged the 
whole of Europe without difficulty, compelled both parts of the Empire to obey his commands and 
forced them to pay tribute. For payments were sent to him every year by the Emperor”.1200 It is 
plausible that Attila would have wanted to avoid losses and battles on many fronts both in Rome 
and near the Italian Alps when returning his own dwelling areas, and hence Attila gave up his 
conquest of Rome.1201 
The expedition to Italy may not have been a great success for Attila, and has even been considered 
to be “worse than failure”.1202 First, the troops did not achieve a remarkable victory and Attila most 
likely did not achieve a peace treaty that guaranteed flow of payments.1203 In addition, once again a 
large number of warriors were killed, which radically reduced the military might of the troops.1204 
However, the troops could at least have been enriched with booty as the slow movements of the 
troops implies. With reference to this, it seems that the troops would have been content at least on 
some level with Attila’s lead because there are no contemporary authors’ accounts of the troops 
splitting up or disagreements concerning their next targets.  
Nonetheless, we might consider that Attila’s position was not strong after returning from Italy 
because Priscus mentions him immediately sending new embassies to the court of Marcian and 
demanded that the Easter Roman Empire pay annual payments during the reign of Theodosius II. In 
addition, Attila seems to have planned a new war against the Eastern Roman Empire if the annual 
payments were not paid to him soon.1205 Because Marcian refused to send the payments,1206 this is 
taken as a sign that the support of the groups in the confederation for Attila’s position was clearly 
weakening. Consequently, Attila would have tried to strengthen his position with a new 
marriage.1207  
Jordanes is the first contemporary author who tells about Attila’s wedding plans with a new 
potential bride, the alleged “German princess” called Ildico. While we do know that Attila was 
already married at least to Hreka, who had borne him sons who Attila favoured,1208 we might doubt 
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whether other marriage plans ever took place.1209 That is to say, Attila already had sons who could 
continue the name and fame of his kin, and hence in this sense there was no need for new perils; 
however, Eurasian pastoralists in general appreciate large families and polygamy is common among 
them.1210 In any case, if Attila really married again, this implies that Attila had tried either to please 
already existing but weakened relationship with some of the Germanic groups who belonged to the 
confederation,1211 or Attila would with the marriage have sealed an alliance with a totally new 
group that could strengthen his position. This suggests that the support of the groups which formed 
the confederation was seemingly in decline.   
However, the marriage with Ildico is claimed to have lasted no longer than the first wedding night – 
Jordanes claims that Attila died during the night because he had drunk too much, and choked on his 
his own blood.1212 We can only wonder, whether Attila died to drunkenness, or as the sixth-century 
Latin chronicler Marcellinus Comes suggests, was stabbed by his new wife.1213 The image of a 
drunken barbarian is a common topos in Roman literature, and it was used to deplore the 
shamefulness and bad behaviour of barbarians; in addition, drunkenness also underlined the fact 
that one did not know one’s limits.1214 Therefore, Jordanes’ account emphasizes the image of Attila 
as a constantly misbehaving and unrestrained barbarian leader whose acts never led to any good. 
Moreover, Marcellinus Comes’ story about a stabbing could have ben written in order to emphasize 
the image of Germanic groups as victims of the Huns. Though at least some of the Germanic groups 
had been interested in joining the Huns’ raids on the Roman Empire, Come’ss implication is that 
they were not in accord with the Huns. In any case, the story strengthens the image of Germanic 
groups as proper Romans, who had always shared an interest in maintaining the Roman Empire in 
order to legitimate the Germanic rule in the Roman Empire. But whether these stories are true or 
false, nothing changes the fact that Attila died at the beginning of 453, and the confederation went 
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10.3. Fragmentation of Groups of Huns Again 
 
After Attila’s death the groups in the confederation could not expect to benefit from the unity as 
easily as before because the Eastern Roman Empire had clearly refused to send payments to the 
Huns in the future, and there had already been two unsuccessful raiding operations in the West: in 
Gallia and Italy. Therefore, it would seem that in order to gain riches only new and most likely 
challenging wars and confrontations with the Romans lay ahead. Another option was to withdraw 
from the confederation and to continue the former more settled life. That is to say, the local 
sedentary groups could concentrate once again more profoundly on farming and nomadic groups for 
herding. There would in addition still be the possibility for trading and small scale raiding. Though 
this option would not enrich the groups to the same extent as former joint activities in the 
confederation, it at least freed the groups from a constant and heavy military burden.  
This may have been in the minds of the groups in the confederation when, according to Jordanes, 
Attila’s sons tried to gain the leadership position at the head of the confederation and this led to 
Ardarich, the leader of the Gepids, disagreeing with their proceedings. This reveals some of the 
crucial aspects of the nature of the confederation in 453. 
First, Attila’s sons were not expected to continue at the head of the confederation if they were not 
accepted by others. In addition, other groups could revolt if decisions made by the confederation did 
not please them.1215 Third, the groups might well have kept their own leaders even though they 
belonged to the confederation with the Huns. In other words, the groups in the confederation 
seemingly did not feel that they belonged or formed a state or a large and strong, coherent unity that 
would continue whatever changes would happen in the leading structures. Therefore, this suggests 
that the state or strong class differences where the upper class is allowed to decide on proceedings 
had not evolved among the Huns during the days of Attila in the 440s.1216 Furthermore, we do not 
hear anything about the logades at the time when Attila’s sons wanted to continue to lead the 
confederation. I would argue that if the logades had formed a leading or administrative elite, they 
would have supported Attila’s sons to maintain unity, or at least carried out the tasks of rulers 
despite the difficult times.1217 However, this is not known to have happened, and hence I suspect 
that the logades were loyal only to Attila.1218 It is also likely that the logades achieve their position 
as Attila’s closest companions because their alliance with Attila was supported by their own groups 
who had chosen them to take care of duties related to military leadership. 
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Although the confederation collapsed once Attila’s sons took over, what comes to the question of 
evolving supercomplex chiefdom, I see that we might speak about it in the days of Attila. After all, 
according to Kradin “In simple chiefdoms power could be inheritable and its stability depended on 
the successfulness of the political and military practices and charisma of the leader”.1219 Attila’s 
sons were seemingly unable to convince the groups in the confederation that they could still win 
profits for their followers despite their father’s lack of success in his final years. For this reason they 
could not prevent the alleged formation of a supercomplex chiefdom from collapsing because in a 
supercomplex chiefdom ruler’s authority was maintained by means of a gift economy, involving 
repeated distributions of material significant resources.1220 That is to say, the confederation of 
groups of Huns and local barbarians could have taken place within the framework of a 
supercomplex chiefdom – that is to say, there would not have been a need to adopt the power 
structures or form of society common to sedentarists.  
However, I am not fully convinced that a supercomplex chiefdom did evolve among the Huns 
because nothing rules out the possibility that the unity of groups of Huns and local barbarians could 
have based on the unity of groups led by their own leaders according to the temporary need and 
agreed alliance of the so-called confederation.1221 On the whole, the Huns might have only formed a 
dispositional chiefdom because the large number of groups who formed the confederation and its 
fluid nature are features common to the phenomenon. In addition, the interest of groups in uniting in 
order to gain more booty from raids is also a common feature of a dispositional chiefdom. It is 
noticed that the composition of a dispositional chiefdom is fairly fluid and the tribe is a chancing 
quantity which is very little organized and disparate. Furthermore, some sort of polity might 
temporarily emerge in times of wars when there are preparations to invade another group or to 
repulse the invasion of a rival tribe. Correspondingly, the leaders are ephemeral leaders of indefinite 
groups with indefinite, always disputable power.1222 
The aspect what I want to emphasize when I considering what kind of form of unity the Huns could 
have formed during the 440s before the unity collapsed in the hands of Attila’s sons is, as Kradin 
and Khazanov have noted, that societal complexity is not always related to the formation of 
statehood – in specific situations nomad polities can temporarily create very centralized systems of 
government in order to accomplish specific aims, and sometimes, when those aims are fulfilled, the 
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systems cease to exist among the nomads.1223 Accordingly, in the case of the Huns, I see no reason 
to speak about the rise of a state and the adoption of a way of life or political structures common to 
sedentarists but to nomads because the nomadic way of life gives wide variety for this. 
The temporary nature of the larger unity of nomads and the fact that the units are formed in order to 
fulfil certain aims, especially raids, are characteristics that occur in 452, after the death of Attila. 
According to Jordanes, Attila’s sons and the groups in the confederation disagreed about the future 
leadership and the existence of the confederation. Jordanes writes: “the sons of Attila … sought to 
divide the tribes equally amongst themselves” but this would appear to be against the general 
expectations because when “Ardaric, the king of the Gepids, learned this, he became enraged that 
so many peoples were being treated like the lowest of slaves and began to revolt against the sons of 
Attila”. This led to a revolt where Ardaric is claimed to have “freed not only his own people but also 
the others who were equally oppressed”.1224 
The course of events show that it was not obvious for groups and leaders in the confederation that 
after the death of Attila everything would continue as before. It would seem that these groups had 
only made an alliance with Attila and were loyal to him and no one else. For this reason Attila’s 
sons could not expect to automatically rely on the groups that had supported their father.1225 
The evidence suggests that Attila’s position was based on a supreme military leadership that was 
common to nomads. In the case of military leadership, the promise of loyalty is connected to a 
person, and not to a certain abstract and continuous leadership position in society, as in the case of 
kingship. The fact that the groups’ acceptance of Attila’s leadership affected only him1226 indicates 
that the leadership position at the head of the confederation had not become hereditary or autocratic. 
If it had, there would have been no disagreement about new leaders and their role.1227 That is to say, 
Attila’s sons would have been expected to take the leadership position, and they could have acted as 
they pleased – however, this clearly was not possible. The basis of the confederation was still 
founded on acceptance provided by groups for temporary joint activities. I am therefore doubtful 
about Jordanes account that Attila’s sons aimed to divide the groups in the confederation under their 
lead. Heather also suspects the reliability of Jordanes’ account, and considers that the fight between 
Attila’s sons and the Gepids would have resulted from the Gepids’ refusal to pay any more tributes 
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to the Huns, or answer the nomads’ demands for military service.1228 Therefore, I consider that after 
Attila’s death the groups could themselves decide to break away from the confederation, and not 
just because of the acts of Attila’s sons.1229  
I doubt Jordanes’ account for three reasons. First, Jordanes’ goal is constantly to underline the 
Goths’ lack of interest in joint activities with the Huns, whereas archaeological remains, for 
example, imply that this was not the case.1230 Second, because some groups of Huns and local 
groups of Goths continued to live together even after the confederation broke up, this would not 
have happened if the confederation had been unpopular among its members. Lastly, Jordanes’ 
account how the Goths bravely fought against the Huns to liberate themselves from the power of the 
despised nomads could have been a familiar topos. At least a fight would explain why the joint 
activities suddenly ended, and at the same time this would hide the less heroic reasons for the act, 
namely that the Goths broke away from the confederation because it seemed unlikely to provide 
booty and riches. 
However, if we take Jordanes’ account as such the situation points out that members of a family, 
where the last supreme leader had come from, would have wanted to keep the position in the 
family. This might imply that a conical clan structure would have strengthened among the groups of 
Huns – Attila’s kinship group could have considered that their position had reached such a mighty 
position that they could decide on forthcoming actions on other behalf.1231 If this was the case, 
Attila’s sons plainly misjudged the situation, though such a drastic miscalculation is unlikely to 
have occurred.  
I also doubt whether the confederation would have ended with a huge clash as Jordanes says took 
place near the river Nedao in Pannonia.1232 According to Jordanes, after Ardaric’s “liberation” of 
the Huns “the various peoples whom Attila held sway clashed … the Goth fought with his pike, the 
Gepid raged with his sword, the Rugian broke the weapons in his own wound, the Suavian was on 
foot, the Hun fought with his arrows, the Alan formed his heavy-armed battle line, the Herul his 
light-armed one” and after heavy fighting “victory unexpectedly went to the Gepids. For the sword 
and the alliance of Ardaric destroyed almost thirty thousand of the Huns and those who were 
assisting them”. Jordanes underlines the loss of the Huns in the battle by telling that during the 
                                                 
1228 Heather 2005, 352-354. 
1229 If we accept Jordanes’ account that Attila’s sons would have wanted to rule over the groups who had formed the 
confederation with them, still the groups’ disapproval towards this proceeding shows that Attila’s sons were not expected or 
allowed to do as they planned or wished. It seems likely that autocratic power had not established itself among the groups in 
the confederation. 
1230 Heather 2005, 352-353, 330-333. I have pointed out in Chapter 3 that this derived from Jordanes’ goal to create an 
image of the Goths as defenders of the Roman Empire allowing them the right to be the leaders of the Roman Empire 
during the 6th century. 
1231 Barfield 1993, 148-149. 
1232 Jordanes, Getica, L: 260-263; Priscus fr. [25] in Blockley 1983, 320-321; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, 174. 
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clash Ellac, who is claimed to have been Attila’s eldest and most beloved son, was killed and this 
caused the rest of Ellac’s brothers to flee “near to the coast of the Black Sea, where, as we have 
said, the Goths earlier had their homes”.1233 
Even though I doubt whether the battle between the groups who had earlier formed the 
confederation would have actually taken place, or if it took on the magnitude that Jordanes 
describes, still the fact is that groups who had formed the confederation scattered at beginning of 
454.1234 At the same time the greatness of the confederation had dissolved and accounts about 
groups of Huns begin to vanish from the narrations of Late Roman authors. However, some of the 
groups of Huns still had contacts to the Roman Empire but they primarily took place in tandem with 
other groups who led the activities, and hence knowledge concerning the Huns becomes very scarce 
in the second half of the fifth century. Another reason for this is that Late Roman authors started to 
use the name “Huns” for some other nomadic groups, like the Bulgars, who arrived in the late fifth 
century and later to the areas around the Black Sea and the the borders of the Roman Empire.1235 
Therefore, even the name “Huns” at the end of fifth century does not clearly tell us about the groups 
of Huns who were in close contact with the Roman Empire a hundred or even fifty years earlier.1236 
Although the information that we have about Huns and their activities after 545 is scarce, we can 
distinguish four larger groupings of Huns and local barbarians, some clearly assimilated together 
near the Roman borders, who gained their living in different ways.  
Because scattered groups of Huns continued to act and live with other barbarian groups, this 
suggests that groups of Huns and local barbarians shared an interest in acting together some decades 
earlier. This is also referred to in Jordanes’ remark about the battle of Nedao, that some groups in 
the confederation would have favoured fighting on the side of the Huns against the others: “Huns as 
well as those of the other nations who brought them aid”.1237 If this is the case, the groups of Huns 
and local barbarians would seemingly have had an alliance that had satisfied at least some of the 
groups. This suggestion is also implied by Priscus’ accounts of the fate of Attila’s sons Dengizich 
and Ernach. Both of the brothers were supported in their leadership of some of the groups, and 
Priscus also mentions Dengizich and Ernach performing the tasks that are common to military 
leaders among nomads at the head of confederation, namely providing riches and opportunities for 
trade and raids. However, before I study more profoundly what Dengizich’s and Ernach’s activities 
tell about the situation among the Huns after 454, and also what kind of inheritance the 
                                                 
1233 Jordanes, Getica, L: 260-263; Priscus fr. [25] in Blockley 1983, 320-321. 
1234 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 147, 149-150, 152, 162; Wirth 1999, 112-114; Stickler 2007, 102-103; cf. Schreiber 1976, 321-
324; Kelly 2008, 210; Thompson (1999) 2000, 168. 
1235 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 165, 168; Wirth 1999, 13, 113-116; Miteva 1988, 12-16; Pohl 2003, 586-587. 
1236 Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 170, 202. 
1237 Jordanes, Getica, L, 262-263 in Mierow 1960, 126. 
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confederation seems to have left for later groups, I shall briefly outline how the Huns fragmented 
and merged into other barbarian groups from the middle of the fifth century onwards on the borders 
of the Roman Empire. 
Groups of Huns and local barbarians lived in the regions near the Black Sea in modern-day Ukraine 
where they seem to have continued to live as before. However, because the regions east to the 
Danube were claimed by the Gepids after the fall of the confederation, the Gepids were likely to 
have formed the leadership and majority in these groups. Even though contemporary sources are 
silent about the activities of the Huns in this region, it would seem that the groups largely 
concentrated on herding and combining their activities with others groups living in the same 
regions.1238 
The second grouping of Huns is formed by the groups that stayed in their old living areas near the 
River Danube and the Theiss.1239 In addition, they gained contacts with the Roman Empire and 
other groups in a similar way as before, though the leading positions were now in the hands of 
others. It is thought that most of the Huns joined some groups of Alans and easternmost Goths in 
Moesia Superior, Dacia Ripensis and Dacia Mediterranea, where they temporarily acted as 
mercenaries of the Eastern Roman Empire to secure Thrace and the lower Danubian basin.1240 
Furthermore, the groups had also established some kind of mutual relationship with the Western 
Roman Empire because Majorian hired them to fight in the Western Roman army against the 
Vandals in 457, and also in 461 in Africa.1241 Accordingly, the Huns still seem to have acted as 
before, and as was common in the nomadic way of life – favoured temporary alliances and 
activities, e.g. raids and mercenary activities that could enrich them.1242 
The third grouping of Huns had established themselves with the Goths in Pannonia, where they 
lived side by side.1243 However, their peace was disturbed by the fourth known unit of Huns who 
lived in the vicinity of the Danube and the Theiss.1244 From these regions they temporarily seem to 
have attacked neighbouring areas combining in a similar way to their attacks in Pannonia in 455.1245 
It is suggested that the reason for the attacks would have been the groups’ need for new pastures.1246 
                                                 
1238 Jordanes, Getica, L: 30-35; see Wirth 1999, 113; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 150, 162, cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, 168. 
1239 Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 173, 168-170. 
1240 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 151-152; Wirth 1999, 114; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, 170. 
1241 Wirth 1999, 114; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 161; Thompson (1999) 2000, 174-175. 
1242 Thompson (1999) 2000, 170. 
1243 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 160; cf. Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 171-172; Kelly 2008, 210; Blockley 1983, 394. 
1244 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, passim. 152, 157-158; Thompson (1999) 2000, 171-172.  
1245 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 144, 150-152, 156-159, 161-162. 
1246 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 144, 150-152, 156-159, 161-162. 
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What supports this notion is the fact that after the first unsuccessful attack, a series of further attacks 
took place in 463 or 464 until 466.1247  
The attacks in Pannonia during the 460s provide us with the first contemporary authors’ remarks on 
the fate of Attila’s two sons: Dengizich and Ernach. It is claimed that Dengizich was responsible for 
attacking the other Huns and Goths in Pannonia, though the attacks could have been made by both 
of the brothers because Ernach’s groups lived near the Danube and the Theiss, and Dengizich’s in 
the Theiss valley.1248 However, because the attacks were unsuccessful, Thompson claims that 
Dengizich led his groups to seek out new and larger dwelling areas north of the Danube.1249 If so, 
the next we hear of the two sons, is that they sent an embassy to the Eastern Roman court in 466, as 
Priscus writes: 
 
At this time an embassy came to the Emperor Leo from the sons of Attila to remove the causes of previous 
disputes. They also said that a peace treaty should be made and that in the old manner they should meet with the 
Romans at the Danube, establish a market and exchange whatever they required […]1250 
 
Because neither Priscus nor any other contemporary author mentions disputes between the sons of 
Attila and the Eastern Roman Empire in the 450s or early 460s, it is likely that the old disputes 
would have been those between Attila and the Eastern Roman Empire.1251 Even if this was not the 
case, the result was that Leo I refused Attila’s sons’ requests. Because this, according to Priscus, 
prompted Dengizich to move his troops near the Danube and to prepare an attack on the Eastern 
Roman Empire, we might suspect that it was one of Attila’s sons who was responsible for sending 
the embassy.1252 The son in question was most likely Ernach because Priscus says he opted out of 
the attack. Briefly, the reason was that the regions of the groups who counted on Ernach’s lead had 
been attacked, and hence Ernach was already engaged in military activity.1253 
It certainly seems likely that Dengizich’s vigorous actions against the Romans together with 
demands for land for larger groupings imply that he desperately needed new herding areas for his 
groups.1254 This is also supported by the fact that even with the help of Ernach’s troops Dengizich 
continued alone both the preparations for war and addressing demands to the eastern Romans. 
                                                 
1247 Wirth 1999, 115-116; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 158-159, 164; Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 171-172. 
1248 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 166-167; Thompson (1999) 2000, 171, 169. Thompson even claims that Marcian would have 
granted the regions for Ernach. AS there are no contemporary sources which refer to this, I doubt his claim. 
1249 Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 172. 
1250 Priscus, fr. 46 in Blockley 1983, 352-353. 
1251 Thompson (1999) 2000, 172. 
1252 Priscus, fr. 46 in Blockley 1983, 352-353. 
1253 Priscus, fr. 46 in Blockley 1983, 352-353. 
1254 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 166. 
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Priscus tells us that Dengizich stipulated that Leo I “give land and money to himself [Dengizich] 
and the army that followed him” otherwise he and his troops would attack Thrace.1255  
It seems that Leo I considered it easier to agree with Dengizich than suffer from his attacks, and 
hence, according to Priscus, he to acceppted the Dengizich’s demands on the condition that 
Dengizich and his groups promised him obedience.1256 However, despite these announcements the 
agreement was never concluded. Priscus reports that before the agreement was put into practice, 
Dengizich fell to plotting against the Eastern Roman Empire, and this plot led to Dengizich’s attack 
against the Eastern Roman troops.1257 The clash ended in defeat for Dengizich in 476, and he seems 
to have died shortly afterwards.1258 At the same time accounts concerning Dengizich and the groups 
of Huns he led end.1259 It is thought that these groups split up and some of them joined the Goths 
living near the western parts of the Black Sea, while some others joined new nomadic raiding 
groups, e.g. the Avars and the Bulgars near the Danube. In addition, it is considered that some of 
the Huns wandered further north, to the vicinity of the Dniepr.1260 
Accounts concerning Ernach and the groups who trusted in his lead also dry up after 454.1261 
Therefore, it is likely that Ernach’s Huns also became assimilated with local barbarian groups or 
wandered further away from the Roman borders in order to move into regions where they could live 
and herd without being disturbed by too many clashes.  
 
 
10.4. A Cycle in the Nomadic Way of Life – The Existence of “The Hun Kings and Empire”? 
 
Dengizich’s and Ernach’s actions, like those of other groupings that the Huns became part of, 
underline the fact that the Huns continued in their nomadic way of life. It was crucial for the Huns 
to establish dwelling areas where nomadic life could unimpeded and the absence of accounts of 
raiding Huns after 454 would seem to imply that the groups now primarily concentrated on herding. 
Another sign that suggests that herding would have remained crux in the life of the Huns are 
accounts about Dengizich’s and Ernach’s constant need to secure land areas large enough for their 
groups.1262 Moreover, because trade is a necessity for life in the steppe, I also suggest that 
Deigizich’s demands for a new market place from the Eastern Roman Empire imply that the Huns 
                                                 
1255 Priscus, fr. 48.1 in Blockley 1983, 354-355. 
1256 Priscus, fr. 48.1 in Blockley 1983, 354-355. 
1257 Priscus, fr. 49 in Blockley 1983, 356-359; Thompson 1999 (2000), 172-173. 
1258 Thompson (1999) 2000, passim. 173.  
1259 Thompson (1999) 2000, 172. 
1260 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 168, 158-159; Kelly 2008, 212; Thompson (1999) 2000, 172. 
1261 Thompson (1999) 2000, 173. 
1262 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 166. 
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continued their life as pastoral herders. Finally, Dengizich’s and Ernach’s demands for new 
payments not only for themselves but also for their supporters from the Eastern Roman Empire 
imply that the brothers had military leadership positions that were common in nomadic life. I 
therefore see no reason to argue that the groups of Huns would have given up their nomadic way of 
life either during the first half of the fifth century or later in the century.  
The groups of Huns did not want at any stage to conquer or become part of the Roman Empire but 
instead wished to dwell in its border areas where they had access to the sedentarists’ riches.1263 The 
fact that after 454 some of the Huns were ready once again to act as Roman mercenaries and to join 
raids with other barbarians also points to the Huns acting as nomads. They wanted to keep their 
nomadic way of life, but within the framework of the nomadic way of life they were merely 
interested in allying themselves temporarily with a lucrative partner in order to gain riches from 
their surrounding sedentary neighbours.  
Because of the clear nomadic nature of the Huns’ actions, I would claim that the position of the Hun 
leaders at the head of groups during the fifth century was constantly based on the position of 
supreme military leadership, which is a common leadership position among nomads. The leadership 
position at the head of united groups was only needed in time of raids and wars, and when an 
interest in acting as a united war band was gone, the leadership position vanished. This clearly 
happened among the Huns. When the confederation could no longer profit its members at the turn 
of the 440s and the 450s, both the leadership position and the power structures in the confederation 
faced collapse. Because this happened without leaving any structures of power behind, this too 
suggests the nomadic nature of the confederation. Among nomads large confederation(s) would 
suddenly appear and form a united and powerfull entity for decades before vanishing in a few years. 
By contrast, social structures do not suddenly vanish among sedentarists, but continue to work even 
if half-heartedly over long periods of time. The confederation led by Attila disappeared a few years 
after his death,1264 and I would claim that fixed administration never formed among the Huns.1265  
                                                 
1263 Barfield 1993, 152-155; Kradin 2002, 381. Barfield states that in the case of Eurasian nomads dwelling near the borders 
of the Chinese Empire in different periods, nomads and larger nomadic confederations never wanted to conquer this 
Empire, but aimed instead to take advantage of its existence by raiding and through trade, as well as through diplomatic 
contacts. The idea of the nomads’ lack of interest in adopting sedentary ways of life or conquering sedentary empires and 
becoming their rulers is also discussed by Kradin. 
1264 Kelly 2008, 219. 
1265 Priscus, fr. 64, fr. 49 in Blockley 1983, 372-373, 356-357; see Stickler 2007, 80, 104; Thompson (1999) 2000, 171, passim. 
170, 173-175. The lack of stable administrative structures is also supported by the fate of the logades. They are not known 
to try to have tried to hold the fragmenting groups of Huns together, but by contrast some of them, e.g. Onegesius, is said 
by Priscus to have become a military leader in the Eastern Roman troops after 454. Some other Huns are known to have 
become leaders in the Roman army, such as Chelchal. I see this to refer to the fact that the logades had acted as military 
leaders who were ready to give their services to the party who was likely to be victorious or would pay most. Some other 
Huns are also known to have ended up in the military service of the Romans. For these reasons it is unlikely that the logades 
can be considered Attila’s administrators. 
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This in my opinion supports the argument that a conical clan structure, common to Eurasian 
pastoralists, was in place among the groups of the Huns during the late 4th and early 5th century. In 
short, groups shared a common idea of belonging together through loose kinship relations and 
common ancestors, and hence groups could easily combine. At the same time there were no 
hindrances to new groups to joining. Groups of Huns and other barbarians could have formed a 
confederation without being forced to do so, and there was no need for power structures and 
leadership positions common to sedentary society and sedentarists to evolve. That is to say, the 
Huns had their own forms and structures for forming a larger unity in response to temporary need. 
I would claim that a state as it commonly found among sedentarists never evolved among the 
Huns.1266 If unity and the power position of leaders in the confederation was strengthening, this 
most likely occurred within the framework of a supercomplex chiefdom. First, the unity of a 
confederation as well as a supercomplex chiefdom is based on the redistribution of profits gained 
from war, plunder and international trade. Second, seen from the outside the unity of such groups 
appears to be that of a militaristic collective exploiter of other nations. Lastly, although the unity of 
a confederation might look strong from the outside, it is fragile within, especially because the 
contacts between groups who form the unity rely on tribal relations that are sensitive to ephemeral 
changes.1267 
Taken together, I conclude that the history of the groups of Huns near the Roman borders during the 
fourth and fifth centuries suggests that the Huns had no need or interest in giving up their nomadic 
way of life but they could, and did, arrange all activities withn the framework of a nomadic way of 
life.1268 Looking at leader figures from a nomadic perspective, it is more appropriate to call the 
position of Hun leaders a “(supreme) military leadership” than a “king”, “monarch” or “autocrat”, 
terms which apply more to leadership positions found among sedentarists rather than nomads. In 
addition, the use of the title “(supreme) military leadership” is also important for avoiding the 
misinterpretation that the Huns would have adopted a sedentary way of life. In short, the Huns were 






                                                 
1266 Pohl 2003, 594-595, 572. According to Pohl the Avars formed a state and adopted a sedentary way of life. 
Controversially, Pohl also claims that the Huns would have established a state. 
1267 Kradin 2002, 383; Kradin 2009, 42. 
1268 Kradin 2008, 150. 
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11. THE HUNS AND THE NOMADIC WAY OF LIFE 
 
 
When groups of fragmented Eurasian pastoral nomads started to arrive on the borders of the Roman 
Empire in the lower Danubian region during the last decades of the fourth century, the Late Roman 
authors considered them newcomers and named them Huns. The first accounts of the Huns are 
general in by nature and stress the common images of barbarians and nomads favoured throughout 
antiquity. Roman authors lacked actual contacts with the groups of Huns and hence needed to rely 
on rumour and images of nomads or stories told by those who had been in contact with the nomadic 
newcomers near the Black Sea region. Accordingly, the accounts of the Huns tell us less about the 
nomadic arrivals than they do about the Greco-Roman view of nomads and barbarians. We also 
learn what kind of images the Romans used to distinguish the Huns as non-Roman, so-called 
“others”. Accounts of Huns as fierce half-human fighters echo earlier descriptions of similar 
nomadic groups who were also described as a threat to Rome. The descriptions of the Huns reveal 
elements that Greco-Roman authors saw as important for them and the existence of the Roman 
world in Late Antiquity. In addition, the stories about the Huns show the encounters of nomads, 
especially Huns, and sedentarists, especially Romans, in the field of images. 
The Late Roman authors’ accounts of the Huns also give us un opportunity to study the activities of 
the Huns near to the Roman Empire during the 370s to the 460s, especially because when 
fragmented groups of Huns began on a large scale to dwell in and conquer regions near the Roman 
borders in the lower Danubian region during the first half of the fifth century, this increased 
contacts between the Huns and the Romans. The resulting descriptions of the Huns tell us more 
about the activities of these nomadic newcomers and replace more generalized images of them. 
Having said that Greco-Roman authors’ accounts of the Huns still primarily reflect the general 
situation among the Huns rather than describe it precisely. For this reason, I disagree with the 
methodology of placing Late Roman authors’ descriptions of the Huns in a primary position when 
evaluating the activities and nature of the Hun leadership. This is especially the case with the claims 
that the Greco-Roman authors’ way of calling Hun leaders by titles such as rex and basileus would 
signify the rise of leadership position comparable to sedentary leaders. I would argue instead that 
because the groups of Huns were expansive Eurasian pastoral nomads, the starting point for 
evaluating the activities and leadership position of the Huns is their nomadic way of life.  
Therefore, I question the general claims that when the groups of Huns arrived on the Roman 
borders and raiding proved to be lucrative during the first decades of the fifth century, the general 
interest of Huns in gaining more riches would have meant that Hun military leadership evolved into 
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leadership position that scholars call “king”, “monarch”, “autocrat”. It is also argued that the Huns 
were led by a supreme king, Grosskönig, even before Huns arrived in the vicinity of the Roman 
Empire. In both of these cases, it is unlikely that the increase of riches gained by the Huns 
concentrating on raiding, would have led them to give up herding. This transformation in their way 
of life from nomadism to the partial adoption of sedentary way of life is impropable. So too is the 
notion that the Hun “kings” strengthened their power by supporting the rise of a rich leading elite 
and this created, or was done in order to create, state structures among the Huns.  
These claims that I am challenging fail to see the nomadic alternative. I would claim that the 
sedentary way of life and the leadership positions associated with it are not the only forms for a 
united society led by a leader – I argue that this is also possible within the framework of a nomadic 
way of life, and to me this is what happened among the Huns. In this thesis the history of the Huns 
has been studied from a nomadic perspective and from within the framework of Eurasian 
pastoralists’ nomadic way of life. This is the basis for the following five main arguments found in 
my thesis. 
First, I consider that the Late Roman authors’ accounts of the Huns primarily present the authors’ 
views of non-Romans and nomads, not exact information about the Huns. Accordingly, in order to 
evaluate the situation among the groups of Huns the information that the Roman authors stories 
give about the activities of the Huns must be considered from a nomadic perspective.   
Second, even though the groups of Huns formed a larger unity, which I consider to be a 
confederation, this was possible within the framework of their nomadic way of life. Furthermore, a 
larger unity would have resulted from common nomadic activity; including temporary alliances 
between groups so as to form larger troops and gain more booty. I argue that the Huns never gave 
up their nomadic way of life, but the actions took place within the cycle of the nomadic way of life. 
Third, the basis for the position of Hun leaders at the head of united groups of Huns and local 
barbarians did not at any stage alter from the position of temporary military leadership that is 
commonly found among Eurasian pastoralists. Therefore, I suggest that we should replace the way 
of naming Hun leaders as “kings”, “monarchs” and “autocrats” which refer to sedentarist leadership 
positions, and use the term “supreme military leader”, which more accurately describes the position 
that the Hun leaders had at the head of their groups and troops. In short, I see it as misleading to 
name Hun leaders, by such labels as Attila: the king of the Huns. 
Fourth, we should consider the larger unity of the groups of Huns and their leadership positions 
within the framework of a nomadic way of life that would have supported possible excitence of a 
supercomplex. Increased power and a stronger unity among groups can also be found among 
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nomads. This emphasizes the notion of complexity of power and society structures in history. In 
short, I speak on behalf of noticing the nomadic alternative. 
Fifth, the Huns were not interested in conquering either local barbarian groups or the Roman 
Empire, but sought to profit from both. Furthermore, contacts with local barbarian groups and the 
Roman Empire affected not only the unity but also the strength of the Huns. These relations directly 
influenced the rise and decline of the Huns’ success as well as the interest of groups in continuing 




The Cycle of the Nomadic Way of Life 
 
The late Roman authors’ descriptions of the arrival of many fragmented groups of Hun to the 
Roman borders during the last decades of the fourth century suggest that there was no permanent 
unity between the groups, but the groups instead formed temporary alliances of various sorts with 
other barbarian groups when lucrative options, such as raiding expeditions or the possibility of 
acting as Roman mercenaries, occurred. The manner of and interest in these kinds of activities did 
not change at any stage during the first decades of the fifth century, as we can see from 
contemporary Roman authors’ descriptions.  
The temporary alliances and the interest in forming larger unity with changing allies reveal that the 
Huns acted in ways that were characteristic of Eurasian pastoral nomads. Fragmented groups of 
nomads were interested in joining together and forming a larger unity only when need required or a 
lucrative option was offered; at the same time the composition of the united of the groups varied, 
depending on the individuals interests of the groups who joined. Alliances with groups other than 
nomads were also possible if there was a shared interest in such activities. Because united groups 
are needed only for temporary activities, especially forming troops, nomads were not concerned 
with submitting other groups to constant rule. This is the situation that I argue took place between 
the Huns and the so-called local barbarians who lived near the Roman borders when the Huns came 
to the lower Danubian regions at the end of the fourth century until the mid fifth century. 
First, in accordance with the nomadic way of life, Eurasian pastoralists do not prefer the submission 
of other groups but alliances or confederations between groups because this answers their need to 
act together when required. Second, the unity of the groups of Huns and local barbarians formed 
such huge troops during the 440s that I doubt whether they could have been formed, if the groups of 
Huns had submitted other barbarians to their power and forced them to join the military activity. In 
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other words, joint activities were based on shared temporary interests, not on the Huns oppression 
of others. Another feature that suggests that the groups of Huns and local barbarians formed a 
temporary confederation is that the raiding operations enriched all of the participants. In a 
confederation this is expected, but I argue that this would not have taken place if the Huns had 
submitted others to their rule.  Finally, the fact that the unity of Huns and local barbarians ended 
when the attacks proved out to be unprofitable supports the idea of a confederation and a way of life 
in which temporary alliances are formed between groups.  
When raiding and military activities no longer enriched the groups, the interest in joint activities 
faded and the groups again fragmented into many independent units. If the unity of Huns and other 
groups had been based on something other than temporary alliances, especially on the alleged 
formation of state structures commonly found among sedentarists, the unity of the groups and the 
confederation would not have collapsed in a few years, which did in fact take place after the death 
of Attila in 452. Among sedentarists the structures of power and the unity between groups is more 
long lasting than among nomads, but because nothing emerged after the death of Attila, this would 
suggest that all the activities of the Huns, the local barbarians and the confederation, took place 
within the framework and cycles of the nomadic way of life.  
 
 
Attila: The King of the Huns? 
 
Nomadic groups of Eurasian pastoralists formed temporarily united groups when a specific military 
activity was required, and this provided the framework and defined the nature of leadership 
positions at the head of united bands. Leadership positions were military in nature and in addition to 
battles and raids, involved peace treaty negotiations. These positions were temporary and depended 
on their fellow warriors’ acceptance and trust. When military activities ended, also the supreme 
military leader lost his position and his right to command his former followers unless further 
acceptance was given. The loyalty to and support of the military leader was personal and often 
long-lasting but because support was based on a supreme military leader’s ability to profit his 
followers from raids and wars, failure to provide booty would cause followers to withdraw their 
loyalty. For these reasons, I prefer to name Hun leaders at the head of united groups engaged in 
large-scale military activity “supreme military leaders”. This usage not only emphasizes their tasks 
but also indicates the basis of their position: the position was temporary and was connected to 
military duties.  
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Because the activities of united groups of Huns close to the Roman Empire from the 370s to the 
middle of the fifth century are all based on military activity, I would claim that the leadership 
positions at the head of these groups did not deviate at any stage from the position of supreme 
military leadership. Second, the nomadic way of life does not support the emergence of any other 
kind of power or leadership position. For these reasons I disagree with the claims that Hun 
leadership positions would have become so autocratic and so strong that they could be compared to 
the positions of “monarchs” or “autocrats”. This would have exceeded the limits of power common 
among nomads. Furthermore, I argue that the position of Hun leaders was always related to the 
acceptance of supporters and the need to enrich the groups who had supported the Hun leaders’ in 
their position as supreme military leadership. The nature of the breakup of the confederation of 
Huns and local barbarians also supports this point.  
After the death of Attila, who had been the last leader of the confederation, and the lack of profits 
from the last two large-scale wars against the Romans, the groups in the confederation fragmented. 
This indicated a lack of interest in continuing as a larger unit or making a further promise of loyalty 
to a supreme military leader of the confederation. The fact that not even Attila’s sons could gain the 
leadership position makes it evident that the leadership position was still based on others’ approval 
and had not become a hereditary or self-evident position. Therefore, because the confederation and 
the leadership position at its head vanished in a few years after Attila’s death without leaving any 
structures of power to continue the rule or the unity between the groups, this strongly suggests that 
the basis for the Hun leadership position had not changed from the framework common to Eurasian 
pastoral nomads. I conclude, therefore, that calling the Hun leaders by such titles as “king” or 




The Nomadic Alternative 
 
During the 430s and 440s groups of Huns formed a confederation with local barbarians. In doing so 
they did not give up their nomadic way of life, nor did the leadership position at the head of the 
confederation change from that commonly found among Eurasian pastoralists. There is in fact no 
basis to claim that the Huns would have adopted, even partially, a sedentary way of life. Thus, the 
nature of the leadership position and the structures required for a larger unity to be formed. This 
supports to consider rise of supercomplex chiefdom among the Huns because it is a formation of 
larger unity of groups that might occur among nomads. 
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A supercomplex chiefdom is a formation of a large number of nomadic groups who are joined 
together for military activities aimed at bringing riches acquired from their surrounding sedentary 
neighbours. A supercomplex chiefdom is led by a supreme leader whose main duty is to conduct 
wars and maintain contact with surrounding sedentary societies in order to profit his supporters and 
thereby the unity of the groups. Furthermore, besides the supreme military leader are other military 
leaders who help to maintain contacts with groups united on a larger scale. The formation of a 
supercomplex chiefdom is temporary and exists as long as the supreme military leader is able to 
bring profits to the united groups from wars, raids and contacts with sedentary neighbours. The 
Huns clearly benefited from their contacts with the Roman Empire and the arrangements they made 
with the Romans could certainly have taken place within framework of a supercomplex chiefdom. 
Furthermore, contemporary accounts of other military leaders aiding Attila, e.g. participating in 
negotiations with the Eastern Roman Empire, also indicates that a supercomplex chiefdom could 
have taken shape among the groups of Huns and local barbarians.  
Nevertheless, I am not totally convinced that a supercomplex chiefdom did evolve among the Huns 
because some of the characteristic elements common for the phenomenon are lacking, e.g. 
redistribution of sources or the rise of a theocracy are not present. On the whole, the primary 
sources are too few and scarce to conclusively prove that a supercomplex chiefdom developed 
among the Huns. Moreover, the sources are even less convincing when suggesting that structures 
common to sedentary societies arose among the Huns or that Hun leaders strove to introduce them 
as is generally claimed.  
Overall, I argue that because the activities of the confederation show that the groups of Huns did not 
relinquish nomadism at any stage of their activities close to the Roman borders during the fifth 
century, this does lend support to the rise of supercomplex chiefdom rather than the formation of a 
statewhich would be more common among sedentarists than nomads. This debate brings the 
multitude of social structures found throughout history into focus, and the example of the Huns 
provides opportunities to deepen the discussion. This thesis has analysed what kind of elements are 
required for us to speak of the formation of a larger unity among Eurasian pastoralists, especially 
when considering the phenomenon of a supercomplex chiefdom. The activities of the Huns indicate 
what kinds of elements are related and define the phenomenon of stronger power and unity among 






Temporary Contacts According to Need 
 
The nomadic perspective on the activities of the Huns stresses that the Huns’ primary goal was not 
to conquer the regions ruled by the Roman Empire or to dominate groups of local sedentary 
barbarians, but to profit from both contacts without relinquishing the nomadic way of life.  
Because the military activity of the Huns with local barbarian groups profited them all, this clearly 
suggests that the Huns were not aiming to subdue local barbarian groups but shared an interest in 
forming a confederation to provide larger and more victorious troops for temporary large-scale 
raiding. Likewise, the notion that the Huns encouraged payments for peace arrangaments with the 
Romans and wished to establish trade connections with the empire emphasizes that the goal was not 
to become new rulers of Rome but to profit from the contacts with it. That is to say, the nomadic 
nature of the Huns and their activities explains the fact that the disintegration of the confederation 
was not the result of an internal situation, namely the structures of leadership or power among these 
groups but was instead linked to external contacts with surrounding sedentary societies, especially 
the Roman Empire and the diminishing flow of riches from the Roman world. The confederation 
between the groups of Huns and local barbarians did not collapse because the local barbarian 
groups finally fought for their freedom from the Huns but because the attacks of the confederation 
to the Roman Empire proved to be unprofitable, and hence the groups became uninterested in 
continuing joint activities. 
Finally, the nomadic nature of the Huns and their activities reveal that during the 5th century the 
Roman Empire not only faced the formation of sedentary, barbarian societies but also the nomadic, 
Hun alternative, a supercomplex chiefdom in its regions or in their vicinity. Looked at from this 
perspective there is still room for further studies to discuss how well the Romans understood the 
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